Testimony of Carl Shapiro, “New Economy”
Antitrust Modernization Commission, 8 November 2005, Page 5
shares have been relatively stable over a number of years, the mere fact that technology is
advancing rapidly does not imply that durable market power is absent.
2. What features, if any, of dynamic, innovation-driven industries pose
distinctive problems for antitrust analysis, and what impact, if any, should
those features have on the application of antitrust analysis to these
industries?
Antitrust analysis in dynamic industries can be challenging when one needs to make reliable
projections of future industry conditions. Such projections are necessary in merger cases and
frequently needed for monopolization cases. Yet these projections inevitably tend to be less
reliable in highly dynamic industries than in more settled and stable industries. In industries
where market leadership and market shares are highly volatile, significant market power is more
difficult to obtain or retain, implying a lessened need for antitrust intervention.
Collaboration among industry participants may be especially important in dynamic industries.
For example, if product compatibility standards enhance the value of new products due to
network effects, there are legitimate reasons for rival producers to cooperate to establish such
standards. In other settings, collaboration between suppliers of complements, such as hardware
and software, or content and distribution, can lead to more rapid product introduction, improved
products and services, or lower prices. Antitrust doctrine, with its emphasis on limiting
coordination among competitors, can have difficulty distinguishing pro-competitive
collaboration from collusion, especially in situations where two parties may have complex
relationships that involve competition in some areas and collaboration in other areas. These
complexities are the norm for large firms in the information technology sector of the economy.
Intellectual property rights play an especially critical role in innovative industries, and thus raise
a number of thorny issues for antitrust analysis of these industries. The intersection between
intellectual property law and antitrust law has been studied in great detail, with some observers
focusing on the alleged “tension” between these two bodies of law. Fundamentally, I do not
believe there need be any such tension, at least if antitrust law properly recognizes the
importance of providing incentives, along with the necessary flexibility, for industry participants
to conduct research, engage in product development, and diffuse the resulting innovations widely
in the marketplace. However, certain specific issues regarding intellectual property rights and
antitrust are gaining saliency as the number of patents grows, as the quality of those patents is
called into question, and as patents play an increasingly central role in the business strategies of
companies in certain sectors of the economy, including the information technology sector.
Several aspects of patent licensing pose distinctive problems for antitrust analysis in innovative
industries, especially those experiencing a surge in the number of patents issued: package
licensing; cross-licenses; patent pools; and agreements to settle patent litigation.
Lastly, determining when and whether to intervene in dynamic industries can be especially
difficult in the presence of switching costs, network effects, and other factors than can cause a
market to “tip” towards one supplier or one technology in a lasting manner. A snapshot of
market shares may suggest effective competition between two or more firms, yet if one firm has
a sizeable market share that is rapidly growing, that firm may come to dominate the market in a
manner that will be difficult to reverse. In such cases, one must assess (a) whether such a firm