Framing the Problem: Strategic Guidance and Vision

Framing the Problem: Strategic

Guidance and Vision

Mr. Jerome Lynes

Deputy Director Joint Staff for

Joint Education & Doctrine

31 October 2018

The purpose of this briefing is to provide senior leader

guidance and intent (Secretary of Defense and

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff) in order to provide

context for Problem Framing.

Purpose

Today’s Meeting Focus: Initiate priority planning effort

to address how PME keeps pace with rapid and

profound changes in the character of warfare.

Setting the Scene

SecDef and CJCS fully agree that:

• “Much of PME is timeless but the dynamically changing character of war drives us

to review our PME approach. Our aim is the education of joint warfighters in

critical thinking and the creative application of military power to inform

national strategy and globally integrated operations under the condition of

disruptive change in order to conduct war.”

• “Robust PME is critical given the complexity of the current and future security

environment; the intellectual demands of globally integrated, all domain

operations; great power competition; coalition warfare; the art of command

relationships; and the rapid adaptation of disruptive technology into military

capability. We also must leverage our schools through relevant focus areas.”

Proposed Problem Statement

• Problem: The Joint Force requires an Professional Military Education (PME)

system/process that is adaptable and optimized to meet the requirements of the changing

strategic environment.

– The Joint Officer Management (JOM) process lacks the capability to identify/ send the right officers at

the right time to education opportunities.

– The PME Enterprise needs a reinvigoration on the focus of “Warfighting” and develop ability to rapidly

adapt curriculum to maintain relevancy.

– JPME requirements are a topic-focused process that lacks a quality mechanism for assessment.

– There is a lack of strategic thought/ strategic foundation in products being developed by senior-level

graduates.

• Outcome: A Professional Military Education (PME) process that develops “fighting” military

leaders that are “strategically minded” capable of discerning the military dimension of a

problem and recommending military options within the context of globally integrated, all

domain, Allied and Partnered operations.

“PME has stagnated, focused more on the

accomplishment of mandatory credit at the

expense of lethality and ingenuity. We will

emphasize intellectual leadership, military

professionalism, and leadership in the art

and science of warfighting, deepening our

knowledge of history while embracing new

technology and techniques to counter

competitors. PME will emphasize

independence of action in warfighting

concepts to lessen the impact of degraded

or denied communications in combat. PME

is to be used as a strategic asset to build

trust and interoperability across the Joint

Force and with allied and partner forces.”

US National Defense Strategy (2018)

Strategic Guidance

Draft Guidance and Intent: PME

“Education is an essential aspect of agility and flexibility. In an

unknowable future, tactical expertise untampered by education will

handicap, if not defeat, the relevance of military actions to policy goals.

Education, whether academic or training with industry, enables strategic

adaptation to the unknowns that training cannot address, and helps to

avoid drawing false comparisons with previous experience, enabling the

Joint Force to react to unforeseen threats and prevail.”

“Adaptation through wargames and exercises refines education,

doctrine, training and interoperability for the agility, flexibility, and

resilience necessary to address the critical challenges and key

operational problems in the NDS. These wargames and exercises must

consider how best to integrate allied, partner, and interagency

contributions to a joint combined arms approach.

Draft CJCS guidance, Oct 2018

Draft Guidance and Intent: PME

“The complexity of the security environment is such that being effective

tactically is not enough by itself, particularly for leaders. The projected

demands of combat against a great power competitor require leaders and

subordinates to be able to operate above their assigned positions, which

drives requirements for the continuing education and broadening

experiences that will amplify their effectiveness both now and in

positions of greater future responsibility.”

“The Joint Force must retain the ability to operate tactically,

operationally, and strategically in mature austere environments, even

when space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum are denied. A

force with diverse educational backgrounds and life experiences is a

catalyst to adaptation and innovation when facing complex challenges in

the future strategic environment.”

Draft CJCS Guidance, Oct 2018

SecDef Thoughts (1 of 2)

• “Nothing is more important than succession planning”

• Frustrated with the lack of strategic thought and assessment he receives –

products lack strategic clarity. “We must have practitioners”

• Noted that he had not seen a reduction in subjects taught so we can deep

dive into warfighting and strategy. “Exposure is not education.”

– Extolled the value of the historically grounded Case Study Methodology

• What we want:

– Tactical level: Brilliance in the basics within operational considerations

– Operational Level: Operational Excellence within strategic

considerations

– Strategic Level: Strategic excellence informed by tactical/ Operational

expertise

SecDef Thoughts (2 of 2)

• “Coverage on the changing character of war should be practicable and

actionable.”

• Use Education to create an Officer Corps that can: Reconcile the grim

realities of war; communicate them; imbue organizations with trust and

harmony (internal and with friends/allies); and is feared by our enemies.

• Jointness has great benefit –build upon the strengths of service culture(s).

• Noting the changing character of warfare, Education needs to instill the

ability to act upon intent.

• PME needs to deliver graduates who can achieve intellectual overmatch with

adversaries. We cannot allow any loss of technical overmatch to lead to the

loss of warfighting overmatch– we need “cunning” warfighters.

• PME Systems does turn out quality officers -- but we cannot afford to be

complacent.

CJCS: JPME End State

“Fighting” military leaders and strategists who:

• Discern the military dimensions of a challenge affecting national

interest, frame the issue at the policy level, and recommend military

options within the overarching frameworks of globally integrated

operations and DIME.

• Lead rapid adaptation and innovation during a period of dynamic

change in the rate of change in warfare under the conditions of great

power competition and disruptive technology;

• Master and lead the transition of joint warfighting, at the operational

to strategic levels, of all domain, globally integrated operations;

• Are “strategically minded.” They can execute and adapt strategy

through Campaigns and Operations. All War College graduates

should be “strategically minded” – only a few will be our select

strategists.

CJCS: Individual Attributes

• Broad description encompasses the 4 “C’s – Critical Thinking,

Creativity, Collaboration, Communication;

• Desired Leader Attributes (officers) (2013 Issuance and draft CCJO

2030)

– The ability to understand the security environment and

contributions of all instruments of national power.

– The ability to anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

– The ability to anticipate and recognize change and lead

transitions.

– The ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and

understanding (Mission Command).

– The ability to make ethical decisions based on the shared values

of the profession of arms.

– The ability to think critically and strategically in applying joint

warfighting principles and concepts to joint operations.

CJCS: Methodology

• Adapt PME in order to optimize the education of the Joint Force for

the changing strategic environment.

– Increase use of historical based case studies (Harvard Business

School Model)

– Increase focus on disruptive technology.

– Mainstreaming Cyber, Space, and EMS into curricula.

• Identify Strategic Talent and assign to key billets:

– Purposeful identification, development and employment of

strategists.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

Title X USC Foundations

• JPME is Three-Phased approach; JPME-I, II, and CAPSTONE

– CAPSTONE required for 1-star officers (Active Component)

– “Designated and Certified” (PAJE) by SECDEF with advice and

assistance of CJCS

• JPME Phase I and II are required elements for promotion to General/Flag

Officer

– Sequenced approach; (10% waiver authority) complete JPME-I prior to

JPME-II

• JPME Topical requirements are focused at Operational-level of war (e.g.,

Operational Contract Support, Joint Planning, Joint Doctrine).

• Prescribed Acculturation standards for SERVICE Senior Colleges (JPME-II)

– Student ratio: no more than 60% of own service officers in own Service

schools

– Faculty ratio: no more than 60% of own military faculty in own Service

schools

Assumptions

• Resources will remain constrained, but no major reductions

anticpated.

• Congress will be open-minded to any PME legislative change

proposals.

• OSD will support and advocate necessary PME policy changes.

• Schools will be postured for rapid integration of proposed solutions.

Mission for the PME/JPME Enterprise

“Our aim is the education of joint warfighters in critical thinking and

the creative application of military power to inform national strategy

and globally integrated operations under the condition of disruptive

change in order to conduct war.”