A Few Basics

70 November-December 2007  MILITARY REVIEW

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Clark, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Clark,

U.S. Army (Retired) is an assistant

professor with the Center for Army

Tactics, U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, Fort Leaven-

worth, KS. He holds a Ph.D. from

Texas A&M University with a re-

search focus in professional military

education.

N 1968, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Ofcers’ Field

Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure, established problem solving

as the bedrock of Army doctrine.

In all subsequent versions of FM 101-5,

its successor FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, and a wide

range of other doctrine manuals, writers consistently framed professional

competence in terms of solving problems. Military as well as civilian prob-

lem-solving models share one core concept—the first step is to identify the

problem.

Yet, neither Army doctrine nor professional military education cur-

ricula offer a problem-structuring methodology. Thus, for over three decades

we have based our military doctrine on the indispensable capacity to solve

problems, but without a clear method to satisfy the first requirement: how

to synthesize critical facts and relationships into a problem statement that

can guide planning and decision-making. To fill the gap in Army doctrine,

this article offers a teachable problem-identification method.

A Few Basics

In any discussion of problem identification, a definition or common ref-

erence point is helpful for two key terms: problem and factor. According

to doctrine, a problem is well structured when all necessary information is

available and a verifiable answer can be determined. A problem is medium-

structured when some information is available and routine solutions are

insufficient. Ill-structured problems require information that is missing and

have no verifiable solution.

Donald Schön also stratifies problems, but into two types: messy and hard.

Like doctrine’s ill-structured problem, messy problems defy direct solutions;

they require continuing interplay between problem solvers in “processes that

are ever changing in form” while “decisions made at any stage will tend

to alter the configuration of future choices to be addressed.”

Establish-

ing democratic government structures in a failed state is one example of a

messy or ill-structured problem. Hard problems, on the other hand, can be

solved through persistent and dedicated efforts, such as by preparing a joint

task force movement order. The premise in this article is that capabilities to

deal with messy or ill-structured problems subsume abilities to solve less

difficult problems.

There is no definition in problem-solving doctrine for the term “factor.” How-

ever, discussion points to “a component of the environment that can be observed,

measured, and applied to achieve (or prevent) an effect.”

This definition is

71MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2007

IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM

consistent with nonmilitary definitions of “factor” as

“a variable that can assume a wide range of values.”

Time-distance, terrain, weather, civil considerations,

and forces available are among the factors commonly

used in identifying military problems.

Overview of Problem Solving

and Army Doctrine

This section traces Army doctrine for planning

and decision making. The sources describe an

ongoing commitment to a deductive approach for

analytical problem solving to identify solutions to

difficult problems. Across a period of 38 years, there

were 3 perceptible shifts:

● Adoptionofproblemsolvingasthepreferred

approach to planning.

● A change in focus from the commander’s

estimate to staff estimates as the centerpiece of

planning activity.

● Areturntothecommanderasthefocalpoint

in problem-based planning.

Benchmark 1. The year 1968 serves as a bench-

mark for the union of planning and problem solving.

Doctrine writers discussed decision-making as a

nine-step process designed to move from receipt of

a new mission through the preparation, approval,

and supervision of plans and orders. All nine steps

focused on the five-paragraph commander’s esti-

mate of the situation, the primary mechanism for

mission analysis and course of action development.

“Military problem solving techniques” defined

the commander’s estimate as “a problem solving

process to find the best way to accomplish a given

mission.”

Writers stipulated that the first step in

decision-making was to recognize the problem.

regard to identifying the problem, paragraph 2 of the

commander’s estimate (the situation and courses of

action) offered guidelines for two actions. The first

action focused on identifying facts and assumptions

related to the situation. The second focused on listing

“significant difficulties or difficulty patterns” that

could work against accomplishing the mission.

Over three decades, writers worked on the mar-

gins, leaving problem solving and the commander’s

estimate at the core of planning doctrine. In a 1972

revision of FM 101-5, writers expanded the first step

in problem solving from “recognizing the problem”

to “recognizing and defining the problem.”

A 1984

update framed military decisions around problem

solving. In tactical decisions, writers modeled the

Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) as an

ongoing set of steps to orchestrate commander and

staff activities. The MDMP mirrored the nine-step

problem-solving approach of 1968, but added a tenth

step: “mission accomplished.”

In the portion of the

commander’s estimate dealing with the situation and

courses of action, guidelines pointed commanders

to consider “facts of the situation that will influence

friendly and enemy actions and, therefore, may

influence the choice of action.”

Examples included

unit compositions, significant activities, weather,

terrain, political, and economic factors.

Through

the 1984 version of FM 101-5, the commander’s

estimate was the primary mechanism to identify and

solve problems. Staff estimates were important, but

occupied a clearly defined supporting role.

Benchmark 2. In a 1997 revision, doctrine writ-

ers established a second benchmark in the union of

planning and problem solving. In describing the

MDMP as an adaptation of analytical problem solv-

ing, writers defined the tactical problem as a “result

of mission analysis.”

Rather than highlighting the

commander’s estimate, the MDMP was more a

checklist of “inputs and outputs” assigned to each

of the seven MDMP steps. Interestingly, the tacti-

cal problem was a result—but not an output—of

mission analysis. Instead of describing the five-

paragraph commander’s estimate with a discussion

of problem identification considerations, writers

reduced the commander’s estimate to a focus on

“assessing the intangibles of training, leadership

and morale, and results in a decision.”

Writers

admonished staff officers, rather than command-

ers, to determine “exactly what the problem is and

precisely and clearly define the problem’s scope

and limitations.”

In 2005, FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Pro-

duction, replaced FM 101-5 as the primary planning

and problem-solving reference. It discussed problem

solving as a systemic activity applicable to “all

Army activities, not just operations.”

The problem-

solving model consisted of seven steps with problem

identification at the top of the list. In connecting

problem solving to planning, writers described the

seven-step MDMP as an analytical planning process

and “an adaptation of Army problem solving.”

capacity to solve tactical problems constituted the

“foundation of effective planning.”

72 November-December 2007  MILITARY REVIEW

FM 5-0 first described the problem solver in

terms of his (or her) ability to reason critically,

state a problem clearly, work in an orderly manner,

seek information diligently, identify and apply

criteria reasonably, focus on the problem at hand,

and be precise.

The manual highlighted important

factors for tactical problems in terms of mission,

enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support,

time-distance, and civil considerations (METT-

TC).

In step-by-step directions, writers outlined

six primary tasks that set the conditions for the

planner-problem solver to develop a plan to solve

the problem:

1. Compare the current situation to the desired

end state.

2. Define the problem’s scope or boundaries.

3. Answer the following questions—

a. Whom does the problem affect?

b. What is affected?

c. When did the problem occur?

d. Where is the problem?

e. Why did the problem occur?

4. Determine the cause of obstacles between here

and the solution.

5. Write a draft problem statement.

6. Redefine the problem as new information is

acquired and assessed.

Benchmark 3. The third benchmark in the union

of planning and problem solving occurred in March

2006. Previously, doctrine writers tended to com-

partmentalize large parts of discussions concerning

a) analytical problem solving and b) analytical

planning. Now, they linked the two, and in the

process highlighted the importance of identifying

problems in relation to developing and selecting a

course of action. In Field Manual (Interim) 5-0.1,

The Operations Process (2006), writers addressed

problem statements in terms of a) a commander’s

visualization and b) a source for criteria to evalu-

ate success in achieving the commander’s intent.

According to FMI 5-0.1, the visualization process

begins with situational awareness when the planner

(the problem solver) frames the important factors

in order to set parameters for in-depth analysis.

Upon achieving situational understanding, the

planner frames a description of the relationships

between and among the important factors in order

to “determine the implications of what is happen-

ing and [to] forecast what may happen.”

This

two-frame process is consistent with the analytical

problem-solving goal to “ensure that all key factors

relevant to the problem are considered and that all

relationships between variables are anticipated and

accounted for in the solution.”

This is where Army problem-solving doctrine

stands today. Once again it embraces the com-

mander’s role as planner-problem solver. At no

point in doctrine do we find even a hint that problem

solving is anything short of a baseline professional

competency for Army officers. While the journey

from 1968 to now has shown much progress, doc-

trine still does not provide a method to identify

tactical problems.

Discussions in pre-1997 versions of FM 101-5

hinted at important considerations such as “signifi-

cant difficulties or difficulty patterns” that could

work against mission accomplishment.

Revisions

in 1997 and 2005 provided instructions to identify

a problem, but in a bit of circular reasoning these

instructions used the problem as the means to iden-

tify a problem.

In the final analysis, the problem

remains: How do we identify a tactical problem?

A Teachable Method to

Identify Problems

Army doctrine can serve as a foundation for a

three-step procedure to identify tactical problems

and produce a problem statement. I define a problem

statement as “an approximately 130-word synthesis

of critical facts and relationships and the important

factors or variables that shape an operational envi-

ronment in such a way that cause-and-effect relation-

ships point to leverage points that bring competitive

advantage to friendly forces.” A problem statement

is a guide to planning and decision making.

Step 1. The first step in identifying a tactical

problem is to analyze the operational environment

in order to reach conclusions from facts related to

the following variables:

● Context.

● Capabilities.

● Structure.

● Time.

The analysis should follow a systematic framework

such as METT-TC or other analytic lens.

Context. By definition, context establishes

the foundation for rational decision-making and

purposeful activity. Context deals with concrete

73MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2007

IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM

factors like topography and geography as well as

political, economic, social, and cultural variables

and values-based beliefs. In problem solving, each

factor and variable has its value as well as a more

complex value under analysis in an interdependent,

competitive situation.

We can frame a mission-

analysis question to deal with context: “What con-

ditions must friendly and enemy forces establish

and prevent?”

Capabilities. Capabilities constitute a capacity

to influence or achieve specified conditions. Capa-

bilities are the basis of planning that links ways

and means to ends. We can also frame a mission-

analysis question to deal with capabilities: “What

are the friendly and enemy forces available to cause

an outcome?”

Structure. Structure refers to the arrangement of

friendly and enemy forces as well as other govern-

ment and non-government actors within a given

context. Structure is physical reality and a driver for

a commander’s visualization, which is the means

to assess an operation from inception through end-

state. A mission-analysis question related to friendly

and enemy structure might be: “How do units fit or

relate to each other from the perspectives of com-

mand, control, and objectives?”

These context, capability, and structure questions

are exemplary. Commanders and staffs may develop

complementary questions to generate information

for a specific situation.

Step 2. The second step in identifying a tactical

problem is to describe the operational environment

in terms of—

● Height.

● Width.

● Depth.

● Time.

This description helps us to understand the maneu-

ver relationships that friendly and enemy forces

must establish and prevent.

Height, width, and depth factors are spatial vari-

ables. Height describes a vertical or perpendicular

extension of the operational environment. Height

areas of interest include communications, visibility,

and air space. Width is a lateral or breadth consid-

eration. Width areas of interest include maneuver

corridors, roads, and bodies of water. Depth is

a horizontal dimension that is at right angles to

width and height. Depth areas of interest include

movement formations, fire control, and an area

of operations. Height, width, and depth constitute

three physical coordinates of a particular activity

or event.

In a tactical problem, time is the fourth coordi-

nate. It is a variable with three potential values.

First, time has a component of discrete values such

as seconds, minutes, or hours to account for events

that must occur within a precise period as well as

events that must occur sooner or later than a given

moment. The discrete component functions around

specific “counts.” Second, time has a component of

periods, seasons, or cycles to account for clumps

of similar activities or characteristics. The clumps

component functions around themes and continu-

ity. Finally, time has a spatial component, such as

“before” and “after,” to account for relationships

between objects or entities. The spatial component

functions around velocity, the rate of movement of

the organization as a whole toward an objective or

end state. A problem statement may incorporate all

time components, but must incorporate a minimum

of one time factor.

Step 3. The third step in identifying a tactical

problem is to calculate the time-distance factors

of combatants as well as interagency actors, neu-

trals, and other entities in relation to objectives or

key terrain in order to understand which defeat

mechanisms and/or stability mechanisms favor

friendly forces.

Time-distance calculations are basic computa-

tions based on a known distance covered at a

constant speed in a specified direction. Their yield

is “elapsed time.” By definition, ratios represent

a comparison of two values. In a problem state-

ment, we can express a ratio as a relation between

factors such as momentum (movement toward a

desired outcome); velocity (speed and direction of

the entire force); or reaction cycles (elapsed time

from observation to effective response). If the

resulting ratio favors friendly forces, the ratio must

be protected. If the resulting ratio favors enemy

forces, we must calculate a second ratio that sets

conditions favorable to friendly forces. Part of the

problem becomes changing the ratios to achieve

the favorable conditions.

A problem statement is the key output from

mission analysis rather than a shortcut en route to

a course of action. A problem statement has two

74 November-December 2007  MILITARY REVIEW

components. In the first component, planners define

conditions that must be established or prevented.

Planners describe conditions in sentences that

address structure of forces involved, time-distance

measurements, and time-based relationships such

as “before” or “after.” The second component of

the problem statement consists of critical planning

factors that affect course-of-action development

and analysis and decision-making.

While developing a problem statement requires

an investment of time and effort, the effectiveness

dividend is a fact-based explanation of the mission

in terms of relationships, patterns, and critical tasks.

The problem statement’s efficiency payoff comes

in time saved when developing all other mission

analysis outputs such as planning guidance, infor-

mation requirements, and commander’s intent.

Developing a Problem

Statement: An Example

So how do we develop a problem statement? An

historical example, Custer at Little Bighorn, should

help illuminate the process. My intent is to frame the

situation from General Custer’s perspective on the

morning of 25 June 1875 before he initiated a course

of action. The facts come from multiple historical

accounts that incorporate some assumptions and

inferences. First, I will list relevant information drawn

from the accounts for each of the three steps discussed

above. Second, I will present a statement of General

Custer’s tactical problem as a synthesis of facts that

he could have derived from a mission analysis.

Step 1. The first step deals with conclusions

related to the context, capabilities, and structure of

friendly and enemy forces.

Context. With regard to context, sources indicate

that having lost the element of surprise, Custer’s

cavalry units needed to approach the Indian’s vil-

lage with stealth in order to prevent the occupants

from moving to escape or fight.

Custer’s units had

to move at midday under clear visibility across low

rolling hills and through tall grass with Indian scout-

ing parties deployed throughout the area of opera-

tions. The Little Bighorn River valley appeared

relatively open and flat. On the other hand, ravines

and streams compartmented the area of operations

as a whole.

Capabilities. Custer’s command consisted of

about 650 soldiers, scouts, and guides armed with

breech-loading carbines but no artillery support.

On the opposing side, an estimated 1,500 warriors

carried a mix of firearms along with traditional

Indian weapons.

Structure. Custer’s cavalry regiment consisted of

12 companies with established command and con-

trol suited for tailored task-organization options.

In contrast, the Indian tribes were a loosely affiliated

coalition organized more around a warrior society

code of bravery in the face of danger.

Step 2. The second step considers height, width,

and depth factors in the operational environment

over time in order to comprehend the maneuver

relationships friendly and enemy forces must estab-

lish and prevent.

Height. Low rolling hills dominated the area.

Due to the absence of clouds and full sun, visibility

allowed observation of a moving force at a distance

of perhaps six miles or more throughout much of

the area.

Width ranged from about one-quarter to one-half

mile along the Reno Creek to approximately one-

half to one mile in the Little Bighorn River valley,

to one-half mile or less on high ground east of the

Little Bighorn River valley.

Depth. Approximately 16 miles separated the

cavalry from the suspected Indian village. The cav-

alry initially moved along a creek bed (Reno Creek)

for about 13 miles to the Little Bighorn River. After

crossing the river, a move of just over two miles,

more or less, remained to the Indian village.

Time. From a spatial perspective, the cavalry had

to control the Little Bighorn River valley before the

Indians detected movement and reacted to escape

or fight. Additionally, U.S. reinforcements had to

move along exterior lines to assist cavalry units in

contact before the Indians could mass forces along

interior lines.

Step 3. In step three, the planner calculates

time-distance factors of friendly and enemy forces

in relation to objectives or key terrain in order

to understand the defeat mechanisms that favor

friendly forces. The distance from the start point at

Reno Creek to the expected line of contact at the

Little Big Horn River was about 13 miles. If the

leading cavalry units crossed the line of contact

before being detected, they had the speed to keep

the Indians from reacting effectively. If detected

east of the line of contact, the cavalry units had to

75MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2007

IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM

destroy the Indians’ command and control and any

organized resistance in less than 30 minutes.

After gathering and analyzing information, the

next action is to synthesize findings and conclusions

into a statement of the tactical problem. The follow-

ing problem statement of approximately 130 words

synthesizes the facts related to Custer’s attack:

Problem: How to move 600 troopers in 12

companies about 15 miles along a creek bed

to disintegrate a coalition of 1,500 mounted

warriors before the Indians with interior lines

can react to escape or fight. Detection east of

the river requires hastened contact to control

the village in less than 30 minutes.

Critical Planning Factors:

● ManeuverspaceintheLittleBighornRiver

valley up to one mile in width; visibility of six miles

or more, low hills, ravines, and tall grass shape the

area. Movement causes a dust plume.

● Regimentmovesatmiddayandmustreinforce

units in contact along exterior lines.

● Regiment must conduct an in-stride river

crossing.

● Indianarmsincluderepeatingrifles;scouting

parties are working throughout the area.

Conclusions and

Recommendations

Problem identification is a professional com-

petency that applies across the full spectrum of

military operations. Since the late 19th century, the

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College has

followed a problem-solving approach to instruction.

But instruction focused on building expertise in the

MDMP does not develop competence in identify-

ing tactical problems. In order to fill the gap, Army

doctrine and officer education should emphasize

how to—

● Analyzetheoperationalenvironmenttograsp

facts related to the variables of context, capabilities,

and structure.

● Analyzeheight,width,depth,andtimefactors

to understand maneuver relationships that friendly

forces must establish and prevent.

● Assess time-space factors to understand the

defeat mechanisms that favor friendly forces.

● Summarize conclusions developed during

analysis and assessments in order to develop a

statement of the tactical problem that will guide

planning and decision making.

● Writecogentproblemstatementsbasedonstruc-

tured analysis that produces findings and conclusions

concerning critical relationships between and among

the important factors of a given situation.

For 30 years, analytical planning has been impor-

tant to Army doctrine, but doctrine writers have

neglected to define how to meet the first require-

ment in analytical planning: identifying the tactical

problem. If we are to make good use of what we

know, doctrine writers, curriculum developers, and

76 November-December 2007  MILITARY REVIEW

Army educators must realize that merely hoping

MDMP exercises will somehow lead to competent

problem identification simply is not prudent. We

can only gain by instituting a systematic, workable

problem identification process. As inventor Charles

Kettering has said, “A problem well stated is a

problem half solved.”

The all-important first step of developing a

method to identify a problem is now behind us. The

path to problem-solving competency is open. MR

NOTES

1. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Ofcers Field Manual: Staff Orga-

nization and Procedure (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], June

1968), 6-1.

2. For civilian sources on problem structuring, refer to Raymond McLeod Jr., Jack

William Jones, and Carol Sanders, “The Difficulty in Solving Strategic Problems:

The Experiences of Three CIOs,” Business Horizons (January/February, 1995),

28-38; Henry Mintzberg, Duru Raisinghani, and André Théorêt, “The Structure of

‘Unstructured’ Decision Processes,” Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (June,

1976): 246-275; Jonathan Rosenhead and John Mingers, eds., Rational Analysis

for a Problematic World Revisited: Problem Structuring Methods for Complexity,

Uncertainty, and Conict, 2d ed. (New York: Wiley, 2001).

3. FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production (Washington, DC: GPO,

January 2005), 2-5.

4. Donald Schön, “The New Scholarship Requires a New Epistemology,” Change

(November-December 1995): 26-34. For additional insight into problems, see Russell

L. Ackoff, Redesigning the Future: A Systems Approach to Societal Problems, (New

York: John Wiley, 1974), 21; Donald Schön, Educating the Reective Practitioner

(San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1990), 324.

5. Jonathan Friend, “Supporting Developmental Decision Processes: The

Evolution of an OR Approach,” International Transactions in Operational Research

2, 3, 225.

6. FM 5-0, 2-2.

7. L. R. Gay, Educational Research: Competencies for Analysis and Application,

5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 627.

8. FM 101-5 (1968), 6-1.

9. Ibid., 6-1.

10. Ibid., 6-3.

11. FM 101-5 (July 1972), 5-1.

12. FM 101-5 (May 1984), 5-6.

13. Ibid., E-2.

14. Ibid., E-3.

15. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (May 1997), 5-1, 5-5.

16. Ibid., C-2.

17. Ibid., D-1.

18. FM 5-0, 2-1.

19. Ibid., 3-1.

20. Ibid., 1-12.

21. Ibid., 2-4, 2-5.

22. Ibid., 1-7, 1-11; FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, June 2001), 5-36.

23. Ibid., 2-7.

24. Field Manual Interim (FMI) 5-0.1, The Operations Process (Washington, DC:

GPO, March 2006), 5-2.

25. Ibid., 1-20.

26. Ibid., 2-2.

27. FM 101-5 (1968), 6-3.

28. FM 101-5 (1997), D-1 and FM 5-0, 2-7.

29. Walter J.M. Kickert, “Autopoiesis and the Science of (Public) Administration:

Essence, Sense and Nonsense,” Organization Studies 14, no. 2 (1993): 261-264.

30. Discussion of time is based on ideas and principles in Henri Bergson, Time

and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F. L.

Pogson (London: George Allen and Company, 1913); Henri Bergson, The Creative

Mind, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946); T. K. Das,

“Time: The Hidden Dimension in Strategic Planning,” Long Range Planning24, no.

3 (1991): 49-56; Peg Thoms and David Greenberger, “The Relationship Between

Leadership and Time Orientation,” Journal of Management Inquiry 4, no. 3 (1995),

272-291; Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War (Westport,

CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994); Donald M. Lowe, History of Bourgeois Perception

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

31. Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, version 1.0 (Fort Monroe, VA:

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2004), 6-6—6-9. Defeat mechanisms

are also discussed in Jack D. Kem, Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade (U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College: Department of Joint and Multinational

Operations, 2005), 27.

32. Dennis K. Clark, “Surprise At the Little Bighorn,” 10th Annual Symposium

Custer Battleeld Historical & Museum Association, Inc, June 1996, 41-42.

33. Robert M. Utley, Little Bighorn Battleeld: A History and Guide to the Battle

of the Little Bighorn (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1994), 48;

Bruce R. Liddic, Vanishing Victory: Custer’s Final March (El Segundo, CA: Upton

& Sons, 2004), 34.

34. John S. Gray, Centennial Campaign: The Sioux War of 1876 (Norman, OK:

University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 145-151.

35. John M. Carroll, Cyclorama of General Custer’s Last Fight (El Segundo, CA:

Upton and Sons, 1988), 35; Thomas B. Marquis, Custer on the Little Bighorn (Lodi,

CA: End-Kian Publishing, 1967), 6.

36. Dennis “DK” Clark, “Following the Guidon’s Trail,” 16th Annual Symposium

Custer Battleeld Historical & Museum Association, Inc., June 2002, 41-46, 54.

37 Utley, 52. Dennis “DK” Clark, personal correspondence, 20 October 2006,

described the Indians’ approach to command and control in terms of a loose alliance

that followed a warrior code of bravery.

38. Ibid. Clark noted that bluffs of up to 300 feet framed the east side of the Little

Bighorn River Valley, a critical fact that Custer did not know until later in the day

because Sharp Shooter’s Ridge blocked his view in the morning.

39. Utley, 51; Marquis, 41.

40. Utley, 44.

41. Liddic, 52; Utley, 64-65; David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler, “Custer in

Cyberspace,” Defense Horizons, February 2006, 6.

42. Utley, 51-53.

43. Clark. Dennis “DK” Clark confirmed this calculation based on Custer’s previous

experience with the Hancock expedition, when an Indian village escaped because

contact was not made until approximately an hour after detection.

PHOTO: (previous page) Column of cavalry, artillery, and wagons, commanded by General George A. Custer, crossing the plains of Dakota Territory. By W.H.

Illingworth, 1874 Black Hills expedition. (NARA)