OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COMMANDER
CIVIL AIR PATROL
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AUXILIARY
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 36112-5967
ICL 24-01
22 April 24
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL CAP UNIT COMMANDERS
FROM: CAP/CC
SUBJECT: Interim Change Letter – CAPR70-1, Civil Air Patrol Flight Management
1. This interim change letter immediately changes CAPR 70-1, Civil Air Patrol Flight Management
and will remain in effect until CAPR 70-1 is revised. Compliance with this letter is mandatory.
2. CAPR 70-1 is immediately changed as follows:
Paragraph 4.3.1.1.6 is added: As of 1 May 2024, complete annual Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Security Awareness training.
Paragraph 6.2.2 is changed to read: “CAP Cadets, qualified CAP Transport Mission Pilots and
CAP Mission Pilots are authorized to use CAP airplanes for flight instruction toward any FAA
certificate or rating. CAP Cadets training in CAP airplanes toward their Private Pilot Certificate
are restricted to C-172 model airplane.”
Paragraph 8.2, Suspension of CAP Flying Privileges - Mishap is changed to read: “Suspension
of CAP Flying Privileges – Safety Significant Occurrences. (This paragraph does not apply to
reportable Near Miss events as defined in CAPR 160-2). Any crewmember involved in a Safety
Significant Occurrence (SSO) resulting in damage to an aircraft, as defined in CAPR 160-2, is
automatically suspended from flying as a crewmember until a commander in their chain-of-
command, or an Incident Commander (IC) during a supervised mission, has been apprised of
the circumstances of the SSO. Using contemporaneously available information, the
commander shall determine which of the conditions described in the following
subparagraphs apply and take the prescribed action.”
Paragraph 8.2.1, is changed to read: “If the SSO appears to have been caused by crew action
or inaction that creates an ongoing concern regarding their readiness for continued flying
duties (e.g., willful violation, excessive risk tolerance, disregard for procedures, lack of
proficiency, etc.), the commander shall suspend those specific crew members “for cause”
using the procedures described in 8.1. A determination that pilot error was causal to a SSO
does not necessarily require suspension for cause. For example, damage to an aircraft tire
due to improper braking technique would not necessarily create an ongoing concern
warranting a suspension for cause. However, such an event would be viewed differently if
excessive braking was required as a result of landing excessively long after an unstable
approach and a poor go-around decision.”
Paragraph 8.2.2, is changed to read: “If it appears that the SSO could be defined as an aircraft
accident per CAPR 160-2, the commander shall suspend all crewmembers using the same