YOU BELONG WITH ME: RECORDING ARTISTS’ FIGHT FOR OWNERSHIP OF THEIR MASTERS

Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property

Volume 18 Issue 2 Article 4

3-2021

YOU BELONG WITH ME: RECORDING ARTISTS’ FIGHT FOR YOU BELONG WITH ME: RECORDING ARTISTS’ FIGHT FOR

OWNERSHIP OF THEIR MASTERS OWNERSHIP OF THEIR MASTERS

Ann Herman

Northwestern Pritzker School of Law

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YOU BELONG WITH ME: RECORDING ARTISTS’ FIGHT FOR OWNERSHIP OF THEIR

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YOU BELONG WITH ME: RECORDING ARTISTS’ FIGHT FOR OWNERSHIP OF YOU BELONG WITH ME: RECORDING ARTISTS’ FIGHT FOR OWNERSHIP OF

THEIR MASTERS THEIR MASTERS

Cover Page Footnote Cover Page Footnote

Ann Herman, J.D. candidate 2021. I would like to dedicate this Note to my grandfather and journalist,

Martin “Gene” Herman, who always inspired and encouraged me to write. He was one of my earliest

editors and supporters, and I would not be where I am today without him.

This note is available in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property:

https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol18/iss2/4

N O R T H W E S T E R N

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY

AND

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

YOU BELONG WITH ME:

RECORDING ARTISTS’ FIGHT FOR

OWNERSHIP OF THEIR MASTERS

Ann Herman

March 2021 VOL. 18, NO. 2

Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property

239

YOU BELONG WITH ME:

RECORDING ARTISTS’ FIGHT FOR

OWNERSHIP OF THEIR MASTERS

Ann Herman

ABSTRACT—Copyright law, governed by the Copyright Act, is based

on utilitarian theory, which balances artists’ interests in ownership of their

creations with the public’s interest in accessing and enjoying such creations.

include master rights—the recording artist’s copyright in the recording.

Taylor Swift has brought the concept of master rights into the forefront of

pop culture. In June 2019, Swift’s masters—the original sound recordings of

her songs—were sold, and she publicly aired her dissatisfaction with the sale,

as well as with overall premise that artists do not have a complete right of

ownership over their masters. In this Note, I analyze the rhetoric of Taylor

Swift and other musicians and determine that many artists, based on their

rhetoric in expressing their views of ownership rights under the current

which the creator of a work is entitled to ownership of it. Based on these

observations, I suggest some solutions which propose changes to copyright

law and state law, inspired by previous solutions posed by other scholars,

that would place artists’ rights to ownership and control of their work at the

forefront of the laws’ purpose. This, in turn, will spur creativity and create a

I. CALL IT WHAT YOU WANT: THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY .................. 240

II. THE STORY OF US: COPYRIGHT LAW AS RELATED TO MUSIC ............................... 241

III. SPEAK NOW: TAYLOR SWIFT AND MUSICIAN RHETORIC....................................... 242

IV. HOAX: CURRYING THE WRONG INCENTIVES ......................................................... 244

A. Mine: The Importance of Control 245

B. Peace: The Importance of Fairness 245

V. TOLERATE IT: WHY WE SHOULD CARE ABOUT WHAT ARTISTS WANT ................ 246

VI. COME BACK . . . BE HERE: THE IMPLICATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS .................... 247

VII. I’M ONLY ME WHEN I’M WITH YOU: THE IMPLICATION OF MORAL RIGHTS ........ 250

VIII. BEGIN AGAIN: SOLUTIONS.................................................................................... 251

A. Our Song: Addressing Property Rights 251

B. Wildest Dreams: Addressing Moral Rights 260

IX. LONG STORY SHORT: CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 263

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

240

I. CALL IT WHAT YOU WANT:

THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The Constitution of the United States provides for the “promot[ion] [of]

the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to

authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and

discoveries.”

This constitutional grant provides the basis of U.S. copyright

law. U.S. copyright law is governed by the federal government under the

utilitarian theories of intellectual property, of which copyright law is a facet.

Utilitarian theories seek to balance the interests of authors, creators, and

inventors with the interests of the public.

Utilitarian theory recognizes the

importance of incentivizing creation while also making such creation

available for the public’s use and benefit. U.S. copyright law seeks to reach

such a balance.

Apart from the utilitarian theory, there are various other theories of

intellectual property, such as property rights theory and personhood theory.

Property rights theory is largely based upon the theories of John Locke.

Locke believed one should be able to ascertain ownership over the things she

creates—the fruits of her labor. While this theory originally applied to

physical property, it has been expanded to intellectual property. Thus, one

who creates a work of art is entitled to the ownership of her creation, for it is

her rightly owned property.

Personhood theory is largely based on the theories of Immanuel Kant

and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

Personhood theory stresses the

emotional and mental labor an artist or author puts into her work and the

connection she has to the finished product.

Thus, because a creation is

inextricably linked to the creator, the creator deserves to maintain control

Ann Herman, J.D. candidate 2021. I would like to dedicate this Note to my grandfather and

journalist, Martin “Gene” Herman, who always inspired and encouraged me to write. He was one of my

earliest editors and supporters, and I would not be where I am today without him.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.

See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 623–

24 (Peter Can & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003).

See William W. Fisher, III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND

POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).

See id. at 170.

See id. at 171.

See id. at 171–72; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Intellectual Property, in A COMPANION TO

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 660 (Robert Goodin et al. eds., 2007).

18:239 (2021) You Belong with Me

241

over it.

Personhood theory, like property rights theory, recognizes and

emphasizes the creator’s personal relation to the work as a result of her labor

and perceives the creator’s rights as more important than the public interest.

In this Note, I analyze the rhetoric of popular musicians, most notably

Taylor Swift, regarding a musician’s right to own her master recordings. I

then parse the rhetoric to ascertain what theories of intellectual property such

rhetoric conjures and what rights such rhetoric implies to seek. I then

suggest—inspired by a survey of proposals from legal scholars—how U.S.

II. THE STORY OF US:

sound recordings.

A musical composition constitutes the written music and

lyrics, or the “instructions” for playing the song.

A sound recording is a

recording of a performance of the musical composition.

The songwriter or

songwriters initially own the copyright in the composition.

The performer

or performers of a sound recording initially own the copyright in the sound

recording.

Often, owners of musical compositions contract with music

publishing companies to license use of their music.

Under the Copyright

Act, the owner of the copyright of a musical composition has the exclusive

rights of distribution, reproduction, public performance, public display, and

the right to create derivative works.

These exclusive rights are alienable,

and any of them can be licensed to other parties.

recordings enjoy fewer rights than do copyright owners of musical

compositions.

See Fisher, supra note 4, at 172; Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 660.

JEANNE C. FROMER & CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

378 (2019).

Id. This does not mean that the music necessarily has to be written down. It is enough for an artist

to record her song, and that would still constitute a composition.

Id.; Copyright Registration of Musical Compositions and Sound Recordings, U.S. COPYRIGHT

OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/register/pa-sr.html [https://perma.cc/K4FB-AY6L].

FROMER & SPRIGMAN, supra note 9, at 380.

Id.

Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 106.

FROMER & SPRIGMAN, supra note 9, at 380.

Id.

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

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The original sound recording is the master recording, and the copyright

rights of the recording artist are the master rights, or the masters.

The master

recording is the recording “from which all later copies are made.”

Ownership of the master rights provides for control over the use of the

recording.

Often, in exchange for the financial backing of a record label,

musicians will assign their master rights to the label.

The owner of the

master rights has the ability to control the licensing of the recording down to

who can use it, when one can use it, what purposes it can be used for, and

the price of its use.

Thus, musicians who do not own their masters may not

be able to control how their music is used in movies, commercials, and other

types of media;

whether the music can be publicly performed; and how the

music is released, such as through which services and platforms.

III. SPEAK NOW:

TAYLOR SWIFT AND MUSICIAN RHETORIC

In 2006, Taylor Swift signed her first major record deal with Big

Machine Records.

Like many young artists, this was a dream come true,

and signing away her master rights seemed like a reasonable price to pay for

the chance to release her own album.

Now, fifteen years later, she has

publicly aired her dismay over her inability to own her master recordings.

Taylor Swift is arguably one of the most powerful celebrities in the

music industry.

She is also publicly vocal about musicians’ rights

Amanda Prahl, Taylor Swift Is Still Fighting the Battle Over Her Masters, and Here’s Why It’s So

Important, POPSUGAR (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.popsugar.com/entertainment/What-Does-Mean-

Own-Your-Masters-Music-46337890 [https://perma.cc/2WV8-KXWU].

Elizabeth Vulaj, Singing a Different Tune: Taylor Swift & Other Artists’ Fight for Music

Ownership, PRACTITIONER INSIGHTS COMMENTARIES, Aug. 28, 2020, 2020 PRINDBRF 0225.

Prahl, supra note 18.

Id.

Damon Brown, Jay-Z Became Hip-Hop’s First Billionaire By Doing 1 Simple Thing Well, INC.

(June 4, 2019), https://www.inc.com/damon-brown/jay-z-is-now-hip-hops-first-billionaire-by-doing-1-

simple-thing-well.html [https://perma.cc/7J6H-8XFK].

Id.; Vulaj, supra note 19.

Vulaj, supra note 19.

Andrew Flanagan & Anastasia Tsioulcas, Taylor Swift’s Former Label Big Machine is Sold,

Rankling the Star, NPR (July 1, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/01/737613627/taylor-

swifts-former-label-big-machine-is-sold-rankling-the-star [https://perma.cc/3B69-GQZ6].

Why Owning Your Master Recordings Means Everything, AWAL (Sept. 19, 2018),

https://www.awal.com/blog/maintaining-ownership-rights-as-an-artist [https://perma.cc/Z74Z-ARX6];

Taylor Swift (taylorswift), TUMBLR (June 30, 2019), https://taylorswift.tumblr.com/post /185958366550

/for-years-i-asked-pleaded-for-a-chance-to-own-my [https://perma.cc/7XGN-EG67].

Swift, supra note 26.

At the American Music Awards on November 24, 2019, Swift was named the “Artist of the

Decade.” She has won twenty-nine American Music Awards, the most of any artist. American Music

Awards 2019: Taylor Swift Takes Artist of the Decade in Record-Breaking Haul, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.

18:239 (2021) You Belong with Me

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pertaining to compensation for and ownership of their music. In June 2019,

Swift publicly expressed her dissatisfaction with the sale of her first six

albums to Ithaca Holding Group.

Swift’s underlying unhappiness with the

sale was due to her desire to own her music and her failed effort at purchasing

the master recordings of her first six albums.

In her statement, Swift

laments her inability to purchase her masters. Although she has a new deal

with another record label—a deal that allows her to retain her master rights—

her statement alludes to feeling cheated by signing a contract at age fifteen

that divested her of those rights.

Swift is not the only major artist that has publicly expressed the

importance of owning her master recordings and shed light on the music

industry’s de facto denial of such ownership rights. Prince publicly

denounced his record label amidst issues regarding ownership of his masters

in the early 1990s. Prince’s early grievances began with his unhappiness with

the restrictions his label placed on him.

Prince “wanted to put out an album

whenever the urge struck him, and it could be a three-song album or a 70-

song album.”

Prince firmly believed artists deserved the right to control and

own their works. In an interview with Rolling Stone in 1996, the singer

warned “[i]f you don’t own your masters, your masters own you.”

expressed by one of Prince’s attorneys, “[Prince] drew attention to the issue

of artists controlling their own destiny.”

Rapper Jay-Z also understood the importance of owning his masters,

and in his negotiations with the record label Def Jam in 2004, Jay-Z assigned

his master rights to Def Jam with the condition that they would revert back

25, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2019/nov/25/taylor-swift-wins-2019-ama-artist-of-the-

year [https://perma.cc/JJB6-NQVQ]. Swift has won eleven Grammys and at the time was the youngest

artist to win Album of the Year at the Grammys; she won the award when she was twenty years old.

Taylor Swift, RECORDING ACADEMY, https://www.grammy.com/grammys/artists/taylor-swift

[https://perma.cc/BG7N-VAZD].

Anne Steele, Scooter Braun Makes $300 Million Deal for Big Machine Records, WALL ST. J. (June

30, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/scooter-braun-makes-300-million-deal-for-big-machine-records

-11561893008 [https://perma.cc/6SX5-4DMQ].

Id.

See Swift, supra note 26.

Melinda Newman, Inside Prince’s Career-Long Battle to Master His Artistic Destiny, BILLBOARD

(Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/cover-story/7348551/prince-battle-to-control-

career-artist-rights [https://perma.cc/98MT-EM6U].

Id.

Rachel DeSantis, From the Beatles to Taylor Swift: Why It’s So Hard for Musicians to Own Their

Music, PEOPLE (July 1, 2019, 5:23 PM), https://people.com/music/beatles-to-taylor-swift-why-its-hard-

musicians-own-their-music/ [https://perma.cc/5RTN-H5TK].

Newman, supra note 32.

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

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to him in ten years.

Thus, while the ownership of one’s masters has

incredible economic incentives, ownership also has personal significance

because of the control it provides the owner.

IV. HOAX:

CURRYING THE WRONG INCENTIVES

U.S. copyright law claims to operate under an “incentives-for-artists

rationale,”

under the premise that artists need incentives to create and that

align with the psychology of creativity nor does it reflect how copyright law

actually operates.

Professor Julie Cohen posits that copyright law, as it currently operates,

is not so much about incentivizing creativity, but rather is about providing

the framework though which copyrighted work can be exploited.

For the

law to actually incentivize creativity, it must focus on the artists and what

drives them to create.

The psychology of creativity shows that intrinsic motivation is more

powerful than extrinsic motivation in spurring creative activity.

Currently,

incentives—for artists. However, artists create because “[t]ime spent and the

burden of the everyday work [of creating] is a source of pride and worth,

both as a matter of personal identity as well as professional merit.”

artist’s work is “intimately linked to their self-concept[,]”

and, as a result,

many artists have possessory interests in their work. Thus, fair copyright

laws that would incentivize artists to create would recognize artists’

possessory interests and would allow them to retain as much control as

possible over their work.

Zack O’Malley Greenburg, Jay-Z’s $50 Million Music Box, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2010, 6:18 PM),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2010/09/22/jay-zs-50-million-music-box/

#19a14dc650de [https://perma.cc/QS8Z-UMN8].

Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011

WIS. L. REV. 141, 143.

Id.

Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the

Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2007–08 (2011).

Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and “Work-Makes-Work,”

Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091, 2122

(2011).

Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1766

(2012).

18:239 (2021) You Belong with Me

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A. Mine:

The Importance of Control

While economic rights are important, the ability to control one’s work

may be just as—if not more—important to some artists. Control can also act

as an incentive to creation.

Ideally, artists want to control the use of their

work by limiting who can use it, how others can use it, and when others can

use it. On the other hand, artists may be interested in compensation for their

work and will cede control in return for compensation. Scholarship suggests

artists are more concerned with reputational harm, attribution, and

misattribution than they are with economic rights.

As expressed by musicians’ rhetoric regarding ownership of masters,

control may be more important or more desirable than compensation due to

the personality and identity-representative aspects of their work. Further,

some artists simply believe they should have control over their works “for

having labored on them.”

However, economic incentives and control are

not mutually exclusive. One aspect of control that is so important is that it

would allow an artist to decide how she wants to exploit her work. She would

have the power to have complete autonomy over her work, or she would have

the power to surrender some control in return for compensation. Control is

important because it provides an artist with the power of choice. Thus,

solely on economic incentives.

B. Peace:

The Importance of Fairness

Research has shown that perceived workplace fairness can “lead to

enhanced creativity.”

Further, “[w]hen organization members perceive

their environment to be fair, they voluntarily respond to higher levels of job

demands by engaging more frequently in . . . creative behavior[.]”

Conversely, when working in environments that they perceive to be unfair,

people are less likely to generate creative ideas and are likely to feel less

motivated.

This research has been extrapolated to the context of expressive

creators, such as recording musicians, and argues the same principles of

See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Rational Faith: The Utility of Fairness in Copyright, 97 B.U. L.

REV. 1487, 1488 (2017).

Silbey, supra note 40, at 2120–21.

Fromer, supra note 41, at 1770.

Bair, supra note 42, at 1502.

Id. at 1503.

Id.

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

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fairness and creative output apply.

Thus, in order to incentivize creation,

artists must feel they are being compensated fairly and are being treated

fairly regarding their ownership and control of their work.

In general, artists are likely to perceive a working environment or an

agreement as fair if they feel that “their individual preferences, interests, and

special needs are respected.”

Having a voice in the decisions regarding their

work and being given proper credit for their work also increases perceptions

of fairness.

Providing artists with greater property rights, as well as moral rights,

which will be discussed in Part VII of this Note, will likely cause artists to

feel that they have greater control over their work and are being treated fairly.

As a result, artists will be more likely to continue to create, and the utilitarian

goals of U.S. copyright law will be furthered.

V. TOLERATE IT:

WHY WE SHOULD CARE ABOUT WHAT ARTISTS WANT

Society, copyright intermediaries (such as record labels, music

publishing companies, and streaming platforms), and lawmakers should care

about what artists want. If the purpose of copyright law is to incentivize

creation, then it matters what artists perceive as being fair. Having greater

control over their works and being subject to laws that they deem as more

fair will incentivize and spur artists to create. Artists are the backbone of the

without artists, it only seems logical that such a regime should primarily

recognize their rights. For it is “the producers and the writers and the artists

[who] are the ones who are making music what it is[,]”

not the public or

intermediaries. While copyright law is artist-centered on its face, in reality,

it is not.

“Although the incentives-for-authors story [of copyright law]

purports to celebrate authors, it has supported a system of property rights that

Id. at 1504.

Id. at 1511.

Id. at 1511–12.

Glenn Rowley, Taylor Swift Talks Changing Music Industry, Taking Control, BILLBOARD (Nov.

5, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/pop/8542711/taylor-swift-talks-changing-music-

industry-taking-control [https://perma.cc/9EVV-V45G].

See Cohen, supra note 37, at 144. Copyright law purports to incentivize creativity and create a

system where an author is compensated for her work, so that she can devote the proper time and effort to

it. Copyright law also focuses on protecting an artist’s work so that she is willing to disseminate her work

to the public. Thus, on its face, the law seeks to protect artists. However, particularly in the music industry,

music has become commercialized, and record labels and other music production companies have used

the law to profit themselves. Often, due to access to more resources, these entities have greater bargaining

power than the artist and can use the law to provide incentives to artists in a way that increases their own

profits while taking rights away from the artist. Id. at 142–44.

18:239 (2021) You Belong with Me

247

as a practical matter relegates authors to the economic . . . margins of the

intellectual property system.”

Society and intermediaries are the

beneficiaries of creative output, and it follows that they should have the

burden of adapting to laws favoring artists. For, as society and intermediaries

have learned to adapt to the current copyright regime, they would be able to

adapt to a new, more artist-friendly regime. To achieve optimal

incentivization of creation, as copyright law purports to do, artists must come

first.

VI. COME BACK . . . BE HERE:

THE IMPLICATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Much of musicians’ rhetoric regarding ownership of masters is

reminiscent of property rights theory—that the creator has property rights in

the fruits of her labor. Property rights theory is more artist-friendly than

utilitarian theory because, at a base level, property rights theory provides for

the creator’s exclusive property ownership of her creation. This theory has

been interpreted as a “value-added” theory.

If the product of one’s labor

provides value to society, then she deserves to be rewarded for her

contribution.

A reward may come in the form of control or ownership of

her contribution. As artistic works have long been considered valuable to

society, artists should be rewarded for the value they add to it.

Thus, if U.S. copyright law strictly adhered to property rights theory,

musicians’ property rights would always be paramount to the public’s

interest in access to musicians’ work because the musician deserves to have

such rights due to her efforts or due to the positive public value of her

creations.

In her post about the sale of her masters in 2019, Swift emphasized the

importance of owning her work.

She stated “[y]ou deserve to own the art

you make,”

suggesting the importance of property rights for an artist, in

line with property rights theories. In her acceptance speech for Artist of the

Decade at the American Music Awards in November 2019, Swift described

Id. at 144.

Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 305 (1988).

Id.

Swift, supra note 26.

Id.

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

248

the award as celebrating “a decade of hard work and of art . . . ,”

once again

alluding to property rights theories.

But why are these property rights so important? As explained in Part IV

of this Note, a main reason is control. Ownership of one’s masters provides

her with control over what others can do with her work. Many of the issues

Prince had with his record label were about his lack of control. Because

Prince had signed his master rights to his record label, he was unable to

release music without the label’s approval.

Prince once likened the control

his label had over him to slavery.

While this is an exaggeration, he clearly

wanted to convey how confining and dehumanizing he felt his situation to

be. In addition to requiring artists to assign their master rights to the record

label, many recording contracts place creative restrictions on artists and lure

them into long-term contracts that prevent them from making music. Typical

recording contracts “require the exclusive personal services of the artist with

respect to recording as a feature artist, for the duration of the contract” and

are often “structured to require a minimal commitment on the part of the

record label to actually record any albums, while reserving a considerable

number of unilateral options to require additional albums.”

This enables

record labels to “renew and extend the term of the recording contract on the

same terms that applied at the beginning of the deal,”

which may be unfair

and do not take into account an artist’s increasing popularity and bargaining

power.

Depending on the artists’ popularity when entering into the contract, a

recording contract may stipulate that the label will only release music that is

“commercially satisfactory,” or music that it thinks will sell well.

Thus, the

record label may have the ability to block artists’ music that it does not like.

Further, many recording contracts’ durations are “stated in terms of delivery,

instead of specific time periods.”

Thus, depending on how long it takes the

artist to record the number of songs specified in the contract to the label’s

liking, “a contract requiring delivery of five studio albums could easily span

Alyssa Bailey, Taylor Swift’s AMAs Artist of the Decade Speech Was All Love, No Drama, ELLE

(Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.elle.com/culture/celebrities/a29847923/taylor-swift-amas-artist-of-the-

decade-speech-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/53T3-ZJKY].

Newman, supra note 32.

Id.

Tuneen E. Chisolm, Whose Song Is That: Searching for Equity and Inspiration for Music Vocalists

Under the Copyright Act, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 274, 308 (2017).

Id.

Id. For example, a recording contract may include language stipulating that the initial contract

period and each renewal period end “six to nine months after the delivery of the last album required for

that period, but no less than a specified minimum time period[.]” Id. (internal brackets omitted).

18:239 (2021) You Belong with Me

249

a period of more than seven years.”

As a result, artists “could remain

trapped in an unfavorable deal for years, despite success of early albums that

would otherwise give the artist enough clout to negotiate a better deal.”

Rapper Lupe Fiasco expressed similar rhetoric to Prince when he

claimed he was “a hostage” to his label because if he did not give his label

what it wanted, “at the end of the day the album wasn’t coming out.”

Singer

Kelly Clarkson expressed dissatisfaction with her label because it pressured

her to change her look and sound in ways she was unhappy with because it

believed that would sell better.

Further, the label would not let her create

the music that she wanted to create and controlled the genre and the specific

songs that Clarkson could release.

Singer JoJo also had an issue with her

label where it continuously delayed the release of her album. Because her

contract stipulated that she could not record music outside of the recordings

done with her label for the duration of the contract, she was unable to

continue to create music simply because her label would not release the

music she had created.

Similarly, it took years for singer Sky Ferreira to

create an album that her label approved of, and the label continually delayed

the album’s release.

Swift has also alluded to creative constraints while she

was with her previous record label.

Rapper Iggy Azalea, who recently entered into a deal with a label to

create a new album in which she retains the master rights, has also expressed

disillusionment with the music industry norms.

Azalea posted on Twitter in

response to Swift’s statement regarding the sale of her masters. Azalea

supported Swift’s call for musicians to be able to own their master rights.

She alluded to her own issues with the industry and stated, “this is why I’m

so happy to own my master [recordings] for this new album, they really do

Id. at 308–09.

Id. at 309.

Aylin Zafar, What It’s Like When a Label Won’t Release Your Album, BUZZFEED (May 12, 2013),

https://www.buzzfeed.com/azafar/what-happens-when-your-favorite-artist-is-legally-unable-to

[https://perma.cc/B97E-88FT].

Brian Hiatt, Kelly Clarkson on ‘The Voice,’ New Album, Her Dramatic Clashes with Old Label,

ROLLING STONE (Mar. 20, 2018, 12:50PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/kelly-

clarkson-on-the-voice-new-album-her-dramatic-clashes-with-old-label-203672/ [https://perma.cc/U32R

-DDUN].

Id.

Zafar, supra note 68.

Id.

Rowley, supra note 51 (“In my previous situation, there were creative constraints, issues that we

had over the years[.]”).

Iggy Azalea (@IGGYAZALEA), TWITTER (June 30, 2019, 4:30 PM), https://twitter.com/IGGY

AZALEA/status/1145444575521181696.

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

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[people] crazy dirty on ownership of their intellectual property in the

[business].”

Singer Ciara also entered a deal with a new label in which she retains

the master rights and has expressed that “[b]eing able to own [her] masters

has been really cool. . . . To have that freedom and flexibility is amazing.”

Ciara’s statements again express the importance of control for artists and the

constraints that lack of control places on them.

If copyright law adhered to a property rights model, artists would have

greater control over their work and would not feel that their creative

expression or freedom was stifled by the business strategies of record labels.

As the law stands, the artists, who are encouraged and incentivized to create,

are prevented from fully expressing themselves and creating due to the

restrictions and demands of the labels that are meant to release the artists’

creations to the public. The current model neither incentivizes creation nor

benefits the public interest if artists are unable to create what and as much as

they want.

VII. I’M ONLY ME WHEN I’M WITH YOU:

THE IMPLICATION OF MORAL RIGHTS

An artist’s ownership of her masters also reflects the personal ties she

has to her work. Because art is expressive, many artists feel their work is

more than just a completed piece, but that it is part of themselves and reflects

who they are.

Because artists have such intense ties to their work,

ownership of the work is about more than monetary gains. It is about artistic

autonomy and owning a piece of themselves.

Throughout her career, Swift has been open about the emotional

connection she has to her work. In an op-ed she wrote for the Wall Street

Journal in 2014, Swift alluded to the effort and emotional taxation of

creating her music as an aspect of the music’s value.

She stressed that

“[m]usic is art, and art is important and rare.”

In speaking about her desire

to own her masters, Swift related the importance of ownership to her

personal life and childhood dreams. When she realized she was unable to

purchase her master recordings and that they would be sold, she “had to make

Id.

Vulaj, supra note 19.

See generally Fromer, supra note 41.

Id.

Taylor Swift, For Taylor Swift, the Future of Music is a Love Story, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2014,

6:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-taylor-swift-the-future-of-music-is-a-love-story-140476321

9?ns=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/XD5C-MLUD] (“In my opinion, the value of an album is, and

will continue to be, based on the amount of heart and soul an artist had bled into a body of work[.]”).

Id.

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251

the excruciating choice to leave behind [her] past.”

For Swift, her music is

part of her, so giving up ownership felt like parting with a piece of herself.

Musicians and other celebrities have publicly supported Swift’s cries

for ownership, and their rhetoric furthers the notion that both musicians and

non-musicians recognize an emotional connection between a musician and

her work.

In support of Swift’s plea for ownership, singer Halsey spoke of

the emotional impact of Swift’s work and referred to Swift’s work as “the

painstaking labor of [Swift’s] heart.”

Recording artists have an undeniable

connection to their work that should be recognized when considering

ownership rights of these works.

VIII. BEGIN AGAIN:

SOLUTIONS

Solutions that provide artists with greater control over their works can

be accomplished by alterations to the Copyright Act and state laws that

address both property rights and moral rights.

A. Our Song:

Addressing Property Rights

Section 203 of the Copyright Act provides an author the right to

terminate a grant of her rights thirty-five years after the execution of the

grant.

In order to exercise her termination rights, an author must provide

advance notice to the current owner of the rights at least two years before the

date on which she can begin to exercise her termination rights.

An author’s

termination rights are inalienable but must be exercised within five years of

Swift, supra note 26.

See generally Kathryn Lindsay, Everyone Who Is Wrapped up in the Taylor Swift-Scooter Braun

Drama, REFINERY29 (July 1, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2019/07

/236691/taylor-scooter-big-machine-artists-celebrities-reactions [https://perma.cc/YFH3-HFXC]; Dan

Clarendon, Celebrities Stand with Taylor Swift Amid Scooter Braun and Scott Borchetta AMAs 2019

Drama, US WKLY. (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/pictures/celebrities-

stand-with-taylor-swift-amid-amas-2019-drama-pics [https://perma.cc/E7DE-3GU3]. Singer Selena

Gomez’s mother, Mandy Teefey, referred to Swift’s music as Swift’s “blood, sweat and tears, especially

as a young woman who shared growing up in front of the world[.]” Mandy Teefey (@mandyteefey),

INSTAGRAM (June 30, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/BzWVSJjhT7Y/. Model Martha Hunt also

referred to Swift’s music as her “blood, sweat, + tears.” Martha Hunt (@MarthHunt), TWITTER (June 30,

2019, 7:29 PM), https://twitter.com/MarthaHunt/status/1145489481652482048.

Halsey (@halsey), TWITTER (June 30, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://twitter.com/halsey/status

/1145435250295635968. Singer Halsey expressed: “[Swift’s music] made my teeth ache like cold water

and my heart swell and my eyes leak[.]” Id.; see also Lindsay, supra note 82.

17 U.S.C. § 203.

Id. § 203(a)(4).

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252

the end of the thirty-five-year period, or she loses her rights to terminate a

grant of ownership.

1. It’s Nice to Have a Friend:

Inalienable Ownership Rights

A change to U.S. copyright law that would favor artists’ property rights

would be to make copyright ownership rights inalienable. Under such a

scheme, an author could license uses of her work; for example, she could

license rights to a record label to produce and market her recordings, but she

could not transfer her full ownership rights of those recordings. While this

would be a radical departure from current practice in the music industry, the

industry could adapt to such a change. Instead of it being customary for

artists to transfer ownership rights to record labels, it would become

customary for artists to retain the ownership rights and only license rights

for particular uses, such as for production and marketing.

Further, labels would continue to be able to commercially exploit an

artist’s work even if she had an inalienable right of ownership. For, as

reflected by some artists’ ability to retain ownership rights while continuing

to work with labels, labels still stand to profit from exploiting artists’ works.

As in Taylor Swift’s current situation, she likely would approve of

inalienable ownership rights for artists, as expressed by her beliefs that artists

“deserve to own the art [they] make.”

However, amidst this belief, she has

not ceased providing her music to the public or working with record labels.

In November 2018, Universal Music Group announced its contract with

Swift making it her “exclusive worldwide recorded music partner” and that

the Universal Music Group-owned label, Republic Records, will serve as her

record label.

The agreement allows Swift to retain ownership rights in her

masters.

So, allowing artists to retain ownership rights can still be

worthwhile for record labels.

2. Long Live:

Decreasing the Termination Period and Making it Perpetual

According to the legislative history of the Copyright Act, Congress

included a termination provision in recognition of the unequal bargaining

Id. § 203(a)(3), (5).

Taylor Swift, Jay-Z, Rhianna, Iggy Azalea, Frank Ocean, Ciara, and other artists have struck

agreements with record labels to continue to work with them and share profits while still retaining their

ownership rights. See Vulaj, supra note 19.

Swift, supra note 26.

Jem Aswad & Chris Willman, Taylor Swift Signs Landmark New Deal with Universal Music

Group, VARIETY (Nov. 19, 2018, 7:06 AM), https://variety.com/2018/music/news/taylor-swift-news-

alert-1203032124/ [https://perma.cc/AKB9-CSTC].

Id.

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power of new artists in contrast to the entities with which they contract.

While the addition of a termination provision is favorable to artists, the

provision does not do enough to protect an artist’s ownership rights and still

pays too much heed to the interests of industry titans. In order to level the

playing field, the termination period should be reduced, and the termination

right should be perpetual.

The logic behind providing an extended period before which an artist

may exercise her termination rights is to enable record labels and other

distribution agencies a chance to regain the economic capital they invested

in promoting an artist.

Because it is difficult to determine the success of an

artist when a label signs them, the label takes a financial risk in doing so.

Thus, if the artist becomes successful and a lucrative asset to the label, the

thirty-five-year period from the grant of rights to when the artist can exercise

her termination rights gives the record label plenty of time to profit or break

even on its investment.

Thirty-five years is more than enough time for a record label to make

back any losses from the investment and to realize profits on the risky

investment that is signing an artist.

Providing record labels with thirty-five

years to economically exploit the artist’s work is a significant portion of the

artist’s copyright term.

Professor Jessica Litman has proposed decreasing

the termination period from thirty-five years to fifteen years from the transfer

of the original grant of ownership.

Fifteen years, while considerably less

time than thirty-five years, is still a sufficient amount of time “to make

investment in copyrighted works worthwhile.”

Professor Litman’s fifteen-

year proposal is appropriate, but not with the five-year notice period. If the

termination period is to be fifteen years, the notice period should be reduced

or eliminated altogether, as explained in more detail in Section VIII(A)(3) of

this Note. With the current notice provisions, artists should be able to

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740 (“[Section

203] is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the

impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been exploited. Section 203 reflects a practical

compromise . . . .”).

Amy Gilbert, Note, The Time Has Come: A Proposed Revision to 17 U.S.C. § 203, 66 CASE W.

RES. L. REV. 807, 816–17 (2016).

See generally Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 48 (2010).

17 U.S.C. §§ 302–03. A typical copyright term for an author, when the work is not a work made

for hire, is the life of the author plus seventy years. The term is the same for joint works, but the measuring

life is the life of the longest-living author.

Litman, supra note 93, at 48. Professor Litman also proposes increasing the minimum amount of

notice to five years in combination with the decreased termination period. Id.

Id.

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

254

exercise their termination rights ten—to a maximum of fifteen—years from

the original grant of ownership.

Record labels are sophisticated parties aware of the termination rights

provided in the Copyright Act. Ten years provides labels plenty of time to

determine the profitability of an artist and to make back money invested in

them. Limiting the termination period provides artists with a greater sense of

control over their work by providing them with the chance to reclaim their

ownership rights in a foreseeable amount of time.

Additionally, the termination right should be perpetual. An artist should

be able to determine when they want to exercise their termination rights, and

if that is over forty years, that should be their prerogative. Doing away with

the five-year limitation to exercise termination rights does nothing to harm a

record label’s planning for the termination and gives the artist the deserved

autonomy over her ownership rights and actions.

3. I Knew You Were Trouble:

Eliminating the Notice Provision of 17 U.S.C. § 203

The notice provision is meant to provide the current holder of the to-be-

terminated copyright rights time to plan for the loss of those rights when the

author terminates them.

While it makes sense that the current holder should

receive notice of termination, anyone involved in the music industry,

particularly record labels, would be familiar with the termination right and

would understand the possibility that an artist may seek to exercise that right

thirty-five years from the grant. Such an extensive notice period actually

gives the current holder time to devalue the copyright.

For example, prior

to the termination date, as communicated in the notice, the current holder

could make the copyrighted work widely available at reduced prices in the

hopes of increasing demand for the work, so that once the rights revert to the

original owner, the value of the copyrighted work is significantly

diminished.

This way, the current rights holder can attempt to make as

much money from the work as they can while they still own it, so that once

the work reverts back to the original owner, there is not much value in it, and

thus the current holder is not losing much in losing ownership. While there

is no guarantee that a current holder would take such unscrupulous action,

the risk to the original owner remains. Because the amount of notice required

appears to be arbitrary, and current holders are likely aware of the

Gilbert, supra note 92, at 845–46. The legislative history fails to provide reasoning for the

implementation of the notice provision. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 126).

Gilbert, supra note 92, at 846.

Id. at 837.

18:239 (2021) You Belong with Me

255

termination provision and had thirty-five years to plan for such termination,

the amount of notice should be eliminated or at least drastically reduced.

100

No notice is a plausible solution because of the current owner’s

knowledge of when an artist may exercise her termination rights. The current

owner can take affirmative steps and discuss with the artist whether she plans

to exercise her termination rights. Alternatively, a reduction in the notice

period would still provide warning to the current owner—which is likely the

reasoning behind the provision—and prompt them to plan for the ultimate

termination. Additionally, a reduced or eliminated notice period would

protect artists from unscrupulous actors by preventing them from having

time to devalue the artist’s work. Eliminating the notice period would also

protect artists who may not have competent legal support who would inform

them of the notice requirement or who are unaware of the intricacies of the

ownership rights simply because they did not have the proper information.

4. I Forgot That You Existed:

The Role of State Law in Protecting Master Rights

In addition to changes in the Copyright Act, artists’ ownership of their

master rights can be achieved through state law. Artists are often divested of

their master rights through contracts with record labels. In addition to, or in

lieu of, changing the Copyright Act, states can pass their own laws regarding

what can and cannot be written into contracts and how recording artists are

categorized with regards to works made for hire as applied to copyright

ownership of master recordings.

101

However, without any changes to the

law, it would preempt any conflicting state law.

102

Such laws should focus on

artists’ ownership rights and should strive to preserve artists’ ownership over

master recordings. Such laws should also seek fairness in recording contracts

so that artists with little bargaining power are not induced to agree to unfair

deals that hold them hostage to their label.

100

Id. at 845–46.

101

States may impose statutory restrictions on contracts “so long as their laws do not run afoul of

some specific federal constitutional prohibition.” David E. Bernstein, Freedom of Contract (GMU Law

& Econ. Research Paper Series No. 08-51, 2008), https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications

/working_papers/08-51%20Freedom%20of%20Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/UMB6-TRM7] (quoting

Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963)).

102

Preemption, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption [https://perma.cc

/8S2J-KEQK].

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

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a. Epiphany:

Clarify When a Sound Recording is a Work Made for Hire

One solution is tackling the work made for hire problem. Under the

103

This

means that the author of the work created it in the course of her employment

or was hired for the purpose of making the work and thus is not the legal

“author” of the work—her employer is. The Act defines a work made for

hire as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her

employment; or a work specially ordered or commissioned . . . ” for use in

specific copyrightable works listed in the statute.

104

Currently, sound

recordings are not listed as a type of work that may be “specially ordered or

commissioned” as a work made for hire, and it is unclear whether or not they

may be considered works made for hire.

105

If they may be, this would prevent

the original copyright owner from exercising her § 203 termination rights, as

those rights do not apply to works made for hire.

106

To address this problem,

state law could prohibit record labels from declaring that master recordings

are works made for hire when the recording artist is not an employee of the

label. Alternatively, as done in California, state law could delineate specific

factors that must be shown in order for a recording artist to qualify as an

employee, so that it is clear-cut when a recording artist enters into an

agreement whether they will be considered an employee or an independent

contractor.

In 1999, Congress passed an amendment to the Copyright Act that

included sound recordings in the list of works that could be specially ordered

or commissioned as a work made for hire.

107

However, the amendment was

vehemently opposed by recording artists who successfully lobbied Congress

to repeal it; thus, sound recordings are not included in the types of works that

may be specially ordered or commissioned as works made for hire.

108

If the

amendment had remained in force, it would be significantly easier for sound

recordings to be considered works made for hire, and thus it would be

significantly easier for recording artists to lose their termination rights.

Even with sound recordings being excluded from potential specially

ordered or commissioned works, the work made for hire provision still

threatens to divest artists of their termination rights. Often, recording

103

17 U.S.C. § 101.

104

Id.

105

Abdullahi Abdullahi, Note, Termination Rights in Music: A Practical Framework for Resolving

Ownership Conflicts in Sound Recordings, 2012 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 457, 464–65 (2012).

106

17 U.S.C. § 203.

107

Abdullahi, supra note 105, at 464–65.

108

Id.

18:239 (2021) You Belong with Me

257

contracts state that while recording artists are not employees of the record

label, their masters are works made for hire.

109

Further, contracts frequently

state that in the event that the masters are determined not to be works made

for hire, the artist assigns the masters to the record label and grants the label

a power of attorney to transfer the master rights to the label in the event the

artist refuses to sign the transfer.

110

Thus, even though a sound recording is

not one of the enumerated works in the Copyright Act that can be specially

ordered or commissioned as a work made for hire, record labels still attempt

to contractually make sound recordings works made for hire in order to grant

the label greater control over the work. While courts may deem such a

contractual clause unenforceable, and while the few cases regarding

termination rights have been resolved in favor of the artist,

111

this does

nothing to prevent record labels from fighting an artist attempting to exercise

her termination rights. And, as the more powerful party in many situations,

the record label likely has greater resources to fight a lengthy suit and may

willing to do so in order to prevent an artist from exercising her termination

rights and losing its control over a lucrative asset—the artist’s works.

If sound recordings were deemed to be works made for hire, recording

artists’ property rights in their work and the control they can exert over their

work would be significantly limited. Particularly relating to recording artists

who already do not possess control over their works in the form of ownership

of the underlying musical composition, the inability to utilize the termination

provision would provide them with almost no rights in their work, which is

starkly against the creation incentives of utilitarian theory. To remedy this

problem, state laws could prohibit record labels from stipulating in recording

contracts that the recording artist is not an employee of the record label, but

the works are works made for hire nonetheless. The law would require that

either the artist must be considered an employee of the record label under the

contract (and be paid a salary and benefits accordingly), and thus works

would be deemed works made for hire; or the contract must provide that the

artist is not an employee of the record label, and thus any master recording

she makes would not be owned by the record label and would not be a work

made for hire.

Alternatively, state law can strengthen protections for recording artists

as independent contractors. California has recently addressed the work made

109

Elizabeth Henslee & William Henslee, You Don’t Own Me: Why Work for Hire Should Not Be

Applied to Sound Recordings, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 695, 711 (2011).

110

Id.

111

Abdullahi, supra note 105, at 476.

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

258

for hire problem in an amendment to its labor code.

112

Under the amendment,

recording artists are subject to stricter standards when a court determines

whether the artist is an employee or an independent contractor.

113

This

classification has important implications for the artist’s work. If the artist is

determined an employee, the artist’s work is a work made for hire and her

ownership rights are divested. If the artist is an independent contractor, her

work is her own creation and her ownership rights are preserved. This new

law—subjecting recording artists to a stricter legal test—makes it more

difficult to prove that a recording artist is an employee, as opposed to an

independent contractor. Thus, it is less likely that a recording artist’s work

will be considered a work made for hire when that was not the intention of

the parties. Therefore, state laws could also use this model of protecting

recording artists from crooked works-made-for-hire claims by record labels.

Changes to state law would not dramatically alter the copyright

landscape and are in line with European countries.

114

These changes would

simply prevent record labels from claiming exclusive ownership of sound

recording rights under a work-made-for-hire claim and would allow

recording artists to retain their termination rights. However, such laws would

still provide for works made for hire in appropriate situations. Additionally,

these changes would decrease frivolous lawsuits by record labels attempting

to deprive artists of their termination rights by claiming recordings as works

made for hire or would make it much clearer when a recording artist’s work

is a work made for hire and when it is not. Further, state laws of this nature

112

Legis. Assemb. B. No. 2257 (Cal. 2020), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient

.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB2257 [https://perma.cc/BUS8-WTYD]; CAL. LAB. CODE § 2780 (West

2020).

113

Id. The Amendment provides for the use of the multi-factor Borello test in determining whether

a recording artist is an employee or independent contractor, instead of the less-comprehensive ABC test.

See Anthony J. Oncidi et al., California Amends Independent Contractor Law (Again)—New Exemptions

for Music Industry Workers, Freelance Writers and Photographers, PROSKAUER (Sept. 9, 2020),

https://calemploymentlawupdate.proskauer.com/2020/09/california-amends-independent-contractor-law

-again-new-exemptions-for-music-industry-workers-freelance-writers-and-photographers/

[https://perma.cc/5ARN-ES9K]. The Borello test “requires consideration of all potentially relevant

facts—no single factor controls the determination.” Independent Contractor Versus Employee, STATE OF

CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. RELS., https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independentcontractor.htm

[https://perma.cc/D3W3-56VN].

114

See Fromer, supra note 41. Discussing French law, Fromer states

In fact, French copyright law . . . holds as “a dominant principle . . . that only a natural person

may be an author.” Therefore, French law, albeit with some exceptions, “precludes the

existence . . . of doctrines of works for hire that vest not only the initial ownership of copyright,

but also the status of author, in the employer.”

Id. at 1796 (quote omissions in original); see also Paul E. Geller, International Copyright: The

Introduction, 1 INT’L COPYRIGHT L. & PRAC. § 6[2][b][ii] (2018) (“German law vests all rights in a work

made on the job in the flesh-and-blood author of the work, but allows an employer to use this work,

effectively as a licensee, consistently with the underlying ‘service or employment relationship.’”).

18:239 (2021) You Belong with Me

259

would not be preempted by the Copyright Act, as sound recordings are not

specifically listed as works that can be specially ordered or commissioned as

works made for hire.

b. We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together:

Limiting the Duration of Recording Contracts

Additionally, state laws should limit the duration of recording contracts.

As explained previously, typical recording contracts are “stated in terms of

delivery, instead of specific time periods.”

115

In order to prevent the situation

in which an artist is stuck in a contract with a record label, state laws should

limit how long recording contracts can last. This would provide the artist

with an exit opportunity from an undesirable or limiting contract and enable

her to seek to negotiate a new contract with the same or a different label.

Under California law, personal service contracts may not last for a

duration of more than seven years.

116

However, the law provides an exception

for contracts rendering “personal service in the production of phonorecords

in which sounds are first fixed”

117

—or for contracts regarding master

recordings. Thus, for recording contracts, in order to get out of a contract of

a duration of more than seven years, the artist must give written notice to the

record label “specifying that the [artist] from and after a future date certain

specified in the notice will no longer render service under the contract.”

118

Further, the record label would then have the “right to recover damages for

a breach of the contract during its term”

119

and “for each phonorecord as to

which that party has failed to render service.”

120

Thus, California law does

not easily allow a recording artist to get out of a recording contract in a time

period less than seven years. California law should allow recording artists to

have the rights of other personal service contractors without the limitations

of a notice requirement. The law should also prevent a label from being able

to sue the artist for damages as to every unproduced phonorecord, and other

states should follow suit.

State law should place a time-limit—not based upon output—on

recording contracts, after which the recording artist is free to get out of the

contract. Recording contracts would then have to be tailored to end within

that time limit and the artist must be able to end the contract after that limit

without being sued for damages for breach of contract or for every

115

Chisolm, supra note 62, at 308.

116

CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 2007).

117

Id. § 2855(b).

118

Id. § 2855(b)(1).

119

Id. § 2855(b)(2).

120

Id. § 2855(b)(3).

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

260

unproduced phonorecord. Such a law would prevent artists from being held

in unfavorable contracts for an unknown and elongated duration. This would

allow recording artists to seek labels that offer them better deals and would

allow artists to leverage any increased bargaining power they may have

amassed since initially signing a contract. Such a law would be fair to the

artist and would spur creative activity by encouraging artists to seek

agreements that allow them to create what they want and give them a sense

of control over their creations.

B. Wildest Dreams:

Addressing Moral Rights

Moral rights provide artists with noneconomic protection of their

work.

121

Traditional moral rights include the rights of attribution and

integrity.

122

In 1990, Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).

123

The

Act provides for moral rights for artists of “work[s] of visual art.”

124

While

moral rights are provided to artists in many European countries, they are

generally not provided to artists in the U.S.

125

VARA adds a limited set of

moral rights to U.S. copyright law by providing creators of works of visual

art with the rights of attribution and integrity. Specifically, artists have the

right: (1) “to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of

visual art which he or she did not create;” and (2) “to prevent the use of his

or her name as the author of the work . . . in the event of a distortion,

mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to

his or her honor or reputation[.]”

126

VARA provides artists with control over

certain uses of their work they find offensive or degrading to their reputation.

VARA’s legislative history reveals that it was passed to recognize and

emphasize the importance of art and artists. The legislative history notes,

“[t]he arts are an integral element of our civilization; the arts are fundamental

to our national character and are among the greatest of our national

treasures.”

127

While VARA is an important step in incorporating moral rights into

U.S. copyright law, VARA’s limited nature is firmly rooted in utilitarian

121

See Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795,

801–02 (2001).

122

Id.

123

Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A.

124

Id.

125

ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY 37 (2009).

126

17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).

127

H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 7 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917.

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principles prevalent in the law. As expressed in the legislative history,

“[b]ecause of its limited nature, [VARA] protects the legitimate interests of

visual artists without inhibiting the rights of copyright owners and users, and

without undue interference with the successful operation of the American

128

In order to avoid excessive expansion of moral rights,

VARA only provides protection for works of visual art, which is a narrow

definition that does not include sound recordings.

129

However, VARA should

be expanded to specifically provide recording artists with moral rights

related to their masters. The language in VARA’s legislative history

acknowledges the importance of artists and the connection between an

artist’s work and her reputation.

130

However, there is no reason that an artists’

connection with her art should not extend beyond visual artists.

The legislative history provides scraps of rationale for the exclusion of

other types of artistic works, specifically audiovisual works. The legislative

history harps on the differences between visual works and audiovisual

works. Audiovisual works—unlike visual works—are usually works made

for hire, and the creator of the work does not typically have economic rights

in it.

131

Further, normally many copies of audiovisual works are produced

and distributed for commercial purposes.

132

Because there are many copies

of a single audiovisual work available, the destruction of one copy is not

detrimental to the creator because the copy is replaceable.

133

However, this

logic focuses solely on the physical destruction of a work of art as opposed

to the reputational alteration or mutilation of a work in the form of a

derivative work or other undesirable uses.

While a sound recording can be copied and distributed widely for

commercial gain like an audiovisual work, sound recordings are often not

considered works made for hire, and the creator retains economic rights in

the recording, unless they assign them. The artist does not necessarily create

the work with the knowledge that she will never own it.

Additionally, recording artists, like visual artists, are inextricably linked

to their work to the extent that “[a]ny distortion of such works is

automatically a distortion of the artists’ reputation. . . .”

134

Some scholars

argue that recording artists are more connected to their work than are visual

128

Id. at 10.

129

17 U.S.C. § 106A.

130

See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 6.

131

Id. at 9.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

Id. at 6.

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artists because “a voice is as distinctive and personal as a face. The human

voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested” and “the singer

manifests herself in the song.”

135

From the perspective that VARA is meant

to recognize the importance of art to an artists’ reputation, sound recordings

are akin to works of visual art.

Because works of visual art are different from sound recordings, the

rights of VARA do not have to be expanded to sound recordings in a parallel

fashion. VARA, as related to sound recordings, should provide the original

recording artist the right to prevent the use of her recording for purposes she

deems to be “prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.”

136

Like typical

VARA rights, this right shall not be transferrable and shall last for the

author’s lifetime,

137

but the right should not be waivable. Thus, even if the

original copyright owner in a sound recording no longer owns the copyright

in her work, she still retains control over her work in that she can object to

uses of her work she finds harmful or offensive to her reputation, such as use

of her song in an ad supporting the National Rifle Association when she is

an anti-gun advocate. Also, a record label or other entity should not be able

to attempt to take VARA rights away by providing waiver of such rights as

a contractual provision. Such a simple expansion of VARA would provide

recording artists with the important right of integrity. This would protect an

artist’s reputation with regard to her works and would provide her with an

important sense of control of property she deems as indistinguishable from

her person and reputation.

The right of integrity is provided for recording artists in the World

Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms

Treaty (WPPT). The U.S. is a signatory to the WPPT, but “[d]espite the

commitments the United States made in joining WPPT, the treaty has had no

effect on performers’ [(including recording artists’)] rights under domestic

law.”

138

Under U.S. law, such moral rights must be specifically contracted

for in order for an artist to exercise them.

139

Providing recording artists with

such moral rights would simply bring the U.S. into compliance with its

obligations under the WPPT. Further, some European countries, such as

France and Germany, provide performers with moral rights.

140

Thus,

135

Tuneen E. Chisolm, In Lieu of Moral Rights for IP-Wronged Music Vocalists: Personhood

Theory, Moral Rights, and the WPPT Revisited, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 453, 453–54 (2018) (internal

quotations omitted) (quoting Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988)).

136

17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).

137

Id. § 106A(d)(3), (e)(1).

138

Mary LaFrance, Are We Serious About Performers’ Rights?, 5 IP THEORY 81, 89 (2015).

139

Id.

140

See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] art. L212-2

(Fr.); URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [URHG] [ACT ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS] § 75, Sept. 9. 1965,

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providing these rights would also bring the U.S. into harmony with other

countries.

IX. LONG STORY SHORT:

CONCLUSION

Taylor Swift’s public desire to own her masters is both reasonable and

understandable. She and all artists work hard to create their work and deserve

to have ultimate control over it. Thus, increasing both property rights and

moral rights for artists under U.S. copyright law and implementing state laws

that protect artists’ property rights will reward the very people who create

the valuable capital copyright law painstakingly attempts to protect and will

incentivize them to create. Implementing changes to U.S. copyright law and

state laws that provide greater control and are fairer to artists further the goals

of copyright law.

BGBl. I S. 1273 (Ger.), translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg

.html [https://perma.cc/B44C-JZ2N].

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