The Global State
of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
© 2022 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
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THE GLOBAL STATE
OF DEMOCRACY 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
ii
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
Contents
Contents
Acronyms and abbreviations iii
Preface iv
Acknowledgements vi
Introduction vii
Chapter 1
Global trends 2
1.1. Global Patterns 6
Chapter 2
Regional trends 10
2.1. Africa and West Asia 10
2.2. Asia and the Pacic 18
2.3. Europe 24
2.4. The Americas 28
Chapter 3
Recommendations 35
3.1. Global recommendations 35
3.2. Regional recommendations 36
Chapter 4
Conclusion 39
Endnotes 40
About International IDEA 51
About the Global State of Democracy initiative 52
iii
International IDEA
2022
Acronyms and abbreviations
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
COPs Conferences of the Parties
EMB Electoral management body
GRECO Group of States Against Corruption
GSoD Indices Global State of Democracy Indices
IEBC Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (Kenya)
International IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
LGBTQIA+ Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex and asexual
NUP National Unity Platform (Uganda)
SAIIA South African Institute of International Affairs
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
iv
Preface
The fourth edition of the Global State of Democracy
Report comes at a time when democracy is under both
literal and gurative assault around the world. The
steady drumbeat of such warnings—included in the
previous edition of this report, which was produced at
the height of the Covid-19 pandemic—always runs the
risk of becoming background noise, as today’s crisis
can quickly become tomorrow’s new normal. But the
dangers are real. Beyond the lingering pandemic, today’s
wars and a looming global recession, lies the challenge
of climate change and all it entails—severe weather
events, the necessary green transition and multi-fold
consequences for democratic governance.
Much has changed since International IDEA produced
its rst Global State of Democracy Report in 2017,
authored on the eve of Brexit and soon after the
election of Donald Trump. That report mixed cautious
optimism about the previous decades’ advances in
democracy with warnings about more recent ‘trendless
uctuations’—a stagnation of democracy, rather than
its erosion. It is a testament to how political shocks can
quickly reorient our thinking. This report will once again
take up the argument that it is democracy, rather than
21st century inventions such as electoral autocracy or
illiberal democracy—let alone the resurrection of 19th
century imperial revanchism and spheres of inuence—
that provides the necessary tools to solve today’s urgent
problems.
The recent series of global crises—including the Russian
invasion of Ukraine and conicts in Ethiopia, Myanmar,
Syria and Yemen, and their rippling effects—appear to
indicate the emergence of a new status quo, dened by
radical volatility and uncertainty, rather than a deviation
from previous historical trends.
Global opinion surveys show that this period has
coincided with declining public faith in the value of
democracy itself. This is immensely worrying for those
who care about the fate of democracy, but sadly not
surprising. The core of any social contract is that
citizens consent to be governed in return for certain
core goods provided by those who govern. Yet the ability
of democracies around the world to provide key public
goods to their citizens and to close the gap between
social expectations and institutional performance is
increasingly at risk. These troubling questions were
present well before democracies had to address the
grotesque inequities within and between countries
exposed by the pandemic, and the ination, shortages,
and threats of a global economic downturn that have
followed.
But contrary to what democratic pessimists may
suggest, authoritarian countries and alternative systems
of government have not outperformed their democratic
peers. Discontent at the neverending stream of Chinese
lockdowns and the tens of thousands of draft dodgers
eeing Russia for an uncertain existence in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia show that it is not just in
democracies where the social contract is in urgent need
of renewal.
Social contracts vary depending on the cultural and
historical context, but all democracies share certain
core commonalties, including respect for individual
civil and political rights, fair and competitive elections,
a reasonably equal exercise of power by the governed
over their government, and effective access to a set of
entitlements that make a dignied and meaningful life
possible. There is now a growing popular realization that
many of the world’s social contracts are no longer t for
purpose.
In some states governments and their people are
renegotiating these social contracts. For example,
the collective uprising against the failed Rajapaksa
government in Sri Lanka cut across previous ethnic and
socio-political cleavages. But it is not a straightforward
process, as the rejection of Chile’s new draft constitution
has demonstrated.
In places as varied as El Salvador, Hungary, Iran and
Myanmar, governing elites are attempting to forge new,
or reinvigorate old social contracts using various anti-
democratic means. Iran and Myanmar are authoritarian
regimes in search of self-preservation. Sometimes
we refer to countries like El Salvador and Hungary as
‘backsliding’, a term that should not always be taken
to mean a clean reversion to an earlier pre-democratic
era; it can also mark a move towards a novel form of
International IDEA
2022
v
Preface
anti-democratic politics. We are not moving forwards
and backwards along a single line of development,
but exploring diverse possible political outcomes as
autocracies and democracies contest our possible
futures.
Democracy has the best chance of forging social
contracts for the 21st century, which can meet the
challenges of the future, particularly the endishly dicult
task of protecting fundamental rights and the ecological
balances on which the future of those rights and human
life depends. Democracy must be reinvigorated—not
because it needs to prevail in a presumed new Cold
War era, but because it still offers the best chance of
preserving what is needed for (and valuable in) human
life. This is the true measure of success for democracies
and societies in this day and age.
We are proud to present this report as part of
International IDEA’s contribution to the global debate
on the fate and course of democracy. Much of the
report focuses on the core place that democracy has in
securing a sustainable and just future—and the fact that
such a future is not foreordained but must be earned.
In many places it is being earned in the hardest of
ways. There are those who are, right now, demanding
the rights and freedoms that democracy promises
at immense personal risk. The people of Ukraine are
resisting the brutal Russian invasion, women in Iran are
standing up to a 40-year theocratic dictatorship, and
the people of Myanmar refuse to accept a return to
military rule. They are proving beyond a doubt that self-
determination, freedom and democracy are universal
aspirations. Many of them are paying the ultimate price
for these aspirations. Many of them will have no other
grave but our memory. We owe it to them to remember
their struggles every day, to commit our steadfast
support to their cause, and to make our work worthy of
their sacrice.
Kevin Casas-Zamora
Secretary-General, International IDEA
vi
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
Acknowledgements
This report was conceptualized and written by the
Democracy Assessment team at International IDEA,
with inputs from the Regional Europe, Africa and West
Asia, Americas and Asia and the Pacic programmes.
It was produced under the supervision of Kevin Casas-
Zamora, Massimo Tommasoli and Seema Shah and
edited by Alistair Scrutton and Seema Shah. Alexander
Hudson and Emily Bloom produced all the graphs
in the report. Lisa Hagman oversaw the publication
production process. Many thanks to Katherine
Chapanionek, Sandor Adam Gorni, and Theodor Thisell
for their invaluable assistance with fact checking, line
editing and production of graphs.
Notwithstanding all the generous advice, help
and comments received from external partners,
International IDEA takes sole responsibility for the
content of this report.
International IDEA
2022
vii
Introduction
At the end of 2022, the world is trapped beneath
the weight of a multitude of old and new problems.
There are myriad causes of political and economic
instability, including the spiking prices of food
and energy, ballooning ination and an impending
recession. These phenomena are occurring in the
unstable context of continuing climate change,
long unresolved inequality, the Covid-19 pandemic,
declining standards of living
1
and the Russian war of
aggression in Ukraine. Long-held assumptions have
been shaken; post-truth narratives have jeopardized
the legitimacy of credible electoral processes; and
inter-state war—including the threat of nuclear
attacks—has resurfaced.
Worryingly, the number of people who believe that
democracy is the answer to these problems is
shrinking. The Global State of Democracy’s latest
ndings reveal a decline in and stagnation of
democracy around the world. A close look at the data
reveals that while many democracies have put in
place the laws and infrastructure required to support
democratic institutions, unequal access to those
institutions is a serious and continuing problem.
Democratic institutions are especially critical in times
of crisis and fear. They ensure open pathways for the
information and communication that citizens and
governments need to be able to act responsively and
effectively. To rebuild and revitalize these institutions
and to re-establish trust between people and their
governments, it is necessary to develop new and
innovative social contracts that better reect the
changing global environment and that meaningfully
prioritize equal access to the mechanisms of
participation.
BOX 1
What is a social contract?
Social contracts are implicit agreements about what
governments provide their people in exchange for public
legitimacy. They reect an understanding of how people
solve shared problems, manage risks and pool resources
to deliver public goods, as well as how their collective
institutions and norms operate.
2
The type of social contract
that underpinned so much of the post-Cold War expansion of
democracy is now under strain, and governments and their
people must renegotiate the terms of their relationships.
People’s needs have evolved; basic economic and social
security are still required, but new challenges have sparked a
demand for different types of guarantees from the state.
For instance, education, social welfare and professional
growth systems must adapt to new needs introduced by
changing ways of working, different kinds of employment,
and new technologies—and recognize the importance of
the care economy and multiple forms of inequality.
3
In an
interconnected global context,
4
social contracts must be
forward-looking to integrate protections against tomorrow’s
threats.
Renewed social contracts must also be grounded in equity.
It is no longer enough for the state to provide opportunities;
it must proactively design systems that facilitate access
to those opportunities in ways that put traditionally
marginalized groups at the centre while ensuring that there
are protections in place to mitigate the creation of newly
marginalized groups. New social contracts must establish
mechanisms that mitigate toxic polarization within societies
and mistrust between governments and their people by
providing the structures and institutions necessary to
develop and maintain shared citizenship.
New social contracts must address particular contexts
(see Box 1). In Asia and the Pacic, ethno-nationalist
parties are changing the face of what were once
considered to be some of the most diverse societies
in the world. Inequality—as seen through poverty,
access to services, violence, corruption and climate
change—cuts across these contexts and drives people’s
demands for change.
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
Introduction
viii
The Russian war of aggression in Ukraine has
shaken Europe, forcing the region to rethink security
considerations and deal with impending food and
energy crises. It has also raised important questions
about the very nature of European and western
democracy, which has exhibited troubling double
standards with regard to migration and the plight of
refugees. These questions are all the more important in
the context of the rise of parties that espouse nativist
and xenophobic beliefs.
In Africa, decades of state capture by illiberal ‘strong
men’ leaders
5
have resulted in serious democratic
decline. Some leaders are resorting to desperate efforts
to change constitutions and legal frameworks to help
them maintain power. A growing number of young
people are anxious for change and want leaders who are
more responsive to their unique concerns. The ongoing
war in Ethiopia, where there have been allegations of
ethnocide, has bloodied the promise of democratic
reform, which had been a hope as recently as 2019. In
West Asia, authoritarian rule remains the norm, although
social turmoil in places like Iran, Iraq and Lebanon may
be evidence of public demand for new and more open
societies as well as more accountable leadership.
A diverse set of new challenges, including toxic
polarization and attacks on electoral management
bodies, is confronting the Americas; Haiti has
now joined Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela as an
authoritarian regime. Three out of seven backsliding
democracies are in this region, pointing to weakening
institutions even in longstanding democracies.
This report provides an overview of the global and
regional trends related to democracy and human rights,
along with examples of efforts to reinvigorate social
contracts around the world. It ends with a set of policy
recommendations designed to help policymakers
seeking to catalyse democratic reform.
1
International IDEA
2022
50%
0%
Countries moving
toward authoritarianism
Countries moving
toward democracy
1975 2021
1980 2021
1980 2021
The global context is rapidly changing, with pandemics,
wars and climate change creating new challenges for democracy.
New constitutions
Civic
education
Spaces for meaningful
youth participation
Stronger and updated
protection of freedom
of expression
Over the past six years, the number of
countries moving toward
authoritarianism is more than double
the number moving toward democracy.
The number of democracies has
stagnated
and there has been a slow
uptake of institutional innovation.
Redesigning social contracts, with an emphasis on responsive
service delivery, can help realize democratic innovation.
THIS INCLUDES:
At the same time, half of the world’s
democracies
are in retreat.
Among non-democracies, 50% are
becoming significantly more repressive.
This amounts to 1 in 5 of all countries.
Electoral integrity
guarantees
Participatory mechanisms
that channel public demands
into new laws and policies
Regional input integrated
into national and local
laws and policies
Severely contracting democracy
Stable democracy
Expanding democracy
Moderately contracting democracy
Non-democracies becoming more repressive
Democracy in retreat, social contracts
under pressure
Chapter 1
Global trends
2
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
BOX 2
The Global State of Democracy measurement methodology
The Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD Indices)
measure aspects of democracy and human rights that have
been central to International IDEA’s work for more than two
decades. While some primary data collection is conducted
within International IDEA, the majority of the input data for
the GSoD Indices are derived from 12 other publicly available
data sources, with a total of 116 input variables.
The indices are hierarchically organized. At the lowest level
are specic phenomena (such as Freedom of Expression or
Personal Integrity and Security) that we call subcomponents.
These are combined into measures of broader subattributes
(such as Civil Liberties or Clean Elections). Finally, the
subattribute indices are aggregated into our broadest
measures—the attributes of democracy. Each index is scaled
to range from 0 to 1; the boundaries are set by the best and
worst observed values across all country years. The GSoD
Indices do not include a singular value for democratic quality,
or any ranking of countries. Their primary utility is found in
the specic indices, which can be used to track progress over
time within countries, and to compare between them.
To group countries for analytical purposes, the GSoD
Indices also classify countries into three political regime
types—democracy, hybrid regime or authoritarian regime.
Democracies are dened as regimes that hold elections that
meet minimal standards of meaningfulness, competitiveness
and suffrage. Hybrid regimes perform at a mid-range level
or higher in Representative Government but do not meet this
electoral standard.
Within the category of democracies, the GSoD Indices also
include differentiations in overall performance to help group
countries for analytical purposes. These classications
are based on performance levels within the ve attributes
of democracy. For each attribute, we classify countries as
high (at least 0.7), mid-range (0.4 to 0.69), or low (0.39 and
below) performing based on their attribute values. Countries
that are high performing on all attributes are called ‘high-
performing democracies’; those that miss this high bar are
called ‘mid-range performing democracies’, and those that
are low performing on at least one attribute are called ‘low-
performing democracies’.
The GSoD Indices also take signicant changes over
time into account. Countries that are experiencing the
most severe declines in democratic quality are classied
as experiencing democratic backsliding. We assess
backsliding with particular reference to declines in Checks on
Government, Civil Liberties, and Clean Elections. Countries
that have declined by more than 0.1 on the average of
these three critical indicators are coded as experiencing
democratic backsliding.
Chapter 1
Global trends
Global democracy, already under increasing threat
over the last few years, approaches the end of 2022
with multiple tipping points on the horizon—a cost of
living crisis, an impending global recession, and recent
wars in places as diverse as Ukraine and Ethiopia.
Democracies are struggling to effectively bring balance
to environments marked by instability and anxiety, and
populists continue to gain ground around the world as
democratic innovation and growth stagnate or decline.
There are troubling patterns even in countries that are
doing relatively well, performing at middle to high levels
of democratic standards and not backsliding (Figure3).
Over the last ve years, progress has stalled across
all four aggregated Global State of Democracy Indices
(GSoD Indices) attributes. In some cases, scores are the
same as they were in 1990.
The stagnation exists in parallel to democratic decline
elsewhere. The number of backsliding countries (seven)
remains at its peak, and the number of countries
moving towards authoritarianism is more than double
the number moving towards democracy. As of the end
2021, nearly one half of the 173 countries assessed by
International IDEA are experiencing declines in at least
one subattribute of democracy.
3
International IDEA
2022
Chapter 1
Global trends
FIGURE 1
The Global State of Democracy framework
FIGURE 2
Regime classication
Democracy
Popular Control and
Political Equality
Representative
Government
Clean
Elections
Elected
Government
Access to
justice
Civil
Liberties
Social Rights
and Equality
Effective
Parliament
Judicial
Independence
Media
Integrity
Predictable
Enforcement
Civil Society
Participation
Electoral
Participation
Direct
Democracy
Local
Democracy
Absence of
Corruption
Inclusive
Suffrage
Free Political
Parties
Fundamental
Rights
Checks on
Government
Impartial
Administration
Africa Americas
Asia &
Pacific
Europe
Western
Asia
Participatory
Engagement
Fundamental
Rights
Representative
Government
Participatory
Engagement
Checks on
Government
Impartial
Administration
Attributes of democracy
Performance classified on each
attribute as high, mid-range or low
Democracy
Minimally
competitive
elections
Does not have minimally
competitive elections
At least mid-range score in
Representative Government
Hybrid
regime
Authoritarian
regime
Low score in
Representative
Government
Chapter 1
Global trends
4
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
Representative
Government
Representative Government covers the extent to
which access to political power is free and equal as
demonstrated by competitive, inclusive and regular
elections.
Elected Governmentdenotes the extent to which
national, representative government oces are lled
through elections.
Clean Electionsdenotes the extent to which elections
for national, representative political oce are free
from irregularities, such as aws and biases in the
voter registration and campaign processes, voter
intimidation and fraudulent counting.
Inclusive Suffragedenotes the extent to which adult
citizens have equal and universal passive and active
voting rights.
Free Political Partiesdenotes the extent to which
political parties are free to form and campaign for
political oce.
Fundamental Rights
Fundamental Rights captures the degree to which
civil liberties are respected, and whether people have
access to basic resources that enable their active
participation in the political process.
Access to Justicedenotes the extent to which the
legal system is fair (citizens are not subject to arbitrary
arrest or detention and have the right to be under the
jurisdiction of—and to seek redress from—competent,
independent and impartial tribunals without undue
delay).
Civil Libertiesdenotes the extent to which civil rights
and liberties are respected (citizens enjoy the freedoms
of expression, association, religion, movement, and
personal integrity and security).
Social Rights and Equality denotes the extent to which
basic welfare and political and social equality between
social groups and genders have been realized.
Checks on
Government
Checks on Government measures effective control of
executive power.
Effective Parliamentdenotes the extent to which
the legislature is capable of overseeing the
executive.
Judicial Independence denotes the extent to which
the courts are not subject to undue inuence from
the other branches of government, especially the
executive.
Media Integritydenotes the extent to which
the media landscape offers diverse and critical
coverage of political issues.
Impartial
Administration
Impartial Administration concerns how fairly and
predictably political decisions are implemented, and
therefore reects key aspects of the rule of law.
Absence of Corruptiondenotes the extent to which
the executive, and public administration more
broadly, does not abuse oce for personal gain.
Predictable Enforcementdenotes the extent to
which the executive and public ocials enforce
laws in a predictable manner.
Participatory
Engagement
Participatory Engagement measures people’s
political participation and societal engagement at
different levels. Because they capture different
phenomena, the subattributes of this aspect are not
aggregated into a single index.
Civil Society Participationdenotes the extent to
which organized, voluntary, self-generating and
autonomous social life is dense and vibrant.
Electoral Participationdenotes the extent to
which citizens vote in national legislative and (if
applicable) executive elections.
Direct Democracydenotes the extent to which
citizens can participate in direct popular decision-
making.
Local Democracydenotes the extent to which
citizens can participate in free elections for
inuential local governments.
5
International IDEA
2022
Chapter 1
Global trends
FIGURE 3
Expansion and contraction of democracies over time
Notes: This graph illustrates both the total number of democracies and their status. For 2021, it illustrates that there are a total of 104 democracies. Of those,
14are ‘expanding democracies’, meaning they have experienced positive and signicant changes in a net count of at least two subattributes (out of 16). Forty-two
more democracies are ‘stable’, meaning that the net counting of positive versus negative subattributes is zero or one. However, 37 democracies are classied as
‘moderately contracting’, meaning they have a net negative count of one or two subattributes. The democracies of greatest concern are the 11 that are classied
as ‘severely contracting’, which have a net negative of three subattributes or more.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
Given these trends, increasing public frustration is
understandable. The number of protests around the
world more than doubled between 2017 and 2022,
sparked by a wide range of issues.
6
One of the most
striking examples has been in Sri Lanka, where
protesters took to the streets in mid-2022 to demand
accountability for the government’s debt default and
eventually forced the president’s ight and resignation
(see Box 7). While people’s ability and willingness to
publicly protest is a sign of functioning democracy, it
is also a warning. Governments’ failure to effectively
respond could damage the legitimacy of the democratic
model. The World Values Survey (which covers
77countries) demonstrates that less than half (47.4 per
cent) of all respondents believe democracy is important,
down from 52.4 per cent in 2017. This is a worrying
drop, especially since less than half believe that having
a democracy is ‘very good’.
7
At the same time, condence in democratic government
is dropping. Survey data indicate that the proportion
of people who agree with the idea that having a strong
leader who does not have to bother with parliament
or elections has been consistently growing in recent
years. In 2009, the World Values Survey reported that
only 38per cent of respondents thought this idea was
fairly good or very good. In 2021, that gure had risen to
52per cent (Figure 4).
General declines and stagnation are not the only
problem, though. Russia’s war in Ukraine has catapulted
the idea of democracy into the international spotlight.
Chapter 1
Global trends
6
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
The war demonstrates just how threatening democratic
growth can be to authoritarian regimes, and it has
resurfaced the Cold War-era divide between a relatively
united democratic community and authoritarian
regimes.
8
The threat that democratization poses to
authoritarians also highlights how critical it is to ensure
that democracies have the internal and external support
they need to weather crises. This is one reason why
it is alarming to see many donor countries cut back
on development aid, which often includes democracy
assistance.
9
Non-western democracies’ relative unwillingness
to strongly condemn Russian President Vladimir
Putin reveals deep divisions. Some regimes view the
western outcry in support of democracy as somewhat
hypocritical, especially in light of multiple past instances
of western aggression.
10
Western calls for support
for democratic ideals also starkly contrast with racist
responses to refugee ows, and the clear difference
in attention to the plight of Ukraine compared to other
longstanding, deadly wars.
11
1.1. GLOBAL PATTERNS
The latest GSoD Indices data show that democracy
is in decline, compounding a decade marked by more
deterioration than democratization. First, between 2016
and 2021, the number of countries moving towards
authoritarianism was more than double the number
moving towards democracy (Figure 5). During that time,
27 countries experienced a downgrade in their regime
classication, while only 13 improved. The world also
lost two more democracies in 2021—Myanmar and
Tunisia. Moreover, 52 democracies are now eroding,
experiencing a statistically signicant decline on at least
one subattribute—compared to only 12 a decade ago.
FIGURE 4
Public opinion on autocratic leadership
Notes: The gure plots responses to the World Values Survey question:
‘Would you say that “having a strong leader who does not have to bother with
parliament and elections” is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way
of governing this country?’
Source: R. Inglehart, C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-
Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin and B. Puranen (eds), World Values
Survey: All Rounds—Country-Pooled Datale Version 3.0, Madrid, Spain
and Vienna, Austria: JD Systems Institute and WVSA Secretariat, 2022,
<https:/www.doi.org/10.14281/18241.17>.
!"#$!!"
7
International IDEA
2022
Chapter 1
Global trends
FIGURE 5
Net movements towards and away from democracy
Notes: This bar graph shows the number of countries moving towards authoritarianism (from democracy to either a hybrid or authoritarian regime, or from a
hybrid to an authoritarian regime) in red or towards democracy (from either a hybrid or authoritarian regime to a democracy or from an authoritarian to a hybrid
regime) in green, by year since 1975. Years shown in dark green rather than pale green are those where the number of countries moving in a democratic direction
outnumbers those moving in an authoritarian direction. Years shown in dark red rather than pale red are those where the changes towards authoritarianism
outnumber the changes towards democracy.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
Second, backsliding, which refers to a more severe
and deliberate kind of democratic erosion, continues
to mar democracies’ trajectories; the latest data
show seven backsliding countries. Brazil, El Salvador,
Hungary and Poland are severely backsliding, and
India, Mauritius, and the United States are moderately
backsliding(Figure 6). This pattern, which reveals how
common it has become for elected leaders to use their
power to weaken democratic institutions from inside
the system, indicates the fragility of democracy and the
need to shore up institutions so they can withstand such
pressures, especially in times of crisis.
Chapter 1
Global trends
8
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
FIGURE 6
Trends over the past ve years in backsliding countries
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Notes: Points at 2021 values and traces back to 2016.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022,
<https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
FIGURE 7
Declining performance among authoritarian regimes
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022,
<https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
Third, authoritarianism continues to deepen. Almost
half (49.3 per cent) of all authoritarian regimes are
declining in at least one subattribute. Afghanistan,
Belarus, Cambodia, Comoros and Nicaragua have
experienced a broad decline across multiple GSoD
Indices subattributes (Figure 7). The Clean Elections
and Effective Parliament subattributes are the most
commonly impacted across these cases, suggesting
that even maintaining the façade of elections is
astruggle.
Fourth, democracy does not appear to be evolving in a
way that reects quickly changing needs and priorities.
There is little improvement even in democracies that
are performing at mid-range or high levels. The global
scores for Representative Government, Fundamental
Rights and Checks on Government are exactly the
same as they were in 2001, continuing at the same
mid-level range of performance (Figure 8). Impartial
Administration and Civil Society Participation have also
remained essentially static.
9
International IDEA
2022
Chapter 1
Global trends
FIGURE 8
World averages for attributes of democracy
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Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
The Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine
have highlighted the stark inequality between and within
countries, and the public are frustrated. Even countries
that are doing well, and even in the wake of crises,
democracies are not necessarily growing or developing
better or more broadly, or creating more innovative
institutions and mechanisms.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
10
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
Chapter 2
Regional trends
2.1. AFRICA AND WEST ASIA
Key ndings
• Despite myriad challenges, Africa remains resilient
in the face of instability. Countries including The
Gambia, Niger and Zambia continue to improve in
democratic quality. Overcoming a restricted civic
space, civic action in several countries has created
opportunities to renegotiate the social contract;
outcomes have varied by country.
• In West Asia, more than a decade after the Arab
Uprisings, protest movements continue to be
motivated by government failures in service delivery
and economic opportunities—key aspects of social
contracts. In response, disillusioned and excluded
youth have mobilized, and their demands for a seat
at the table highlight their political consciousness
and vital role as drivers of political change and better
governance.
• Some resource-rich authoritarian regimes that have
survived by distributing the economic benets of
hydrocarbon sales have come under scrutiny. There
is evidence that people want more accountability
and a reform of what have been limited obligations
to provide public goods and social welfare.
• Coups d’état and unconstitutional transfers of power
have transformed Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and
Mali into new frontiers of instability, but they are only
the most striking examples in a general picture of
declining regime performance across a number of
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
2.1.1. Introduction
Africa and West Asia (also known as the Middle East)
is a key area of contestation between democratic
and autocratic approaches to politics. Legacies of
colonization remain politically and economically
relevant, as many national economies are built on the
extraction and export of raw materials—a dynamic
that has hampered political and economic progress.
12
Yet, the systems of governance that developed after
independence are being increasingly contested.
Systems of governance (and the social contracts
they enforce) vary widely across this diverse group of
countries. However, they can be broadly grouped into
two types, one dominant in sub-Saharan Africa and the
other dominant in North Africa and West Asia. In the
former, extractive institutions were developed in the
colonial period that concentrated political power and
material gains rst in foreign hands, and then among
a new local elite.
13
This political class then used the
distribution of some of these gains to cultivate support
for the legitimacy of the system. Such institutions have
tended to persist. This centralized relationship between
the provision of resources and the legitimacy of the
system of governance is often termed neopatrimonial.
14
A patrimonial social contract is not necessarily counter
to democracy, since reciprocity can be legitimate.
15
However, institutions in many states have developed in a
way that has limited accountability and maintained high
levels of inequality.
In recent years, several countries have experienced
opportunities to renegotiate these social contracts with
varied success. Large mobilizations questioning the
legitimacy and authority of governments have occurred
in 2021 and 2022 in Eswatini,
16
Ghana,
17
Libya
18
and
Sudan,
19
among other countries. The combination of
young populations, economic challenges and ethnically-
driven politics raises the stakes for changes in social
contracts.
Several countries in Africa have experienced major
changes in their democratic performance over the
past year—for good and for ill. The continent is key to
the future of the planet, as it is home to countries with
the fastest rates of population growth,
20
and many of
those most exposed to the effects of climate change.
21
It is also increasingly important geostrategically, as
various African countries supply rare-earth minerals, oil
and natural gas, and agricultural land that are coveted
by powerful states in other regions. The increasing
relevance of these resources, as well as the resurgence
Chapter 2
Regional trends
11
International IDEA
2022
FIGURE 9
Population under regime types in North Africa and West Asia
!
"
#$
%
& ' $
Notes: The size of the box indicates population size.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, Online Edition, 2022, <https://population.un.org/
wpp>, accessed 24 October 2022.
of coal exports in response to the global energy crisis,
22
may pose new challenges for democratic consolidation,
as external involvement in domestic politics may
increase alongside foreign economic interests.
Somewhat differently, social contracts across much
of North Africa and West Asia depend on a rentier
economy, in which the state is primarily funded through
the sale of raw materials (chiey hydrocarbons).
23
While
rent seeking may also characterize neopatrimonialism,
the extent to which rents from resource extraction
fund the state is a distinguishing feature between the
two models.
24
Rentier systems impede democratic
development because they undermine the reciprocal
relationships of rights and duties that enable
accountable governance. As long as the government
is able to provide sucient economic benets to the
people, rentier states can be relatively stable—even if
they are almost always authoritarian.
In West Asia, authoritarian leaders are still dominant a
decade after the Arab Uprisings, partly because of the
rentier model. Oil revenues have provided a substitute
for democracy in the oil-exporting countries in West
Asia, where rent distribution has secured the legitimacy
of authoritarian regimes. Some countries in the region—
such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates—have never experienced
democracy and rely on their oil and gas assets and
geopolitical location to sustain their power.
2.1.2. Trends in West Asia and North Africa
West Asia and North Africa continues to be the
most authoritarian region in the world, with only
three democracies—Iraq, Israel,
25
and Lebanon. Five
countries are hybrid regimes (Jordan, Kuwait, Libya,
Morocco and Tunisia), and 12 countries (60 per cent)
are authoritarian. Several countries in the region have
experienced declines in political institutions and rights
protections since 2020, including Iran, Palestine,
Sudan and Tunisia. As of 2021 only 11 per cent of the
population of North Africa and West Asia were living
in a democracy, and 14 per cent were living in a hybrid
regime; the vast majority of people in the region (75 per
cent) were living in an authoritarian regime (Figure 9).
Chapter 2
Regional trends
12
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
FIGURE 10
Representative Government scores across West Asia and North Africa in 2021
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*+
,
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0+
1!2+!)
34+ (54+ &%4+
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
Two of the democracies, Lebanon and Iraq, remain
fragile and suffer persistently low (and declining)
performance. Amid these challenges to democratic
consolidation, attempts to reform the political system
through electoral means provide grounds for cautious
optimism. The parliamentary elections that took
place on 10 October 2021 (Iraq) and 15 May 2022
(Lebanon) were inuenced (and in the case of Iraq
directly triggered) by movements that were driven by
dissatisfaction with the quality of social justice, control
of corruption and public services. Although established
parties in both countries maintained their dominance,
the elections gave life to new movements that have
the potential to grow in future elections.
26
In Lebanon,
independent candidates opposed to the political
establishment also made breakthroughs.
27
In Iran, the legitimacy of the social contract seems
to be fading.
28
The 2022 protests were sparked by
the immediate issue of women’s rights, but they have
broadened in scope and highlight how demands for
change are manifested even in repressive contexts. The
case of the World Cup in Qatar highlights the international
linkages that arise in some repressive contexts, as
foreign workers who protested to demand their wages
were deported,
29
and the foreign football teams who will
participate in the tournament have struggled to nd an
effective approach to support the workers.
30
For a decade, Tunisia was the major success story
from the Arab Uprisings. The protests that led to the
overthrow of the Ben Ali regime’s 23-year reign in 2011
were driven by a widespread rejection of the social
contract. The 2014 Constitution created a new social
contract through an inclusive and participatory process,
enshrining several socio-economic rights, including the
right to decent working conditions and a fair wage. Yet
the economy continued to decline. In the midst of a
Covid-induced economic crisis and a loss of condence
in political parties,
31
President Saied suspended (and
then dissolved) the parliament and a signicant portion
of the Constitution in 2021 and 2022.
32
This effectively
suspended democracy in Tunisia; the GSoD Indices
reclassied it as a hybrid regime. A new constitution,
drafted in 2022 under Saied’s control and in violation
Chapter 2
Regional trends
13
International IDEA
2022
BOX 3
Renegotiating the social contract in Iraq
Democracy in Iraq has endured turbulent years. Anti-
government protests and political turmoil illustrate the
growing disconnect between citizens and public institutions.
A deteriorating economy caused by a fall in oil prices and the
effects of Covid-19 has increased public disillusionment.
34
Iraqis have grown increasingly tired of the state’s inability
to deliver services and development. As a result, Iraqis took
to the streets in October 2019. The cross-sectarian and
national uprisings, known as the Tishreen protest movement,
emphasized widespread discontent with ruling elites and
deep distrust in the state and its institutions.
35
The protests, driven by youth, called for the government to
step down and an end to the current consociational power-
sharing system, which they claim reduces representatives’
accountability.
36
Trust in the country’s political system is
among the lowest in the region, and corruption perceptions
are among the highest.
37
Iraq’s consociational system has
enabled the expansion of corruption and patronage networks
of the ruling ethno-sectarian parties.
38
A clientelist system
evolved based on sharing the country’s oil wealth, serving
elite interests at the expense of the citizens. With one of the
youngest populations in the world, where nearly 60 per cent
are under the age of 25, Iraq’s post-2003 patronage networks
have excluded an increasing proportion of the population.
The effects of the Tishreen movement still reverberate two
years later as the grievances remain, and young people
continue to be excluded from the decision-making process.
Reimagining a new social contract will be a long-term
process involving comprehensive political and economic
reform that includes genuine opportunities for the youth to
be heard and help improve the country’s situation. Short-term
responses can provide alternative venues to address some
of the protestors’ demands within the current government
structures. Two Baghdad-based think tanks provide cases
that suggest possible pathways for inclusive and resilient
social contracts.
The Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies supports youth
activism and mechanisms to channel social protest through
several initiatives to increase political awareness, engage
with civil society and create avenues for representation
to ensure their voices are heard by the political elite. A
dedicated series of skill development and entrepreneurial
training programmes provide better economic opportunities.
Al Bayan’s work promotes the political, social and economic
inclusion of youth in Iraq in an effort to restore hope and a
sense of belonging.
39
The Rewaq Baghdad Center is working towards creating
cultural and behavioural shifts in the political class, as well
as improving citizen–state relations in Iraq.
40
It works closely
with parliament to offer a wide range of knowledge products
and policy assistance to improve legislation. It launched
a mobile application ahead of the October 2021 elections,
designed to reinforce citizens’ participation in the decision-
making process and innovating democracy mechanisms.
41
The rst of its kind in the country, the online tool allowed
voters to engage in dialogue with candidates. Given young
people’s proclivity to use information and communications
technology tools and platforms, the application provided an
incentive for Iraqi youth to participate, beneting more than
100,000 users.
of the rules for constitutional amendment, signicantly
weakened the legislature and judiciary, concentrating
power in the presidency.
33
Tunisia’s December 2022
parliamentary election will be a key test of the degree
to which the new constitutional order can support
democracy.
2.1.3. Trends in sub-Saharan Africa
The situation in sub-Saharan Africa has been much
more dynamic (Figure 11). Free and fair elections
in Niger and Zambia have allowed both countries
to be reclassied as democracies. Zambia held a
credible general election in 2021 in which the defeated
presidential incumbent swiftly conceded.
42
Niger’s
transition has been more dicult. Its 2021 election
marked the country’s rst peaceful transition of power
as President Mahamadou Issoufou stepped down after
two ve-year terms and was replaced by Mohamed
Bazoum, who won the second round of the election.
However, opposition parties made allegations of fraud,
43
and a coup attempt was put down a few days before the
presidential inauguration.
44
The share of the region’s population living under
democracy has declined over the last ve years. Asof
the end of 2021, only 27 per cent were living in a
democracy—equal to the share living in an authoritarian
regime. After the change in Nigeria from democracy to
hybrid (in 2019), the plurality of the region’s population
(45 per cent) now lives in a hybrid regime.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
14
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
FIGURE 11
Population under regime types in sub-Saharan Africa
!
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$ +
Notes: The size of the box indicates population size.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, Online Edition, 2022, <https://population.un.org/
wpp>, accessed 24 October 2022.
Three countries that stand out as having declined in
their performance have experienced coups d’état or
unconstitutional changes of government—Chad, Guinea
and Mali (Figure 12).
45
Benin, Central African Republic,
Comoros, Mauritius and Nigeria have demonstrated
broader declines in performance. Common themes in
countries in the region that are experiencing democratic
decline are the restriction of civic space
46
and the
manipulation of elections and term limits to serve
the interests of those with (ongoing or prospective)
presidential ambitions. The GSoD Indices show that
Civil Liberties have signicantly declined in eight African
countries over the last ve years.
The Gambia is the continent’s main success story over
the past ve years; it has dramatically improved its
democratic performance. Since Yahya Jammeh was
defeated in the 2016 presidential election, the country
has improved on almost every indicator measured by
the GSoD Indices. These advances reect the vision
of the country’s National Development Plan—a new
social contract for Gambians that aims to deliver
good governance, national reconciliation, improved
social cohesion and an inclusive economy.
47
Its
implementation has involved a transitional justice
process, security sector reform and a constitutional
review.
48
Kenya’s 2022 election is another success story
(see Box 4).
Chapter 2
Regional trends
15
International IDEA
2022
FIGURE 12
Change in average score across subattributes of democracy (2016–2021), selected countries in
sub-Saharan Africa
!"#$%
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Notes: Points denote current values; tails extend back to 2016.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
BOX 4
Kenya’s 2022 election
The 2022 Kenyan election was broadly assessed
as credible and largely peaceful, and ethnicity was
less salient than in past years.
49
However, other
unresolved issues, both old and new, present an
ambiguous case for the country’s democratization
trajectory. The public fracturing of the Independent
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)
over the validity of the ocial result highlights the
diculty of achieving a fully independent electoral
process.
50
More broadly, the election was met
with widespread voter apathy (especially among
younger voters),
51
and turnout was only 64.8 per
cent (Figure 13).
52
However, the election moderately
increased women’s representation to 21 per cent
of the legislature, though this remains far below
the one-third target set by the Constitution.
53
It was
also lauded for increased transparency, due to the
use of a publicly accessible online results portal
and the IEBC’s memorandum of understanding with
media houses to announce the results from polling
stations. The successes of the 2022 election should
be celebrated, but much work remains to be done.
FIGURE 13
Voter turnout in Kenya (1992–2022), presidential
elections
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022,
<https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
16
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
BOX 5
BOX 6
Social contract renewal in Uganda
Uganda has one of Africa’s youngest populations yet one of its
oldest leaders. President Museveni has ruled for 36 years—his is
an increasingly authoritarian and sclerotic regime that is failing
to meet Ugandans’ growing democratic aspirations
58
and basic
socio-economic needs.
59
Yet the prospect that this aspiration–
reality gap will precipitate a renewal of the social contract is
currently remote, and is likely to remain so until Ugandans can
agree on a shared vision for the future. Such a convergence
requires pro-democracy activists to be able to effectively
counter the regime’s polarizing narrative, in which it presents
itself as the guarantor of stability and growth and its critics as
being in the service of foreign powers.
60
It is not for a lack of alternatives that this narrative has prevailed,
but rather the Museveni regime’s ability to limit Ugandans’
exposure to these accounts. Since the introduction of multiparty
elections in Uganda in 2005, opposition party voices have been
among the loudest calling for a new democratic dispensation.
Yet by starving such parties of funding, shutting them out of rural
areas, repressing their activists and restricting their access to
the media, the regime has ensured that their voices reach only a
fraction of their intended audience.
61
The 2021 general elections
were an inection point in this regard. The regime deployed
these tactics with an unprecedented level of violence, particularly
against the National Unity Platform (NUP) party; its governance
reform agenda and popular leader, the musician-turned-politician
Bobi Wine, had helped it galvanize Uganda’s urban youth.
62
In
response to this escalation, the NUP has sought to strengthen its
capacity to disseminate its message across the country through
the construction of a network of mobilization committees, known
as Kunga Committees.
63
The new committees’ ability to compete
with the deeply embedded structures of the Museveni regime and
to withstand its repression remains to be seen.
While generally less confrontational than the pro-democracy
opposition parties, Uganda’s civil society has historically been
a source of ideas and practices that challenge the country’s
authoritarian trajectory. The regime has increasingly come
to view them as a threat to its power. Using methods similar
tothose deployed against opposition parties, it has hollowed
out civil society’s democracy sector, forcing organizations
toclose or to engage in less overtly political work.
64
As demographic and economic factors push Ugandans into an
ever more conictual relationship with Museveni’s militarized
regime, the need for a responsive democratic social contract
has become urgent. However, those striving tobring it about
have been left muzzled and despondent.
South Africa’s young climate policymakers
As the demographic that will be hardest hit by continued
global warming, the world’s youth have the greatest stake in
the unfolding climate crisis.
65
Yet despite their widespread
advocacy on the issue, young people have largely been excluded
from climate policymaking.
66
In South Africa this is beginning to
change.
The most visible sign of this progress has been the recent
presence of ocial youth delegates among the country’s
delegations to the United Nations Climate Change Conferences
of the Parties (COPs).
67
Independent of the government, they are
mandated to represent the views of young South Africans at the
negotiations. The delegates are selected from a growing pool of
young climate activists with both a sophisticated understanding
of climate change and the skillset needed to effectively
participate in high-level policymaking. The South African Institute
of International Affairs (SAIIA) has cultivated a youth-run network
of organizations and activists that convenes to draft climate
policy documents which articulate its members’ perspectives and
priorities.
68
Stakeholders regard these documents as authoritative
representations of the youth voice and useful tools for shaping
climate policy. Young activists have also been involved in
formulating government climate policy: several worked on the
City of Johannesburg’s 2021 Climate Action Plan.
Youth participation in such policymaking and inuencing is a
marked departure from the situation in South Africa a decade
ago, when young voices were absent from climate policy spaces.
Desirée Kosciulek, the Head of Youth Programmes at SAIIA,
characterizes this progress as being youth driven but credits the
South African Government with being a responsive partner. She
notes its willingness to increase the number of ocial youth
delegates to the COP from one to three and to adapt policy
processes to meet the needs of young participants (e.g. scheduling
meetings outside of school hours and covering transport costs).
Having secured a seat at the table, the next challenge for
South Africa’s youth (and other stakeholders) is to ensure that
their participation in climate policy processes is meaningful.
For Kosciulek, the rst step will be to dene what meaningful
participation is, but she is clear that it is not one-off or tokenistic
engagement.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
17
International IDEA
2022
FIGURE 14
Unemployment rate among job-seeking youth (15–24)
in Africa and West Asia
Source: International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. Data as
of June2022, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS>,
accessed 15June 2022.
2.1.4. Conclusion
Across Africa and West Asia, social contracts are likely
to come under increasing strain in the short to medium
term as the broader effects of Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine drive food and energy costs up—though the
effects will vary between energy-exporting and -importing
countries. Many countries are also facing increasing
borrowing costs as a result of higher interest rates and
the strengthening of the US dollar. These challenges must
be addressed in a context of longstanding problems
with youth unemployment, poverty and inequality.
54
Generational change in politics could also play a role in
some African countries, as the already fragile legitimacy
of ageing autocrats will be further tested by demands
from a young population for better economic outcomes,
and more freedoms in politics and culture.
55
Longer-term dynamics that may disrupt these
rentier social contracts include continuing youth
unemployment (Figure 14) and the green energy
transition. The UN recently estimated that 33 million
jobs will need to be created across North Africa and
West Asia by 2030 to keep up with the growth in the
youth population.
56
Similar dynamics apply in Africa
more generally. The failure to deliver such jobs could
generate pressure for change. Looking further ahead,
decarbonization may threaten oil-exporting states’
ability to fund social programmes at current levels.
Several important elections are scheduled for 2023,
including a general election in Nigeria and a legislative
election in Benin. Both countries’ democratic
performance has declined since 2019, but they have an
opportunity to reverse that trend in 2023. Sierra Leone
will also hold elections for the president and parliament
next year, hoping to build on recent improvements
in democratic performance. While the situation in
Libya remains unpredictable, it is possible that a new
constitution will be drafted and national elections
organized in 2023.
Demand for democracy remains high in the region, but
satisfaction with democratic performance is low.
57
How
that gap is addressed will be determinative for many
countries in the next ve years.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
18
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
2.2. ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Key ndings
• Democracy is receding in Asia and the Pacic,
while authoritarianism solidies. Only 54 per cent
of people in the region live in a democracy, and
almost 85 per cent of those live in one that is weak
or backsliding. Even high- and mid-performing
democracies, such as Australia, Japan and Taiwan
are suffering democratic erosion.
• Although erosion has taken place in all aspects of
democracy, the impact on Freedom of Expression and
Media Integrity is striking: 35 per cent of democracies
in the region exhibit erosion in at least one of them.
• Although highly diverse, common elements eroding
democracy are, inter alia, rising ethno-nationalism,
military intervention in political processes, patronage
politics and executive aggrandizement.
• This negative trend is tearing the social contract
apart in many countries, with a demand for increased
accountability and an overhaul of the political system
in countries as varied as Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka and
Thailand. The cases of Kazakhstan and Thailand
also highlight the popular discontent with some
fundamental characteristics of the political system
that were assumed to be immovable, such as the
role of the King in Thailand or the focus on economic
development over freedoms in Kazakhstan.
• The continuing effects of the pandemic and Russia’s
war on Ukraine have been particularly acute for
Central and South Asian countries, providing political
space for both democratic renewal and opportunistic
authoritarians.
2.2.1. Introduction
Democracy in Asia and the Pacic is receding. In
the last ve years, approximately 60 per cent of
the 35 countries in the region, including half of the
democracies, have suffered signicant decreases in
at least one subattribute. Although the most dramatic
examples of breakdown have been in Afghanistan
and Myanmar, even more longstanding and stable
democratic systems in India, Indonesia, the Philippines
and Taiwan are at risk.
Nearly half of the region’s inhabitants live in an
authoritarian regime (72 per cent of those live in China)
(Figure 15). More than three-quarters (84 per cent) of
residents of a democracy in Asia and the Pacic live in
one that is weak or backsliding.
69
The erosion of democracy in the region is a product
of several factors, including the rise of exclusionary
ethno-nationalist movements fuelled by a mix of
real and politically manipulated social grievances,
armed and unarmed interventions by the military in
political processes, executive aggrandizement, stalled
democratic transitions and economic mismanagement
that has led to unsustainable debts and, in extreme
cases, nancial collapse. Countries’ democratic
trajectories are shaped by their postcolonial histories
as well as their neocolonial political and economic
relationships with regional hegemons. But these factors
should not be overstated: national elites have long
proved adept at using the legacy of colonialism to
deect criticism from their own mismanagement and
cronyism.
Additionally, foreign actors’ geopolitical interests are
impacting domestic politics. In Nepal, citizens protested
against the approval of a USD 500 million grant from a
US aid agency due to concerns that the grant conditions
unacceptably infringed upon national sovereignty.
70
In
Kazakhstan and Sri Lanka, foreign actors have assisted
incumbent leaders in various ways, angering citizens,
who demand accountability and responsiveness.
71
Chapter 2
Regional trends
19
International IDEA
2022
FIGURE 15
Population under regime types in Asia and the Pacic
! "#
"
$
%&
'## ( "
Notes: The size of the box indicates population size.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, Online Edition, 2022, <https://population.un.org/
wpp>, accessed 24 October 2022.
2.2.2. Trends in the region
Social contracts are being tested, renegotiated and
disputed across the region, and subregional nuances are
fundamental to understanding these tensions. In South
Asia, where communal mistrust and competition have
in some cases been addressed through power sharing,
economic crises and the rise of illiberal forces have
contributed to the resurgence of ethno-nationalism.
Resulting violence against minority groups and
increased societal polarization highlight the pressures
exerted on the social contract.
72
The persistence of
pandemic-instigated disruption to migrant ows and
remittances on which South Asian economies heavily
depend adds to the economic anxieties that fuel ethno-
nationalism and remains an unsolved problem for the
region.
73
An active civil society and the strength of some
key institutions—such as the judiciary and electoral
management bodies (EMBs)—can act as bastions
of democracy. India’s active civil society have been
key in denouncing some states’ attempts to limit
religious freedoms. In Nepal, citizen and civil society
mobilizations demanding accountability, gender equality
and good governance remain a fundamental and
inuential political force.
74
The breakdown of democracy in Myanmar is the major
event in Southeast Asian democratic development.
Yet actors like the National Unity Government and the
Committee Representing the Union Parliament, which
are building new democratic institutions that reect
many longstanding concerns regarding minority rights
and equal access to public goods, demonstrate the will
to build a new social contract.
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam remain rmly anchored
in authoritarianism with no visible signals of change.
Vietnam, like China and Singapore, has managed
to provide economic prosperity without granting
democratic rights, giving its communist regime a veneer
of public legitimacy. An economic crisis and possible
debt default in Laos have generated signs of popular
dissatisfaction with the government but have not
Chapter 2
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20
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
manifested in the kind of organized protest in favour
of a responsive and accountable social contract seen
recently in Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka and elsewhere. As
Laos is politically and economically dominated by its
stable authoritarian neighbours, China and Vietnam, its
people may feel that democratic progress is currently
infeasible or too risky.
75
In the Philippines, an intensive disinformation campaign
supported the ascent of the son of Ferdinand Marcos,
known as Bongbong Marcos, to the presidency. Yet,
pro-democracy movements in Thailand and Malaysia
and the refusal to accept the military junta in Myanmar
demonstrate that democracy remains a core aspiration
for millions in Southeast Asia, even in the most
repressive circumstances. In Thailand, protesters
have demanded concrete policy changes, such as the
elimination of the military’s power to hand-pick senators
and select the prime minister, and the reversal of the
prohibition of some political parties. They have also
challenged the country’s political and economic elite
model of governance, including by questioning the role
of the monarchy for the rst time in decades. However,
the ghost of military dictatorships past is not always
easy to exorcise; in Indonesia and the Philippines,
the military’s signicant public role in the pandemic
response dashed hopes that the armed forces’ retreat
from the political sphere during recent periods of
democratization might be permanent.
76
East Asia remains stable and, apart from China,
predominantly democratic. During the last ve years,
democracy has expanded notably in South Korea
and remained stable in Japan and Taiwan. Mongolia
continues last year’s trend of declines across all
attributes except Representative Government. The rising
tensions in the Taiwan Strait and mainland China’s
suppression of democracy in Hong Kong and incursion
on Bhutanese sovereignty are clear examples of its
willingness to exert its inuence in the region.
77
Oceania continues to stand out for its strong democratic
performance, although declines in certain attributes,
largely due to expanded pandemic-related restrictions,
curb the region’s overall performance. It is particularly
vulnerable to climate change
78
and has been the site
of intense geopolitical competition between China,
Australia and the USA. Overall, the region has witnessed
a slight drop in its Impartial Administration score; New
Zealand and Papua New Guinea have experienced one-
year declines in Predictable Enforcement, in the latter
case accompanied by a signicant and concerning drop
in the Absence of Corruption.
Central Asia’s democratic indicators continue to
be marked by stagnation as national elites have
proven adept at putting down, often violently, popular
movements advocating more democratic and broadly
accountable political institutions. The relaxation of
Karimov-era social controls in Uzbekistan appears to
have stalled, and protests over the loss of regional
autonomy in the impoverished western Karakalpakstan
region were put down with extreme violence.
79
Kyrgyzstan continues its slow and steady decline
across many indicators; the 2020 electoral protests and
installation of Sadyr Japarov as prime minister, and later
president, are symptoms. Kazakhstan’s ‘Black January’
and Tajikistan’s bloody 2022 crackdown in the Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Region demonstrate how
long-term stagnation in authoritarian regimes can be
a source of, rather than a guard against, instability and
violence. Russia’s war on Ukraine has caused tens of
thousands of Russian refugees to ee to Central Asia—
primarily to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.
80
The economic
impacts of the war, sanctions and refugee ows are
complex and not necessarily negative, but managing
them will be demanding for the region’s democratic
and authoritarian institutions. While there is genuine
public solidarity with Russian refugees arriving in the
region, there is also unease and hostility stemming from
Russia’s unresolved postcolonial relationship with its
former Central Asian colonies.
81
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BOX 7
Social contract renewal in Sri Lanka
The spring of 2022 may prove to be a watershed moment
for Sri Lankan democracy. Over the past two years, a
fundamental breakdown of the social contract between
the state and society has resulted in unprecedented (in
both scale and the degree of unity) anti-government
demonstrations.
82
What began as protests over food, fuel,
power cuts and essential supply shortages quickly morphed
into demands for system-wide reform, culminating in
thousands of protesters storming the president’s and prime
minister’s residences and oces on 9 July 2022 and leading
to their resignations. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe
became acting president shortly thereafter.
The months-long peaceful protests are a testament to
the resilience of Sri Lankan democracy, though signicant
challenges lie ahead. Sri Lankans are eager to see greater
transparency and accountability of elected representatives,
but there are concerns that ‘one has to work within the
present system’.
83
A key challenge is the power of status
quo elites, who undermine key reforms. For example, the
Colombo-based Centre for Policy Alternatives has called
for the government’s proposed 22nd Amendment to
abolish the executive presidency to be rejected, deeming
it to be a ‘token reform’ that does not suciently curtail
the powers of the president or introduce meaningful
checks and balances.
84
The Colombo Urban Lab similarly
cautions that Sri Lankans should not be misled by the
interim government’s small gestures and proposals,
which demonstrate its weak commitment to fundamental
reforms.
85
This includes abolishing the executive presidency,
repealing the Prevention of Terrorism Act, increasing social
protection and planning for fresh elections. Supercial
reforms will no longer satisfy Sri Lankans’ grievances.
Ultimately, a new social contract can only be forged through
deliberation that bridges the trust decit between the public
and policymakers. This, too, requires a reckoning with Civil
War-era violations to build a more inclusive national identity.
Small changes, including more power sharing in parliament
and a greater representation of protesters’ demands with
the rise of the Frontline Social Party, could bode well for the
democracy, if they materialize.
86
Indeed, opposition parties
such as the National People’s Power and Samagi Jana
Balawegaya are perceived as more active in raising issues
of accountability and transparency, albeit with limited
powers. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if (and how)
political parties will transform protesters’ demands into
sustainable democratic reforms.
FIGURE 16
Countries with new laws restricting freedom
ofexpression online
Source: Research by the Democracy Assessment Unit, International IDEA.
2.2.3. The concerning increase in repression of
Freedom of Expression and Media Integrity
Despite the region’s vast diversity, most countries
are experiencing restrictions on the Freedom of
Expression and Media Integrity. Overall, 35 per cent of
democracies in Asia and the Pacic and 33 per cent of
non-democracies have experienced erosion in either
Freedom of Expression or Media Integrity over the
last ve years—a trend that predates the pandemic.
Since 2018, at least 15 countries in the region have
approved measures that restrict Freedom of Expression,
especially online (Figure 16).
87
These measures, such
as Bangladesh’s Digital Security Act,
88
Vietnam’s
Cybersecurity Law,
89
Kyrgyzstan’s False Information
Bill
90
and Singapore’s Protection from Online Falsehoods
and Manipulation Act,
91
all target online content under
the guise of ghting disinformation and protecting
infrastructure against cyberattacks.
Chapter 2
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The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
In most cases, governments employ these laws to
selectively remove or block content and use social
media giants as their executing arm online under the
guise of fullling national legislation.
92
Such laws form
part of a global trend in which the need to regulate
online content is being used to restrict rights and ght
an open Internet. Many countries are left with the worst
of both worlds—a social media ecosystem in which
key critical speech is censored and suppressed while
disinformation that facilitates elite preservation is
allowed to run rampant.
These contaminated information environments
hamstring constructive political dialogue and erode
key democratic institutions. They also have clear-cut
effects on democratic outcomes; Bongbong Marcos and
Sara Duterte won the Philippines 2022 election with the
support of a well-funded social media disinformation
campaign run by supporters, which whitewashed
Bongbong’s father’s record as a dictator and vilied
their critics. The information space had already been
reshaped by Duterte’s father, Rodrigo, who spent his
time as president attacking the Filipino free press
through judicial harassment and executive overreach.
93
2.2.4. Conclusion
Given the region’s varied history, including its colonial
past, boisterous renegotiations of the social contract
have often occurred within living memory. However,
with the exception of the regional giants of China and
India, the countries’ post- and neocolonial relationships
continue to dictate the scope of any new social contract
that might arise. Countries across the region depend on
economic systems and political alliances in which they
are subordinate players.
The cases of Kazakhstan and Thailand, among others,
reveal that governments are not upholding their end of
the social contract. Beyond a simple shift in governance,
democratic erosion is also tearing at the fundamental
building blocks of the social contract in many countries.
With the economic consequences of the pandemic and
Russia’s war on Ukraine stoking ination and increasing
the cost of living, and leading to unevenly distributed
global shortages of basic goods and commodities,
the perfect storm for unrest might be brewing in many
countries in the region.
BOX 8
Kazakhstan unrest
In January 2022, protesters in Kazakhstan (Figure 17),
motivated by soaring liqueed petroleum gas prices,
took to the streets to demand that the government
address socio-economic inequality. Under an Internet and
telecommunications blackout that made denitive accounts
of the roots of escalation and the identities of the main
instigators nearly impossible, protests gave way to violent
clashes, burning government buildings and armed conict
in the streets. President Tokayev ordered the security
services to ‘shoot to kill without warning’ and called in
troops from the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty
Organization to put down the protests.
According to ocial estimates, over 200 private citizens
and 19 members of the security services were killed,
hundreds tortured, and over 9,000 arrested.
94
What began
as a bottom-up demand for a renegotiation of the social
contract of ‘economics rst, politics later’ ended in mass
state-administered violence, a reshuing of elites, and a
constitutional referendum of vague purpose and ecacy.
95
Rather than create a new social contract that guarantees
rights and shared wealth equitably, the country’s leadership
instead seems set to refashion the old social contract
around the promise of installing President Tokayev as the
new national patriarch.
96
The protests in Kazakhstan were the country’s third such
public uprising since 2010, and the second to be put down
violently.
97
The mix of token reforms and indiscriminate
repression may have temporarily quieted Kazakhstan’s
political chaos, but absent tangible changes in the socio-
economic or political status quo, these tactics only delay
the next inevitable confrontation between the state and its
citizens.
98
Chapter 2
Regional trends
23
International IDEA
2022
FIGURE 17
Democratic quality in Kazakhstan
! " #
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&
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)
*
)
%%
(
%
(%
'+
+
+
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,
% - *. '/
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
24
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
FIGURE 18
Population under regime types in Europe
!
"
#
"$%
& !$ "
Notes: The size of the box indicates population size.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, Online Edition, 2022, <https://population.un.org/
wpp>, accessed 24 October 2022.
2.3. EUROPE
Key ndings
• Although democracy remains the main form of
government in Europe, its performance is stagnant.
• Nearly half (43 per cent) of democracies—atotal of
17 countries—in Europe have suffered erosion in the
last ve years. These declines affect 46 per cent of
the high-performing democracies.
• Yet democratic values and institutions are
increasingly seen as a fundamental barrier to
Russia’s irredentism and neocolonialism, especially
in Ukraine, but also in most countries in the region.
• Democratic stagnation, the pandemic and the cost
of living crisis have reignited a much-needed debate
in the region on the underpinnings of the social
contract and its future.
2.3.1. Introduction
Russia’s war against Ukraine has shaken Europe and
sparked an unprecedented crisis that threatens the
peace and stability that had long been taken for granted.
High ination, economic distress and stagnation, the
rise of far-right parties, and energy supply concerns
imperil the continent’s democracy even further.
These phenomena come at a time when democracy
is stagnating, and often contracting, in most of the
region. Although democracy remains the main form of
government (see Figure 18), 43 per cent of democracies
in Europe have suffered democratic erosion in the last
ve years. The percentage is even higher for those that
are considered high performing.
Chapter 2
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25
International IDEA
2022
Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has highlighted
that democracy is central to the defence of peace and
prosperity. By reinforcing democratic institutions and
values, many countries are buttressing their defences
against Russia. The expansion of democracy in
Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine, for example, is a clear
manifestation of the desire to root national identity and
sovereignty in democratic institutions (see Figure 19).
At the same time, they have intensied the ght against
all types of Russian interference, from disinformation
campaigns to direct military intervention. According to
the Eurobarometer, the protection of democracy and its
values has become more important to Europeans since
the Russian invasion of Ukraine; it is now cited as the
top value to be defended by the European institutions.
99
The relative bright spots are overshadowed by the
general democratic erosion in Europe. Two European
countries—Poland and Hungary—are backsliding.
Six countries recorded statistically signicant declines
in Media Integrity. The declines affect Western Europe
(Austria, Germany), Central Europe (Slovenia), the
Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Southern Europe
(Cyprus) and Eastern Europe (Azerbaijan). This decrease
in Media Integrity comes at a time when reliable,
impartial information is more valuable than ever,
especially in the midst of armed conict and a looming
economic crisis.
100
Europe’s non-democratic regimes have been further
consolidated in the last year. Russia has joined Belarus
and Azerbaijan as the third autocratic regime in
Europe. Authoritarianism in Belarus has deepened, with
signicant declines in nine subattributes in the last ve
years; Access to Justice and Freedom of Association
and Assembly are the biggest decliners. The crackdown
on protests and opposition has only exacerbated the
situation.
101
Serbia and Turkey remain entrenched in
hybridity with declines over the last ve years, especially
related to Clean Elections.
2.3.2. Moldova as a bright example of democracy
inEurope
With the electoral victory of liberal democratic players in
Moldova, rst in the presidency and then as a majority in
parliament, the country has entered an unprecedented
phase of democratic expansion (Figure20).
Performance improvements since 2017 mean that
Moldova is now among the top 25 per cent of countries
globally in terms of Representative Government
(including Inclusive Suffrage and Free Political Parties),
Social Rights and Equality, and Gender Equality, as well
as Media Integrity.
However, corruption has persistently undermined
Moldova’s post-Soviet transition to democracy.
Although the ght against corruption has improved in
recent years, as reected in the Absence of Corruption
subattribute, it remains a key challenge. Other
indicators, such as Basic Welfare, continued to stagnate,
performing below Eastern European averages.
FIGURE 19
Expanding democracies in Europe
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022,
<https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
26
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
FIGURE 20
Trends in the Republic of Moldova
!"#$
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%
&
&'' &''$ % %$ %& %&$ %%
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
Moldova faces both old and new challenges, from
ethnic tensions that led to a separatist movement in
Transnistria and continuing disputes with the ethnic
Turkic Gagauz minority to—more recently—threats from
Russia’s war of aggression in neighbouring Ukraine.
In this context, Moldova’s democratic expansion is
noteworthy and deserves close attention as it seeks to
deliver on the pro-reform and anti-corruption mandate
secured in the 2020/2021 elections, and to pursue
integration into the European Union.
2.3.3. The social contract in Europe
The promise of democracy as a bedrock of shared
prosperity has faded in recent years, causing people
to question whether this social contract is fair, or even
desirable. The region, including the wealthiest countries
in Western Europe, is facing a deepening cost of living
crisis.
102
Unemployment, worsening labour conditions,
decreasing standards of living, underinvestment
in key public services, such as education and
healthcare, and the rising cost of living are creating
more unequal economies that generate uncertainty
for many.
103
European societies are also undergoing
notable changes as a result of migration and ageing
populations.
104
These changes are now at the top
of the list of concerns and priorities for Europeans,
showcasing the tensions in the social contract.
105
There is increasing support for nativist and illiberal
populist parties all over Europe.
106
In general, these
parties promise a renegotiation of the social contract,
albeit in discriminatory, regressive and often unrealistic
terms. Their agendas promote nationalistic, nativist,
anti-immigration or illiberal policies, which threaten
the rights of marginalized groups as well as those
of racial, ethnic and political minorities. Another
manifestation of tensions is an increasing detachment
from the democratic process, seen both in the
dissatisfaction with democracy and in voter turnout (see
Figure21).
107
The link between economic pessimism
and dissatisfaction with democracy signals the need to
forge a new social contract. But the full impacts of this
poly-crisis may be yet to come. Far-right forces question
some key democratic principles and might carve out
political space among voters who feel politically under-
represented.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
27
International IDEA
2022
FIGURE 21
Trends in voter turnout in parliamentary elections in Europe
! !" !# "
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( ( ) )
)
'
) * * *"
+,-
Notes: Red lines indicate decreases relative to 2001; green lines indicate improvement.
Source: International IDEA, Voter Turnout Database, [n.d.], <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout>, accessed 24 October 2022.
A broader conversation involving all sectors of society
about how to renovate the social contract is crucial and
urgent. With a negative view of politics and institutions,
especially political parties, and with three out of four
Europeans not trusting parties, few spaces remain
available for a dialogue on a renewed social contract in
Europe.
108
The social contract in European countries is tearing
at both the economic and political levels. Economic
crises, such as the current situation or the 2008–2012
nancial crisis, detach the population from the
political process.
109
This disenfranchisement creates
further space for illiberal trends by reducing popular
support for democratic voices. To prevent this from
happening, attempts have been made to expand
political participation and international pressure for
good governance. For example, Belgium has lowered
the voting age for European Parliament elections to 16,
reecting a change in the terms of the social contract.
110
There was also progress in efforts to increase the
implementation of recommendations by the Group of
States Against Corruption (GRECO) in 2021.
111
Moldova
and Armenia, for instance, have signicantly improved
their performance in Absence of Corruption. In addition,
innovative forms of political participation have been
tested all over Europe, including citizens’ assemblies
(see Box 9), participatory budgeting in cities like Paris
or Milan, sortition and new participation platforms
in Estonia and Madrid.
112
Political parties have also
experimented with new forms of membership, including
in France, Latvia, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
113
Chapter 2
Regional trends
28
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
2.3.4. Conclusion
Europe is facing the most challenging times in decades.
Democratic stagnation is compounded by economic
shocks and the diverse impacts of Russia’s war of
aggression in Ukraine. President Putin’s nuclear threats,
as well as his strategy to weaponize Europe’s winter
energy needs, call for strengthened unity in the region.
The debate around the social contract is resurfacing
with intensity, pushed by the unprecedented economic,
political, and social shocks and the unhealed wounds
of the pandemic. While democracy is being used as
protection against Russian irredentism, voters in many
longstanding democracies in Europe are increasingly
supporting far-right and nativist parties that disregard
some of the basic principles of democracy, such as
press freedom or the inclusion of minorities in decision
making. How European countries address the crisis will
dene the fate of democracy in the coming decades.
2.4. THE AMERICAS
Key ndings
• While the Americas is the world’s second-most
democratic region, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela
have joined Cuba as autocracies in the region.
• A third of democracies in the region have
experienced declines in at least three subattributes
in the last two years. Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador,
Guatemala and the USA exhibit the most declines.
• In the USA, threats to democracy persist after
the Trump presidency, illustrated by polarization,
counter-majoritarianism and the rolling back of long-
established rights.
• Rising threats to democracy include toxic
polarization, disinformation and fake news,
restrictive laws and bans on rights, intimidation of
the press, and increasing attacks on courts and
EMBs.
BOX 9
Citizens’ assemblies in Europe
In a context of declining trust between citizens and
governments, there is renewed enthusiasm for participatory
and deliberative mechanisms—especially citizens’
assemblies—all over Europe. Through different forms of
institutionalization, these representative microcosms of the
broader public have grappled with a wide range of policy
issues.
114
Citizens’ assemblies have been used in many countries
and at various levels of governance.
115
Policy issues related
to the environment were among the most discussed by
both national and local assemblies, whereas urban and
strategic planning, environment, health and infrastructure
were frequently addressed at the local level.
116
At the
supra-national level, during the Conference on the Future
of Europe, the EU launched the European Citizens’ Panels,
which deliberated and provided recommendations on issues
such as migration, security, the environment, education and
digital transformation.
117
Since then, tangible steps have
been taken to incorporate the nal report’s suggestions,
which include a proposal to incorporate amendments to the
current EU treaties.
118
Sceptics have worried about ordinary citizens’ limited
ability to address complex political situations and the
sustainability of the model. However, evidence suggests
that citizens have the capacity to make sound policy
decisions, especially when the deliberative process is
well designed.
119
In this context, citizens’ assemblies
should be viewed as a democratic process that—
like elections—requires a set of standards to ensure
legitimacy and sustainability.
120
At the same time, limited
representation and inclusion in citizens’ assemblies,
particularly of marginalized communities, and the ad hoc
way in which participatory governance is often carried
out, continue to hamper this instrument.
121
Cases in
which the authorities discard the majority of citizens’
assemblies’ recommendations, mainly due to special
interest lobbying, further hinder their impact.
122
Whether this
deliberative system works in Europe depends heavily on the
commitments of governments and the EU to ensure they
do not weaken citizens’ drive and ambitions to keep these
assemblies alive and active.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
29
International IDEA
2022
FIGURE 22
Population under regime types in the Americas
!
"
#
"
$
Notes: The size of the box indicates population size.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, Online Edition, 2022, <https://population.un.org/
wpp>, accessed 24 October 2022.
• Discontent is also on the rise. Fuelled by poverty,
inequality, insecurity, corruption and the effects of
the pandemic, people are turning to the ballot box
and the streets, looking for change.
• While discontent can (and has) resulted in
democratic options on the ballot, populist
authoritarians manipulate this dissatisfaction in
an attempt to dismantle democracy from within.
Democracy is an ally, not an obstacle, in revising
the social contract. It offers institutional channels
that can deliver for all citizens, especially the most
vulnerable.
2.4.1. Introduction
The Americas is the world’s second-most democratic
region (after Europe). Over the past ve decades, the
proportion of democracies in Latin America and the
Caribbean has grown from 32 per cent to a stunning
84 per cent (Figure 23). Democracy reached its peak
in 2006–2007, when Cuba was the lone authoritarian
country in the region.
This is no longer the case. Nicaragua and Venezuela
have become consolidated authoritarian regimes, and
in 2021 Haiti slipped into authoritarianism and has
recently requested foreign assistance to quell extreme
gang violence (Figure 23). Established democracies
have also experienced setbacks, and declines have been
especially severe in Brazil, El Salvador and the USA.
Chapter 2
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The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
FIGURE 23
Trends in regime type in Latin America and the
Caribbean
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022,
<https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
FIGURE 24
Latin American countries with improved performance
!
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022,
<https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
A diverse set of issues challenges the quality and
sustainability of democracy in the Americas. The
last decade has witnessed growing threats, including
polarization,
123
disinformation,
124
restrictions on
rights,
125
and increasing attacks on environmental and
human rights activists
126
as well as key democratic
institutions.
127
However, there is hope. Last year, Honduras re-joined
the democratic ranks after Xiomara Castro, the region’s
only female president, won a credible election,
128
with
results accepted by all actors (Box 11).
129
Ecuador and
the Dominican Republic have also strengthened their
democratic institutions (Figure 24). In Ecuador, Civil
Liberties and Checks on Government (including Judicial
Independence and Effective Parliament) have improved
in the last two governments. The Dominican Republic
has experienced improvements in seven subattributes,
including Civil Liberties, Media Integrity, Judicial
Independence and Access to Justice.
FIGURE 25
Democratic performance in the Americas, 2021
!""!
#
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022,
<https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
31
International IDEA
2022
FIGURE 26
Latin American countries with the most declines in 2020 or 2021, by subattribute
!"
#$
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
2.4.2. Beleaguered democracy
While the Americas is overwhelmingly democratic,
most countries’ performance has been mid-range or
lower; the average score across all subattributes for all
democracies is slightly lower than the average in 2010.
A third of countries have experienced declines in at
least three subattributes in the last two years, including
Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador (see Box 10), Guatemala
and the USA. In Bolivia, the elected government has
begun baseless criminal proceedings against all
opposition leaders and even against election ocials
who oversaw the 2020 vote.
130
In Guatemala, Impartial
Administration and Checks on Government scores have
dropped further, with indications of severe government
corruption and politicians’ involvement in organized
crime
131
resulting in at least 13 former prosecutors now
in exile.
132
In addition, Brazil and the USA are backsliding
democracies. In Brazil, Fundamental Rights, Checks on
Government and Clean Elections scores have dropped in
the last few years. The growing inuence of the military
in politics and the state
133
and President Jair Bolsonaro’s
attacks on the country’s election system are causes
for concern.
134
Attacks on US democracy during the
Trump presidency,
135
polarization and threats to long-
established rights (such as the overturning of Roe v.
Wade on abortion rights)
136
continue.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
32
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
BOX 10
El Salvador moves towards authoritarianism
In the Global State of Democracy in the Americas 2021
report, International IDEA called for ‘careful attention to
be paid to the evolution of the democratic status of El
Salvador’,
137
which declined from a mid-performing to a weak
democracy in 2020. This trend has worsened in 2021, with
signicant declines in key indicators such as Civil Liberties,
Effective Parliament and Judicial Independence. However,
El Salvador’s situation has worsened further; it is likely to be
classied as hybrid next year based on 2022 data.
Last year’s report highlighted attacks on the rule of law,
through measures such as ‘the full dismissal of the
magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Court of Justice and the Attorney General, or the expulsion
from the country of journalists belonging to media criticism
of the government’.
138
The 2021 report also focused on the
decision of the Constitutional Chamber, with new members
selected by the current government, to issue a ruling that
authorizes presidential re-election. This decision allowed
Nayib Bukele to announce, in September 2022, his plan to
run for re-election in 2024, in violation of the Salvadoran
Constitution (articles 75, 88 and 131 expressly prohibit
immediate presidential re-election).
The six-time extension of the state of emergency has
led to arbitrary arrests and severe restrictions on press
freedom, actions that have been seriously questioned by
human rights organizations.
139
Amnesty International has
accused the Bukele government of immersing its country ‘in
a human rights crisis’, pointing to its authorities as authors
of ‘widespread and agrant violations of human rights, and
criminalizing people in poverty’.
140
The region is also experiencing worrying restrictions
on Fundamental Rights and Checks on Government
(Figure27). Across the region, harassment and
persecution of, and violence against journalists and
media outlets are on the rise. In 2022 alone, authorities
raided the oces of La Prensa, Nicaragua’s oldest
newspaper,
141
arrested journalist José Rubén Zamora
in Guatemala
142
and harassed journalist Carlos Loret
de Mola in Mexico, in a period when violence against
journalists is the highest ever in the country.
143
More
journalists have been killed in Mexico so far in 2022
than anywhere else in the world.
144
Populist authoritarian leaders are increasingly
attempting to dismantle democracy from within
after being democratically elected.
145
These leaders
understand people’s frustrations and offer seemingly
easy solutions for complex problems such as poverty,
inequality and lack of opportunity. However, once
in power, instead of delivering inclusive new social
contracts, they promote the opposite and weaken rights
and key democratic institutions such as legislatures,
courts and election bodies. For example, Mexican
President López Obrador and his party have tried to
weaken several autonomous constitutional bodies,
including the National Electoral Institute
146
and local
electoral institutes, by slashing their budgets and
questioning their relevance.
147
In Brazil, President
Bolsonaro has raised baseless allegations against the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the electronic voting
system.
148
In the USA, Donald Trump’s ‘big lie’ about the
2020 election continues to spread.
149
Similar actions
can be observed in Peru, where allegations of fraud
FIGURE 27
Percentage of countries with declines in at least one
subattribute, Americas 1980–2021
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices v. 6.1, 2022,
<https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>, accessed 24 October 2022.
Chapter 2
Regional trends
33
International IDEA
2022
in the aftermath of President Pedro Castillo’s victory
weakened public trust in the EMB.
150
These actions not
only damage institutions; they have also been used to
pressure elected ocials, destabilize governments and
condone violence. In other regions, such allegations
have been used to justify coups d’état.
151
BOX 11
Honduras
In Honduras, historically disadvantaged groups have pushed
to renew the social contract through activism that targets
longstanding challenges to the protection of human rights.
Six years after human rights defender Berta Caceres was
murdered for her work protecting the environment and the
rights of the Lenca people, stakeholders have increased
pressure on the government to accede to the 2018 Escazu
Agreement.
152
This is particularly relevant in a country where
over 130 defenders of the environment have been killed
since 2009, according to the government’s own records.
153
Symbolically, Congress declared Caceres a national hero
this year,
154
but the government still claims implementation
challenges impede immediate accession
155
to the
agreement on which environmental activists depend for the
free and safe exercise of their work, and for accountability
in case of abuses.
Women’s rights organizations continue to push for the
decriminalization of abortion, undeterred by a 2021
constitutional amendment that further consolidated its
absolute prohibition.
156
In 2021, the ‘Somos Muchas’
platform presented a judicial appeal, pleading for
decriminalization in certain circumstances.
157
The case is
currently under consideration in the Supreme Court, and
different organizations have presented amicus briefs this
year with a view to continue their advocacy.
158
LGBTQIA+ activists face challenges associated with
attaining further protections against hate crimes and
legalizing same-sex marriage.
159
Yet President Xiomara
Castro issued an apology for the state’s responsibility
for the 2009 murder of Vicky Hernandez, a trans woman
activist. This was in accordance with a judgment against
Honduras by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
In compliance with the ruling, President Castro announced
that trans people will be allowed to revise their documents
to match their gender identity.
160
Many have set their hopes on President Castro delivering
on her campaign promises, which included a relatively
progressive rights agenda and a social equality platform.
161
As the country’s rst female president she undoubtedly
faces further scrutiny in the implementation of rights-based
and feminist policies to address persistent inequalities and
gender-based discrimination and violence.
162
2.4.3. Renewing the social contract
Latin America is the most unequal and violent region
in the world.
163
One-third of its population lives in
poverty,
164
and the Covid-19 pandemic caused major
economic damage. The drop in per capita GDP is
not expected to recover to pre-pandemic levels until
2023–2024.
165
The economic and social fallouts
of the pandemic have disproportionately affected
informal workers. According to recent International
Labour Organization estimates, more than 60 per
cent of workers across Latin America are informally
employed.
166
The region’s informal economy is
associated with greater inequality and weaker
governance,
167
viewed as an expression of a lack of
trust in public institutions with limited access to social
security.
168
Governments in the region have also failed to
adequately protect their citizens. A stunning 47.5 per
cent of the region’s population has no social protection
for pensions,
169
and those who receive them do not
get enough. In Chile, 82 per cent of the population that
gets a pension receives less than minimum wage.
170
In addition, the latest available data show that the
average health expenditure in Latin America is well
below the global average.
171
As in the rest of the world,
the marginalized and poor suffer the most. These
challenges have fuelled frustration and discontent in the
region. The number of massive protests (of over 10,000
participants) has almost doubled,
172
from 44 between
2013 and 2016 to 71 between 2017 and 2020.
173
This discontent is reected at the ballot box. Between
2018 and 2022, 76 per cent of all national-level elections
in Latin America and the Caribbean resulted in an
opposition victory. In Colombia, citizens recently elected
a left-wing president for the rst time in history.
174
Chapter 2
Regional trends
34
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
FIGURE 28
Incumbent defeats in Latin America, 2018–2022
Notes: Costa Rica and Barbados have had two elections since 2018, one of
which resulted in a change of government. Bolivia had a temporary change
of government in 2019 with the resignation of President Morales. Morales’
Movement for Socialism was reinstated as the ruling party following the 2020
election. Haiti has not held an election since 2016; the election scheduled for
2021 has been postponed indenitely.
Source: Research by the Democracy Assessment Unit, International IDEA.
In Chile, discontent has been channelled into a
constitutional process that used participatory
mechanisms and sought to strengthen social and
economic rights, gender equality and environmental
protection, and to highlight the plurinational character
of the state.
175
Nevertheless, the referendum on
4September 2022 resulted in an overwhelming rejection
of the new constitution. Electors seem to favour a
more moderate approach to some of the profound
changes proposed,
176
including on Indigenous peoples’
rights. Surveys showed contentious reactions to the
provisions on quotas to ensure political representation,
self-determination and self-government of Indigenous
peoples. Some—including members of Indigenous
communities—expressed concerns about whether the
measures would be ecient or bring about division.
177
President Boric’s subsequent call on Congress to
present a timetable for the drafting of a new constitution
that is acceptable to the majority of citizens,
178
as well
as modications to his cabinet following the results,
179
illustrates the government‘s recognition that the renewal
of the social contract must take into account the
diverse views of the population. Before the UN’s General
Assembly, President Boric emphasized that, despite
the result, demands for change were addressed in a
constitutional manner, and not through violence as they
had been in the past.
180
In the USA, recent mass mobilizations called for
government action on climate change.
181
Political
compromises facilitated the inclusion of important
energy and climate provisions in the Ination Reduction
Act, albeit weaker measures than the administration
had pledged.
182
A boom in the gig economy during
the pandemic also contributed to increased demands
for labour protection in a sector in which migrants
and people of colour are the most affected; the Labor
Department is currently considering these demands.
183
Backlash against the Supreme Court’s decision in
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,
which effectively overturned the reproductive rights
protected by Roe v. Wade, also led to protests to prevent
further rollbacks in states such as Kansas, where a
referendum’s results conveyed discontent with a judicial
decision viewed as detached from public opinion.
184
2.4.4. Conclusion
Recent developments in the Americas show that
governments and institutions at all levels must listen to
citizens, include them in their decision making, and work
with them to ensure that social contracts remain valid or
are adequately renewed to address popular demands.
Community organizers and grassroots movements in the
region will continue to mobilize to inuence policymakers
to that end. This is evident in the Green Wave movement
that has delivered ground-breaking achievements
for abortion rights in Latin America,
185
despite some
setbacks in the region due to conservative and religious
inuence.
186
The traction gained in the past few years
in Argentina, Mexico and, most recently, Colombia, has
also invigorated local activism in countries where women
face greater restrictions on their reproductive rights.
187
The Feminist Recovery Plan for Canada, which features
an intersectional approach to economic reactivation,
exemplies an inclusive new social contract.
188
Activists
and citizens expect to be heard by their institutions; if
they are not, this could lead to further discontent. The
social contract needs to be revised in an inclusive way;
for this, democracy is an ally, not an obstacle.
189
Chapter 3
Recommendations
35
International IDEA
2022
Chapter 3
Recommendations
3.1. GLOBAL RECOMMENDATIONS
• Governments should prioritize the implementation
and enforcement of strategies and policies that
reduce corruption and rebuild public trust.
– Social contracts are based on mutual trust.
Accountability and transparency are essential
prerequisites for successfully renewed social
contracts.
– Adopting recommendations by regional anti-
corruption bodies, such as GRECO in Europe, the
Follow-Up Mechanism for the Implementation of
the Inter-American Convention against Corruption
in the Americas, and the Open Government
Partnership, are strong rst steps.
• Governments, in close partnership with civil society
actors, must ensure the protection of Freedom of
Expression, especially online, as enshrined in article
19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and in general comments 25 and 34.
– Country-based legislation should be adapted
and updated to take the realities of digital
communications into account.
– Legal frameworks protecting Freedom of
Expression should be enlarged and reinforced by
synchronizing them with new digital rights, such
as right to privacy or to accessible Internet.
– Online content moderation legislation should
effectively prevent hate speech and incitement
to violence without being overly restrictive. Such
regulations should not cripple market innovation
by establishing complex and costly requirements
that only large social media companies can full.
– The Government of Spain’s Charter of Digital
Rights extensively covers the protection of
Freedom of Expression online, among and
synchronized with other digital rights.
• Governments and civil society organizations
should offer youth dedicated spaces, including in
established bilateral and multilateral forums, to
meaningfully participate in politics and help develop
policies that impact them. Youth advisory councils at
the Council of Europe and at the subnational levels in
Canada and Australia could serve as models.
• Governments and, when relevant, international
partners and organizations, must prioritize
addressing all forms of inequality, especially in light
of ination and the rising cost of living. Traditionally
marginalized groups’ needs must be at the centre of
activities such as citizen assemblies, new legislation,
local dialogue and mobilization, climate action and
other such efforts.
– Colombia’s designation of the Andes-Amazon
rainforest as a civil society nature reserve allows
Indigenous women to repurpose their knowledge
of medicinal plants, gardening, artisanship,
women’s self-care and ecological stewardship.
190
– In response to the need for modernized childcare
options, highlighted during the pandemic, the
development of community-based childcare
centres is critical. Such centres are already
enabling more mothers to earn incomes in
Cambodia,
191
Malawi,
192
Bangladesh and other
countries.
• Regional organizations should utilize bilateral and
multilateral relationships to hold countries to the
highest democratic standards.
– Such organizations should take a rm public
stance against democratically illegitimate
governments. They should regularly convene
multisector stakeholders who can share lessons
learned across regions and develop common and
contextually appropriate goals for democratic
growth and innovation.
Chapter 3
Recommendations
36
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
– Human rights experts from the UN and the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
have collaborated to call attention to Nicaragua’s
repression of its civic space through joint
statements.
193
The Commission established a
Special Monitoring Mechanism for Nicaragua in
2018; its work documenting rights violations has
increased international awareness of the actions
that undermine the rule of law and weaken the
liberties of a democratic state.
194
• International actors should re-commit to supporting
electoral integrity, which is the bedrock of
democracy.
– Donors and assistance organizations should
focus on helping domestic actors to mitigate
vulnerabilities in the electoral cycle, especially
those that impact public perceptions of electoral
credibility.
– Peer-to-peer learning across borders, and
cooperation between EMBs and judicial
institutions, can effectively improve electoral
integrity. Regional EMB networks, such as the
Organization of Arab Electoral Management
Bodies, are good examples of such peer learning
and cooperation.
195
3.2. REGIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Africa and West Asia
• Regional bodies and member states should
condemn coup leaders as politically illegitimate.
They should further demonstrate their rejection
of such actions by fully implementing the African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
and the African Peer Review Mechanism, and the
relevant norms and instruments, including the
African Peace and Security Architecture and African
Governance Architecture frameworks, as well as the
resolutions of the Malabo Summit on combatting
unconstitutional changes of government. At the
same time, due consideration must be given to the
causes of coups d'état and the development of early
warning systems, as longer processes of democratic
decline that often presage coups have tended to
attract less attention.
• Donors must be more assertive in their responses to
the shrinking civic space in Africa.
196
The collective
reinforcement of relevant human rights norms in
intergovernmental forums such as the African Union
is particularly important.
– Donors should strengthen their support to
African civil society organizations by developing
exible modes of funding that can adapt to
changing contexts and which reect civil society
organizations’ administrative capacity limitations.
– The Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency’s results-based funding,
which focuses on results and objectives rather
than a xed set of activities, has enabled it to be
an agile and effective donor in contexts of closing
civic space.
197
Asia and the Pacic
• Governments in the region should roll back and limit
the spread of legislation that undermines freedom
of expression and privacy under the guise of security
and ghting disinformation. In addition, they should
develop legislation that is aligned with international
standards to protect data privacy and secure the
treatment and storage of personal data, ideally
with a human rights focus. The EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation and the standards set by the
UN Human Rights Council are good benchmarks.
• Donors should focus on empowering civil society
groups and other independent actors that are
mobilizing public demonstrations and protests
for change. Demands must be channelled into
meaningful political dialogue, and mechanisms
should be created through which people’s grievances
are heard and documented. Transparent oversight
structures should also be developed that can
monitor responses and action. Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya
political party, which grew out of mass protests, will
likely generate important lessons learned.
• Donors and democracy assistance organizations
should support states’ capacities regarding oversight
of security forces, anti-corruption and tackling
election-related disinformation. They should pay
special attention to weak and mid-performing
democracies that are making slow but steady
progress such as Fiji, the Maldives and Pakistan.
Chapter 3
Recommendations
37
International IDEA
2022
• Regional bodies, especially the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), should uphold
the highest standards of democracy and human
rights by fully implementing the 2009 ASEAN Human
Rights Declaration and reinforcing the role of the
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights. ASEAN member states should energetically
condemn the crimes committed by the junta in
Myanmar.
Europe
• Donors to European countries that are most
vulnerable to Russian aggression and inuence
should prioritize exible and comprehensive support
to domestic pro-democracy actors. This is especially
important for civil society watchdog organizations
focused on the integrity of the electoral process,
the information environment and corruption, as
these aspects have proven to be backdoors for
Russian inuence operations designed to destabilize
democracy.
• Regional bodies and civil society organizations
should lead the expansion of regional cooperation
in support of media integrity in line with article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, including
in responses to violations of media freedoms, and
through swift passage and implementation of the
European Media Freedom Act.
• The EU, donor organizations and public authorities
should regularly invest more resources in
experimenting with, supporting and building
knowledge around innovative participation
mechanisms to identify forms that work in different
contexts. More attention is also needed to ensure
that these mechanisms are as inclusive as possible
and that there are systems in place to channel
recommendations into policy action. European
authorities at the local, regional and national
levels should provide increasing decision-making
power to successful initiatives that enhance public
participation.
– Innovative participation mechanisms have
included the European Home Parliaments
initiative, which allows small groups of citizens to
debate EU policy issues and provides a direct link
with EU politicians as the results are aggregated
and submitted to policymakers.
– The European Platform for Participatory
Budgeting for Youth was designed to promote
coordination between selected cities (members
of the European Youth Capitals network) to
encourage young people to engage in local
participatory budgeting mechanisms.
The Americas
• National human rights institutions and government
agencies should develop participatory mechanisms
through which protesters’ demands can be
discussed and acted upon, if necessary.
– Civil society groups and activists should
be consulted and involved in dening these
mechanisms’ methods of work and schedule of
meetings, consultations and agreements.
– Canada’s Human Rights Commission has
taken steps to tap into participatory processes
to guide decision making on social issues.
For example, the Federal Housing Advocate,
housed at the Commission, relies on public
submissions from Canadians suffering housing
issues and homelessness to inform policy
recommendations.
• In times of declining trust in institutions and
disinformation, election bodies must update their
civic education efforts. Civic education programmes
and campaigns should go beyond technical
information about how elections work to focus more
on ‘citizenship building’ with the visibility, promotion
and replication of successful citizen participation
experiences and lessons learned. Election bodies
also need to socialize people on the importance of
key democratic principles, from the importance of
participation to the need to be critical and sceptical.
This effort should consider wider audiences and
underrepresented groups, such as Indigenous
peoples, youth, persons with disabilities and persons
belonging to the LGBTQIA+ community.
– Peru’s National Oce of Electoral Processes
conducts comprehensive electoral voter
education and civic education programmes on
matters related to the promotion of democratic
elections.
198
– Mexico’s National Electoral Institute developed
a Civic Culture Strategy that aims to empower
citizens and increase their participation in
Chapter 3
Recommendations
38
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
public debate, advocacy and strengthening the
accountability of political institutions.
199
– Panama’s Electoral Tribunal has promoted civic
education through a Digital Ethical Pact that
seeks to engage citizens in the responsible use of
social media during elections.
200
• It is widely known that for elections to be credible,
EMBs should follow fundamental guiding
principles.
201
Chief among these is autonomy:
EMB members must act independently, and the
government must not unduly interfere in their
decisions. There are several options for building
structurally independent EMBs, including a law that
creates an autonomous institution that is entitled to
a xed percentage of the national budget. Another
option is to establish an election civil service with
members appointed through a transparent and
impartial process.
– A country’s legal framework and EMB design
have limits. It is becoming increasingly
important for other democratic institutions—
from intergovernmental organizations to local
civil society—to raise their voices when EMBs
are under attack. Governments and electoral
assistance organizations should support forums
such as the Summit for Electoral Democracy,
202
which has issued a statement advocating EMB
autonomy.
– International bodies, including the UN Human
Rights Council and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, should
consider creating a Special Rapporteur on
the independence of EMBs, similar to current
initiatives supporting the independence of
judges
203
or freedom of opinion and expression.
204
Chapter 4
Conclusion
39
International IDEA
2022
Chapter 4
Conclusion
Democracies are declining or stagnating in the face
of a rapidly changing global context. Even countries
previously considered ‘established’ democracies have
vulnerabilities that cannot be ignored. At the same time,
democratic regimes have not convincingly made the
case that they can deliver what people need. Current
challenges, such as an impending recession, the rising
cost of living and the increasingly severe effects of
climate change highlight this weakness. People’s faith
in the importance and effectiveness of democratic
institutions is thus decreasing to a worrying extent.
The world is at a critical crossroads. Given current
trends, democracies are under urgent pressure to
deliver. Fortunately, as this report details, efforts
are already underway to put the appropriate and
corresponding mechanisms in place. One key
mechanism is the social contract, which must be
reconceptualized to reect a new reality and respond
to new and evolving public needs and demands.
Around the world, groups are attempting this
reconceptualization through a variety of channels,
including new constitutions, citizens’ assemblies,
local political associations and governmental dialogue
mechanisms.
Governments, civil society, media, expert groups,
academics and individuals each have a role to play in
supporting and participating in the renovation of social
contracts. Our collective ability to come together, locally
and internationally, to pursue the citizen-centred design
of these contracts will determine the fate of democracy
in the years to come.
Endnotes
40
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
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Endnotes
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The Global State of Democracy 2022
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Endnotes
48
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
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About International IDEA
51
International IDEA
2022
About International IDEA
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental
organization with the mission to advance democracy
worldwide, as a universal human aspiration and
enabler of sustainable development. We do this by
supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding
of democratic political institutions and processes at
all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic
processes, actors and institutions are inclusive and
accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.
WHAT DO WE DO?
In our work we focus on three main impact areas:
electoral processes; constitution-building processes;
and political participation and representation. The
themes of gender and inclusion, conict sensitivity and
sustainable development are mainstreamed across all
our areas of work.
International IDEA provides analyses of global and
regional democratic trends; produces comparative
knowledge on democratic practices; offers technical
assistance and capacity building on reform to actors
engaged in democratic processes; and convenes
dialogue on issues relevant to the public debate on
democracy and democracy building.
WHERE DO WE WORK?
Our headquarters are located in Stockholm, and we
have regional and country oces in Africa, Asia and the
Pacic, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean.
International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the
United Nations and is accredited to European Union
institutions.
<https://www.idea.int>
About International IDEA
52
The Global State of Democracy 2022
Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent
About the Global State of Democracy initiative
International IDEA launched the Global State of
Democracy (GSoD) initiative in 2016. This Initiative
provides evidence-based and balanced analysis and
data on the state and quality of democracy globally and
for 173 countries across all regions of the world. It aims
to contribute to the public debate on democracy and
inform policy interventions to strengthen democracy.
Its main products include the annual Global State
of Democracy report, the annual Global State of
Democracy indices, the monthly Democracy Tracker, In
Focus reports, blogs and op-eds.
GSOD REPORT
International IDEA’s The Global State of Democracy
Report aims to inuence the global debate and analyses
current trends and challenges to democracy. It offers
specic policy recommendations to spark new and
innovative thinking for policymakers, governments and
civil society organizations supporting democracy.
<https://www.idea.int/gsod>
GSOD INDICES
The Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD Indices)
quantitatively measure democratic trends at the country,
regional and global levels across a broad range of
different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–
2021. They do not provide a single index of democracy.
They produce data for 173 countries across the globe.
The GSoD Indices are based on 116 individual indicators
devised by various scholars and organizations using
different types of sources. The GSoD indices consist of
attribute and subattribute scores per country per year
for the period 1975–2021.
<https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices/democracy-indices>
DEMOCRACY TRACKER
The Democracy Tracker provides comprehensive
qualitative data on the state of democracy and human
rights in 173 countries. The tool monitors and ags
events, highlighting those that are signicant enough
to impact the status quo of each country. It provides
policymakers and other stakeholders with timely
analysis of the events and developments that merit
attention and intervention.
<https://www.idea.int/democracytracker>
ISBN: 978-91-7671-575-8 (Print)
ISBN: 978-91-7671-576-5 (PDF)
International IDEA
Strömsborg
SE–103 34 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 698 37 00
www.idea.int
At the end of 2022, the world is trapped beneath the weight of a multitude of old
and new problems. There are myriad causes of political and economic instability,
including the spiking prices of food and energy, ballooning ination and an
impending recession. These phenomena are occurring in the unstable context
ofcontinuing climate change, long unresolved inequality, the Covid-19 pandemic,
declining standards of living and the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine.
Democratic institutions are especially important in times of crisis and fear. They
ensure open pathways for the information and communication that citizens and
governments need to be able to act responsively and effectively. To rebuild and
revitalize these institutions and to re-establish trust between the people and their
governments, it is necessary to develop new and innovative social contracts that
better reect the changing global environment and that meaningfully prioritize equal
access to the mechanisms of participation.
International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Report 2022 provides an overview
ofthe global and regional trends related to democracy and human rights, along
withexamples of efforts to reinvigorate social contracts around the world.
