Before the development of axiomatic models of game-level outcome uncertainty (Coates et al., 2014),
the tools of economic theory had not been applied to Neale’s outcome uncertainty discussion. The classical
Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (UOH), attributed to Rottenberg (1956), asserts that fan’s interest is
largest when the game has an uncertain outcome, other things equal, so attendance will be higher, and
gate revenues maximized, when a team plays games with uncertain outcomes compared to games where the
home team is expected to win most or all of the contests. While easy to empirically implement, given a
variable reflecting game-level outcome uncertainty, the theoretical underpinnings of the classical UOH were
unexamined for decades.
Neale’s (1964) “League Standing Effect” follows immediately from the classical UOH. If each team in a
league plays games against opponents with relatively equal talent, games have uncertain outcomes and there
will be regular changes in the league standings, generating additional fan interest in games, and, according
to Neale (1964), increasing gate revenues.
Coates et al. (2014) develop a model of consumer choice under uncertainty to explain the UOH. In this
model, consumers have reference dependent preferences about game or match outcomes, and their utility
includes both standard consumption utility and “gain-loss” utility that reflects differences between their
expected outcome of games and actual game outcomes. Fan’s can also exhibit loss aversion in this model,
in that the marginal utility of a loss by the home team when the fan expected the home team to win may
exceed the marginal utility of an home win when the fan expected a loss. The UOH emerges only as a special
case in this model, and the version of the model with loss averse fans appears to have significant empirical
support compared to the UOH version. This model also simplifies to a case where fans only care about
seeing the home team win; in this case, fans have preferences for home team wins above all other possible
outcomes, given that game outcomes are uncertain.
The loss aversion and home win preference cases generate tension in terms of both game level and league-
wide outcome uncertainty. If fans exhibit either, then teams will not want to play large numbers of games
with uncertain outcomes. In the loss aversion case, either the possibility of an upset of a stronger team or the
home team overpowering weaker opponents both generate more expected utility for fans than games with
uncertain outcomes, suggesting that attendance will be lower at games with an uncertain outcome. In the
home win preference case, fans only want to see the home team win, and games with uncertain outcomes,
or games where the home team is an underdog, generate less expected utility for fans than games the home
team is expected to win. In either case, teams would not be interested in playing games with uncertain
outcomes. In this case, the “League Standing Effect,” where teams are close in the standings and frequent
changes in the rank ordering of teams takes place, can be thought of as a public good that all teams must
produce in order to generate a “league standing effect” that increases demand for all games played in the
league, as Neale (1964) posited.
We develop a model of game outcomes that includes fans with both reference dependent preferences
and a preference for a “League Standing Effect” that increases expected utility when there are frequent
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