Outline for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Paper

U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES IN COMBAT, 1991-2003

Dr. Daniel L. Haulman 9 June 2003

Executive Summary

Between 1991 and 2003, the United States used a variety of unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAVs) in combat operations. These included the Pioneer, the Pointer, the

Hunter, the Predator, the Global Hawk, the Dragon Eye, the Desert Hawk, and the

Shadow. During those thirteen years the role of UAVs expanded from mere

reconnaissance to target designation and attack. Advantages of UAVs over manned

aircraft systems include eliminating pilot risk, saving money, providing long-term real-

time video reconnaissance, and reducing the time between target identification and

destruction. UAVs are especially useful for extremely long reconnaissance missions and

for missions in areas of extreme danger. The percentage of unmanned aircraft sorties

should continue to grow as UAV capabilities increase.

Table I: U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Used in Operations, 1990-2003

UAV Type Operations Years Used Locations

RQ-2 Pioneer DESERT STORM

ALLIED FORCE

IRAQI FREEDOM

1991

1999

2003

Kuwait, Iraq

Serbia

Iraq

FQM-151 Pointer DESERT STORM

IRAQI FREEDOM

1991

2003

Kuwait

Iraq

RQ-5 Hunter ALLIED FORCE

IRAQI FREEDOM

1999

2003

Serbia

Iraq

RQ-1 Predator PROVIDE PROMISE,

JOINT ENDEAVOR,

JOINT GUARD

SOUTHERN WATCH

ALLIED FORCE

ENDURING FREEDOM

IRAQI FREEDOM

1995-1997

(1998)-2003

1999

2001-

2003

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Iraq

Serbia

Afghanistan

Iraq

MQ-1 Predator ENDURING FREEDOM

IRAQI FREEDOM

2001-

2003

Afghanistan

Iraq

RQ-4 Global

Hawk

ENDURING FREEDOM

IRAQI FREEDOM

2001-

2003

Afghanistan

Iraq

Dragon Eye IRAQI FREEDOM 2003 Iraq

Desert Hawk IRAQI FREEDOM 2003 Iraq

RQ-7 SHADOW 2003 Iraq

Table II: UAV and Manned Reconnaissance Aircraft Advantages

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Manned Aircraft

No casualties Faster

Less expensive per aircraft (the cost of the

original Predator was a fifth that of an F-

16)

Direct control and more situational

awareness allows greater flexibility

Can fly longer missions to provide near

real-time reconnaissance (not subject to

human endurance limitations)

Better performance in bad weather

Reduces time between target identification

and destruction

Airframes incorporate more stealth

technology

Space and payload for pilot and life support

equipment available for other uses

Not as dependent on ground and satellite

signals that may fail

Can fly into more hostile environments More likely to return if hit

Smaller (more difficult to detect than

manned aircraft without stealth)

Refuelable by aerial tanker

Easier to store and ship Tolerates rougher runways

Table III: UAV and Satellite Advantages

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Satellites

Less expensive Not subject to weather

Easier to launch (in long run uses less fuel) Stays aloft much longer

Can carry weapon to destroy target More difficult for enemy to detect

Can be retrieved more easily More difficult for enemy to destroy

Can be replaced more easily Little maintenance required

Can loiter over target area More stable platform for cameras/sensors

Can fly much closer to target Imagery generally of higher quality

Easier to repair Does not need to be refueled

LESSONS LEARNED

• UAV flights should be carefully synchronized with each other and with the

flights of other systems.

• UAVs should be improved to reduce their vulnerability to weather, enemy

air defenses, and mechanical and communication failures.

• UAVs should be specialized and used for a greater variety of missions.

• The Air Force should develop countermeasures to enemy UAVs.

ELABORATIONS

• UAV flights should be carefully synchronized with each other and with

the flights of other systems.

Modern air component commanders lead an orchestra of air and space assets.

Instruments include manned and unmanned aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, and

satellites. Each instrument offers its own advantages and disadvantages. Familiarity with

the strengths and weaknesses of various UAVs allows commanders to select them for the

most appropriate missions depending on such factors as threat, weather, and time.

Unmanned aircraft should supplement rather than replace manned systems and satellites.

Over Bosnia and Serbia in the 1990s, for example, satellites and manned airplanes

provided reconnaissance from high altitudes, but UAVs were needed at lower altitudes

where enemy air defenses increased risks to airborne pilots.

Commanders have had more success with UAVs when they were flown in

coordination with manned aircraft and satellites. For example, UAVs operated more

successfully after air supremacy or at least superiority has been achieved. Moreover,

armed UAVs and unarmed UAVs working together can enhance the utility of each.

In high-sortie operations, the number of UAV sorties should rise with the number

of manned aircraft strike sorties because of the need for more target imagery. During

Operation ALLIED FORCE over Serbia in 1999, for example, there were sometimes as

many as 300 manned aircraft strike sorties on a day on which only four UAVs were

airborne at a time.

Not enough real-time imagery was available to accurately strike all

the targets.

During the same operation, certain targets lacked UAV coverage, while others

had too much. All UAV units posted liaison officers at the Combined Air Operations

Center (CAOC). Despite this, USAF Predators and U.S. Army Hunter UAVs sometimes

arrived over the same targets at the same time and ended up observing and recording each

other. This duplication of effort demonstrated the need to centralize UAV control and to

improve mission planning.

UAVs offer real-time video simultaneously to decision-makers regardless of how

far they are from the battlefield. Commanders far from the battlefield, and in some cases

outside the theater, have sometimes diverted or preempted flights launched by local

commanders.

Field commanders have complained that UAVs have encouraged

micromanagement of the air battle. During Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999, some

NATO pilots were angered because a commander in Italy using a UAV as his “eye in the

sky” denied their requests to attack targets of opportunity. Such oversight was intended

to limit civilian casualties. What appeared to a pilot of a high-flying attack aircraft to be

an armored column might turn out to be a refugee convoy. At times the ground

commander wanted to send a UAV over the target to verify it. By the time the relatively

slow UAV arrived over the target area, the target sometimes disappeared. The delay

meant lost opportunity.

In Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM in 2001-2003,

the need to coordinate UAV flights with the flights of manned strike aircraft decreased

because increasing numbers of Predators could strike the targets they found, firing air-to-

ground missiles. Once they discovered an enemy asset, usually on a moving vehicle,

they could destroy it before it got away. Sometimes calling in additional aircraft was not

necessary.

In the future cruise missiles might take out most fixed targets while UAVs destroy

mobile targets. Commanders will have to plan carefully to avoid collisions. Several

UAVs might fly in cooperative groups or in formation. This will require enhanced

mission control capabilities and automatic collision avoidance. The need to coordinate

the flights of UAVs with other aircraft, manned or unmanned, is likely to increase.

A warrior is more eager to shoot one of many arrows than to throw his only spear.

More willing to lose is more willing to use. Theater commanders have been more willing

to risk UAVs than manned aircraft at low altitudes over enemy territory because they

have been more willing to sacrifice them. Being less expensive and having no pilots to

preserve or rescue, UAVs sometimes flew where manned aircraft did not. The greater

expendability of UAVs has encouraged theater commanders to use aircraft where they

were not used before.

• UAVs should be improved to reduce their vulnerability to weather,

enemy air defenses, and mechanical and communication failures.

In the years 1990-2003, UAV proved to be more vulnerable than manned aircraft

to bad weather, enemy air defenses, and mechanical and communication failures. By

1998, the peacetime attrition rate for the Pioneer UAV was 17 times higher than that for

manned aircraft.

By early 2002, 23 of 65 Predators built, or over a third, had crashed.

During combat operations between 1999 and 2003, at least 19 UAVs crashed. The exact

cause of each loss over enemy territory is not always evident because there is no pilot to

confirm why the craft went down. No doubt the enemy claimed to have destroyed some

that went down because of weather or mechanical failure.

UAVs proved to be fair weather aircraft. During Operation DESERT STORM in

1991, rain eroded the laminated wood propellers of Pioneer UAVs.

During the 1990s,

precipitation, fog, and crosswinds often prevented safe takeoffs and landings.

Lightweight UAVs such as the Predator, the Hunter, and the Pioneer were less able to

cope with high winds than heavier manned aircraft. The Predator in Afghanistan during

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, for example, could not take off or land when

crosswinds exceeded 17 knots.

The early Predator models were especially susceptible

to wing icing and could not be used in freezing weather. In December 1998,

commanders withdrew Predators from Hungary because of winter icing problems.

least three Predators crashed in Afghanistan between October 2001 and February 2002

because of bad weather and ice.

A first-generation Predator could not be equipped with

de-icing equipment without degrading its ability to carry a full complement of sensors or

a full fuel load.

The larger and more powerful MQ-9 Predator B is equipped with de-

icing equipment.

Even the faster, heavier, and more robust Global Hawk UAV

demonstrated poor performance in bad weather. At least one of the two lost in

Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM crashed because of poor

weather.

Heat was another UAV weather nemesis. Predators based in Pakistan and Kuwait

during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, SOUTHERN WATCH, and IRAQI

FREEDOM endured temperatures as high as 113 degrees. Despite use of sunshades in

front of hangars, mobile ground cooling units, shorter taxi distances, and streamlined

ground checks, excessive heat threatened to cause structural damage to the aircraft and to

degrade the critical electronic communication links that guided them. Launches became

impossible during the middle of the day in the summer.

Besides weather, enemy air defenses brought down many UAVs in the period

between 1991 and 2003. In comparison with manned aircraft, they generally flew lower

and slower, were less stealthy, were more fragile, and flew in areas of greater risk.

Enemy antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and interceptors brought down as

many as 16 UAVs over Bosnia, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the years 1995-2002.

Iraqi air defenses downed no manned aircraft in those years but destroyed at least four

Predators. In the Balkans, Serb machine gunners in helicopters downed a few UAVs

while flying alongside them.

During its first overseas deployment between July and

November 1995, the Predator system lost three airplanes, at least two to Serb ground

fire.

The Air Force could improve the survivability of UAVs in a number of ways, such

as making them faster, flying them higher, making them more durable, making them

more stealthy, equipping them with chaff, and flying them only in areas in which air

supremacy has already been attained.

Such efforts would make UAVs more costly,

reducing one of their advantages over manned aircraft. Moreover, if UAVs flew only

where risk was slight, they would not be needed in place of manned aircraft.

Table IV: USAF Manned Aircraft and UAV Operational Losses, March 1999-May

2003

Operation Manned aircraft

losses

UAV losses

ALLIED FORCE

(Serbia)

2 (F-16 and F-117) 4 Predators

ENDURING FREEDOM

(Afghanistan)

3 (B-1, 2 MC-130s) 9 (7 Predators, 2 Global Hawks)

SOUTHERN WATCH

(Iraq)

0 5 Predators

IRAQI FREEDOM

(Iraq)

2 (F-15, A-10) 1 Predator

TOTAL 7 19 (17 Predators, 2 Global Hawks)

Despite their vulnerability to enemy air defenses, UAVs were more often the

victims of mechanical or communication failure. Many of the UAVs were so small and

light that their mechanical systems lacked the redundancy and durability built as a matter

of course into manned aircraft. Certain UAV models were rushed to the battlefield even

as they were being developed and had not been tested extensively. Landing gear on some

UAVs was lighter and more prone to fail than that on manned aircraft. Runways had to

be especially flat and smooth for the generally delicate and fragile UAVs. The Predator

RQ-1A, for example, demanded a 5,000 by 125-foot hard surface runway.

In 2001, the

Pentagon’s operational test and evaluation office argued that the Predator UAV system

was “not operationally effective or suitable.”

At about the same time, a RAND study

questioned the Predator’s operational suitability based on its maintainability, reliability,

safety, and supportability.

UAVs fell not only to mechanical but also to communication failures. Because

pilots at remote ground stations guided them in flight, UAVs depended more than

manned aircraft upon ground stations and satellite links. In the years through 2003, such

communications were often broken or interrupted by such factors as bad weather,

electronics failures, or enemy jamming.

During Operation DESERT STORM in 1991,

friendly electromagnetic interference caused a Pioneer UAV to crash.

To control the

aircraft, the ground station had to have a direct line-of-sight connection with the aircraft,

preventing the UAV from descending behind mountains, buildings, or trees without

losing the link.

The Predator was the first operational UAV to use the global

positioning system (GPS) for navigation, eliminating the need for a direct line of sight

connection with a ground station, but communications remained a problem.

September 2002, a Predator flying in the southwest Asia theater flew into a cloud and lost

contact with its operator. The pilot reestablished communication with it twice, but the

UAV would not respond to his signals and failed to return.

The absence of an on-board pilot with situational awareness able to compensate

for unexpected aircraft movements contributed to UAV losses. Generally, UAV pilots

with experience flying manned aircraft controlled UAVs more effectively than those

without such experience. They were more familiar with the behavior of aircraft in

various situations and were more likely to respond appropriately.

• UAVs should be specialized and used for a greater variety of missions.

UAVs began only as reconnaissance instruments. During Operation DESERT

STORM in 1991, the U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, and Army had as much success with the

Pioneer UAV as a reconnaissance drone as the U.S. Air Force with the Lightning Bug in

Vietnam. For example, a Pioneer flying over northeastern Saudi Arabia detected the

Iraqi attack on Khafji, enabling U.S. air strikes to decimate the invaders. Pioneers also

served as artillery spotters for a battleship in the Persian Gulf.

The Air Force acquired the Predator UAV from its joint Defense Department

developers after it demonstrated its reconnaissance capability over Bosnia in the mid-

1990s, but that role was not enough.

During Operation ALLIED FORCE over Serbia in

1999, the Air Force equipped some of its Predators with laser designators so that they

could mark armored targets for manned attack aircraft, but the war ended before they

could be used.

During Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM,

Predators and Global Hawks supplied real-time imagery directly to airborne AC-130s,

fighter, and bombers so that the strike airplanes could concentrate on hitting rather than

finding their targets.

In Serbia, Predators sometimes detected targets such as tanks and enemy troop

formations that moved before manned aircraft could arrive to strike them. This delay

between discovery and destruction of a target encouraged the Air Force to arm the

Predator with missiles.

In 2001, the Air Force successfully test-fired Hellfire air-to-

surface missiles from Predators against armored vehicles on the ground in Nevada. This

allowed the Predator to destroy a target almost immediately after finding it. In 2002

during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, armed Predators serving the Central

Intelligence Agency destroyed human targets on the ground, performing as attack aircraft

in combat for the first time. In Afghanistan, Predators fired some 40 Hellfire missiles by

the end of 2002.

The Air Force used Predators for both reconnaissance and attack over

Iraq during the last full year of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in 2002, targeting

mobile air defense systems. On March 22, 2003, a Predator found and destroyed a radar-

guided antiaircraft artillery site in southern Iraq, firing an AGM-114K “Hellfire II”

missile. It was the first Predator strike of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

The Air Force’s attack version of the Predator is called the MQ-1. A larger

Predator attack aircraft called the MQ-9 is under development.

The newer, larger

Predators have more powerful turboprop engines, higher ceilings, strengthened wings,

greater payload capabilities, and wing de-icing systems. They can carry up to eight

Hellfire missiles.

In addition, the Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency is developing a new unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) designed

from the start as a strike aircraft. Called the X-45, it will work with manned systems to

suppress enemy air defenses, and might eventually take the place of the F-117.

Large

and fast, the X-45 will incorporate stealth technology and possibly an in-flight refueling

capability.

It might even use directed radiation as a weapon.

Another experimental

UAV called the X-47 is also being developed for use on ships.

For strategic reconnaissance and surveillance, the Air Force developed Global

Hawk. Designed as an alternative to the U-2, the Global Hawk can fly faster, higher, and

farther than the Predator. It is also much larger to accommodate more sensor equipment

and fuel. After test flights from the west coast to Alaska and Australia, the Global Hawk

entered combat during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan after the

terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, supplementing Predator

missions.

During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the Air Force first used a new Force

Protection Airborne Surveillance System (FPASS) involving small UAVs nicknamed

Desert Hawk. They provided local surveillance around the perimeter of U.S. controlled

air bases in Afghanistan. Desert Hawk UAVs also protected air bases in Kuwait during

the last stages of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and in Iraq during Operation IRAQI

FREEDOM.

Table V: Comparison of Predator and Global Hawk

Category Predator (RQ-1) Global Hawk (RQ-4)

Cruise

Speed

84 miles per hour 400 miles per hour

Altitude

Up to 25,000 feet (RQ-1A)

Up to 45,000 feet (RQ-1B)

Up to 65,000 feet

Range

454 miles (for 24 hour loiter) 1,380 miles (for 24 hour loiter)

Payload

450 pounds (RQ-1A)

750 pounds (RQ-1B)

2,000 lbs.

Length

27 feet 44 feet

Wingspan

48.7 feet 116 feet

Sensors

Television, infrared, synthetic

aperture radar

Electro-optical, infrared, synthetic

Aperture radar

Use

Tactical reconnaissance

(RQ-1B adds missile capability)

Strategic reconnaissance

And surveillance

The X-45, Global Hawk, Predator, and Desert Hawk were designed for different

purposes. They were not interchangeable. Each UAV had its own advantages and

disadvantages for certain missions. The same was true for UAVs of the other services.

Centralized UAV development during the period 1993-1998 convinced the Department

of Defense that each service should be allowed to develop its own UAV types because

one design could not satisfy all the services.

The U.S. Navy, for example, desired

UAVs capable of being launched from ships and hovering over one spot, and the Marine

Corps favored small man-portable UAVs. The X-47 Pegasus, that flew experimentally

in 2003, was designed to launch from and land on an aircraft carrier.

The

Hummingbird UAV will fly like an Army helicopter, taking off and landing vertically.

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM the Marines used a very small surveillance UAV

called Dragon Eye. The Air Force’s 46

Test Group at Holloman AFB, New Mexico,

teamed up with New Mexico State University’s Physical Science Laboratory to create an

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Test Center (UTEC) to evaluate various new models of

USAF UAVs.

• The Air Force should develop countermeasures to enemy UAVs.

Although the United States currently leads the world in the development of UAVs

for combat, that was not always the case. In the 1970s, Israel led the world in UAV

development. In the future, enemies of the United States might develop their own UAV

capabilities, partly because they are less expensive and do not risk pilots. Whatever

weapon the United States uses successfully against other countries might one day be used

against the United States.

When Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the case against Iraq at the

United Nations before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, he warned that Iraq was developing

its own unmanned aerial vehicles to dispense chemical and biological agents.

The

Anglo-American invasion of Iraq removed the threat, but terrorists might consider the use

of unmanned aerial vehicles as a cheap alternative to the use of manned aircraft. For that

reason, the United States should not only be developing UAVs but also developing

countermeasures to them.

The Future

The history of UAVs in combat has revealed much about their weaknesses and

strengths and has given insight into how their utility can be improved. Between 1991 and

2003, UAVs proved to be useful for only part of the spectrum of air roles and missions.

They were not yet capable of shooting down enemy airplanes, airlifting troops or

equipment, dropping heavy bombs, or refueling other aircraft. They complemented and

supplemented manned airplanes but did not yet make them obsolete. UAVs probably

will never replace manned aircraft or satellites completely, but they will provide a

commander with more tools. The continued development of the attack UAV as an

instrument of strategic bombardment, interdiction, or close air support will no doubt

produce new lessons about how and when they should be employed with other manned

and unmanned systems.

UAVs will increasingly take the place of manned aircraft, assuming some of the

roles they fulfilled in the past. Future unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) can

conceivably outmaneuver manned jets because the latter have reached the limits of the

human body to turn and accelerate. Some day UAVs might even dogfight, controlled by

remote pilots on the ground who can direct their craft without concern for how many Gs

they can tolerate.

Technological improvements in UAV performance are already underway. Newer

UAVs under development should have more autonomous control so that they need less

pilot correction. This will include automatic collision avoidance. Improved mission

control capabilities should allow multiple UAVs to fly in a cooperative groups and

formations. Improved coordination of UAV flights with the flights of manned aerial

vehicles, satellites, cruise missiles, and other UAVs would further enhance their utility.

More unitized structures, with fewer parts, joints, and fasteners, should reduce weight,

cost, and repairs.

Future UAV airframes will increasingly incorporate antennas and

sensors as wing and fuselage components. Active flow control technology should

reduce propulsive volume, allowing UAVs to be smaller, lighter, and carry more payload.

Increasing UAV fuel efficiency or increasing fuel capacity will allow unmanned aerial

vehicles to fly farther, conduct more complex missions, and loiter longer. It would also

allow commanders to require fewer UAVs. Weaponized UAVs of the future might

employ not only heavier and more advanced precision guided munitions but also

directed energy weapons such as destructive laser beams.

Making UAVs faster would decrease their vulnerability to enemy fire and

increase their ability to confirm the hostility of potential targets in time for manned

aircraft strikes. Increasing UAV stealthiness and the variability of UAV flight paths

would also make them harder for an enemy to knock down. Giving them more all-

weather capability by the addition of more effective deicing equipment would also

improve their utility in the winter. Increasing the quality of UAV sensors through

miniaturization would reduce the need for U-2 and satellite reconnaissance. Real time

video imagery could be enhanced. UAVs might have to sacrifice some of their small size

and lightness to accommodate some of the additional equipment necessary for effectively

countering enemy air defenses. For example, UAVs might dispense flares and chaff

like manned aircraft. Reducing the ability of enemy defenders to jam UAV

communications would also enhance the vehicles’ performance.

Adding an inflight

refueling system would allow UAVs to loiter longer over enemy territory without having

to return all the way to home base. Improving landing gear and increasing weight to

counter crosswinds would allow UAVs to take off and land on more airfields and at more

times. In a December 11, 2002 speech, President George W. Bush commented, “Now it

is clear that the military does not have enough unmanned aerial vehicles.”

As the

percentage of combat aircraft that are unmanned increases, the roles they fill will also

increase.

Dr. Daniel L. Haulman

Air Force Historical Research Agency

There are some exceptions. Air Force Chief of Staff General Ryan envisioned the Global Hawk as a

replacement for, and not a complement to, the U-2. Thomas P. Ehrhard, A Comparative Study of Weapon

System Innovation: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the United States Armed Services (Washington, DC:

Johns Hopkins University Dissertation, 2000) 558.

Ehrhard, 546. Tim Ripley, “UAVs Over Kosovo_Did the Earth Move?”

(http://www.defense_data.com/features/fpage34.htm

) 3.

Capt. Brian P. Tice, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: The Force Multipliers of the 1990s,” Airpower Journal

(Spring 1991) (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/4spr91.htsml

) 7.

Ripley, 3.

Ibid, 2.

Ibid, 4.

“Transforming the Future of Warfare with Unmanned Air Vehicles,” Air Force Research Laboratory, Air

Vehicles Directorate, (http://www.afrlhorizons.com/Briefs/Sep02/VA0209.html

) 1-2.

Ehrhard, 375.

Marc C. Herold, “The Problem With the Predator,” (http://www.cursor.org/stories/dronesyndrome.htm)

3-4.

Ehrhard, 374-375.

“ENDURING FREEDOM Watchdog Group Doubts Predator UAV Claims”

(http://www.analisidefesa.com/numero22/eng/ef-watch.htm

) 1. “Predator UAV Crashes in Bosnia”

(http://www.aeronautics.ru/nws001/astra01.htm

) 1.

Ripley, 1.

“Q and A on the Use of Predator in Operation Enduring Freedom,” Center for Defense Information, 11

February 2002 (http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/predator.cfm) 2.

Richard Newman, “The Little Predator That Could,” Air Force Magazine vol. 85 no. 3 (March 2002) 4.

John D. Gresham, “March of the Robots,” The Year In Defense, 2002 edition

(http://www.aviation100.com/web04/yid/articles/robots.pdf) 178

“Q and A on the Use of Predator in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,” 11 February 2002

(http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/predator.cfm) 2.

Background Paper on Predator OEF Operational Issues, CFACC/C4, undated, supporting document 47 in

History of U.S. Central Command Air Forces (Forward) for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and

SOUTHERN WATCH, September 2001-May 2002, vol. II (S). Information used is unclassified.

Ehrhard, 620. Ripley, 7-8. Robert Burns, “Pentagon Reports Unmanned U.S. Plane Missing Over Iraq;

Iraq Says It Shot It Down,” North County Times,

28 August 2001

(http://www.nctimes.net/news/2001/20010828/62456.html

) 2. Newman, 2.

Ripley, 4.

“RQ-1 Predator MAE UAV,” FAS Intelligence Resource Program

(http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/predator.htm) 3.

Ehrhard, 621. Marcus Corbin, “Transformational Stars: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or Unmanned

Ground Vehicles?” Center for Defense Information, 11 June 2002 (http://www.defense-

aerospace.com/data/features/data/fe238/) 1. Tice, 5.

“RQ-1 Predator MAE UAV” FAS Intelligence Resource Program

(http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/predator.htm

) 1.

Newman, 3.

Ehrhard, 541.

Newman, 4.

Ehrhard, 374-375.

Herold, 3. Tice, 5.

Ehrhard, 535.

“Pilot Error Causes Predator Loss,” Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI)

website (http://www.auvsi.org/news/index.cfm

Ehrhard, 619.

Ibid, 539-541.

UAV Forum, News 1999 (http://www.adroit.com/uavforum/library/news99.htm) 5. Newman, 2.

Newman, 5. Air Force Magazine vol. 86 no. 5 (May 2003) 15.

The USAF as early as 1971 experimented with UAVs as attack vehicles, launching a Maverick missile

from a Lightning Bug drone to destroy a ground target. Ehrhard, appendix 8.

Andrew Brookes, “Lessons from Afghanistan,” Air Forces Monthly issue 169 (April 2002) 21.

“First Predator Strike Takes Out Anti-Air Threat,” (http://www.af.mil/stories/32303137.shtml) 1. “MQ-1

UAV Killed AAA,” Air Force Magazine

vol. 86 no 5 (May 2003) 18.

“Predator Successes Spawn Enhancements,” Jane’s International Defense Review vol. 35 no. 4 (April

2002) 12.

“Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, USA” (http://www.army_technology.com/projects/predator/) 1.

John D. Gresham, “March of the Robots,” 178.

Michael Sirak, “UCAV Programme Nears First Flight,” Jane’s Defence Weekly vol. 37 no. 10 (6 March

2002) 9. “X-45 UCAV Pumps Iron for its Next Bout,” Jane’s International Defense Review

vol. 35 no. 4

(April 2002) 11.

Ehrhard, 558-559.

“U.S. Military Robots Employed in Iraqi War,” Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems

International (AUVSI) website (http://www.auvsi.org/iraq/index.cfm

). “Force Protection Airborne

Surveillance System,” AeroMech Engineering, Inc. (http://www.aeromechengineering.com/FPASS%2011-

15.htm) 1-2.

Ehrhard, 566.

“Pegasus Takes Flight,” Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) website

(http://www.auvsi.org/news/index.cfm

“Hummingbird Hums Along,” Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI)

website (http://www.auvsi.org/news/index.cfm

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