biometric entry-exit system. The categories of targeted individuals have included various categories of
non-U.S. citizens and visa waiver participants.
Despite ample opportunity to do so, in the last 15 years Congress never explicitly instructed DHS, and
later CBP,
to include U.S. citizens in biometric entry-exit.
Nonetheless, CBP has deployed facial
recognition technology at U.S. land, sea and air ports of entry and collected biometrics from U.S.
citizens.
The Traveler Verification Service (TVS), CBP’s cloud based facial matching service, retains
both U.S. citizens’ and non-citizens’ photos in TVS for up to 12 hours, photos of non-immigrants and
green card holders are stored for up to 14 days in an Automated Targeting System database.
Photos
of “in-scope travelers”
are retained in IDENT, the central DHS-wide system for storage and processing
of biometric and associated biographic information for national security, for up to 75 years.
CBP’s
biometric entry-exit system should not include U.S. citizens. The inclusion of U.S. citizens was never
legally authorized, and the practice must stop immediately.
It should also be noted that CBP has not been mandated to deploy facial recognition technology on
non-U.S. citizens as a part of biometric entry-exit. Other less sensitive biometrics like fingerprints could
Congress assigned responsibility of biometric entry-exit to CBP in 2013. Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 127 Stat. 198 (2013).
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002) (called for the
installation of technology at ports of entry “to allow biometric comparison of all United States visas and travel and entry
documents issued to aliens); ; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat.
3638 (2004); Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266
(2007); Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat.
3574 (2008); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 127 Stat. 198 (2013).
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DHS/CBP/PIA-0056, Privacy Impact
Assessment for the Traveler Verification Service, 9 (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp030-tvs-november2018.pdf
.
Id.
According to the applicable regulations, “in-scope travelers” are any aliens other than those specifically exempted in 8
CFR 235.1(f). Exempted populations include Canadian citizens under section 101(a)(15)(B) of the Act who are not otherwise
required to present a visa or be issued a form I-94 or Form I-95; aliens younger than 14 or older than 79 on the data of
admission; aliens admitted A-1, A-2, C-3 (except for attendants, servants, or personal employees of accredited officials), G-
1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO-2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6 visas, and certain Taiwan officials who hold E-1
visas and members of their immediate families who hold E-1 visas unless the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Homeland Security jointly determine that a class of such aliens should be subject to the requirements of paragraph
(d)(1)(ii); classes of aliens to whom the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State jointly determine it shall
not apply; or an individual alien to whom the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, or the Director of
Central Intelligence determines it shall not apply. 8 CFR 235.1(f)
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DHS/CBP/PIA-0056, Privacy Impact
Assessment for the Traveler Verification Service, 9 (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp030-tvs-november2018.pdf.
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