The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021 75
MILITARY PLANNING
The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021 75
by Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Prescott
United States Army
Advis or y Te am
NATO Joint Warfare Centre
W
HEN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS do not properly understand
the operating environment or do not correctly frame the problem,
it oen leads to an oversimplication of the root causes that are
driving instability in a region. As crisis response planning continues,
this oversimplication leads to headquarters developing generic
military response options, predictable operational designs, and
limited operational actions to aect the relevant conditions needed
to reach the military end state. is article argues that framing
the problem is the most important step prior to an organization
developing their method of achieving success in an operation.
Photo by NATO
►►►
FRAMING THE
PROBLEM AND
Crucial to the Operational Planning Process
THE PROBLEM
STATEMENT
76 The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to."
"I don't much care where."
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go."
The conversation between Alice and the Cheshire Cat
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll
Introduction
A recurring challenge seen throughout the
lifespan of an exercise developed by the Joint
Warfare Centre (JWC) is a training audience's
diculty with understanding the strategic and
operational problem(s) created as part of the
exercise scenario. Exercise scenarios are com-
plex and cover both contemporary military
and non-military challenges within the operat-
ing environment. When military headquarters
do not properly understand the environment
or do not correctly frame the problem, it of-
ten leads to an oversimplication of the root
causes that are driving instability in a region.
As crisis response planning continues, this
oversimplication leads to headquarters de-
veloping generic military response options,
predictable operational designs, and limited
operational actions to aect the relevant con-
ditions needed to reach the military end state.
Although many nations and military
services have dierent processes for plan-
ning military operations, conducting mission
analysis is oen considered the most impor-
tant step. is article argues that framing the
problem, traditionally a doctrinal step in mis-
sion analysis, is the most important step prior
to an organization developing their method of
achieving success in an operation. e natu-
ral next step, following an organization fram-
ing the problem, is the development and ap-
proval of a problem statement that states what
the organization is trying to accomplish, thus
providing a focus to ensure planning eorts
are aligned in the same direction. Currently,
in NATO doctrine this is problematic because
developing a problem statement is not a formal
step at any echelon (strategic, operational, or
tactical). With no compass to steer an organi-
zation towards the desired end state, develop-
ing a comprehensive approach and maintain-
ing unity of eort to solve complex problems
will remain extremely dicult.
is article has three aims: 1) inform NATO
military practitioners on the importance of
framing the problem, 2) describe why NATO
should consider incorporating the develop-
ment of a problem statement as a doctrinal
step in mission analysis, and 3) reinforce that
framing the problem and the development of
the problem statement should occur at all ech-
elons to increase understanding, synergy, and
unity of eort across the joint force.
Framing the Problem
Across Echelons
In today's increasingly complex and multi do-
main military operations no echelon, from a
squad to a joint force command headquarters,
will have a single problem to solve. Having a
clear understanding of the major challenges and
problems that are present within an operational
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WRITING A PROBLEM STATEMENT
ABOVE: Warfare development syndicate at the JWC Vision 2025 workshop. Photos by JWC PAO
The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021 77
►►►
environment begins at the start of planning
activities and remains throughout execution
of an operation.
1
Although subordinate units
should trust the analysis provided by their
higher headquarters, this does not negate the
need for each echelon to understand the op-
erational environment and analyze the major
challenges from their perspective.
Initial strategic guidance normally pro-
vides a description of the unacceptable con-
ditions in an environment. However, the root
causes of these conditions may not be clearly
articulated to operational and tactical level
headquarters. erefore, the rst task of each
headquarters is to understand the problem in
order to visualize potential solutions.
2
Achieving understanding requires two
activities: framing the problem and mission
analysis. Each echelon in NATO doctrine has a
dierent name and sequence to understand the
environment and frame the problem during
the NATO Operational Planning Process. At
the strategic level, understanding comes dur-
ing the "develop a strategic appreciation of the
crisis" step and involves contribution from the-
atre component commands. At the operational
level, military organizations "frame the opera-
tional level problem" during mission analysis.
Within Phase 1 at the tactical level, military
units "understand the situation and problem."
3
To develop a thorough understanding of
the problem, NATO doctrine stresses the need
for each echelon to provide feedback on their
understanding and appreciation of the stra-
tegic environment during the initial stages of
planning. is feedback enables SHAPE to de-
velop recommended military response options
that provide the best military advice to politi-
cal decision makers. As the military progresses
into execution of an operation, each headquar-
ters across all echelons must have processes in
place to continually evaluate their understand-
ing of the environment and reframe their as-
sessment of the problem. rough vertical and
horizontal information sharing, each echelon
has a responsibility to report changes in the
environment to increase shared understanding
and enable any adjustments to the plan.
Framing the Problem
Albert Einstein is famous for stating that, "if I
were given an hour to solve a problem, I'd spend
55 minutes thinking about the problem and
ve minutes thinking about the solution." e
information needed to understand the prob-
lem depends upon how one denes it, and the
solution depends upon how one understands
the problem, or how one answers the question:
what is causing this problem?
4
Taking deliberate
steps to frame the problem serves as a baseline
for learning throughout a headquarters.
Framing the problem begins with col-
laborative sta analysis, but does not fully take
shape until the commander is integrated into
the process. e goal of framing the problem
and developing a problem statement is un-
derstanding all essential and relevant actors,
tendencies, tensions, potentials, and trends in
the operational environment. rough com-
mand group and sta analysis and dialogue,
a headquarters must understand and analyze
the complex contextual situation in the envi-
ronment and develop a logical well-structured
working hypothesis.
5
Developing this logic starts with asking the
right questions. Some example questions to
analyze and answer with the command group
are the following:
What is the dierence between the
unacceptable state of an operational
environment and the desired end state?
What is preventing the command from
reaching the desired end state?
What needs to change versus what
doesn't need to change?
What conditions do other actors want
to achieve that are unacceptable to us?
What are the threats, opportunities,
and challenges?
What identied tensions will preclude us
from achieving our end state conditions?
What are the similarities between other
actors' desired end-state and ours that
may oer opportunities for synergy?
What risks will we impose on the
environment if we do (or do not)
achieve our desired end state
conditions?
“Framing the
problem begins
with collaborative
staff analysis, but
does not fully take
shape until the
commander is
integrated into
the process.
WRITING A PROBLEM STATEMENT
ABOVE: An advisory team meeting during STEADFAST DEFENDER 2021. Photo by JWC PAO
78 The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021
Asking and answering the right questions
through analysis and collaboration enables a
headquarters to determine what military and
non-military actions are achievable and what
is not. As questions about the environment
are answered, it is common for headquarters
to develop link diagrams, a system-of-systems
analysis, and graphically depict trend analyses
on maps to visually display areas of tension
and opportunities throughout an operating
area. rough analysis of the environment and
critical thinking, framing the problem enables
learning and a shared understanding across
the sta.
Other steps needed to properly frame
the problem from each echelon is reviewing
historical analysis, reviewing previous les-
sons identied, as well as reviewing strategic
and political guidance. Mission command and
clarity of ones' mission are only achieved once
guidance and direction is provided. However,
sometimes strategic and political level guid-
ance does not provide the level of clarity a
subordinate headquarters requires. When this
occurs, planners must look beyond the initial
direction and guidance and analyze other rel-
evant sources to enable subordinate echelons
to clearly understand the higher headquarters'
desire. Additional guidance may come from
political speeches, transcripts from NATO
Summits, strategic strategy documents, and
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more recently posts on ocial social media
sites. Taking the time to deliberately frame the
problem provides a headquarters the valuable
analysis needed to transition into the other
steps of mission analysis. With compressed
timelines common during planning activities,
headquarters should develop and rehearse the
processes they will use to frame the problem.
e sta and command group can then prac-
tice their process to ensure it is t for purpose
and developed in a timely manner.
In summary, framing the problem attempts
to answer the question: what is the organiza-
tion trying to accomplish? e advantages of
framing the problem as one of the initial steps
in mission analysis enables a headquarters to
focus the majority of their eort in determin-
ing the relevant and essential aspects that need
to be solved to reach the military end state.
e output of framing the problem should be
a well-dened problem statement approved by
the commander. e problem statement then
provides a focus that fuses planning eorts to-
wards solving the problem.
6
Once this step is completed, the com-
mander takes ownership of the problem state-
ment, which helps facilitate a commander's
dialogue with higher and subordinate head-
quarters to ensure understanding and consen-
sus across the joint force.
Developing a
Problem Statement
ere are three key inputs to assist planning
groups as they transition from mission analy-
sis to course of action development: a prob-
lem statement, mission statement, and com-
mander's intent. As stated earlier, the problem
statement describes the key issues that must
be solved in the operational environment to
reach the desired end state. e mission state-
ment describes what problem an organization
needs to solve and why. Lastly, commander's
intent describes the methods the organization
will use to solve the problem statement and ac-
complish the assigned mission.
During the mission analysis brieng, all
evidence and analyses presented to the com-
mand group is in direct support of the problem
statement. Just as each echelon has a mission
statement, they also require a problem state-
ment. Developing a problem statement is cur-
rently not a step during mission analysis in
NATO doctrine or the SHAPE Headquarters
Comprehensive Operational Planning Direc-
tive (COPD); however, the development of a
problem statement is becoming more main-
stream and desired by NATO military com-
manders. For example, students conducting
the NATO School's Strategic Operations Plan-
ning Course develop and brief their problem
statement to the lead senior mentor, who repli-
cates the commander.
ere is no directed length for a problem
statement, so it is incumbent upon the sta to
know how their commander likes to receive in-
formation. However, there are three character-
istics that make an eective problem statement
that should be described in narrative form:
• e ideal or desired conditions
• e current reality in the environment
• e consequences, or "so what" if no
action is taken
If possible, the problem statement
should also describe the timeframe needed to
solve the problem so that it best conveys the
headquarters' understanding of the problem.
7
Developing a problem statement takes
practice, experience, and command group
involvement. rough practice and collabora-
tion with the command group, a sta learns
how to convey only the essential information a
ABOVE: Coordination with the higher headquarters during the exercise planning process; a virtual visit to the JWC
by Admiral Joachim Rühle, SHAPE Chief of Sta, hosted by Rear Admiral Jan C. Kaack. Photo by Chris Hill
WRITING A PROBLEM STATEMENT
The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021 79
commander needs to know to understand the
environment and approve the problem state-
ment. e commander will then use the prob-
lem statement as one of the key documents to
develop their commander's intent. e key is
to identify the essential problems associated
with the relevant operational variables, ex-
amine relationships among the problems, and
then synthesize the analysis into a narrative
that aids the commander's thinking, and in-
forms the overall planning process.
8
To assist the reader, below are some examples
of problem statements.
WRITING A PROBLEM STATEMENT
BELOW: (From left) Yongsan Garrison,
Republic of Korea, photo by Lee Min-hw.
Yorktown Campaign by John Trumbull,
oil on canvas (1820). Brigadier General
Douglas K. Clark, JWC Deputy Commander
and Chief of Sta, during the rst All Hands
Call in 2021, which was held virtually on
February 5, as one of the largest internal
information exchange and teambuilding
events via the Internet. Photo by JWC PAO
►►►
EXAMPLES OF PROBLEM STATEMENTS
Blue text depicts the ideal or desired conditions. Black text describes the current realities in the environment. Red text depicts
consequences, or the "so what". Lastly, underlined portions emphasize key points in the problem statement.
Korean Peninsula
Modern Day
Problem Statement
U.S. Forces Korea and the Combined
Forces Command seek to maintain a
stable balance of power on the Korean
Peninsula, one that deters North Korean
provocations, defends South Korean
territory, and allows South Korea to
prosper economically. North Korea,
however, actively attempts to undermine
these goals. As a result of its crumbling
economy, its inability to feed its own
people, and its reliance on illicit means
of maintaining control of its population
through propaganda and coercion, North
Korea engages in a calculated effort to
raise tensions in order to win foreign
concessions. It does this, primarily, by
actively developing nuclear weapons,
expanding the range of its ballistic
missiles, and committing occasional acts
of violence against the south. Even if
the Alliance succeeds in deterring North
Korea from conducting a major attack,
the continuance of such provocations and
other acts of deance serve to destabilize,
not only the Korean Peninsula, but the
larger region as a whole.
9
General George Washington
Yorktown Campaign (1781)
Problem Statement
Although the Continental Army retains
possession of large areas in the 13
Colonies, American stagnated efforts to
regain key terrain have resulted in poor
morale, indecisive recruiting efforts, and
a loss of faith in the American Congress.
This is mainly due to historical poor
coordination between the French Navy
and American Land Forces and limited
supplies and funding for the Continental
Army. The hub of British Power remains in
New York City and their naval superiority
has enabled them to secure key port cities
throughout the colonies to maintain their
economy of force missions. However, with
British General Lord Charles Cornwallis'
forces now conducting an operational
pause on the Yorktown Peninsula, there
is an opportunity to isolate and defeat a
large British Army in Virginia if the French
Navy can dominate the Chesapeake Sea
area and land forces can reach Yorktown
in time.
10
Return-to-Work (COVID-19)
June 2020
Problem Statement
Due to the Joint Warfare Centre's (JWC)
reduced manning regulations since
mid-March 2020, any gap in information
and knowledge management within
the organization will affect its mission
performance, while the Centre continues
to adapt to the global crisis. During this
period of teleworking, conditions and
priorities within the JWC programme
of work have changed. As the JWC's
pre-pandemic programme of work
activities return, there is a need to inform
and recalibrate the staff on the revised
programme of work through clear
direction and guidance. Additionally,
once conditions allow the JWC to
resume programme of work activities,
there will remain multiple national, higher
headquarters, and host nation regulations
that must be adhered to.
11
80 The Three Swords Magazine 37/2021
Developing a problem statement pro-
vides a headquarters the compass they need to
ensure planning eorts are focused and headed
in the same collective direction to solve the
problem. During mission analysis and course
of action development, the problem statement
ensures that: 1) the mission statement is ad-
equately written with the correct essential tasks
and purpose to achieve the military end state, 2)
commander's intent and direction and guidance
describe the methods the organization will use
to solve the problem statement and achieve the
assigned mission, and 3) the development of the
operational design describes the conceptual ap-
proach for how the organization will solve the
problem statement and achieve the needed con-
ditions to reach the military end state.
Conclusion
Although the initial strategic guidance a sub-
ordinate headquarters receives is prompted by
symptoms that are unacceptable to the NATO
Alliance, the dynamics of the root problem re-
quire more analysis across all echelons. ere-
fore, the rst task of each headquarters is to
understand the problem in order to visualize
possible solutions.
ENDNOTES:
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint
Doctrine 5 (AJP-5) Allied Joint Doctrine for the
Planning of Operations (Brussels, Belgium: NATO
Standardization Oce, 2019), 4-1 thru 4-2.
2 Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-
5-500, The U.S. Army Commander's Appreciation
and Campaign Design (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, 2008), 21.
3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Procedural
Publication 28 (APP-28) Tactical Planning for Land
Forces (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Standardization
Oce, 2018), 2-1.
4 TRADOC PAM 525-5-500, 14.
5 Ibid., 25.
6 Maj. Erik K. Kober, "Bridging the Planning Gap:
Linking Conceptual Army Design to Military Decision-
Making" (Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and
General Sta College, 2010), 45.
7 U.S. Army War College, Campaign Planning
Handbook (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States
Army War College, 2020), 69.
8 Marine Air Ground Task Force Sta Training Program
Pamphlet 5-0.2, Operational Planning Team Leader's
Guide (Quantico, VA: MSTP Center, 2017), 29-30.
9 Problem Statement provided by the Joint Forces Sta
College: Joint and Combined Warghting School
Strategy and Campaign Design ("Dene the Problem"
lecture).
10 Problem Statement provided by the author during a
Yorktown Campaign-Battleeld Sta Ride.
11 Problem Statement provided by the author as part
of the JWC COVID-19 Operational Planning Team.
12 Joint Forces Sta College, The Joint Sta Ocer's
Guide (Norfolk, VA: National Defense University,
2019), 3-40.
“Developing a
problem
statement
provides a
headquarters
the compass
they need to
ensure planning
efforts are
headed in the
same collective
direction.”
Framing the problem is relevant to all
levels of war (strategic, operational, and tac-
tical) because all levels view the environment
through dierent lenses. Framing the problem,
with an approved problem statement narrative,
enables commander dialogue across echelon
to clearly dene the needed actions to solve the
problems and reach conict resolution.
If NATO does adapt their doctrine to
include the development of a problem state-
ment as part of framing the problem, NATO
organizations will likely improve the additional
outputs required during mission analysis and
course of action development. is will also cre-
ate more opportunities for headquarters' sta
and command group interaction, which is an
integral part of developing a problem statement.
Presently, the diculties in properly
framing the problem have led many NATO
commands during recent JWC exercises to
oversimplify the problem leading to predictable
military response options and an operational
design with little hope of creating favorable
conditions to reach the military end state. In to-
day's increasingly complex environment, where
peace, crisis, war, and stabilization are oen
blurred, oversimplifying the problem presents
increased risk to your operation and inade-
quately organizes the processes needed to drive
the commander's decision-making process.
Framing the problem and the develop-
ment of a problem statement are key steps
in mission analysis. e problem statement
forms the foundation for which all solutions
WRITING A PROBLEM STATEMENT
are developed.
12
When these steps are com-
pleted correctly, a military headquarters better
understands the complexities throughout the
environment, is able to develop a plan with a
reasonable chance of success, and puts pro-
cesses in place to better adapt planning when
eects are not achieving the desired results.
With a problem statement in-hand, a head-
quarters has the focus they need to ensure
planning eorts head in the right collective
direction to solve the problem. As such, a well-
dened problem statement is crucial to the op-
erational planning process.
ABOVE: Wargaming at the JWC. Photo by JWC PAO