protection gap. Furthermore, in many EMDE markets, any insurance coverage options to limit the
effect of Covid-19, such as BI, can be very limited or not available.
In response to the mounting losses incurred as a result of Covid-19, a number of proposals
emerged during the pandemic – across a range of jurisdictions – for insurance-based programmes
that would build resilience and close the protection gap(s) for future pandemics. Some of these
programmes have been proposed by government, others by industry. Common to all programmes
is the fact they would require a multi-stakeholder approach, bringing together consumers, the
private sector, governments and supervisors.
The environment has shifted since many of these programmes were originally conceived (mostly
throughout the course of 2020). For the most part, they have not yet been implemented.
3
In some
cases, proposals have now been abandoned.
4
Nonetheless, pandemics remain an extant and
evolving risk.
5
Furthermore, societies will be faced with other types of emerging and potentially
systemic risks – such as wide-scale cyber disruption or catastrophic climate-related risks – that will
challenge traditional models of insurance coverage and will highlight the limits on the types of
coverage that can reasonably be offered by the insurance sector alone.
6
As insurance-based programmes are proposed – or implemented – that aim to provide coverage
for risks that are more challenging to diversify, supervisors will need to consider where they can
play a role. For programmes predicated on a risk-sharing arrangement between insurers and
government, supervisors may have a role in assessing whether the risk-sharing being taken on by
insurers is sustainable from a micro- and macroprudential perspective. Supervisors can also have
a key role in advising governments and insurers on supervisory and regulatory implications.
Depending on their mandate, supervisors may also have a role in assessing whether an insurance-
based programme will be effective in improving access and coverage for consumers; in other
words, whether such a programme would be effective in addressing protection gaps.
For the purposes of this note, descriptions of some key (interrelated) concepts are outlined
below.
Pandemic risk
The Covid-19 pandemic has affected different lines of insurance, including health, mortality,
trade credit, event cancellation and BI. While other accumulation events, including natural
catastrophe and terrorism risk, are generally confined to a certain area or region, a pandemic is
3
This could be due to a range of factors, including that governments are now looking at more targeted coverage, rather than
broad-based BI coverage; vaccination rates have brought down hospitalisation rates and mortality; and businesses have also
learnt to adapt to the challenges caused by the pandemic, and have adapted their business continuity planning thus mitigating
their BI losses. Some governments may also believe that an ex-post fiscal response can be more efficient than an ex-ante
insurance system, in terms of addressing pandemic risk.
4
For example, the Swiss Federal Department of Finance announced in March 2021 that it would not pursue the concept of a
pandemic insurance for companies. See Konzept einer Pandemieversicherung wird vorerst nicht weiterverfolgt (1 April 2021).
5
Over the last decades the frequency, severity and economic impact of disease outbreak risk (epidemic and pandemic) has
increased. See Kraut and de Kuiper (2021), Epidemic and pandemic risk transfer solutions and options for public sector support
,
pg. 1-2.
6
For example, the Geneva Association contends that the systemic characteristic of cyber risks, in particular the potential for
multiple losses from a single event or a campaign of attacks linked to hostile cyber activity (HCA), mean that the scale of
accumulated losses may exceed levels that can safely and sensibly be absorbed by the private (re)insurance sector. Ultimately,
some form of government backstop or PPP to finance extreme cyber risks will be needed to foster the development of a
sustainable private cyber (re)insurance market and boost economy-wide resilience. See The Geneva Association (2022),
Insuring hostile Cyber Activity: In search of sustainable solutions
).