24 GEORGIA BAR JOURNAL
Georgia law has provided for “added on”
coverage (also known as “excess UM
coverage”) in which the UM carrier does
not get credit for the liability coverage.
Instead, the UM coverage is added on
or stacked on the liability coverage.
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(ii)(I).
Thurman and its progeny have no impact
on added-on policies.
7. See articles collected at endnote 2, supra.
8. There is no distinction in the legal status of
a claim under a UM policy if the tortfeasor
has no liability coverage, sometimes
called a true uninsured motorist,
or if the tortfeasor has insufficient
liability coverage, sometimes called an
underinsured motorist. Both are defined as
an “uninsured motorist.” O.C.G.A. § 33-7-
11(b)(1)(D)(ii)(II). Of course, the amount
of liability coverage is a factual distinction
that may have legal consequences.
9. Donovan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 329 Ga.
App. 609, 765 S.E.2d 755 (2015),
Jenkins
and miller § 29:1.
10. Allstate Fire and Cas. Co. v. Rotham,
332. Ga. App. 670, 671, 774 S.E.2d 735,
736-37 (2015).
11. See generally
Jenkins and miller § 39.5(b).
12. The statute states in relevant part, “[The
tortfeasor’s] motor vehicle [is] uninsured
only for the amount of the difference
between the available coverages under
the bodily injury liability insurance and
property damage liability insurance
coverages on such motor vehicle and
the limits of the uninsured motorist
coverages provided under the insured’s
motor vehicle insurance policies;
and, for purposes of this subdivision,
available coverages under the bodily
injury liability insurance and property
damage liability insurance coverages on
such motor vehicle shall be the limits
of coverage less any amounts by which
the maximum amounts payable under
such limits of coverage have, by reason
of payment of other claims or otherwise,
been reduced below the limits of
coverage.” (emphasis added).
13. Erturk v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 315 Ga.
App. 274, 276, 726 S.E.2d 757, 759-60
(2012).
14. Thurman, 278 Ga. at 162, 598 S.E.2d at
449.
15. 5 U.S.C. § 8101-8152
16. 5 U.S.C. § 8901-8914.
17. Thurman, 278 Ga. at 164, 598 S.E.2d at
450.
18. In Thurman, the liability policy was
a $100,000 single limit policy, which
means that all claims arising from a
collision, including property damage,
are taken from the $100,000 limit as
opposed to a “split limit” policy that
provides separate amounts for property
damage and bodily injury. Thirty-
four thousand, six hundred sixty-six
dollars and 32/100 ($34,666.32) of the
liability coverage was paid to the federal
government pursuant to either the
FECA or the FEHBA, and $4,445.81 of
the liability coverage was paid to the
United States Post Office for damage
to the mail truck, leaving a balance of
liability coverage of $60,887.87. Ms.
Thurman had an aggregate of $75,000
traditional uninsured motorist coverage
(three $25,000 policies). Ms. Thurman
brought suit for the difference of
$14,112.13. Id. 278 Ga. at 162-63, 598
S.E.2d at 449-450.
19. Id.
20. Thurman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 2003 WL 23784045 (Plaintiff’s Brief
on Certiorari).
21. It is tempting to state the rule as one
injury for one policy; however, under
Georgia’s rather complicated “stacking”
rules, the applicable UM coverage may
be comprised of several policies. See
generally,
Jenkins and miller § 39:6.
22. Thurman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 260 Ga. App. 338, 579 S.E.2d 746
(2003).
23. Thurman, 278 Ga. at 163-64, 598 S.E.2d
at 450.
24. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(ii)(II) (as
quoted and emphasized by the Supreme
Court); Thurman, 278 Ga. at 163, 598
S.E.2d. at 450.
25. Thurman, 260 Ga. App. at 339, 579
S.E.2d at 747.
26. Thurman, 278 Ga. at 164, 598 S.E. 2d at
450.
27. Id. 278 Ga. at 164, 598 S.E. 2d at 451.
28. Adams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 298 Ga. App. 249, 250-51, 679
S.E.2d 726, 727-28 (2003). The bulk of
the opinion is devoted to the definition
of “otherwise.” At the end of its analysis,
however, the Court did not say what
the term means in the context of the
statute except that it means something
more than “other claims,” which is true
but not very helpful if one is looking to
“otherwise” for guidance in determining
if a particular type of lien comes within
the Thurman exception.
29. Thurman, 278 Ga. at 164, 598 S.E.2d at
451.
30. Bradley S. Wolff, et. al., Insurance, 61
Mercer L. Rev. 179, 182–84 (2009)
(“[The Thurman] decision was unusual
but seemingly limited to a fairly rare set
of facts.”).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1392.
32. 292 Ga. App. 60, 63, 663 S.E.2d 763,
765-66 (2008).
33. 298 Ga. App. 249, 679 S.E.2d 726 (2009).
34. Because UM coverage is a creature
of statute, the Court’s effort is an
understandable but, in light of Thurman,
futile exercise. See also discussion in
endnote 29, supra.
35. 298 Ga. App. at 253, 679 S.E.2d at 729.
36. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 288
Ga. 315, 702 S.E.2d 898 (2010).
37. 288 Ga. at 319, 702 S.E.2d at 902
(emphasis in the original).
38. Right of recovery from beneficiary for
Medicare benefits: 42 U.S.C. § 1395(b)
(2)(B)(ii); Taransky v. Secretary of U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 760
F.3d 307, 309 (3d Cir. 2014); right of
recovery from beneficiary for federal
workers’ compensation benefits: 5
U.S.C. § 8132; Ward by and Through
Ward v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 726 F.2d
516 (9th Cir. 1984); right of recovery
from beneficiary of federal health
insurance (FEHBA): 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)
(1); Bell v. BC/BS of Oklahoma, 827
F.3d 1198 (8th Cir. 2016) (FEHBA right
of reimbursement is not mandated by
federal statute but if the plan document
provides for subrogation and/or
reimbursement the statute preempts
state law from enforcing the complete
compensation rule against the plan).
39. To illustrate, if instead of being tort
victims, Mr. Adams, Ms. Thurman
and Ms. Toomer had been the at-fault
drivers in their respective accidents, no
third party (i.e., tortfeasor) would have
been liable for their medical expenses.
Nonetheless, Mr. Adams would have still
owed the hospital, whereas Ms. Thurman
and Ms. Toomer would not have owed
anything to their health insurance carrier
(i.e., the federal government).
40. Davis v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan
of Georgia, Inc., 271 Ga. 508, 511,
521 S.E.2d 815, 818 (1999) (citations
omitted). Compare Woodcraft by
MacDonald v. Ga. Surety and Cas. Co.,
293 Ga. 9, 743 S.E.2d 373 (2013) (the
Court declined to follow the Complete
Compensation Rule in a property
damage case despite the fact that the
insurance contract did not expressly