Evaluation of Administrative Cooperation in Direct Taxation
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relevant to EU priorities and needs until today. In the last communications from the EU, an
increasing emphasis has been placed on corporate tax avoidance, on fighting aggressive tax
planning, and increasing tax transparency. The inclusion of DAC3 and DAC4 provisions appears
fully aligned to this evolution.
Finally, the appreciation of the fitness-for-purpose of the Directive and its mechanisms and tools
is also positive. The Directive scores very well in terms of its appropriateness to tax authorities’
needs, both overall and considering specific mechanisms. The tax authorities commented that a
single ‘most useful’ tool is difficult to identify; rather, they tend to underline their positive
assessment of the tools on which they are more experienced. Furthermore, the tax authorities
strongly praise the Directive for providing a comprehensive set of tools and mechanisms for the
exchange of information, from which the tool more fit for the purpose at hand can be selected,
and which complement and reinforce each other. With respect to the other general objectives –
improving the functioning of the Single Market and promoting fairness in taxation – the entire
Directive and all its mechanisms are fit in theory, but in practice those targeted at corporate
entities – DAC2, DAC4 and DAC5 – may progressively emerge as more relevant, given that
corporate tax avoidance represents a higher priority for the EU and a larger scale phenomenon
at present.
Effectiveness
The Directive has contributed to an improved ability to fight tax fraud, evasion, and
avoidance, and the limited evidence available suggests that this has already started
translating into incremental tax assessed. While the recent implementation of several
of the provisions does not allow drawing firm conclusions, positive signals were
recorded also as regards the Directive’s potential in increasing spontaneous
compliance through a deterrent effect. No elements have emerged yet as regards the
effects on the reduction in the scope for harmful tax competition.
Undoubtedly, the Directive improved the ability of the Member States to fight against tax fraud,
evasion, and avoidance, with respect to legal and natural persons operating, gaining incomes,
or holding assets across multiple jurisdictions. This is unanimously acknowledged by the tax
authorities, which appreciate especially the ‘menu of options’ that the Directive has created.
Indeed, the various ACDT provisions have resulted in a toolbox, from which the tax officials can
select the most useful tool for the case at hand or the objective to be pursued. Furthermore, the
instruments supported by the Directive complement, trigger, and reinforce each other. This
assessment is undisputed even considering that the quality and timeliness of certain data
exchanges still present some flaws. At the same time, the national tax authorities are still
learning how to best process and use the AEOI data received. The situation is positively evolving,
as Member States are increasingly making use of the AEOI information and their ability to match
it with national taxpayers’ databases has also grown. However, as of 2017, not all Member States
have started employing these data.
The Directive was also intended to contribute to reduce the scope for harmful tax competition,
in particular via the amendments aiming at making the national tax systems more transparent,
i.e. DAC3 and DAC4. On the latter, the first exchanges had just taken place, and hence no
information on their outcomes is available. On the former, the evidence shows that the
transparency of advanced rulings has increased. At the same time, this has so far not affected
the behaviour of tax authorities in granting advanced tax rulings and pricing agreements, nor
the attitude of firms demanding for these rulings.
In addition, the DAC mechanisms in general, and more specifically the AEOI, providing for the
mass exchange of data about taxpayers at large, are expected to have a deterrent effect on
taxpayers, thus increasing the spontaneous compliance with their tax obligations. On this effect,
the evidence is not conclusive, due to the recent implementation of the AEOI mechanisms, and
in particular of DAC2. However, tax authorities are already trying to take advantage of the
deterrence, thus signalling the potential of AEOI in spurring spontaneous tax compliance. In
particular, a number of actions have been launched by various Member States to invite taxpayers