February 2022
Humanitarian Access,
Great Power Conict, and
Large-Scale Combat Operations
A
Brittany Card
Rob Grace
Tarana Sable
Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies
Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs
Brown University
About CHRHS
Established in 2019 at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Aairs,
the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies (CHRHS) is committed to tackling the
human rights and humanitarian challenges of the 21st century. Our mission is to promote a more
just, peaceful, and secure world by furthering a deeper understanding of global human rights and
humanitarian challenges, and encouraging collaboration between local communities, academics, and
practitioners to develop innovative solutions to these challenges.
About the Authors
e authors prepared this report in their capacities as researchers for CHRHS, Brittany Card as a
Visiting Scholar at CHRHS, Rob Grace as an Aliated Fellow at CHRHS, and Tarana Sable as a
Research Assistant at CHRHS.
Acknowledgments
e authors express gratitude to all research participants, including focus group participants and
interviewees, who played a role in this research process. Additionally, the authors received valuable
feedback on earlier dras of this report from Dave Polatty, Jonathan Robinson, Ziad Achkar, Adam
Levine, Alexandria Nylen, and Zach Shain. e authors also beneted from useful feedback and
edits from an additional external reviewer who wished to remain anonymous. In terms of outreach
to potential research participants, the authors are grateful to the chairs of various thematic working
groups based at CHRHS, in particular, Dave Polatty, Jonathan Robinson, and Hank Brightman.
e authors extend particular gratitude to Beth Eggelston for co-organizing and co-convening the
third focus group session, which focused on stakeholders based in Australia. A nal thank you to
Seth Stulen for serving as the graphic designer for the report. Any substantive errors are those of the
authors alone.
Disclaimer
The opinions and views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of any
organizations with which they are affiliated or for whom they work, including the US Government
or USAID.
Suggested Citation
Brittany Card, Rob Grace, Tarana Sable, “Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-
Scale Combat Operations,” Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies, Watson Institute for
International and Public Aairs, Brown University, February 2022.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary i
Introduction 1
Part I: Denitions and Methodology 3
Part II: e Shiing Geopolitical and Security Landscape 6
Part III: Envisioning Possible Future Large-Scale Combat Operations 12
Part IV: Humanitarian Access Challenges During Large-Scale Combat Operations 15
Part V: Conclusion and Recommendations 27
Executive Summary
e geopolitical landscape of the world is shiing. Geopolitical dynamics are driving the re-emergence of great
power competition as the dominant paradigm through which major global powers view their relationships
with each other. For instance, the United States shied its focus from the ‘Global War on Terror’ framework
that dominated foreign policy planning for most of the 21st century to a focus on great power competition.
Within this new frame, China and Russia are identied as its greatest threats. Meanwhile, China and Russia
are pursuing global inuence as they view the US as a struggling hegemon. All three states appear braced for
long-term geopolitical contestation and are engaged in preparations for future potential conict, including in
the form of large-scale combat operations.
For humanitarian policymakers and practitioners, the state of thinking, analysis, and planning on these issues,
for the most part, remains nascent. e overall conclusion of this report is that it cannot remain nascent for
much longer. Conict between two or more states, especially in the form of large-scale combat operations,
should it occur, will lead to devastating impacts on civilian populations and signicant challenges for human-
itarian response.
e international humanitarian system as it exists today has never engaged in a response context of this nature.
Current ongoing complex emergencies that entail overlapping conicts between an array of non-state and
state actors—such as those in Ukraine, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq—and past great power military conicts, such
as World War I and World War II, oer some insight into the scale and scope of humanitarian needs, as well
as the response challenges, likely to arise during large-scale military conict between great powers. However,
the anticipated high-tempo and destructive nature of operations, scope of aected areas, and sheer number of
forces involved in operations across multiple domains—with a particular emphasis on the role of information
and cyber operations—is likely to have eects on civilian populations and militaries far beyond what one can
fully comprehend from current events.
To advance understanding of the humanitarian dimensions of large-scale combat operations between great
powers, or between other peer or near-peer states, this report analyzes humanitarian access challenges likely
to arise in such contexts. e analysis is based on focus group sessions and key informant interviews with
37 humanitarian, military, academic, and government stakeholders. is report examines these issues in ve
parts. Part I denes key terms and oers an overview of the methodology of this research project. Part II
provides a more in-depth examination of the current geopolitical environment. Part III discusses the likely
overall characteristics of future great power conict and large-scale combat operations. Part IV examines
three categories of anticipated humanitarian access challenges: political, operational, and tactical. Part V
articulates recommendations for humanitarian organizations, governments, and militaries to proactively
adopt to mitigate and prepare for the humanitarian access challenges identied in this research.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | i
Humanitarian Access Challenges
During Large-Scale Combat Operations
Political Challenges
relating to high-level
political or strategic
engagements, oen inoling
issues relating to the norms
or values that undergird
humanitarian action
Limited impact of high-
level multilateral political
engagements
Politicized government
perceptions of the
international humanitarian
actors
Relationship decits with
potential state actors
Operational Challenges
relating to developing and
planning practical and
procedural methods for
activities or operations that
align with broader political
and strategic goals
Bureaucratic impediments
and donor restrictions
Limited operational role
of traditional international
humanitarian actors
Devising processes to
manage humanitarian
insecurity
Tactical Challenges
relating to implementing
operational arrangements
while also responding to
ground-level issues, which
can change rapidly
Managing access and
logistics across multiple
domains with limited
resources
Physical and digital threats
to aid worker security
Recommendations for Humanitarian
Organizations, Governments, and Militaries
Develop awareness in the humanitarian community about possible future scenarios, including
humanitarian implications and response requirements
Incorporate humanitarian and protection of civilian considerations into military planning
Build relationships with potential future parties to the conict
Conduct planning to ensure the continuity of humanitarian operations
Improve humanitarian-military relations through education and training
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | ii
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 1
Introduction
“We are in great power competition today, and with competition, conict is
always a risk—this is not just a problem for tomorrow’s leaders.”
– Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, US Army, October 2018
1
e geopolitical landscape of the world is shiing. e Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, issued
by United States (US) President Joe Biden in March 2021, warns against “strategic challenges from an
increasingly assertive China and destabilizing Russia.”
2
e publication dubs China “the only competitor
potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a
sustained challenge to a stable and open international system,” whereas “Russia remains determined to enhance
its global inuence and play a disruptive role on the world stage.”
3
is vision of the security threats that the
US faces from abroad is very dierent from the ‘Global War on Terror’ framework that dominated US foreign
policy planning for most of the 21
st
century.
Meanwhile, the Chinese government has embraced the paradigm of a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship’
to frame Sino-American relations and has undertaken a series of military modernization initiatives, aiming
to develop a ‘world-class’ military by 2049 that is equal or superior to the US.
4
Over the past decade, Russia’s
relationship with Western states has deteriorated, in part due to the conicts in Syria and Ukraine.
5
Whereas the
US sees China and Russia as rising threats, China and Russia see the US as a struggling hegemon prone toward
aggression to preserve its waning global inuence.
6
All three states appear braced for long-term geopolitical
contestation, with substantial military strategizing for future possible great power conict scenarios already
underway.
Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. Army, “Meeting the Challenge of Large-Scale Combat Operations Today and Tomorrow,” Military Review,
September-October 2018, p. 112, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/SO-18/Lundy-LSCO.pdf.
Oce of the President, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance: e White House, March 2021, p. 14.
Ibid., p. 8.
Michael S. Chase, “China’s Search for a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship,’” China Brief Vol. 12, Issue 17 (2012), https://jamestown.
org/program/chinas-search-for-a-new-type-of-great-power-relationship/; Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Se-
curity Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2020), p. i, https://media.defense.
gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF. For an analysis of the limita-
tions of Chinese strategic foresight, see Paul Charon, “Strategic Foresight in China: e Other Dimension Missing,” European Union Institute
for Security Studies, 2021, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/les/EUISSFiles/Brief_5_2021.pdf.
Dmitri Trenin, “Strategic, Mental Shi in Global Order,” Global Times, Carnegie Moscow Center, May 17, 2015, https://carnegiemoscow.
org/2015/05/17/ukraine-crisis-causes-strategic-mental-shi-in-global-order-pub-60122.
See “Wang Yi Meets with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,” Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in New York, March
26, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgny/eng/xw/t1864347.htm, which is a joint statement from China and Russia in which both coun-
tries call on the United States to “reect on the damage it has done to global peace and development in recent years, halt unilateral bullying, stop
meddling in other countries’ domestic aairs, and stop forming small circles to seek bloc confrontation.”
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 2
For humanitarian policymakers and practitioners, the state of thinking, analysis, and planning on these issues,
for the most part, remains nascent. e overall conclusion of this report is that it cannot remain nascent for
much longer. Conict between two or more states, especially in the form of large-scale combat operations,
should it occur, will lead to devastating impacts on civilian populations and pose signicant challenges
for humanitarian response.
7
Furthermore, large-scale combat operations will likely involve all ve of the
warghting domains: air, land, sea, space, and cyber.
e international humanitarian system as it exists today has never engaged in a response context of this nature.
Current ongoing complex emergencies that entail overlapping conicts between an array of non-state and
state actors—such as those in Ukraine, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq—and past great power military conicts, such
as World War I and World War II, oer some insight into the scale and scope of humanitarian needs, as well
as the response challenges, likely to arise during large-scale military conict between great powers. However,
the high tempo of operations, employment of conventional and advanced weapons, sheer number of military
forces involved, and scope of aected areas in future large-scale combat operations is likely to have eects on
civilian populations and militaries far beyond what one can fully comprehend from current events.
To advance understanding of the humanitarian dimensions of large-scale combat operations between great
powers, or between other peer or near-peer states, this report analyzes humanitarian access challenges likely
to arise in such contexts. Across the globe, and especially in the context of large-scale humanitarian crises,
populations already struggle to access essential services. Humanitarian organizations face a myriad of access
constraints, including issues related to entering a country (obtaining visas, importing equipment, goods, and
supplies); bureaucratic obstacles to operating within a country (obtaining permission from authorities to
implement programs or travel to certain areas); diversion of aid (including eorts to control humanitarian
programming in ways that serve security or political interests of states, non-state armed groups, or other actors);
security incidents (attacks against aid workers, goods, and equipment, as well as ongoing military operations);
and infrastructure constraints or weather-related hazards.
8
In armed conicts, additional challenges include
building simultaneous relationships with host states and non-state armed groups; navigating decisions on the
use of armed escorts; implementing humanitarian notication systems; and grappling with counter-terrorism
laws and policies that can complicate engagements with non-state armed groups designated as terrorists.
9
Adequate preparation for possible future great power conict scenarios must entail understanding how these
challenges are likely to manifest, in what ways the dynamics of large-scale combat operations might further
aggravate these challenges, what new challenges might arise, and what steps humanitarian and military actors
can take to better navigate these diculties. is report examines these issues in ve parts. Part I denes key
Daniel R. Mahanty and Annie Shiel, “Protecting Civilians Still Matters in Great-Power Conict,” Defense One, May 3, 2019, https://www.
defenseone.com/ideas/2019/05/protecting-civilians-still-matters-great-power-conict/156723/; and Daniel R. Mahanty, “Even a Short War
Over Taiwan or the Baltics Would Be Devastating,” Foreign Policy, July 29, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/29/war-taiwan-chi-
na-united-states-russia-baltics-nato-military-civilians-deaths-losses-casualties/.
See “OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Access,” United Nations Oce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aairs, April 2010, https://
www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/les/dms/Documents/OOM_HumAccess_English.pdf.
Rob Grace, “Surmounting Contemporary Challenges to Humanitarian-Military Relations,” Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Studies, Watson Institute for International and Public Aairs, Brown University, August 2020, p. 32-41, https://watson.brown.edu/chrhs/les/
chrhs/imce/research/Surmounting%20Contemporary%20Challenges%20to%20Humanitarian-Military%20Relations_Grace.pdf.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 3
terms and oers an overview of the methodology of this research project. Part II provides a more in-depth
examination of the current geopolitical environment, including current military thinking and planning for
large-scale combat operations. Part III discusses the likely overall characteristics of future great power conict
and large-scale combat operations. Part IV examines anticipated humanitarian access challenges during large-
scale combat operations. Part V provides concluding remarks and recommendations.
Part I | Denitions and Methodology
A. Dening Key Terms
Great power conict refers to militarized incidents that involve great powers in the international system.
By “great powers,” this report means, “states whose interests and capabilities extend beyond their immediate
neighbors. More so than other states, they shape and respond to the structure of the international system.”
10
Conict can entail three dimensions. e rst is threats of the use of force, meaning “verbal indications of
hostile intent.”
11
e second is displays of force, which “involve military demonstrations but no combat
interaction.”
12
Displays of force may include public displays of naval or aerial force, an increase in military
readiness, and force mobilization.
13
e third dimension is the use of force, which encompasses a wide range
of conict types, including large-scale combat operations, proxy warfare, and the use of military force in
settings that fall short of the legal denition of armed conict.
14
Peer-to-peer or near-peer conict entails two or more states of relatively equal capabilities and political will
engaging in military confrontation with each other. A US-Army funded RAND report presents the following
denition of a peer competitor: “For a state to be a peer, it must have more than a strong military. Its power
must be multidimensional—economic, technological, intellectual, etc.—and it must be capable of harnessing
these capabilities to achieve a policy goal.”
15
e concept of peer-to-peer or near-peer conict encompasses
great power conict; however, this term can also apply to military confrontation between non-great powers
(for example, regional powers). As with great power conict, peer-to-peer or near-peer conict can entail
threats of the use of force, displays of force, and actual uses of force.
Bear F. Braumoeller, “Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conict,” American Political Science Review 102, no. 1 (2008): 77.
Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1812-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical
Patterns,” Conict Management and Peace Science 15, no. 2 (1996): 170.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 172.
Ibid., p. 171-173.
omas S. Szayna, e Emergence of Peer Competitors: a Framework of Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. xii.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 4
Large-scale combat operations are direct, extended major military confrontations between two or more
states. As the US Department of the Army Field Manual 3-0 (FM 3-0) denes the term, large-scale combat
operations “occur in the form of major operations and campaigns aimed at defeating an enemy’s armed
forces and military capabilities in support of national objectives.”
16
FM 3-0 also states, “Large-scale combat
operations are intense, lethal, and brutal. eir conditions include complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue,
and uncertainty.”
17
Future large-scale combat operations, FM 3-0 articulates, are also likely to be multi-
domain in nature, entailing conict in “air, land, maritime, space, and the information environment (including
cyberspace).”
18
Proxy warfare is dened as a conict in which “a major power instigates or plays a major role in supporting
and directing a party to a conict but does only a small portion of the actual ghting itself.”
19
ere are
multiple ways for states to directly or indirectly engage in proxy conict, including through partnered military
operations; arms transfers; and nancial, logistical, or political support.
20
Humanitarian action refers to activities aiming to “assist people aected by disasters due to natural hazards
or armed conict, and seek to enhance the safeguarding of their rights.”
21
ese activities are guided by
humanitarian principles, the core four of which are humanity (alleviating suering wherever it is found),
impartiality (basing programming on needs and prioritizing the most vulnerable), neutrality (refraining from
taking sides in a conict), and independence (maintaining autonomy from other actors).
22
Humanitarian access refers to “both access by humanitarian actors to people in need of assistance and
protection and access by those in need to the goods and services essential for their survival and health, in
a manner consistent with core humanitarian principles.”
23
e dual-pronged denition of humanitarian
access places attention on two interrelated issues: 1) from the perspective of humanitarian organizations, the
extent to which the response environment enables their ability to implement programming; and 2) from the
perspective of people aected by large-scale emergencies, the extent to which their needs can be met, whether
by humanitarian organizations or through other means.
United States Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 3-0: Operations, October 6, 2017, p. 1-1.
17
Ibid., p. 1-4.
18
Ibid., p. 1-23.
19
Daniel L. Byman, “Why Engage in Proxy War? A State’s Perspective,” Brookings, May 21, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/or-
der-from-chaos/2018/05/21/why-engage-in-proxy-war-a-states-perspective/.
20
“Understanding Support Relationships,” International Committee of the Red Cross, https://sri.icrc.org/understanding-support.
21
“Humanitarian Action 101,” InterAction, https://www.interaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Humanitarian-Action-101.pdf. e
word ‘humanitarian’ has a certain degree of inherent ambiguity, and there are no denitive parameters to delineate organizations and activities
considered ‘humanitarian’ from those that are not. For an overview of the history of the term, ‘humanitarianism,’ see Craig Calhoun, “e Im-
perative to Reduce Suering: Charity, Progress, and Emergencies in the Field of Humanitarian Action,” in Humanitarianism in uestion, eds.
Michael Barnett and omas G. Weiss (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 73-142.
22
See “OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Principles,” United Nations Oce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aairs, June 2012,
https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf.
23
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Aairs, Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conict: Handbook on the International Nor-
mative Framework, Version 2, December 2014, p. 13, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/humanitarian-access-situations-armed-conict-hand-
book-international-normative.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 5
B. Methodology
is report’s ndings are based on the authors’ analysis of relevant existing literature (including desk reviews
on humanitarian access, historical and contemporary concepts of great power competition and conict, and
the state of training and preparations for future conict), virtual focus group discussions that the authors
convened, and semi-structured interviews conducted with key informants. Between the focus group sessions
and key informant interviews, the research team captured perspectives from 37 humanitarian, military,
academic, and government stakeholders. Military stakeholders included active duty, reservist, and retired
service members. Academic stakeholders included individuals engaged in teaching and research. Additionally,
multiple research participants have previous relevant or dual-hatted professional experience, for example,
a former government stakeholder who now works with an academic institution or a current humanitarian
practitioner with prior military service.
e research team interviewed ve key informants and engaged 32 stakeholders across three focus group
sessions, each of which engaged a dierent set of stakeholders. Each focus group session lasted approximately
an hour and a half, and semi-structured interviews lasted between 25 and 45 minutes. e focus group sessions
and semi-structured interviews were conducted under Chatham House rules. Participants understood that
identiable information and organizational aliations would not be included in any publications resulting
from the research. e research team analyzed data from the focus groups and interviews using NVivo, a
qualitative data analysis soware. Two members of the research team coded all transcripts from focus groups
and interviews using inductive analysis to capture patterns in themes, topics, and concepts across the data.
e research team convened the rst two virtual focus group sessions in May 2021. e rst focus group session
had 11 participants and the second focus group session had 10 participants. Each focus group included a
combination of humanitarian, military, academic, and government stakeholders. Participants were identied
primarily through pre-existing networks, in particular drawing from members of the Protection of Civilians
Working Group, the Aid Worker Security Working Group, and the Humanitarian Access Working Group, all
of which are associated with the Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop convened annually by
the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies at Brown University and the US Naval War College
Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Program. All members of these working groups have extensive
experience and/or expertise in humanitarian response. Additional selected experts on humanitarian access
and/or humanitarian civil-military coordination were also invited to participate in these sessions.
e third virtual focus group session, which had 12 participants, was convened in August 2021 in collaboration
with the Humanitarian Advisory Group, which co-hosted the session. e aim of this third session was to
capture the particular perspectives of experts knowledgeable about and/or working on relevant issues in
the Asia-Pacic region. is focus group was composed solely of humanitarian, military, academic, and
government stakeholders based in Australia.
Before each focus group session, the research team draed and disseminated a brieng document to
participants that oered an overview of key concepts and articulated a set of questions intended to frame
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 6
the discussion. e brieng document did not specify a particular scenario to orient participants’ comments.
Rather, participants were prompted to speak more generally about their perspectives on possible future great
power conict and large-scale combat scenarios. e geopolitical contest between the United States and
China/Russia framed much of the discussions, with a focus on imagining what future large-scale combat
operations would look like between these actors. However, participants also discussed other possible large-
scale combat operations scenarios, in particular, involving peer-to-peer or near-peer conict between regional
powers. Additionally, participants discussed proxy warfare, drawing connections to conicts already seen
today. e scope of this report reects this somewhat loose framing in terms of scenarios, while centering the
analysis on the intersection between great power conict and large-scale combat operations.
Finally, it is important to highlight that the focus group participants and semi-structured interview subjects do
not constitute a representative sample of a broader population of humanitarian, military, and/or governmental
actors. e sampling was purposive, aiming to collect perspectives from actors already working on or thinking
about these subjects or in a position to oer expert commentary. Two important limitations are that the
sample skews humanitarian (a limited set of military actors participated in the research) and Western (the
sample drew largely from people in the United States, the United Kingdom, various European countries,
and Australia). e research team hopes that this initial report will prompt future research to build on this
foundation (for example, by engaging more deeply with military actors, as well as non-Western policy actors,
practitioners, and experts, in particular, from China and Russia).
Part II
e Shiing Geopolitical and
Security Landscape
is section oers an overview of the shiing current geopolitical context and the potential implications for
possible future conict scenarios. e section proceeds in three parts. e rst part, as a point of departure,
examines how the US, over the past several years, has embraced a strategic shi toward great power competition.
e second part addresses perspectives and developments from China and Russia. e third part discusses
dierent perspectives on the likelihood of large-scale combat operations and how and why such conicts
might arise.
A. e United States’ Strategic Shi Toward Great Power Competition
Over the past several years, the US has formally reoriented its national security and foreign policy strategy
toward great power competition. e 2015 National Military Strategy indicated the resurgence of great power
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 7
competition,
24
and the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy cemented the
shi, identifying China and Russia as the main priorities for the US Department of Defense.
25
e 2021
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance—as noted in this report’s introduction—retained this focus on
great power competition, although the US has embraced ‘strategic competition’ as a framing device.
26
Further illustrating the shi toward great power competition, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin at his
conrmation hearing called China “the most signicant threat going forward” and noted that the US has
“seen [China] do a number of things that tend to make us believe that China wants to be the preeminent
power in the world in the not too-distant future.”
27
Austin asserted that China “is clearly a competitor that we
have to make sure that we begin to check their aggression.”
28
Moreover, in September 2021, US Department
of Defense Policy Chief Colin Kahl acknowledged the short-term threat that Russia poses to the US, stating,
“In the coming years, Russia may actually represent the primary security challenge that we face in the military
domain for the United States and certainly for Europe,” continuing, “Russia is an increasingly assertive
adversary that remains determined to enhance its global inuence and play a disruptive role on the global
stage, including through attempts to divide the West.”
29
US service-specic posture statements and command guidance documents reect this focus on great power
competition and conict.
30
For example, the 2021 budget submission for the US Department of the Air Force
seeks to align the Air Forces’ portfolios and develop operational concepts in accordance with the National
Defense Strategy, such as investing in logistics that can support rapid deployment of forces to forward
locations and the generation of combat power.
31
e US also seeks to limit the inuence of China and Russia
by repositioning its forces and upgrading military capabilities, especially in the Indo-Pacic region (to counter
China) and the North Atlantic (through the reestablishment of the US Navy’s Second Fleet, responsible for
the US east coast and the North Atlantic Ocean).
32
24
US Department of Defense, e National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015, e United States Military’s Contribution
To National Security, June 2015, p. i, 1-4.
25
Oce of the President, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 55; US Department of Defense, Sum-
mary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, undated
but released January 2018, p. 1, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf,
26
Daniel Lipmann, Lara Seligman, Alexander Ward and uint Forgey, “Biden’s Era of ‘Strategic Competition,’” Politico, October 5, 2021,
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2021/10/05/bidens-era-of-strategic-competition-494588.
27
US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Conrmation Hearing on the Expected Nomination of Lloyd J. Austin III to be Secre-
tary of Defense, 117th Cong., 1st. sess., 2021, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/21-02_01-19-20211.pdf.
28
Ibid.
29
Jim Garamone, “DOD Policy Chief Kahl Discusses Strategic Competition With Baltic Allies,” Department of Defense, September 17, 2021,
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2780661/dod-policy-chief-kahl-discusses-strategic-competition-with-baltic-al-
lies/.
30
“CNO Gilday Releases Guidance to the Fleet; Focuses on Warghting, Warghters, and the Future Navy,” US Navy, December 4, 2019,
https://www.navy.mil/Press-Oce/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/2237608/cno-gilday-releases-guidance-to-the-eet-focus-
es-on-warghting-warghters-an/.
31
e Honorable Barbara Barrett and General David L. Goldfein, United States Air Force Posture Statement Fiscal Year 2021, United States
Air Force Presentation to the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2021, https://www.armed-ser-
vices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Barrett--Goldfein_03-03-20.pdf. e United States Air Force Posture Statement Fiscal Year 2021 reference to
the NDS refers to the 2018 NDS, as the 2021 Interim NDS had not been released yet.
32
Jerey Goldberg, “e Obama Doctrine,” e Atlantic, April 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-
doctrine/471525/#2; Marian Faa and Prianka Srinivasan, “Pentagon pushes for Pacic missile defence site to counter China’s threat to the US,”
Australian News Broadcast, March 18, 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-19/united-states-pentagon-missile-defence-guam-count-
er-china/100015900. See Sam LaGrone, “Navy Reestablishes U.S. 2nd Fleet to Face Russian reat; Plan Calls for 250 Person Command in
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 8
US preparations for future conict, including in the form of large-scale combat operations, also involve
prioritizing investments in developing advanced technology for future warfare, such as autonomous weapons,
articial intelligence, and hypersonic weapons. According to a Congressional Research Report released in
October 2021, “e United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies. However, China and
Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military technologies.
As these technologies are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could hold
signicant implications for the future of international security writ large…”
33
Furthermore, the need to prepare and train for large-scale combat operations is communicated across various
US Department of Defense documents—including doctrine and training initiatives—and war-gaming
exercises are already underway.
34
One has to look no further than to FM 3-0 (the aforementioned US Army
eld manual published in 2017) to understand how the US Army, and the US military more broadly, is
anticipating this possibility. FM 3-0 asserts, “While the U.S. Army must be manned, equipped, and trained to
operate across the range of military operations, large-scale ground combat against a peer threat represents the
most signicant readiness requirement.”
35
B. Perspectives and Developments from China and Russia
Chinese perspectives on the great power paradigm clash with those from the US. Chinese leaders and foreign
policy scholars generally reject the framework of great power conict to describe Sino-American relations.
For example, in commentary published by the China Institute of International Studies in 2020, Teng Jianqun
framed the notion of strategic competition between the US and China as a dishonest American rhetorical
device, writing that US air and naval activities in the Asia-Pacic region “are part of what the US calls ‘strategic
competition’ with China; equally, these could be seen as preparations for a possible future war close to the
Chinese mainland.”
36
Some Chinese scholars, such as Wang Jisi, believe that strategic competition between
China and the US is the “inevitable” outcome of a situation in which the US “cannot accept” the view that
Norfolk,” USNI News, May 4, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/05/04/navy-reestablishes-2nd-eet-plan-calls-for-250-person-command-in-
norfolk, which discusses the explicit link between the reestablishment of the Second Fleet and great power competition. In particular, Chief
of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson has stated, “Our national defense strategy makes clear that we’re back in an era of great power
competition as the security environment continues to grow more challenging and complex...at’s why today, we’re standing up 2nd Fleet to
address these changes, particularly in the North Atlantic.”
33
US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Emerging Military Technologies:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler, R46458 (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46458, p. i.
34
For an example of doctrine, see United States Department of the Army, U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, TRADOC 525-3-1
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2018), https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo114669/TP525-3-1_30Nov2018.pdf. On training, in
October 2021, the US Army held its course for division and sta ocers to develop the “skills needed to plan successful large-scale combat oper-
ations in the major urban areas.” See John Spencer, “e US Army’s First Urban Warfare Planners Course,” Modern War Institute, https://mwi.
usma.edu/the-us-armys-rst-urban-warfare-planners-course/. For war games conducted as a component of US preparations for responding to a
possible Chinese seizure of Taiwan and/or surrounding islands, see Valerie Insinna, “A US Air Force War Game Shows What the Service Needs
to Hold O—or Win Against—China in 2030,” Defense News, April 12, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2021/04/12/a-
us-air-force-war-game-shows-what-the-service-needs-to-hold-o-or-win-against-china-in-2030/; and Chris Dougherty, Jennie Matuschak and
Ripley Hunter, “e Poison Frog Strategy: Preventing a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwanese Islands,” Center for a New American Securi-
ty, October 2021, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-poison-frog-strategy.
35
United States Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 3-0: Operations, October 6, 2017, p. ix.
36
Teng Jianqun, “Regional Security Outlook 2021,” China Institute of International Studies, December 23, 2020, https://www.ciis.org.cn/
english/COMMENTARIES/202012/t20201223_7692.html.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 9
American prestige on the world stage declined aer the 2008 nancial crisis and is “unwilling to acknowledge
its weakness vis-a-vis China.”
37
As noted earlier in this report, Chinese President Xi Jinping has promoted the
framework of a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship’ between China and the US, a rubric that the US has
not embraced due to concern that it is tantamount to accepting China’s rise.
38
In the military realm, China now has the largest navy in the world and has land-based conventional ballistic
and cruise missiles that outnumber and outperform those of the US in terms of range.
39
e People’s
Liberation Army (PLA)—through equipment and systems modernization, historical analysis, information
collection, and training—is preparing for low and high intensity conicts.
40
e US Defense Intelligence
Agency “estimates the core strengths of the PLA to be long-range res, information warfare, and nuclear
capabilities. Furthermore, it acknowledges the PLA’s ever-improving power-projection capabilities and SOF
[special operations forces].”
41
China is also investing heavily in ‘anti-access’ or ‘area denial’ capabilities aimed
at blocking the United States’ naval access to the western Pacic, specically the waters that surround China’s
coastline.
42
Russia’s self-identication as a great power is well established. In fact, a RAND report notes, “Russia has
consistently described itself as a great power. At a minimum, this vision includes Russia’s desire to participate
in deciding global issues and to have a sphere of inuence in its region.”
43
However, Russian scholarship
conceptualizes Russia as a unique state that cannot be understood through the paradigms of Western
theories. Mariya Y. Omelicheva and Lidiya Zubytska write, “Kremlin authorities have tried to dene and
defend Russia’s great power identity by rejecting and downgrading what they view as alien to Russia. e anti-
Western and anti-American discourses and policies have been central to this approach.”
44
ese perspectives
inuence Russian foreign policy and academic discourse, which views a unipolar international system under
US dominance as “destabilizing,” particularly to Russian security.
45
Rather, Russian foreign policy promotes a
multipolar system, in which Russia retains special roles and rights based on its great power status.
46
Russia is also rapidly modernizing its military and building up its capacity for conict. According to Michael
Kofman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “Today, the Russian military is at its highest level of readiness, mobility,
37
Minghao Zhao, “Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US–China Strategic Competition,” e Chinese Journal of Interna-
tional Politics 12, no. 3 (2019): 371–394.
38
Cheng Li and Lucy Xu, “Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over the ‘New Type of Great Power Relations,’” Brookings, December
4, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinese-enthusiasm-and-american-cynicism-over-the-new-type-of-great-power-relations/.
39
US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2020), https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-
MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF, p. ii and vi.
40
Paul Erickson, “Competition and Conict: Implications for Maneuver Brigades,” Modern War Institute, June 2021, p. 32, https://mwi.usma.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Competition-and-Conict-Implications-for-Maneuver-Brigades.pdf.
41
Ibid., p. 21.
42
Mike Yeo, “China’s Missile and Space Tech is Creating a Defensive Bubble Dicult to Penetrate,” Defense News, June 1, 2020, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/asia-pacic/2020/06/01/chinas-missile-and-space-tech-is-creating-a-defensive-bubble-dicult-to-penetrate/.
43
Andrew Radin and Clint Reach, Russian Views of the International Order (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), p. 15.
44
Mariya Y. Omelicheva and Lidiya Zubytska, “An Unending uest for Russia’s Place in the World: e Discursive Co-Evolution of the Study
and Practice of International Relations in Russia,” New Perspectives 24, no. 1 (2016): 20.
45
Ibid, p. 34.
46
Radin, Russian Views, p. 17.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 10
and technical capability in decades.”
47
Over the last decade, Russia has upgraded its ground forces, which
include motorized, mechanized, and armored units with the missions of “forcible entry and holding and
seizing territory,” as a Modern War Institute report notes.
48
A Congressional Research Service report also
states that these forces “emphasize mobility and are increasingly capable of conducting short but complex,
high-tempo operations.”
49
However, the report continues, ground forces remain a relatively low funding
priority for Russia in comparison to “massed artillery, rocket re, and armored forces,” all of which have been
crucial to Russia’s engagement in Ukraine and Syria.
50
Russia has also deployed cyber and information operations in numerous contexts.
51
Indeed, Russia’s preferred
methods of warfare, encapsulated by the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine, are “nonmilitary means” of instigating
chaos and instability in foreign states (such as information warfare) supplemented by “military means of a
concealed character.”
52
Russia also remains a nuclear peer competitor with the US, and its proximity means
that its long-range conventional missile capabilities pose a unique and signicant threat to the US.
53
C. Where Will It All Lead? e Possibility of Large-Scale Combat Operations
Where will these developments lead? Future military confrontations could assume many forms, ranging
from grey zone conict (measures short of armed conict, including election interference or disinformation
campaigns) to head-to-head military combat.
54
In FM 3-0, the US Army puts forth: “e proliferation of
advanced technologies; adversary emphasis on force training, modernization, and professionalization; the
rise of revisionist, revanchist, and extremist ideologies; and the ever increasing speed of human interaction
makes large-scale ground combat more lethal, and more likely, than it has been in a generation.”
55
However,
analysts disagree about the likelihood of large-scale combat operations occurring. Some believe that great
power contestation will zzle out, predicting that one or more of these states (the US, China, and/or Russia)
47
Michael Kofman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “e Myth of Russian Decline: Why Moscow Will be a Persistent Power,” Foreign Af-
fairs, November/December, 2021, p. 142-152, https://www.proquest.com/magazines/myth-russian-decline-why-moscow-will-be/
docview/2584599186/se-2?accountid=9758.
48
Erickson, “Competition and Conict.”
49
US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities, by Andrew S. Bowen, IFII589 (2020), https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11589.pdf.
50
Ibid.
51
For an example of Russia using cyber and information operations, see Sarah P. White, “Understanding Cyberwarfare: Lessons from the
Russia-Georgia War,” Modern War Institute, March 20, 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/understanding-cyberwarfare-lessons-russia-georgia-war/,
which notes that “overt cyberspace attacks...were relatively well synchronized with conventional military operations” by Russia against Georgia
in 2008.
52
Molly K. McKew, “e Gerasimov Doctrine,” Politico, September/October 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/
gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538/.
53
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky, “Grand Illusions: e Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, June 30, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/30/grand-illusions-impact-of-misperceptions-about-rus-
sia-on-u.s.-policy-pub-84845; and Kofman, “Myth of Russian Decline.” Additionally, for an analysis of strategic foresight within the Russian
government, see Andrew Monaghan, “How Russia Does Foresight: Where is the World Going?” European Union Institute for Security Studies,
2021, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/les/EUISSFiles/Brief_1_2021_0.pdf.
54
On grey zone conict, see “Competing in the Gray Zone: Countering Competition in the Space between War and Peace,” Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/features/competing-gray-zone.
55
U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual No. 3-0: Operations, October 6, 2017; and “Analysis: Americans ink Conict with China is
Possible but Unlikely,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://chinasurvey.csis.org/analysis/china-conict-possible-but-unlike-
ly/.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 11
will implode or lose their geopolitical standing.
56
Others believe the trend of geopolitical competition will
continue yet disagree on the likelihood of all-out warfare.
57
Few scholars assert that any great power is likely to purposefully initiate large-scale combat operations with
another near-peer competitor in the coming decades, especially given the high perceived risks of such a
conict. Yet, the probability of large-scale combat operations between great powers is certainly not negligible,
especially given the possibility of inadvertent escalations and miscalculations. In e Senkaku Paradox: Risking
Great Power Over Small Stakes, Michael E. O’Hanlon argues that the most plausible scenario in which large-
scale combat operations between the US, China, and Russia might occur would be an initially low-stakes
conict (what O’Hanlon refers to as a “localized crisis”) that escalates into full-edged war.
58
Similarly, in
the 2010 book, e China Dream: e Great Power inking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-
American Era, retired PLA ocer Liu Mingfu argues that China will ultimately surpass the US in geopolitical
power and that no matter how peacefully it seeks to do so, dramatic head-to-head conict between the US
and China in the coming decades is inevitable.
59
Indeed, tensions between the US and China exist in multiple geographic areas of the Asia-Pacic region
and beyond, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the West Pacic.
60
Each of these tension points
has the potential to escalate as a result of purposeful, inadvertent, or miscalculated actions. Although the
contemplation of possible confrontations between the US and China oen dominated discourse throughout
focus group sessions and key informant interviews conducted for this research, signicant US-Russian tensions
persist as well. Indeed, tensions have particularly escalated in the context of Russia’s large-scale invasion of
Ukraine in February 2022.
Regardless of debates among scholars and analysts about where exactly these developments will lead, the US,
China, and Russia are all bolstering their capabilities for future military combat in the context of great power
competition. e rest of this report examines the potential implications of possible future large-scale combat
operations on the humanitarian response environment, with a specic focus on humanitarian access.
56
For example, see George Friedman, e Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), which articulates a
prediction that neither China nor Russia will continue to rise and that both will implode during the 21st Century. Also see Alfred W. McCoy,
In the Shadows of the American Century: e Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017), which examines the
possibility that US power will decline over the course of the 21st century.
57
For various perspectives, see, for example, John Mearsheimer, “e Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Poli-
tics,” Foreign Aairs, November/December 2021, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-19/inevitable-rivalry-cold-war; and
Charles C. Krulak and Alex Friedman, “e US and China are not Destined for War,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, August 24, 2021,
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us-and-china-are-not-destined-for-war/.
58
Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Introduction: Expanding the Competitive Space,” In e Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small
Stakes, p. 1-18 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2019), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctv3znzxb.7.
59
Liu Mingfu, e China Dream: e Great Power inking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Era (Beijing: CN Times
Books, 2010). English translation published in 2015.
60
e US believes that China wishes to have the capability to seize Taiwan by 2027. See Sam LaGrone, “Milley: China Wants Capability to
Take Taiwan by 2027, Sees No Near-term Intent to Invade,” USNI News, June 23, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/06/23/milley-china-
wants-capability-to-take-taiwan-by-2027-sees-no-near-term-intent-to-invade.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 12
Part III
Envisioning Possible Future Large-Scale
Combat Operations
is section presents potential characteristics of future large-scale combat operations, including conventional
military confrontation, as well as cyber and information operations, during great power conict.
61
e section
draws on perspectives from the focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews, as well as relevant
literature. In particular, this section discusses: 1) perceptions regarding key actors, geographic scope, and
duration; 2) the fast-paced, lethal, and destructive nature of future large-scale combat operations; and 3) the
role of information and cyber operations.
A. Key Actors, Geographic Scope, and Duration
Research participants strongly expressed the expectation that large-scale combat operations will entail a
combination of direct large-scale military confrontation and indirect confrontation through the use of
proxies, with great powers funding, arming, and working with and through other armed actors. ird-party
actors (state and non-state) are anticipated to play a signicant role.
62
Generally, research participants discussed the possibility of a global conict of an unbounded nature, vast in
geographic scope, playing out across multiple domains: air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. Such a conict
would dier from current conicts due its metastatic nature, quickly expanding to secondary locations,
including to territories not necessarily in direct geographic proximity to the origin of ghting.
63
Some
participants contemplated the possibility of an attack on the US, Chinese, or Russian homelands, although
other research participants doubted the likelihood of this possibility, placing focus on tertiary locations.
Nevertheless, there is an expectation that great power conict would directly impact domestic populations,
given the likelihood of adversaries deploying cyber-attacks and information operations (discussed in greater
detail below). One research participant oered the following reection:
I personally think that the conict will look nothing like recent conicts of the last twenty,
thirty, forty years in terms of the scope and scale of violence… e unbounded nature of it is
something that governments, populations and militaries will nd dicult to stop. ere’s a lot
of planning going on at the moment, but in terms of how it compares: no comparison at all.
61
See Sandor Fabian, “Irregular versus Conventional Warfare: A Dichotomous Misconception,” Modern War Institute, 2021, https://mwi.
usma.edu/irregular-versus-conventional-warfare-a-dichotomous-misconception/.
62
As noted in the “Methodology” section of this report, discussions with research participants were loosely focused on the possibility of future
conict between the US versus China and/or Russia, but participants also raised the possibility of large-scale combat operations arising between
regional powers.
63
See David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, War with China: inking rough the Unthinkable (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2016), p. 27, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1140/RAND_RR1140.pdf, which
notes, “In modern history, wars involving great and more or less evenly matched powers have sucked in numerous third parties (not just prewar
allies), lasted years, metastasized to other regions, and forced belligerents to shi their economies to a war footing and their societies to a war
psyche.”
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 13
is kind of warfare would engender a variety of challenges for conict de-escalation. First, as noted, the
destabilizing global consequences of great power conict could draw in other third-party actors, with the
metastatic nature of the conict causing military operations to expand and evolve in unpredictable ways.
Second, proxy forces, driven by their own sets of objectives, might continue to pursue these objectives even
aer tensions between great powers have been mitigated or resolved, further complicating eorts to contain
or end the military conict. ird, a lack of clarity about who is responsible for certain actions during military
operations that involve proxies could complicate diplomatic engagement eorts. is set of challenges,
combined with the peer or near-peer nature of states’ capabilities, could prevent a quick and decisive end to
military conict.
B. Fast-Paced, Lethal, and Destructive
Large-scale combat operations, should they occur, are likely to be intentionally chaotic, intense, lethal, and
destructive. Research participants likened the humanitarian consequences of such a conict to those of
World War II. Indeed, large-scale combat operations will cause extensive damage to civilian infrastructure,
particularly if armed actors target civilian infrastructure in their conduct of this ‘total war.’ e impacts on
civilians will amplify feelings of the conict being “more like an existential crisis rather than a discretionary
crisis,” as one research participant stated. In the words of another research participant, “If we move to total
war, it’s not a war of choice, it’s all in, and will involve everybody and go until someone wins.” e result will
be that the “population will be targeted from both sides to destroy the will of both countries,” a research
participant asserted. Furthermore, within this context, there is an expectation that states will pursue whole-
of-nation mobilization eorts to support their military operations.
64
Research participants expressed mixed views on the extent to which international humanitarian law (IHL)
would eectively limit the eects of such an armed conict. On the one hand, some research participants
argued that states will have an incentive to respect IHL for reasons that include promoting reciprocity and
claiming moral legitimacy. On the other hand, many participants envisioned peer-to-peer conict between
great powers as relatively unconstrained by IHL, with states viewing humanitarian considerations (including
civilian protection) to be secondary or tertiary concerns in the context of total warfare. ese research
participants expected great powers to violate IHL both unintentionally (resulting from a chaotic, fast-paced
conict environment) and intentionally (for example, targeting civilians and civilian objects protected by
IHL as part of a deliberate warghting strategy).
65
64
See Gompert, Cevallos, and Garafola, War with China, p. 27-28, which paints the following picture of possible war between the United
States and China: “Whole populations suspend normal life; large fractions of them are prepared or forced to throw their weight behind their
nation’s ght. Not just states but opposing ideologies, worldviews, and political systems might be pitted against each other. Whatever their
initial causes, such wars’ outcomes might determine which great powers and their blocs survive as such. Prewar international systems collapse or
are transformed to serve the victors’ interests. us, the costs of failing outweigh those of ghting.”
65
See Shane Reeves and Robert Lawless, “Reexamining the Law of War for Great Power Competition,” Articles of War, January 27, 2021,
https://lieber.westpoint.edu/reexamining-the-law-of-war-for-great-power-competition/; Lt. Col. John Cherry, Sqn. Ldr. Kieran Tinkler and
Michael Schmitt, “Avoiding Collateral Damage on the Battleeld,” Just Security, February 11, 2021, https://www.justsecurity.org/74619/avoid-
ing-collateral-damage-on-the-battleeld/; and Lt. Gen. Charles Pede and Col. Peter Hayden, “e Eighteenth Gap: Preserving the Command-
er’s Legal Maneuver Space on ‘Battleeld Next,’” Military Review: e Professional Journal of the U.S. Army, March–April 2021, https://www.
armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2021/Pede-e-18th-Gap/.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 14
Within the context of large-scale combat operations, research participants discussed that armed actors may be
very unlikely to support implementing humanitarian pauses or humanitarian corridors, which if implemented
could oer an opportunity for militaries to re-position, re-supply, and potentially conduct other operations
during the pause.
66
is reluctance to support humanitarian pauses or corridors would be compounded by
states’ motivations to refrain from ceasing operations until the opposing side is completely defeated.
Research participants also predicted that the tempo and lethality of operations will require local governments
(spanning national to municipal levels) and civilian populations to remain constantly vigilant to threats to
their safety and will require civilians to take actions to protect themselves. In other words, fast-paced warfare
will place pressure on local governments,civilians themselves, and the humanitarian sector to ensure that
populations, even before the eruption of conict, are prepared to weather threats to civilian protection.
C. Cyber and Information Operations
States, militaries, and non-state actors in great power conict may pursue multiple types of operations
simultaneously, with conventional military operations conducted along with cyber and information
operations. Cyber-attacks cost little to carry out compared to conventional military operations, especially in
light of their ability to inict extensive damage on critical infrastructure, disrupt government and military
operations, and impact civilian populations in various ways, including by hindering access to basic services.
67
Determining who is responsible for such attacks (also known as cyber attribution) is a time and resource-
intensive process.
68
Further exacerbating the destruction and confusion inherent in fast-paced large-scale combat operations,
information operations could be widely used to limit access to necessary data, promote disinformation, and
control political and military narratives relevant to the conict. In the words of one research participant,
“Trying to control that narrative, to be seen as the provider of aid and the adversary as the uncaring,
illegitimate, discredited power will be more important.” ese operations may directly or indirectly aect
civilian populations, including by seeking to inuence public opinion on the conict and those involved.
All information platforms are vulnerable to this type of instrumentalization, but social media was of particular
interest to research participants. As one research participant underscored, reecting on the possibility of
a conict on the scale of World War II, but with contemporary cyber and information warfare elements
also mixed in, “If we’re looking on those kinds of scales, I think, one of the things that we’ve never faced
66
“Glossary of Terms: Pauses During Conict,” United Nations Oce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aairs, June 2011, https://www.
unocha.org/sites/unocha/les/dms/Documents/AccessMechanisms.pdf.
67
For discussion and resources on the intersection between cyber operations and IHL, see Laurent Gisel, Tilman Rodenhäuser, and Knut
Dörmann, “Twenty Years On: International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Civilians Against the Eects of Cyber Operations During
Armed Conicts,” International Review of the Red Cross 102, no. 913 (2020): 287-334; “Cyber Operations During Armed Conicts,” Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/conduct-hostilities/cyber-warfare; and “Cyber Warfare: Does
International Humanitarian Law Apply?” International Committee of the Red Cross, February 25, 2021, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/
cyber-warfare-and-international-humanitarian-law; and Michael N. Schmitt (ed), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to
Cyber Operations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
68
United States, Oce of the Director of National Intelligence, A Guide to Cyber Attribution (Washington, D.C.: Oce of the Director of
National Intelligence, 2018), https://www.dni.gov/les/CTIIC/documents/ODNI_A_Guide_to_Cyber_Attribution.pdf.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 15
before in those huge contexts is the impact of social media. e psychological operations and the scare
factor that dimension might bring to us would be a consideration from the outset.” ere are also possible
intersections in the information and space domains, in particular, relating to targeting satellites to interfere
with communication abilities.
Part IV
Humanitarian Access Challenges
During Large-Scale Combat Operations
Considering the conict characteristics presented in the previous section, this section discusses the
humanitarian access challenges likely to arise in future large-scale combat operations, in particular, during
crises arising from great power conict. is analysis draws primarily on the views articulated during focus
group discussions and key informant interviews. e section rst oers a broad overview of the challenging
nature of humanitarian access during large-scale combat operations. e section then delves more deeply into
particular access issues, categorized in terms of three types of challenges: 1) political, 2) operational, and 3)
tactical.
A. e Humanitarian Access Environment: An Overview
During future large-scale combat operations, the high tempo of operations, combatants’ employment of
conventional and advanced weapons, and the wide scope of aected areas spanning multiple domains—air,
land, sea, cyber, and space—are likely to aect civilian populations at a level unseen in recent humanitarian
crises. Indeed, the fast-paced, devastating, and continuous nature of the conict will directly impact civilians’
ability to survive, a view captured by one research participant, who stated:
e population will remain faced with the question of how they will survive such a scenario and
how they can make sure that, even if they’re physically safe—outside of the areas of conict,
shooting, and bombing—how can they be sure they will get the minimum goods and services
they need whilst in those locations?
Another research participant concurred, reecting, in particular, on the ‘total war’ approach that may be
adopted during large-scale combat operations:
is is going to be an ongoing conict. is is not going to be, like, you rest for the night. We
expect this to be an ongoing thing, 24/7 until it’s done. So it’s fast paced, very denite in terms
of what it needs to achieve, which is the neutralization of the other. And for the population,
this is going to be a dicult situation or scenario for them to be in.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 16
One can certainly draw lessons from recent highly politicized access contexts in which global and/or regional
powers have had a signicant stake (e.g., Syria, Yemen, and Ukraine). However, challenges to humanitarian
access in great power conict, particularly large-scale combat operations, will far exceed the scale, scope,
and complexity of access obstacles encountered in current and recent contexts. e dynamics of large-scale
combat operations are likely to not only exacerbate existing challenges but also result in new, and at times
unprecedented, access challenges for humanitarian actors and civilian populations.
ere was a nearly universal perspective shared among research participants that military operations will
result in a scale and level of violence that yields a signicant number of civilian injuries and casualties, threats
to life and safety, and destruction of critical infrastructure. ese eects are especially important to consider,
as militaries and humanitarian organizations anticipate that future conicts are likely to occur in urban
environments, with disproportionate impacts on civilian populations, including their ability to access goods
and services.
69
e remainder of this section examines challenges that humanitarian organizations may encounter in trying
to access civilians in need. is analysis divides these challenges into the following three categories:
1. Political challenges relating to high-level political or strategic engagements, oen involving issues
relating to the norms or values that undergird humanitarian action.
2. Operational challenges relating to developing and planning practical and procedural methods for
activities or operations that align with broader political and strategic goals.
3. Tactical challenges relating to implementing operational arrangements while also responding to
ground-level issues, which can change rapidly.
ese three categories broadly align with analytical distinctions found in literature on humanitarian
negotiation, military planning, logistics, and organizational management.
70
ese categories are also
interrelated and potentially overlapping.
71
For example, politicized perceptions of international humanitarian
69
Margarita Konaev and John Spencer, “e Era of Urban Warfare is Already Here,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 21, 2018,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/03/the-era-of-urban-warfare-is-already-here/.
70
For relevant literature on humanitarian negotiation, see Field Manual on Frontline Negotiation (Geneva, Switzerland: Centre of Competence
on Humanitarian Negotiation, 2019), which presents three types of humanitarian negotiation: political, professional, and technical; and the
Humanitarian Negotiation Handbook (Geneva, Switzerland: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2004), which discusses three levels at which
humanitarian negotiations occur: high-level strategic, mid-level operational, ground-level frontline. For military perspectives on these three
levels (commonly labeled in military publications as strategic, operational, and tactical), as well as information about the historical development
of this framework, see Georgii Samoilovich Isserson, e Evolution of Operational Art (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press,
2013), https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo88396/OperationalArt.pdf; USAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE),
“ree Levels of War,” Air and Space Power Mentoring Guide, Vol. 1 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997), https://faculty.cc.gatech.
edu/~tpilsch/INTA4803TP/Articles/ree%20Levels%20of%20War=CADRE-excerpt.pdf; and John R. Deni, “Maintaining Transatlantic
Strategic, Operational and Tactical Interoperability in an Era of Austerity,” International Aairs 90, no. 3 (2014): 583–600. For examples in
which other elds have used a similar framework, see G. Schmidt & Wilbert E. Wilhelm, “Strategic, Tactical and Operational Decisions in
Multi-National Logistics Networks: A Review and Discussion of Modelling Issues,” International Journal of Production Research 38, no. 7
(2000): 1501–1523; and Roger Kaufman, Jerry Herman, and Kathi Watters, Educational Planning: Strategic, Tactical, Operational (Lanham,
MD: Scarecrow Press, 2002).
71
See CADRE, “ree Levels of War,” which notes, “e boundaries of the levels of war and conict tend to blur and do not necessarily corre-
spond to levels of command.”
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 17
actors can lead to tensions in high-level political engagements, spiraling into operational challenges (such
as governments instrumentalizing bureaucratic procedures to control humanitarian activities) and tactical
challenges (as frontline humanitarians grapple with ad hoc restrictions, for example, during checkpoint
negotiations). Conversely, ground-level tensions between humanitarian and military actors can escalate into
issues that operational-level and political-level actors seek to address.
In light of the inter-related and potentially overlapping nature of these categories, there are opportunities
for humanitarian actors, governments, militaries, other armed actors, and donors to work across and
transcend divides that oen exist between these categories. An implication is the importance of coordination
between actors engaged in high-level diplomatic interactions, mid-level operational planning, and frontline
implementation. Nevertheless, the analysis below situates particular access challenges within specic
categories, even if certain elements are relevant to other categories as well. Table 1 (below) lays out these
humanitarian access issues. e rest of this section oers details and analysis.
Table 1: Anticipated Humanitarian Access Challenges During Large-Scale Combat Operations
B. Political Humanitarian Access Challenges
Limited Impact of High-Level Multilateral Political Engagements
e geopolitically charged nature of peer-to-peer conict is expected to create signicant challenges for high-
level humanitarian advocacy eorts, including possibly curtailing their impact, especially in the context of the
United Nations (UN) Security Council. e reality is not new that political will, particularly that of state
actors, plays a powerfully disproportionate role in determining the extent to which humanitarian organizations
are able to operate. However, these dynamics are likely to be heightened and intensied, especially if one
envisions a World War II style conict. One research participant lamented this particular dynamic, describing
Political Challenges
Limited impact of high-
level multilateral political
engagements
Politicized government
perceptions of the international
humanitarian actors
Relationship decits with
potential state actors
Operational Challenges
Bureaucratic impediments and
donor restrictions
Limited operational role
of traditional international
humanitarian actors
Devising processes to manage
humanitarian insecurity
Tactical Challenges
Managing access and logistics
across multiple domains with
limited resources
Physical and digital threats to
aid worker security
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 18
how the already grave political conditionality on humanitarian access in certain contexts would turn even
graver during great power conict:
Without the political will, you have no access. at includes the Security Council, bilateral
advocacy, member states… You see it today with Ethiopia that when there’s no political will,
there’s not much movement. We can only imagine that, when there’s a great power conict,
the political stakes are much, much higher, the political will is much slower or smaller, and the
leverage you have on any advocacy that can be possible is diminished. You can only imagine
that, in that situation, advocacy at a high level is almost moot or not very helpful.
ese diculties will be especially acute if UN Security Council Member States—in particular, the ve
permanent members, or P5 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US), each of whom has
veto power over Security Council resolutions—are direct parties to the conict or have a substantial political
stake (in the context of proxy warfare, for example). Additionally, Security Council Member States are also
signicant humanitarian donors (the humanitarian nancing landscape remains dominated by Western
states).
72
One should expect the Security Council, which is already hyper-politicized even in the absence of a
large-scale military confrontation between P5 members, to be of limited utility in such a scenario, as gridlock
will likely render engagement in this forum to be futile. Humanitarian access “would indeed be extremely
challenging, especially from a UN-related humanitarian response, because it is intrinsically tied to Member
State interests, to Member State political will, and the bodies that go along with it. How the UN system is
set up is that a certain group of Member States have a large say on how things happen,” a research participant
stated.
Large-scale combat operations between great powers would be a test of the entire UN system. e result would
be, a research participant predicted, “either the making or breaking of the UN.” Since the establishment of
the UN, the world has seen only minimal direct confrontation between P5 Member States. It is quite possible
that a great power conict of substantial scale and duration could fundamentally undermine the ability of
the UN system to function and even survive. Not mincing words, a research participant emphasized that the
notion of large-scale conict between P5 Security Council Member States “is an existential threat to the order
of what has governed humanitarianism. It’s a major collapse of the foundations we take for granted.”
Politicized Goernment Perceptions of International Humanitarian Actors
Limited engagement or outright stalemate in the Security Council, and the UN more broadly, could result in
an increased need for humanitarian actors to rely on bilateral engagement with states to negotiate access. is
scenario further underscores the role of political will in humanitarian access, especially given the possibility
72
See Fran Girling and Angus Urquhart, “Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2021,” Development Initiatives, p. 48, https://devinit.org/
documents/1008/Global-Humanitarian-Assistance-Report-2021.pdf, which notes that the top ve public donors of humanitarian assistance
in 2020 were the United States, Turkey, Germany, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. However, non-traditional donors, including
Gulf states (such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait) and private sector actors are likely to play an important role in the
future of humanitarian nancing. See Barnaby Willitts-King and Alexandra Spencer, “Reducing the Humanitarian Financing Gap: Review of
Progress Since the Report of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing,” Humanitarian Policy Group, April 2021, p. 41-42, https://cdn.
odi.org/media/documents/Reducing_the_humanitarian_nancing_gap_WEB.pdf.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 19
that host states will leverage arguments rooted in sovereignty to deny or intentionally delay access, despite
provisions found within IHL.
73
Moreover, in a conict involving the US, Russia, and/or China, the world’s major international humanitarian
organizations may struggle to operate in light of their perceived geopolitical anities and alignments. Many
organizations associated with the Western-dominated international humanitarian system may not easily access
Russian- or Chinese-controlled territory due to concerns about organizations’ perceived alignment with
Western interests (particularly those of the US). Western nationals working for humanitarian organizations
may struggle to gain entry for this same reason. Conversely, Western nationals will likely harbor similar
suspicions of Russian and Chinese humanitarian eorts. In the words of one research participant:
Look at traditional norms of humanitarian actors… ey’re all Western-based, and the Russians
would almost certainly not consider them as neutral. Being able to nd a humanitarian actor
with, in theory, free movement around the battlespace, would be dicult. e West is incredibly
suspicious about Russian humanitarian organizations, we invariably assume they would be used
for nefarious purposes.
Especially in the absence of meaningful high-level diplomatic engagement on humanitarian issues,
humanitarian organizations may struggle in their bilateral engagements on access with parties to the conict.
e result, for many international humanitarian organizations, will be great diculties in implementing
principled humanitarian action. Research participants anticipated that impartiality, neutrality, and
independence will all be challenging to actualize, given the likely inability for most organizations to eectively
operate on all sides of the conict. One research participant posited that humanitarian actors will not have
the “luxury to choose to do principled actions” during large-scale combat operations and will “very quickly
slide into ‘any means possible.’”
ere is already a growing discourse about potentially rethinking the utility and content of humanitarian
principles.
74
e debates among humanitarians around continuing with the principles versus rethinking or
abandoning some or all of them will be particularly acute should conict between great powers emerge. As
parties to the conict may view humanitarian organizations with politicized suspicions, humanitarians will
likely nd themselves engaging in organizational and sector-wide debates about how they can and should
engage with the politics of the conict, what role humanitarian principles should play, and what types of
compromises on principles are appropriate. ese dynamics would also have signicant implications for local
humanitarian actors, as explored in more detail below.
73
See “Rule 55. Access for Humanitarian Relief to Civilians in Need,” Customary IHL Database, International Committee of the Red Cross,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docindex/v1_rul_rule55.
74 For example, see Matthew Clark and Brett W. Paris, “Vale the Humanitarian Principles: New Principles for a New Environment,” Work-
ing Paper 001, e Humanitarian Leader, Centre for Humanitarian Leadership, 2019, https://ojs.deakin.edu.au/index.php/thl/article/
view/1032/1021; Hugo Slim, “You Don’t Have to be Neutral to be a Good Humanitarian,” e New Humanitarian, August 27, 2020, https://
www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2020/08/27/humanitarian-principles-neutrality; and Hugo Slim, “What’s Wrong with Impartiality?”
e New Humanitarian, July 12, 2021, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2021/7/12/three-challenges-for-humanitarian-impar-
tiality.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 20
Relationship Decits with Potential State Actors
Relationships between humanitarian actors and parties to armed conict—those pre-existing and those that
can be cultivated aer crises emerge—enable fruitful multilateral and bilateral engagements on humanitarian
access. As one participant stated, “In the end, access isn’t a technical science. It’s a lot of common sense and
your ability to nagle your way into things and situations and scenarios. A large part of that is relationships and
engagements.” Indeed, existing literature emphasizes the role of cultivating relationships—building rapport
and trust, as well as mutual understanding of organizational capacities, competencies, and ways of working—
as a means of negotiating humanitarian access and promoting norms of IHL.
75
ese engagements can
sensitize state actors on humanitarian norms, using these relationships as a means of humanitarian persuasion.
Proactively building relationships before a crisis emerges can also help humanitarian organizations gain access
to the right decision-makers to address humanitarian response challenges.
A key challenge identied by research participants is a lack of sucient relationship-building eorts by many
humanitarian actors towards key actors, such as China and Russia. In the words of one research participant:
If we’re moving into a space of multipolar authorities, it’s the obligation of the humanitarian
community to have conversations with everybody. We have to be able to understand the strategic
thinking, interests and thresholds of dierent actors… If China and Russia are the other actors
in the room, we really need to start having conversations with them.
The purpose of such proactive engagements would be to build rapport and to cultivate a broader
understanding of the US, China, and Russia as potential future interlocutors, including these states’
approaches to engaging with the international humanitarian system. On this issue, one research participant
asked rhetorically, “How many NGOs know that Russia and China view humanitarianism in a dierent
sense to how they view it?... Education is lacking across the humanitarian space” on this issue.
76
Research
participants rmly articulated the importance of proactive engagements so that humanitarians at least gain
the possibility of mitigating humanitarian risks and emphasizing the importance of prioritizing humanitarian
75
See Deborah Mancini-Grioli and André Picot, Humanitarian Negotiation: A Handbook for Securing Access, Assistance and Protection
for Civilians, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, October 2004, https://hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Humanitarian-Negotia-
tionn-A-handbook-October-2004.pdf, p. 117-124; Rob Grace et al., “Understanding Humanitarian Negotiation: Five Analytical Approaches,”
Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action, Humanitarian Academy at Harvard, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/les/
resources/understanding_humanitarian_negotiation-_ve_analytical_approaches_0.pdf; Fiona Terry and Brian Mcuinn, “Roots of Restraint
in War,” International Committee of the Red Cross, June 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/les/resources/4352_002_e-roots-
of-restraint_WEB.pdf; and Rob Grace, “e Humanitarian as Negotiator Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector,” Negotiation Journal 36,
no. 1 (2020): 28-29.
76 On China’s approach to humanitarian action, see “Positive Disruption? China’s Humanitarian Aid,” Humanitarian Advisory Group, Decem-
ber 2019, p. 7, https://humanitarianadvisorygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/HH_China-Practice-Paper_Final-December-2019.pdf,
which discusses, among other issues, how China views humanitarian aid as inherently linked to development; funds humanitarian aid in an ad
hoc manner, as opposed to publicly articulating a humanitarian policy structure; and oers funding bilaterally, as opposed to through multilater-
al mechanism. On Russia’s approach to humanitarian action, with a focus on Syria, see Marika Sosnowski and Paul Hastings, “Exploring Russia’s
Humanitarian Intervention in Syria,” Fikra Forum, June 25, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/exploring-russias-hu-
manitarian-intervention-syria; Marika Sosnowski and Jonathan Robinson, “Mapping Russia’s So Power Eorts in Syria rough Humani-
tarian Aid,” Atlantic Council, June 25, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/mapping-russias-so-power-eorts-in-syr-
ia-through-humanitarian-aid/; and Jonathan Robinson, “Russian Aid in Syria: An Underestimated Instrument of So Power,” Atlantic Council,
December 14, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/russian-aid-in-syria-an-underestimated-instrument-of-so-power/.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 21
concerns. In the words of one research participant, “We’re probably ten years too late on engagement with
China, but better to start now than miss the moment altogether.”
Another research participant emphasized the importance of sustained relationship-building eorts between
humanitarian and military actors specically, recommending “continuing that engagement with the military…
about who humanitarians are, what our roles and responsibilities are in the contexts where we nd ourselves,
the unique capabilities that military can use to support humanitarian action, but also the dangers of the
military being used to deliver humanitarian assistance when civilian capabilities are available and preferred.”
Indeed, building relationships between humanitarian and military actors, when appropriate and based on
contextually specic guidance, is a core component of humanitarian civil-military relations.
C. Operational Access Challenges
Bureaucratic Impediments and Donor Restrictions
During large-scale combat operations, it is possible that humanitarian organizations may nd themselves
caught within a web of access restrictions imposed by various states on how humanitarians can operate
and to whom relief organizations can direct programing. ese challenges may arise from, rst, host states
instrumentalizing bureaucratic procedures as a tool to control humanitarian programming, and second,
donor states imposing restrictions on whom humanitarian organizations can serve and even engage. Given the
anticipated limited impact of high-level diplomatic engagements in resolving these issues, this set of challenges
will fall to individual organizations to manage in an ad hoc manner.
Turning rst to bureaucratic control mechanisms in contemporary contexts, host states have used bureaucratic
control mechanisms to restrict or delay humanitarian aid through a variety of means. States nancially exploit
humanitarian actors through excessive taxes and fees, impose burdensome documentation and reporting
requirements, maintain strict control over the importation of humanitarian aid and equipment, and dictate
which humanitarian personnel can enter or remain in the country.
77
Bureaucratic impediments can also aect
populations seeking to access goods and services by impacting the ease of registration processes, for example.
In light of the highly politicized nature of the operational environment, including suspicions of humanitarian
organizations’ geopolitical alignments and intentions, as one research participant described, these obstacles
will likely “get harder and harder” in the context of large-scale combat operations.
Counterterrorism restrictions may constitute another likely impediment during large-scale combat operations.
Although large-scale combat operations evoke an emphasis on states and traditional militaries, such a
77
Jacob D. Kurtzer, Denial, Delay, Diversion: Tackling Access Challenges in an Evolving Humanitarian Landscape (Washington, D.C.: Center
for Strategic and International Studies, 2020), p. 16, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Kurtzer_DenialDe-
layDiversion_WEB_FINAL.pdf. For an examination of ethical dilemmas that arise regarding obstacles of establishing presence in a country
(such as NGO registration and acquiring visas for sta ), see Marika Sosnowski and Paul Hastings, “Assad Regime Maintains Strangle-hold
Over Humanitarian Access in Syria,” e New Arab, January 22, 2019, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/assad-regime-maintains-stran-
gle-hold-over-humanitarian-access-syria. For guidance on navigating issues of bureaucratic obstruction, see “Understanding and Addressing
Bureaucratic and Administrative Impediments to Humanitarian Action: Framework for a System-wide Approach,” Inter-Agency Standing Com-
mittee, January 2022, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/les/2022-01/IASC%20Guidance%20Understanding%20and%20
Addressing%20Bureaucratic%20and%20Administrative%20Impediments%20to%20Humanitarian%20Action_Framework%20for%20a%20
System-wide%20Approach.pdf.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 22
scenario will also likely involve a wide range of non-state armed groups, including proxy forces, as previously
noted. Similar to bureaucratic restrictions imposed by host states, counterterrorism restrictions imposed on
humanitarian organizations by donor governments will mean, as one research participant articulated, that
“resources that are already constrained will be even more constrained” in the context of great power conict
involving proxy forces and other types of non-state armed groups.
Limited Operational Role of Traditional International Humanitarian Actors
e analysis presented thus far yields an operational picture in which militaries and governments directly
and indirectly involved in the conict seek to control what areas international humanitarian actors can access
through various political, bureaucratic, legal, and security means, including the wholesale denial of entry to
countries or areas where military operations are ongoing. e implication is that some traditional international
humanitarian actors will very likely have a limited operational role. Funding limitations could further fuel this
dynamic. Research participants articulated concerns that the largest humanitarian donor states, if embroiled
in armed combat, might not prioritize humanitarian nancing, choosing instead to devote state resources to
warghting eorts.
Research participants voiced the possibility that certain large international humanitarian organizations—for
example, the International Committee of the Red Cross or Médecins Sans Frontières—might nd viable
avenues for access given their global reputations as principled humanitarian actors. However, there is a general
expectation that the largest international humanitarian organizations will generally struggle to operate. In the
words of one research participant, it is “safe to assume the closer you get to confrontation, the adequacy of the
humanitarian system, which is stitched together precariously, will be quickly exceeded.”
Consequently, in the words of one research participant, “the most important actors will be local humanitarian
actors,” including national societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, who are able to provide
goods and services to aected civilian populations in this context. Speaking to the massive scale of such a
conict, another research participant added, “Given the size and scope and number of theaters and dierent
environments that this will be conducted over, this will be local, regional at best. e scope is beyond real
thought.” Another research participant added that it will be a “very positive strength in the midst of great
power conict for local entities to respond locally to the immediate impact, wherever that takes place.”
In acknowledging the critical role that local humanitarian actors may play in responding to needs, research
participants also discussed the role that humanitarian principles—especially neutrality—will play in response
conducted by local actors in this type of conict. Just as international humanitarian actors will face questions
about their neutrality, local humanitarian actors will likely confront similar challenges and concerns as well,
especially given their anticipated central role in providing assistance to aected communities.
78
78
For debates and discussion about the principle of neutrality in the context of Myanmar in the wake of the February 2021 coup, see Khin
Ohmar, “ere’s Nothing Neutral about Engaging with Myanmar’s Military,” e New Humanitarian, July 28, 2021, https://www.thenewhu-
manitarian.org/opinion/2021/7/28/theres-nothing-neutral-about-engaging-with-myanmars-military; and Emily Fishbein, “Choosing Sides:
Five Local Takes on Aid Neutrality in Myanmar,” e New Humanitarian, August 25, 2021, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fea-
ture/2021/8/25/Myanmar-coup-humanitarian-neutrality-local-aid.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 23
e humanitarian sector’s localization eorts thus far have fallen well short of expectations despite high
levels of policy attention, including commitments made as part of the Grand Bargain, which was launched
at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. Currently, only a small proportion (3.1 percent in 2020) of
international humanitarian assistance goes directly to local and national actors.
79
Donor unwillingness to
fund local organizations, the overall slow and reactive nature of the international humanitarian system, and
the reluctance of some large humanitarian organizations to increase local ownership all play a role in stymying
progress. One research participant, pondering how international humanitarian actors can best prepare for the
diculties of large-scale combat operations during great power conict, oered the following reection:
You need to let go of that pedestal and decentralize and give the authority… but also delegate
response to other actors. at’s how we best prepare… preparing for a scenario where we’re
letting go. It sounds odd, but preparing for a scenario where we’re not involved… Preparing
for a scenario where local populations are more involved… If our end is not just for us to be
involved but to save lives, that’s what we need to do.
Indeed, if international humanitarian organizations are unable to gain sucient access, the success of
humanitarian eorts could very well hinge on a more robust sector-wide embrace of the localization agenda.
Devising Processes to Manage Humanitarian Insecurity
e chaotic, fast-paced, and complex nature of the conict is likely to make it dicult for both humanitarian
organizations and militaries to maintain mutual awareness of the operational picture in terms of who is doing
what and where. ese dynamics could aect the ecacy and eciency of coordination and information
sharing mechanisms, such as humanitarian notication systems, an especially important challenge considering
the unpredictable and insecure nature of the environment. Humanitarian organizations able to secure and
maintain a presence will need to manage signicant threats to operational security.
Possible operational challenges to military targeting systems and humanitarian notication systems—already
plagued by a range of systemic challenges and failures—will fuel security risks for humanitarian actors and
civilian populations.
80
For example, research participants discussed an expectation that dynamic targeting will
dominate, as deliberate targeting will be too dicult to conduct based on the chaotic and fast-paced nature of
the conict.
81
As a result, one research participant said:
79
Girling and Urquhart, “Global Humanitarian Assistance,” p. 68.
80
See Dave Phillips and Eric Schmidt, “How the U.S. Hid an Airstrike at Killed Dozens of Civilians in Syria,” New York Times, November
13, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/13/us/us-airstrikes-civilian-deaths.html; Dave Phillips, Eric Schmidt, and Mark Mazzetti, “Civil-
ian Deaths Mounted as Secret Unit Pounded ISIS,” New York Times, December 12, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/12/us/civilian-
deaths-war-isis.html?smid=tw-share; Azmat Khan, “Hidden Pentagon Records Reveal Patterns of Failure in Deadly Strikes,” New York Times,
December 18, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/18/us/airstrikes-pentagon-records-civilian-deaths.html; and Azmat
Khan, Haley Willis, Christoph Koettl, Christiaan Triebert and Lila Hassan, “Documents Reveal Basic Flaws in Pentagon Dismissals of Civilian
Casualty Claims,” New York Times, December 31, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/31/us/pentagon-airstrikes-syria-iraq.html; and
Michael J. McNerney et al., “U.S. Department of Defense Civilian Casualty Policies and Procedures: An Independent Assessment,” RAND,
2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA418-1.html.
81
According to Merel A. C. Ekelhof, “ere are two types of targeting: deliberate targeting and dynamic targeting. Dynamic targeting consists
of the same steps, but is more responsive than deliberate targeting, since the process is used to prosecute targets that are identied too late to
go through the deliberate targeting process. e dynamic targeting process is compressed in time.” See Merel A. C. Ekelhof, “Liing the Fog of
Targeting: ‘Autonomous Weapons’ and Human Control through the Lens of Military Targeting,” Naval War College Review 71, no. 3 (2018):
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 24
…as soon as you get into combat… you’re looking at relying on the commander and the law of
armed conict for proportionality, which is a much cruder mechanism. at would become
the dominant mode when looking at heavy metal warfare, less and less deliberate targeting. e
ability to mitigate harm and limit damage becomes harder and harder the closer you get to an
actual combat zone, people on the ground using proportionality to guide their own judgment
on what is and isn’t acceptable.
Another research participant underscored this sentiment: “e gloves will be o, and the environment so
chaotic, that many mistakes will be made… we lose all command and control from a military perspective
of tactical decisions being made with respect to weapons employment.” In another research participant’s
pointed words, “If the notication systems have failed in Syria and Yemen—horric conicts, but arguably
much less complex than potential large-scale combat operations against peer competitors—are notication
systems even going to function in a great power conict context?” A dierent research participant oered a
similar viewpoint: “Not sure there’s much room for optimism here. When we look at how we’ve managed
[humanitarian notication systems] in some of the less demanding scenarios compared with the scale of
challenges we’d face in a great power crisis, they are less in signicance to the challenges we will face.”
Additional complications in the eective implementation of humanitarian notication systems could include
humanitarian actors refraining from using these systems due to concern that the data will be misused or
ignored, states using humanitarian notication systems as a mechanism to control or restrict humanitarian
access, and a lack of clear procedures following an attack on a notied site.
82
Research participants also noted
that the technological requirements of humanitarian notication systems, as well as other communication
platforms for humanitarian and civilian actors to share information with one another, will likely fail or become
unavailable due to internet outages. Indeed, information and communication blackouts due to government
actors shutting down the internet is already a dynamic of contemporary armed conict.
83
Such communication
platforms could even be deliberately targeted via cyber operations.
D. Tactical Access Challenges
Managing Access and Logistics Across Multiple Domains with Limited Resources
e multi-domain nature of great power conict will impact humanitarian organizations seeking to move
people and goods across various areas in order to provide services to civilian populations. Five key issues
61–95, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26607067.
82
For a more in depth examination of these issues, see Grace, “Surmounting Contemporary Challenges,” p. 34-37; and Rob Grace and Britta-
ny Card, “Re-assessing the Civil-Military Coordination Service of the United Nations Oce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aairs:
Findings and Recommendations Based on Partners’ Perspectives,” Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies, Watson Institute for
International and Public Aairs, Brown University, September 2020, p. 18-19, https://watson.brown.edu/chrhs/les/chrhs/imce/research/
Re-assessing%20the%20Civil-Military%20Coordination%20Service_CHRHS%20Report.pdf; and Sara Miller, “e Conict in Deconict-
ing: e Humanitarian Notication System for Deconiction in Syria,” Liaison 13, no. 1 (2021): 64-71, https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.
aspx?leticket=ZY0LUUs74Uo%3d&portalid=0.
83
For example, see Witney Schneidman, “Ethiopia, Human Rights, and the Internet,” Brookings, June 15, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/africa-in-focus/2021/06/15/ethiopia-human-rights-and-the-internet/.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 25
related to managing access and logistics at the tactical level with severe resource constraints may emerge. First,
humanitarians may be required to operate across large geographic distances, traveling by air, over land, and by
sea while hostilities are ongoing. As one research participant articulated:
e usual challenge we face in a fast-paced humanitarian emergency is the movement of goods
and services. If there will be a sizable part of the population that needs humanitarian assistance,
goods and services, these goods and services should be able to reach them—that’s part of having
access. e thing is, getting them to the people in need is going to be the main challenge,
especially if airspace is constantly closed because of what’s happening and travel by sea is not
possible because of whatever ongoing sea battles are taking place.
Second, the conict is expected to involve a signicant maritime component. As a result, humanitarian
organizations may be required to negotiate maritime access to provide services at sea or on land. Maritime
warfare between vessels at sea will create physical access issues for humanitarian organizations who may
not have the policies, procedures, or capabilities to respond to the sick and wounded at sea. Furthermore,
one participant argued that, among many militaries and humanitarian organizations alike, there is a lack of
widespread expertise and knowledge on IHL at sea, which could be an important limitation for humanitarians
seeking to operate in a conict with a signicant maritime component.
84
ird, access depends on the availability of logistics capabilities to move people, goods and services. At the
local level, militaries or governments may direct logistics capabilities and resources toward warghting eorts.
One research participant pondered, “Even if humanitarian organizations gain access, I wonder where they’ll
get the physical logistics from. All local availability will be snapped up immediately. It’s not a small issue.”
Indeed, another research participant surmised that a key role of humanitarian civil-military coordination will
be supporting the logistics of humanitarian operations through negotiations with militaries and identifying
logistics capabilities, including commercial options.
Competition between military and civilian actors for spaces and infrastructure, especially medical facilities,
could further limit humanitarians’ means of providing assistance to aected populations. One research
participant discussed how the number of anticipated casualties—civilian and military—would likely overrun
medical systems, meaning that military actors would need to use civilian hospitals to treat military casualties.
Fourth, at the global and regional level, logistics and supply chains on which humanitarian organizations
rely for their operations are vulnerable to a variety of disruptions. One needs to look no further than the
COVID-19 pandemic for a current example of an event that resulted in multi-sector disruptions and access
restrictions at the global, regional, and local levels.
85
One could certainly expect such disruptions, should
large-scale combat operations between great powers erupt.
84
For an examination of challenges of operationalizing humanitarian principles at sea, with a focus on search and rescue operations for migrants
in the Mediterranean Sea, see Eugenio Cusumano, “e Sea as Humanitarian Space: Non-governmental Search and Rescue Dilemmas on the
Central Mediterranean Migratory Route,” Mediterranean Politics 23, no. 3 (2018): 387-394.
85
For an examination of how the COVID-19 pandemic aected humanitarian access, see Rebecca Brubaker, Adam Day, and Sophie Huvé,
“COVID-19 and Humanitarian Access: How the Pandemic Should Provoke Systemic Change in the Global Humanitarian System,” Centre for
Policy Research, United Nations University, February 2021, http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:8033/UNU_COVIDandHumanitarian-
Access_FINAL.pdf.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 26
Fih, critical infrastructure on which civilian populations rely—such as water systems, electrical grids,
airports, seaports, and hospitals—may also be targeted through conventional means during large-scale
combat operations and via cyber operations. Research participants highlighted that the targeting of critical
infrastructure has already occurred in some contexts, albeit at a smaller scale than what is anticipated in future
conict.
Overall, the large-scale and high-tempo nature of the conict, and the anticipated challenges at the political
and operational levels, will lead to a dire situation for humanitarians, health response actors, and emergency
managers working at the frontline level. Illustrating this reality, a research participant painted a sober portrait
of the state of American federal and local emergency response systems, should such a conict reach the United
States: “We’d be on our own. We know this across the board. We have the National Guard, but they’d be
pulled elsewhere… Medical resources would be strapped immediately… e scale of something like this would
be unimaginable. We could be completely incapacitated.”
Physical and Digital reats to Aid Worker Security
Given the expected characteristics of this type of conict, frontline humanitarian practitioners will likely nd
themselves navigating an insecure environment, engaging and negotiating with other ground-level actors to
mitigate security risks. Moreover, due to the likelihood that unexploded ordnance will remain even aer the
conict has ended, security risks will also be long-term, impacting the local population—as well as response
actors engaged in recovery and rehabilitation—in areas where unexploded ordnance is present.
In addition to conventional threats, digital threats are likely to shape humanitarians’ experiences in at least
four ways.
86
First, cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, such as power grids or water supply systems, could
further exacerbate humanitarian needs by depriving local populations of essential services. Impacts on critical
infrastructure may also aect humanitarian organizations by disrupting services on which organizations rely,
such as electricity, for conducting humanitarian operations.
87
Second, information and communication blackouts (imposed, for example, by governments for warghting
purposes) could aect the ability of humanitarian actors to gather information, analyze the operational
context, and communicate across organizational lines or even internally. As one research participant detailed,
“We’re going to see the access issue most signicantly in cyberspace: an adversary/peer competitor denying
us ability to use an access node, or other nations/donors providing resources through interstate commerce
or transactions. e problem will be one of communication and technological denial.” Another research
participant argued that the targeting of technological infrastructure through cyber operations will precede
other types of operations, saying that the “initial phase is likely to be in a cyber domain, or a break out in the
internet... We won’t necessarily see the rebombing of London.”
86
For an examination of cyber security issues in contemporary conict settings, see Ziad Al Achkar, “Digital Risk: How New Technologies Im-
pact Acceptance and Raise New Challenges for NGOs,” Global Interagency Security Forum, https://gisf.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/
Digital_Risk_how_new_technologies_impact_acceptance_and_raise_new_challenges_for_NGOs.pdf.
87
Laurent Gisel and Lukasz Olejnik, e Potential Human Cost of Cyber Operations, International Committee of the Red Cross, May 29,
2029, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/potential-human-cost-cyber-operations.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 27
ird, misinformation, disinformation, or mal-information could negatively aect perceptions of
humanitarian organizations, hindering their ability to gain and maintain humanitarian access. The
challenging and uncertain information environment could also complicate various other aspects of
humanitarian programing, including needs assessments and actor mapping undertaken as a component of an
access strategy. is dimension could also complicate advocacy eorts—as humanitarian organizations and
donors seek to inuence states’ approaches toward issues such as humanitarian access and civilian protection—
given the need to si through credible versus non-credible information sources.
Fourth, cyber security issues could fuel data protection concerns for humanitarian organizations and the
civilian populations that they serve. Indeed, one research participant noted, “Data protection is going to be
one of the key issues” during large-scale combat operations, especially given that such a conict will involve
“relatively sophisticated actors with a relatively good capacity to reach into and take the kind of data they
might be looking for.”
Part V | Conclusions and Recommendations
is section oers concluding comments and recommendations for humanitarian, government, and military
actors to proactively prepare for the humanitarian response environment examined in this report. ese
recommendations are immediate steps that stakeholders can take now to help prepare for and mitigate the
identied political, operational, and tactical humanitarian access challenges. Activities are currently already
underway by governments and militaries to plan and prepare for potential great power conict, including
large-scale combat operations. However, the humanitarian sector remains generally limited in their proactive
thinking, analysis, and planning for humanitarian response challenges likely to occur during large-scale
combat operations. e below recommendations oer a pathway forward for lling these gaps. Additionally,
although oered with the specic frame of great power conict in mind, many of these recommendations
have relevance for ongoing or more near-term response contexts in which humanitarian organizations are, or
will be, engaged.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 28
A. Develop Awareness in the Humanitarian Community about Possible Future
Scenarios, Including Humanitarian Implications and Response Requirements
“It’s never good to be behind the game, so I think planning ahead for seeing what could
happen or what will happen in the next twenty, forty, y years, it’s really important to say
that these are issues humanitarians and humanitarian leaders should be thinking of, these
are gaps that we see in our understanding or in our advocacy.”
– Research Participant
ere is an immediate need to raise awareness in the humanitarian community about possible future scenarios
of great power conict, including large-scale combat operations. Research participants emphasized that the
majority of humanitarian organizations are currently not considering these future operating environments
and how humanitarian operations may be impacted. e lack of considerations for large-scale combat
operations and other types of conict between great powers directly impacts how humanitarians understand
the totality of their work, especially in terms of required advocacy and overall engagement with a wide array
of relevant actors (host states, non-state armed groups, and donor governments) on issues of humanitarian
access, response, and protection.
Scenario analysis and planning will help organizations understand what actions humanitarian organizations
may need to undertake, in terms of both their internal and external operations, should such a conict occur.
In addition to conducting this work internally within individual organizations, there is a need for sector-wide
collaboration to promote dialogue across organizations on these issues and identify conduits for information
sharing. For example, organizations may nd it useful to collaborate on their analysis and planning, especially
as a means of incorporating multi-organizational perspectives. Indeed, initiatives already underway to promote
foresight analysis and anticipatory action in the humanitarian sector may serve as models for developing
eorts to understand the eects of great power conict.
88
Research participants noted that the current design of the humanitarian planning cycle is oen about
the near-term estimated requirements of aid delivery, with inadequate attention paid to more long-term
considerations about how future operating environments might bring forth dierent diculties, including
resource constraints. Furthermore, there was a resounding sentiment that many segments of the humanitarian
sector largely undertake planning on a reactive, rather than a proactive, basis. is research makes clear that a
shi in this mindset is essential for preparedness. However, there are notable constraints in operationalizing
this approach, including funding and stang.
To support this shi, multiple research participants noted that donors have the ability to direct funding
towards political analysis, which organizations may use to inform humanitarian advocacy and policy
engagements. e hiring of sta dedicated to conducting scenario planning will be essential for ensuring
that this lens is incorporated into organizational work streams and planning. In particular, as noted by one
88
Tiina Elise Neuvonen and Chris Earney, “Using Strategic Foresight to Shape Our Futures,” UN Global Pulse, March 22, 2021, https://www.
unglobalpulse.org/2021/03/using-strategic-foresight-to-shape-our-futures/
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 29
research participant, there is a need to hire sta who are “well versed in geopolitics, who can look through a
geopolitical lens and do some critical analysis about scenario planning,” with a specic eye toward anticipating
new diculties likely to arise in future response contexts.
e aim should be to continue to cultivate concerted eorts to improve knowledge amongst sta—at both
the international and local levels—about what scenarios militaries and governments are contemplating in
their planning and preparedness eorts. is process would inform how humanitarian actors too can engage
in proactive planning and preparation.
B. Incorporate Humanitarian and Protection of Civilian Considerations into
Military Planning
“ere is a noticeable level of incorrect planning assumptions that humanitarian
organizations will somehow be within the conict area in numbers, capabilities, and
there to carry out their core functions and to absorb many of the impacts of conict that
the military therefore don’t need to concern themseles about….[ere is a] need for the
military to understand the challenges of the humanitarian landscape and to plan for those
realities and not make incorrect assumptions.”
– Research Participant
With military preparations and planning for large-scale combat operations underway, it is essential for
militaries to understand the direct and indirect eects of military operations on civilian populations and
on the ability of humanitarian organizations to operate in these environments. Unfortunately, previous
research on the protection of civilians in great power conict has highlighted that, “Conspicuously absent
from policy and planning documents… is a clear-eyed assessment of the likely human costs of such a conict
or considerations for how to minimize civilian harm should the worst come to pass.”
89
Should conict
occur, the protection of civilians, including civilian harm mitigation, cannot come as a secondary or tertiary
consideration to warghting eorts. Furthermore, current challenges regarding targeting systems must be
addressed, especially considering that future operating environments may compound already existing issues.
90
Additionally, there is a continued need for militaries to work with partner forces to ensure respect for IHL
and the protection of civilians, especially considering the potential role of proxy forces in future conicts.
91
ere is a particular need for military planners to review and interrogate the assumptions that are incorporated
into planning eorts. Especially relevant are assumptions regarding the capacity and capability of humanitarian
89
Brittany Card, Daniel R. Mahanty, Dave Polatty, Annie Shiel, and Paul Wise, “Anticipating the Human Costs of Great Power Conict,” Just
Security, November 9, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/73107/anticipating-the-human-costs-of-great-power-conict/. Additionally, a key
nding of McNerney et al., “U.S. Department of Defense Civilian Casualty Policies and Procedures,” p. x, is that “Combatant commands plan-
ning for high-intensity conict against near-peer adversaries are unprepared to address civilian-harm issues.”
90
Larry Lewis, “Hidden Negligence: Aug. 29 Drone Strike is Just the Tip of the Iceberg,” Just Security, November 9, 2021, https://www.justse-
curity.org/78937/hidden-negligence-aug-29-drone-strike-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg/.
91
For an example of existing research on this issue, see Melissa Dalton et al., “e Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations,” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Center for Civilians in Conict, and InterAction, October 2018, https://www.interaction.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/02/the_protection_of_civilians_in_u.s._partnered_operations_october_2018_low.pdf.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 30
organizations to operate in signicantly violent and complex conicts and the behavior of civilian populations
in such environments. Incorrect planning assumptions—such as assuming that humanitarians will even have
the capability to operate in these environments—not only jeopardize military operations but also can result
in damaging eects on civilian populations and humanitarian actors. ere are multiple avenues, such as
education and joint exercises, through which militaries can engage with civilian and humanitarian actors in a
principled way, as a means of informing planning eorts.
C. Build Relationships with Potential Future Parties to the Conict
“One overarching concern around humanitarian access and the paradigm we’re talking
about here is really about access to the right decision makers at the right time, meaning to
say: in the kind of conict dynamic you’re talking about, we’ll be required to engage with a
range of states and, as has rightly been mentioned, proxy actors, with whom maybe we don’t
have a long history of engagement.”
– Research Participant
Humanitarian organizations must continue to make every eort to build deeper relationships and establish
communication channels with actors that could have a role in future conicts. In particular, multiple research
participants acknowledged that many humanitarian organizations lack adequate relationships in China,
including with government actors and national response organizations, that would be required to respond to a
conict in which China was directly or indirectly involved. Preexisting relationships, cultivated before conicts
even erupt, can better situate humanitarian organizations to engage eectively and eciently with those
who have direct inuence over the conduct of military operations and who could inuence, and potentially
obstruct, humanitarian access to aected areas. Advocacy and humanitarian diplomacy with government and
military actors, if possible and appropriate (see section below on humanitarian-military relations), regarding
the anticipated humanitarian impacts of large-scale combat operations and great power conict are essential.
Approaches to establishing relationships must be contextually driven and informed by an understanding
of how dierent countries and organizations approach relationship building. For example, one participant
highlighted that, as a means of solidifying trust and rapport, some countries prefer to engage the same sta
over a long-term period. In such contexts, frequently rotating sta in and out of their positions would not
be an eective strategy for engagement. Furthermore, not all humanitarian organizations will prefer or
will be able to conduct direct engagement with various states. For such organizations, using a third-party
interlocutor or establishing a collective forum might be preferable. Some research participants suggested that,
in some contexts, the UN can play a unique role in engaging with governments directly about certain topics—
civilian protection, for example—so that operational NGOs need not risk jeopardizing their current or future
operations by engaging in direct dialogue on potentially sensitive issues.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 31
D. Conduct Planning to Ensure the Continuity of Humanitarian Operations
“Time and resources will be even more scarce in great power conict. We have to think about
the appropriate level of upont planning.”
– Research Participant
Large-scale combat operations are expected to result in reverberating eects across the political, economic,
security, and nancial domains. Such a conict will likely be highly disruptive to the ability of most
humanitarian organizations to operate. Humanitarian organizations should understand and plan for how
their internal and external operations may be aected in these contexts.
In particular, humanitarian organizations must consider how their operational model may entail a shi to
decentralized operations or remote management, while grounded in support for a locally led response.
92
is
need may be especially pronounced considering the expectation of limited communication and restricted travel
for sta. Furthermore, organizations’ sub-oces and teams must be prepared to function independently and
without capabilities to which they are accustomed. Research participants highlighted that the humanitarian
sector is currently very reliant on services—such as GPS, electricity, and internet connectivity—that might be
unavailable during large-scale conict.
Preparation for these scenarios should include developing plans, policies, and procedures for continuing
operations in the absence of these capabilities. For example, preparations can entail identifying, documenting,
and disseminating plans regarding the usage and maintenance of primary and back-up methods of
communication. To help prepare for these scenarios, sta training and exercises can teach and help maintain
skills that may be needed, such as map reading, navigation, and radio communications. Institutionalizing
the maintenance of plans and systems, such as through internal reporting and annual exercise requirements,
can help ensure the maintenance of capabilities over time. Diversication of sta skills should also be
complemented by the prioritization of recruiting sta members from diverse backgrounds with the language
skills and cultural awareness to act as eective interlocutors with potential parties to the conict.
Regarding plans for disruptions to external operations, there are, of course, many factors that organizations
cannot anticipate. However, there is an overwhelming consensus that large-scale combat operations
will be disruptive to logistics and supply chains at local, regional, and global levels. With this likelihood
in mind, humanitarian organizations could perform point-to-point planning and exercises to understand
the reverberating eects to their operations, informing decisions about developing contingency plans and
prepositioning supplies.
Additionally, performing scenario and geopolitical analysis, as described above, may inform a contextually
grounded analysis of how organizations can gain access and begin operations. is consideration is especially
92
For a publication oering guidance on this issue, see “Remote Humanitarian Management and Programming Guidance Note, May 2020,”
Humanitarian Advisory Group and CARE International, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/les/resources/HH_PP_Guidance-Note_
Remote-Management_electronic_FINAL.pdf.
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 32
important because, as one research participant stated, “In many of the likely conict places, most humanitarian
organizations have a light, if not zero, footprint to begin with: there’s nothing to build upon.” Ultimately, these
dynamics further underscore the need for donors to increase direct funding to local and national organizations
and for international humanitarian organizations to increase their support of local actors.
Finally, humanitarian organizations need to continue to invest and build capacity to protect data that they
collect, store, and use as part of their operations, especially data related civilian populations who are receiving
humanitarian assistance. As one research participant noted, “Many organizations operate large cloud
networks and host everything from personally identiable information to operational and location data in
formats that are ripe for exploitation by any sophisticated state actor.” Especially given that cyber-attacks
are anticipated to be a key aspect of future conict, humanitarian organizations must continue to promote,
institutionalize, and develop humanitarian data protection standards and practices.
93
Although this research
is focused on the anticipated dynamics of future conict, there are cyber-attacks occurring today against
humanitarian organizations and their data.
94
Proactively analyzing digital risks as part of planning eorts may
help organizations understand the relationship between digital and physical risks to their operations, their
sta, and those to whom they provide assistance.
95
E. Improve Humanitarian-Military Relations rough Education and Training
“From the CMCoord [humanitarian civil-military coordination] point of view, keeping up
with the way warfare is changing…is very important.”
– Research Participant
e relationships between humanitarian and military actors in large-scale combat operations are likely to
be complex, varying in nature across dierent interlocutors, and potentially contentious. ese dynamics
are not new and have prompted the development of various conceptualizations of humanitarian-military
relations, frameworks for guiding contextually-based engagements, and the establishment of dedicated sta
within humanitarian, government, and military organizations to build relationships and, when appropriate,
coordinate eorts.
96
Continuing to develop relationships between humanitarian and military actors is critical
for preparing for potential interactions in a future great power conict scenario.
ere is a need to continue the education of military forces about humanitarian action, the roles and
responsibilities of humanitarian organizations, and procedures for engagement during both natural hazard
and armed conict responses. Conversely, there is a need to develop the knowledge of humanitarian sta
93
“Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action,” International Committee of the Red Cross, Second Edition, June 11, 2020,
https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/430501-handbook-data-protection-humanitarian-action-second-edition.
94
See “Cyber-attack on ICRC: What We Know,” International Committee of the Red Cross, January 25, 2022, https://www.icrc.org/en/
document/cyber-attack-icrc-what-we-know, which states, “e ICRC determined on 18 January that servers hosting the personal information
of more than 500,000 people receiving services from the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement were compromised in a sophisticated cyber
security attack.”
95
Robert Mardini, “e Dire Costs of Hacking the ICRC,” e National, January 24, 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/com-
ment/2022/01/25/when-we-get-hacked-people-could-die/.
96
Grace, “Surmounting Contemporary Challenges.”
Humanitarian Access, Great Power Conict, and Large-Scale Combat Operations | 33
regarding military operations, objectives, and constraints. Research participants emphasized that there is
currently a limited understanding of the military in the humanitarian community, and where knowledge
does exist, it is oen limited to sta who were former military personnel now working for a humanitarian
organization.
Civilian academic institutions can play a unique role by oering educational opportunities for humanitarian,
military, and government actors. Additionally, academia can convene humanitarian, government, and military
actors for engagements to advance dialogue and thought, with a particular focus on large-scale combat
operations. As non-military and non-humanitarian venues, academic institutions can play a useful role in
fostering dialogue, particularly on sensitive issues. ere is also an opportunity to engage professional military
education institutions to oer courses, lectures, or training for military students with a focus on humanitarian
response in conict. Such eorts can plug into pre-existing initiatives and courses on related topics, such as
IHL, natural hazard response, and Women, Peace, and Security.
Building on the general education of sta, there is a critical need for strategic dialogue between humanitarian,
military, and government actors on the humanitarian implications of great power conict, including
humanitarian principles, access, and IHL-related issues. In particular, strengthening relationships and
generating buy-in from senior military and humanitarian leaders is essential. Commitments at the senior
military level can inuence strategic guidance and aect the conduct of operations. In the words of one
research participant, “It really comes down to the commander telling their sta that this is a consideration.”
Military training and exercises should include humanitarian considerations and perspectives and engage
with subject matter experts from the humanitarian sector. Subject matter experts can be involved in various
ways, such as oering inputs to exercise design, providing feedback on training objectives, and guest lecturing
and co-hosting exercises and training. Involvement beginning with the initial planning phase helps ensure
that humanitarian aspects are purposefully and thoughtfully incorporated from the onset, rather than as an
aerthought. Integrating humanitarian considerations into military training and exercises will help ensure
that training reects the realities of the battleeld and that, when faced with these issues during conict,
military personnel will have already rehearsed addressing them.
In addition to improving operational readiness, training has various subsequent benets, including building
relationships and trust, sensitizing military actors to humanitarian concepts and actors, and ensuring that
both sides understand one another’s approaches, capacities, and limitations. Furthermore, joint engagements
can be used, as previous research has highlighted, “to facilitate dialogue between humanitarian and military
actors on nuanced topics, such as civilian protection in future warfare scenarios or the challenges that arise for
humanitarian actors when a party to a conict engages in relief eorts.”
97
Indeed, there is an urgent need to
orient humanitarian-military relations toward preparing for and addressing the grave challenges highlighted
throughout this report.
97
Grace and Card, “Re-assessing the Civil-Military Coordination Service,” p. 34.
