The Future of Conventional Deterrence: Strategies for Great Power Competition

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e Future of Conventional Deterrence:

Strategies for Great Power Competition

Robert P. Haa Jr.

Abstract

e return of great power competition as described in the 2018 Na-

tional Defense Strategy suggests the need to reconsider the theories and

strategies of Cold War conventional deterrence in a world of near-peer

competition. e seminal questions become: Does deterrence have a

future, and do the tenets of Cold War theory and practice apply to the

era of emerging strategic competition? Indeed, deterrence, particularly

conventional deterrence, does have a future. However, distinct strategic

and force planning implications exist for adapting conventional deter-

rence to meet the challenges of great power competition.



Fundamental changes are occurring in the international political sys-

tem and the future US role in that system. e declared policies enunci-

ated in the recently published national security and defense strategies

describe an environment in which global disorder, revisionist ambition,

coercive diplomacy, and interstate strategic competition will provide

plenty of opportunity and motivation for armed conict while making

threats and planning contingencies dicult to foresee. And although

democracies may be unlikely to go to war against each other, the rise of

illiberal democratic states, as seen in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, pro-

motes neither domestic nor international tranquility. Within the cur-

rent environment, the United States retains vital interests, and, despite

Robert P. Haa Jr. is a retired Air Force colonel and nonresident senior fellow at the Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. A graduate of the US Air Force Academy, he holds a doctorate in

political science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, teaches as an adjunct professor at Johns

Hopkins University in Washington, DC, and serves as an advisor to Strategic Studies Quarterly. is

article is an updated version of Conventional Forces and the Future of Deterrence (report, ird Annual

Conference on Strategy, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, February 1992), 5–30.

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some isolationist sentiments, it will remain fully engaged in pursuit of

its foreign policy objectives while deterring threats to its interests.

In deliberating on the role of conventional deterrence within US de-

clared military strategy, the question becomes: Does deterrence have a

future? Can we apply the tenets of Cold War theory and practice to

this emerging strategic competition? ere are some initial issues we

must deal with in thinking about the future of conventional deterrence.

Indeed, deterrence, particularly conventional deterrence, does have a

future—but one very dierent from the way it was conceptualized and

applied during the Cold War. e 2018 National Defense Strategy states

that “the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the re-

emergence of long-term, strategic competition. . . . China and Russia

want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining

veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security

decisions.”

is return of great power competition suggests the need

to revisit the theories and strategies of Cold War conventional deter-

rence to this world of near-peer competition. Such an examination re-

quires us to separate conventional deterrence from its Cold War past,

when conventional threats of denial and reprisal were coupled with, if

not subordinated to, those of theater or strategic nuclear weapons. is

article briey reviews the theoretical foundations of conventional deter-

rence and questions the application of that theory to US defense policy

in consideration of a changed international political system and newly

declared strategies. It then suggests the strategic and force planning im-

plications of adapting conventional deterrence to meet the challenges of

great power competition.

e eoretical Foundations of Conventional Deterrence

As the United States encounters near-peer competitors in pursuing

its global interests, the theories of deterrence developed as a guide to

policy during the Cold War years require reexamination. In addition

to the perceived success of those policies, deterrence goes to the heart

of the central questions of international politics: How is military force

applied to achieve political ends? In wielding the military instrument to

inuence other actors, how can wars be avoided? Although we have seen

neither the end of history’s dialectical struggles nor the end of war, it is

realistic as well as idealistic to continue to work toward an international

system in which armed conict becomes less probable, less destructive,

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and less costly. And although some universal concept of deterrence to

render war obsolete—that all parties might calculate negative cost ben-

et to the use of military force—may appear utopian at the end of

mankind’s bloodiest century and into the rst decades of its successor

century, deterrence will remain an important way to exert US inuence

in the world and to dissuade would-be aggressors from challenging US

objectives.

To think about applying concepts of deterrence, we need to dene

some terms and examine the formulation of classic deterrence theory as

it has been applied to conventional deterrence. In its most general form,

deterrence is simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and

risks of a given course of action outweigh its benets. e classic focus

of deterrence theory has been on creating military capability to prevent

taking aggressive military action. us, deterrence, for our purpose here,

can be dened as “the manipulation of an adversary’s estimation of the

cost/benet calculation of taking a given action . . . thereby convincing

the opponent to avoid taking that action.”

Is this formulation of deterrence, fashioned in the nuclear age, still

relevant? ere was, as George Quester has described, deterrence be-

fore Hiroshima, but conventional deterrence theory as we have most

recently known it was strongly inuenced by the bipolar, nuclear, and

conventional confrontation centered on US-USSR relationships during

the Cold War.

What can we learn from classic deterrence theory that

applies to concepts of conventional deterrence in a very dierent world?

To answer that question, we need to remind ourselves of some of the

requirements, components, and critiques of deterrence theory.

Components of Deterrence

e components of deterrence normally include capability, credibility,

and communication.

Capability. Capability refers to the acquisition and deployment of

military forces able to carry out plausible military threats to retaliate in

an unacceptable manner or to deny the enemy’s objectives in an unaord-

able way.

Credibility. As the declared intent and believable resolve to protect a

given interest, credibility can be reinforced by force structure, proximity,

and power-projection capability and must be evaluated through compara-

tive analysis.

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Communication. Communication involves relaying to the potential

aggressor, in an unmistakable manner, the capability and will to carry

out the deterrent threat.

ese three requirements, formulated principally at the level of strategic

nuclear deterrence, have also been applied to deterrent confrontations

involving conventional forces. Moreover, in addition to these require-

ments, a considerable amount of theoretical work has been done to

dene and dierentiate among the ways in which that theory might

be applied.

For example, we realize there is a dierence between im-

mediate deterrence (a potential attacker is actively considering the use

of force, and the deterrer, aware of that threat, issues a counterthreat to

deter) and general deterrence (the possibility of armed conict is pres-

ent, but the potential attacker is not actively considering the use of force

to threaten the interests of the deterrer).

We understand the dierence between basic (or Type I) deterrence

(we are eyeball-to-eyeball with the adversary threatening our national

survival) and extended (Type II) deterrence (in which the objective is

to defend allies and friends from attack and is inherently less credible).

We also know the dierence between strategic nuclear deterrence (the

level at which the majority of the theorizing has occurred, at which the

use of intercontinental thermonuclear weapons has been threatened,

and at which deterrence is usually thought to have held) and conven-

tional deterrence (the level that has received considerably less attention,

at which, by denition, threats to use unconventional weapons of mass

destruction are excluded and at which deterrence, arguably, has been

prone to fail). An important distinction drawn during Cold War for-

mulations of this dichotomy is subject to considerable question in the

present environment. During the Cold War, the evolution of a “stalwart

conventional defense” in Central Europe meant that the US and its

allies could lessen their reliance on nuclear weapons to deter conict.

us, nuclear weapons became the instrument of deterrence by punish-

ment, while conventional forces shouldered the burden of deterrence by

denial. Whether that distinction should continue to hold in an era of

long-term great power strategic competition is worthy of consideration.

Criticisms of Deterrence eory

In either case, however, and despite the richness of this body of the-

ory, classic formulations of deterrence, even in the purest of strategic

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nuclear deterrence situations, have encountered considerable criticism.

e most signicant claims follow.

Uncertainty. Although it can be argued that nuclear deterrence

worked during the Cold War, we do not know that for sure. It is very

dicult to prove deterrent successes because that would require show-

ing why an event did not occur. ere is inherent uncertainty about the

antecedent causes one cites in such cases, as other plausible factors can

always be suggested.

Rationality. e emphasis on the rational calculation of the cost of a

retaliatory response has also been faulted in deterrence theory. Decision

makers who start wars may pay more attention to their own domestic

needs or to other internal or external factors than to the military capa-

bilities or options of their possible adversaries or to the potential severity

of the outcome.

Stability. Deterrence theory has also been criticized for contributing

to a spiral of conict. e threat of retaliation may be so great and so

destabilizing that, in times of crisis, it becomes in the aggressor’s interest

to preempt or escalate.

Failure. Deterrence at conventional levels has tended to “fail.”

However, proponents of conventional deterrence argue that the use of

conventional military force does not necessarily equate to a failure of doc-

trine. Deterrence failures are not inconsistent with deterrence theory,

provided they can be attributed to the absence of a clear commitment or

to insucient capability or credibility. On the other hand, because the

risks of conventional conict could be perceived as relatively modest,

the costs of choosing to go to conventional war, even if the likelihood

of attaining a military victory is granted little condence, might be out-

weighed by perceived political benets.

Distinctions of Nuclear versus Conventional

e dierences between the perceived costs and risks of nuclear versus

conventional deterrence are important for our discussion. Bipolar

nuclear deterrence has some special properties making its costs and risks

relatively easy to calculate: two principal actors, well-dened strike scenarios, a

nite number of weapons planned against a transparent target set, calculable

losses under any plausible exchange. Calculations of plausible nuclear

exchanges suggest that a survivable second-strike capability with assured

destruction potential should allow deterrence to hold. However, past

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attempts to conduct similar simulations at a conventional level, par-

ticularly when conventional deterrent strategies were often underpinned

by theater or strategic nuclear weapons, have tended to make analysts

and policy makers see conventional deterrence as less rigorous, far more

context-dependent, and, ultimately, far more unreliable as a guide to

strategy. at situation began to change in the mid-1970s, owing to

what was referred to as a revolution in conventional military capabili-

ties (e.g., space reconnaissance, global command and control, precision

weapons, and stealth technology). e development and deployment of

survivable conventional delivery platforms and very precise munitions

suggested that conventional force had become more punishing, more

usable, and, therefore, more credible.

Evolution of Conventional Capability

Writing in Foreign Aairs after the rst Gulf War, former Defense Sec-

retary William Perry pointed to a “new conventional military capability”

that “adds a powerful dimension to the ability of the United States to

deter war.” Key to this new capability were “a new generation of military

support systems”—intelligence sensors, defense-suppression systems,

precision-guided munitions, and stealth technologies—that gave true

and dramatic meaning to the term “force multiplier.” To avoid further

such foreign entanglements in the future, Perry argued, the United

States needs to use this newfound strength to deter future wars, not to

ght them.

e continued evolution of US conventional capability since that

time, as well as its demonstrated use and capability for long-range preci-

sion strike, enhances the theory of conventional deterrence for application

in a world of great power competition. Suppose a potentially hostile

power were to display an interest and a capability, if not an immediate

intent, to encroach on or to directly attack American friends and allies

or geographic regions or resources in which the United States has a major

or vital interest. Such attacks might be deterred if that state calculates

the results from prospective military action to be costly, problematic,

and likely not to achieve the objectives sought—that is, if it perceived

that the United States has the capability and credibility to defend that

state, region, or interest; force the attacker to pay high costs; and deny

that aggressor’s aims.

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erefore, many of those searching for a military strategy in a renewed

great power competition might conclude that much of the conventional

deterrence theory developed in the past is still relevant; the requirements

of capability, credibility, and communication will continue to apply in

the future. And while the central focus of contemporary deterrent rela-

tionships has become multipolar and less nuclear intensive, these were

not relationships left unconsidered in the original development of the

theory. It seems clear, therefore, that reinforcing the logic of conven-

tional deterrence on its would-be adversaries should be a central concept

of US defense policy over the next decade or so. e principal stumbling

block in attempting to apply that deterrence theory to a coherent mili-

tary strategy appears to be the tendency of conventional deterrence to

“fail.” If conventional rather than nuclear forces are about to assume a

prominent role in deterring great-power conict, theoretical work now

needs to be focused on the use or threatened use of conventional force.

How can a policy of conventional deterrence be communicated and a

supporting military strategy and force structure be shaped? One propo-

sition, diametrically opposed to nuclear deterrence theory, is that a past

“failure” of conventional deterrence may be a reinforcing, rather than a

diminishing, factor: to communicate a credible deterrent threat, capable

conventional military force must be demonstrated, exercised, and, at

times, used.

Applying Deterrence eory to Conventional

Military Strategy

Deterrence theory fashioned during the Cold War may still prove

helpful, but the implementation of deterrent strategy is likely to be con-

siderably dierent. In other words, while the requirements of deterrence

may be little changed, past formulations of conventional deterrence

objectives, focusing on large ground armies facing each other across a

central front, may become increasingly irrelevant (although such a con-

frontation may yet remain, as in Korea, and might emerge elsewhere,

as in the Baltics). ere have been important studies of conventional

deterrence strategies in the past, but it is not clear that they are easily

transferable to the deterrent problems of the future.

For example, in

the nuclear deterrence studies of the Cold War, conventional deterrence

has been seen as:

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• an adjunct to containment of the USSR. at is, applied in a bipolar,

nuclear setting and not generally applicable to less simple and less

polarized crises.

• appropriate only in support of “symmetrical” approaches to con-

tainment to match the enemy’s moves at the level of provocation,

for example, the “exible response” policies of NATO. Asymmetrical

responses (shifting the nature of one’s reaction into avenues better

suited to one’s strengths against the adversary’s weaknesses) relied

ultimately on threats of nuclear escalation.

• most valuable for its ability to buy time to resolve disagreements

diplomatically and to bring hostilities to a halt.

• a defensive application of deterrence strategy. “Flexible response” in

NATO Europe implied deterrence at all levels but could not be per-

ceived as weakening the US nuclear deterrent. Conventional forces

were politically restricted from preemptive or oensive options.

• deterrence by denial, that is, blocking the enemy’s military objec-

tives through the attrition of his attacking forces. Deterrence by

punishment, owing to the perceived limitations of conventional

weapons in reaching over the battleeld to target the aggressor’s

leadership and infrastructure, was left for nuclear weapons.

• a method of inuencing an opponent’s political calculus of the

acceptable costs and risks of his potential initiative, rather than

threatening overwhelming punishment and societal destruction.

Conventional forces did not provide the means to deter by force

alone and had to be supplemented by diplomatic, political, and

economic instruments.

• a means of extending deterrence to allies and friends, but ultimately

dependent on the credibility of a US nuclear commitment. Con-

ventional deterrence in Europe, for example, could not rely solely

on the stationing of US troops there. ey were only part of a multi-

faceted deterrent that, in the end, relied on nuclear threats.

Because conventional deterrence during the Cold War relied on its

coupling with nuclear capabilities, past military strategies of conven-

tional deterrence, as outlined above, seem less relevant to the new world

order than earlier deterrence theory might have promised. For example,

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as the theory reminded us, most failures of conventional deterrence have

resulted from a lack of credibility in the deterrent threat. Although capa-

bility may be evident and an interest communicated, the resolve of the

deterrer is arguably the most dicult element of the deterrent equation

to structure and to assess. Can the credibility of a conventional deterrent

be enhanced for more eective application in the future? e require-

ments and applications of deterrence theory developed in the previous

section suggest three areas of emphasis: (1) the visibility of the military

force, (2) a documented record of willingness to use force in the past,

and (3) the rationality of the use of force once deterrence has failed.

Visibility of Military Force

One of the critical requirements for deterrence has been substantial

US forces deployed overseas, not merely as a symbol or a tripwire but as

a signicant military force to be reckoned with. If deterrence is to be ex-

tended, it must be seen to exist. e presence of US conventional forces

probably acted as a restraint on the spread of nuclear weapons to our

allies, unless they found our assurances incredible (France) or we lacked

the in-place treaties and troops (Israel). A new military strategy based on

conventional deterrence must pose a “virtual presence,” even in a period

of US military retrenchment and overseas base closures. For future US

conventional forces to deter, they must maintain some form of visibility

to be perceived as credible and capable. To this end, small-scale exercises

with rapid-reacting forces to Europe, as well as the European Defense

Initiative stationing US troops in Eastern Europe could be helpful.

Willingness to Use Force

As noted above, conventional deterrence failures have not been incon-

sistent with deterrence theory, if failing could be attributed to the absence

of a clear commitment or to insucient credibility. erefore, just as force

visibility can be enhanced, so can force credibility through measures such

as communicating a commitment, demonstrating resolve, and pointing to

past uses of force. It may be that, owing in part to a past declaratory policy

and practice of preferring diplomatic or economic instruments to the use

of military force, or, even worse, backing away from a declared red-

line, potential aggressors may not be persuaded that the United States will

readily respond with force when its interests are threatened. To strengthen

credibility, the use of force may be necessary in some cases for deterrence

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to hold in other crises. In nuclear strategist Tom Schelling’s words, “what

one does today in a crisis aects what one can be expected to do tomor-

row.”

Deterrence theory stressed that not being tough enough in a

situation may bring peace only at the expense of one’s image of resolve

and, therefore, at the cost of long-term deterrence and stability.

Rationality of the Use of Force

Somewhat ironically, despite its failures, conventional deterrence is

theoretically more credible in terms of carrying out deterrent threats

than is nuclear deterrence. at’s because once nuclear deterrence fails,

it may be irrational for the deterrer to respond to the challenge owing

to the enormous destruction to his own society that may result. In the

words of Paul Nitze, he may be “self-deterred.”

A conventional deter-

rent, however, can be made to appear more certain and, therefore, more

credible: Rationality does not have to fail; the nation does not have to

threaten to stumble into war to respond; doomsday forecasts do not have

to be considered. In practice as well as in theory, there are more likely

to be greater risks and uncertainties resulting from not carrying out a

conventional deterrent threat than in acting to support declared policy.

e operational implication of that theoretical principle is a strategy of

conventional deterrence that allows for the likely use of military force—

a plausible threat “that leaves something to chance.”

A central point of these arguments overlooked in past conventional

deterrence theory is that the use of conventional force, presumed in the

past to be a failure of conventional deterrence, can in the future be a

major contributor to the deterrence of conventional conict. If that is

so, the problem now is that much on which the United States previously

constructed its conventional deterrent is going away. US base structure

overseas has been rapidly drawn down, and the United States is moving

toward a smaller military relying on forward presence or small foot-

prints rather than forward deployment, with attendant power projection

shortfalls. e Army is no longer sized to conduct large-scale, sustained

stability operations (let alone to confront a force-on-force scenario)

but rather to carry out small-scale expeditionary missions against un-

conventional foes. is brings into serious question the ability of US

strategy and forces to meet the requirements of capability, credibility,

and communication. What military strategies are suited to match an

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objective of conventional deterrence with fewer forces stationed abroad

in fewer regions of interest and concern?

Strategies of Conventional Deterrence

When we consider the strategies of conventional deterrence dominat-

ing the Cold War years, we nd them inadequate to meet the challenges

of great power competition. For example, John Mearsheimer and others

argued that the essence of conventional deterrence was being able to

halt an enemy breakthrough that might lead to a successful blitzkrieg

and military occupation of friendly territory. As military analysts fo-

cused on the European Central Front, however, there was considerable

debate regarding which military strategy could best meet that deter-

rent requirement.

ese strategies included a conventional “tripwire”

to demonstrate commitment but designed to fail quickly and rely on

vertical escalation to deter; horizontal escalation (assuming direct con-

ventional defense was beyond America’s reach, but deterrence could be

strengthened by threatening the adversary’s other interests); or conven-

tional direct defense (many defense analysts characterized as optimists

or reformers argued that a direct conventional defense [and, therefore,

deterrence] was possible with reforms or improvements in troop deploy-

ment, employment, strategy, and doctrine).

From several perspectives, none of these approaches appear particu-

larly attractive when facing long-term competition with near-peer pow-

ers. Tripwire theories encourage nuclear threats and, perhaps, nuclear

proliferation and fall into the same credibility traps of the past. Strate-

gies of horizontal escalation are subject to the “spiral of conict” cri-

tiques of deterrence as well as to the argument that other regions might

not be nearly as valuable as the focus of primary conict. e objective

of conventional deterrence is to contain the conict, not escalate it to

a more global confrontation. Structuring a direct conventional defense,

in the past considered the most reliable of deterrent strategies, is less

plausible in the future owing to the retrenchment of US general purpose

forces and the uncertain nature of the threat. Which, then, appear to be

the components of a military doctrine, strategy, and force structure that

will support the requirements of conventional deterrence with respect to

new, powerful adversaries?

Simply put and based on the theoretical requirements that continue

to hold, a conventional deterrent strategy must be both capable and

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credible. If we delve more deeply into the requirements developed in the

previous section and apply them to the problem of confronting great

power competition, a theory of conventional deterrence should be con-

structed to possess the following characteristics.

General as opposed to immediate. Although the capability to in-

voke an immediate deterrent threat against a specic adversary must

remain, the policy must be geared to a long-term strategic competition.

Extended as opposed to basic. is property has two components.

First, the United States is not in danger of conventional attack on its

homeland but is seeking a way to extend deterrence and defense to vital

regions, resources, and interests. Extended conventional deterrence is far

more credible, given current capability, than is extended nuclear deter-

rence, because it obviates the “trading Boston for Bonn” question. And

although the United States will wish to maintain both strategic nuclear

forces and theater nuclear power projection capability to deter nuclear

powers and potential proliferators, it appears that limited strategic and

theater missile defenses will gradually replace some of the assured de-

struction deterrence theories enshrined in the antiballistic missile treaty.

Second, we need to dierentiate a new conventional deterrent from

Cold War strategy that was focused on a single region coupled with a

exible, nuclear response. In other words, although specic plausible

contingencies must be considered in general purpose force planning, we

are seeking a conventional capability that is strategic rather than theater-

oriented. To be credible, that force must have prompt global reach and

power projection capability.

Overwhelming, as opposed to gradual. Although we may wish to

eschew the term massive conventional retaliation, this formulation of

deterrence strategy is the antithesis of the graduated escalatory response

characterizing the Cold War strategy of exible response in which sud-

den and massive escalation (fearful of the next, nuclear step) was avoided

at all costs. e purpose here is to terminate conict rapidly and to do so

by adding the element of punishment to conventional deterrence rather

than relying on denial.

Conventional as opposed to nuclear. It is in the interest of the

United States to deemphasize nuclear weapons and systems, particularly

as new confrontations with near-peer adversaries possessing strategic

nuclear capabilities arise. Conventional deterrence in crises less than na-

tional survival can be more eective than nuclear deterrence, as its capa-

Robert P. Haa Jr.

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bility is enhanced by the certainty (therefore, credibility) of a response.

One of the striking dierences regarding the future of conventional de-

terrence, at least in the near term, is that the United States enjoys an

enormous margin of global reach and power projection capability over

any emerging conventional rival. us, the United States should not be

self-deterred in a crisis, and the threat of use of conventional force, to

include preemption, becomes more credible.

Conventional deterrence in the post–Cold War world, then, requires

supporting a military strategy and force structure that can be extended

credibly to distant regions, quick in response, and decisive in applica-

tion. Against near-peer adversaries, relatively small but very powerful,

precise, intense, and survivable forces may be able to meet the theo-

retical requirements and strategic needs of extended conventional deter-

rence. If so, the properties that will characterize conventional deterrent

strategy will be very dierent from those that dened it during the Cold

War. A strategy of eective conventional deterrence must be decoupled

from nuclear threats, asymmetrical in threat and application, intense

and overwhelming in its threat, oensive with a capability for punish-

ment as well as denial, and extended globally through advanced tech-

nologies and weapons systems.

Based on this analysis, the United States is faced with developing a

military strategy of conventional use that can be extended to interests

abroad and can be generally applied. e United States now requires the

military strategy and forces to underwrite a theory of “general extended

conventional deterrence.” Can it be done?

How to Get General Extended Conventional Deterrence

According to national strategies of security and defense, the United

States is entering a new period of great power competition and is facing

that confrontation following a time of strategic atrophy. Unfortunately,

as defense resources have been compressed over the past decade, the list

of US national security goals has not been reduced. e goals most rel-

evant to the study of future conventional deterrence are as follows:

• Sustaining joint force military advantages, both globally and in key

regions;

• Deterring adversaries from aggression against our vital interests;

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• Maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pa-

cic, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere;

• Defending allies from military aggression, bolstering partners

against coercion, and fairly sharing responsibilities for common de-

fense; and

• Dissuading, preventing, or deterring state adversaries and nonstate

actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons of mass de-

struction.

ese national security objectives, although familiar, have been re-

structured to match a time of emerging great power competition. To

that end, military planners are now receiving guidance that approxi-

mates the following:

• Plan an eective military campaign in a distant region (the Indo-

Pacic, Europe, or the Middle East) to deter a sophisticated, near-

peer adversary. at adversary may possess precision conventional

weapons as well as unconventional (nuclear, biological, chemical)

weapons and the capability to deliver those weapons within the

region, adding to his anti-access, area denial capability.

• Plan to deploy continental US (CONUS)–based forces on very

short notice. Although US forces may be present in the region, they

will not be there in numbers enough to conduct a stalwart defense

or successful counterattack without rapid CONUS reinforcement.

• Defeat the enemy quickly by denying his objectives and, as re-

quired, by punishing his war-making infrastructure. Do this with

as few friendly casualties as possible, while minimizing collateral

damage.

• Plan to do all this as quickly as possible, before public support

dissolves or allied resolve weakens. Signicant allied military con-

tributions, except for indigenous forces in some contingencies, may

not be available until later in the war.

• Hedge against the possibility of a second, simultaneous regional

contingency by deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere.

Can a strategy of general extended conventional deterrence, coupled

with advanced military capabilities and technologies demonstrated

during the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the continuing counterterror/

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counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and elsewhere, meet such

demanding guidance? at demonstrated resolve and capability, as

Secretary Perry previously argued, suggests that the use of conventional

force should be judged as an important element of establishing the cred-

ibility of a general extended conventional deterrent in future crises. A

discrete yet overwhelming use of conventional force, narrowly seen as a

deterrent failure if one focuses on a single crisis, can also be an impor-

tant rst step in the structuring of a new strategy of general extended

conventional deterrence that may inuence international relations and

deter great power conict in the future. ere is plenty of work to be

done if US military forces are to develop and sustain the capability of

acting quickly and decisively in future contingencies to underwrite con-

ventional deterrence. What kinds of capabilities and what sorts of forces

are needed to underwrite a strategy of extended general conventional

deterrence in a world of interstate strategic competition?

Strategic concepts and military planning guidance must be translated

into force size and structure. ere has been no eective substitute, dur-

ing the Cold War and after, for sizing and shaping US military forces

than the use of plausible, hypothetical contingencies to test the eec-

tiveness and eciency of those forces to deter and defeat an adversary.

And because force planners tend to be a conservative lot, they generally

choose to contemplate a worst-case scenario, under the assumption that

forces sized for that contingency should be able to deal with less-intense

conicts as lesser-included cases. What, then, are the plausible contin-

gencies featuring potential great power conict to which force planners

should turn their attention? In his consideration of the future of land

warfare, Brookings analyst Michael O’Hanlon suggests two.

In the case of Russia, an invasion threat to the Baltic States seems a

reasonable place to start force planning for potential great power con-

ict. Although some opposed the expansion of NATO to states formerly

included in the Soviet empire, the Article 5 mutual defense pledge of the

NATO treaty requires the US and its allies to come to the defense of these

frontline states. Although O’Hanlon notes that a Russian intervention

in the Baltics could pursue several avenues, including tactics employed

in Crimea and Ukraine, the most stressful scenario to plan against is the

classic land invasion—reminiscent of planning contingencies employed

during the Cold War. Notably, O’Hanlon starts from the premise that

the US and NATO should not rely solely on nuclear deterrence here, as

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Russian objectives may be limited. at premise results in the consid-

eration of conventional force options to deter and, if necessary, defeat

the invading land forces. Because NATO’s rapid reaction force is likely

to serve as only a tripwire, O’Hanlon develops a methodology, follow-

ing Cold War conventional deterrence models, suggesting the need to

deploy from 150,000 to up to 225,000 US troops to deter and defend

against a Russian force that might approach 300,000. As in the Cold

War, deterring conict in Central Europe will depend heavily on the

contributions of the allies. e strongest deterrent might be formed by

the permanent stationing of large NATO air and land forces in the Baltics

or by demonstrating an eective capability of rapid reinforcement.

In China’s case, if we can put aside a reenactment of the Korean War

in which Republic of Korea military forces act as a robust deterrent and

Chinese intervention is questionable, a stressful contingency demanding

dierent American force planning is a South China Sea scenario that

spills over into Chinese threats to blockade Taiwan or seize islands in the

Philippine archipelago. Here the militarization by China of islands in

the South China Sea is particularly worrisome, as is the growing power

projection capability of the People’s Liberation Army and its increasing

ability to deny US forces access and freedom of movement in the region.

Deterrence in this case is likely to rely more on air- and sea-based forces

rather than on land power. But if the US and its allies were to develop

a containment strategy to deter potential Chinese adventurism in the

region, a new network of bases might be established in the Philippines

to enable air and sea superiority with attendant ground forces to defend

these bases. As US forces are unlikely to be deployed to bases in Taiwan,

this forward-deployed and carefully exercised force could also add to

American pledges to defend Taiwan.

In postulating great power confrontation, the 2018 National Defense

Strategy has posed for the US military a task more dicult than the pre-

vious force planning construct of deterring and defeating two smaller

regional adversaries nearly simultaneously. In addition to the planning

factors noted above, a premium will be placed on the following roles and

missions necessary to communicate a conventional deterrent capability.

Show of Force

With fewer US forces stationed abroad, the need to project forces

quickly to demonstrate US commitment and resolve will remain im-

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portant. Depending on the contingency, that force should be more than

just the shadow of power; it will need robust, sustainable repower.

Punitive Raids

To make a conventional deterrence credible, the United States must

be able to strike multiple targets (200 or so to attack weapons sites, sup-

press enemy defenses, and take out command and control capabilities)

simultaneously, across great distances, without seeking overight, basing

rights, or access to facilities from any foreign state and to conduct that

raid with impunity.

Rapid Reaction

e need is for the rapid deployment of air, sea, and light ground

forces with adequate air cover in support of commitment to allies faced

with potential great power aggression.

Air Superiority

Air Force doctrine has long held that establishing air superiority is

essential to allowing air-to-surface and surface warfare to be conducted

successfully. is includes targeting key military facilities and command/

control/communication infrastructure to blind the enemy and disrupt

his ability to use and control his forces.

Halting, Delaying, or Disrupting a Cross-Border Invasion

In the early days of a potential great power conict it may be nec-

essary to bring in long-range airpower to deter the onrush of enemy

ground forces and buy time for the arrival of ground and naval forces or

for other diplomatic and military actions.

Parallel (or Simultaneous) Warfare

e ability to execute parallel warfare—that is, concurrently execut-

ing multiple operations at every level of an enemy’s target set—will

prove eective in both deterring and bringing the conict to a rapid

and decisive close while minimizing friendly casualties. Parallel warfare im-

plies the ability to employ the overwhelming but precise use of military

force needed to underwrite a strategy of general extended conventional

deterrence.

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S S Q ♦ W  111

In summary, to make viable a theory of conventional deterrence that

can be extended to great power threats to US global interests, the United

States will need to construct a coherent military strategy to defend those

interests, ensure stability, and deter would-be aggressors from adventur-

ism. It can be declared softly—if a big stick is nearby. Without the ex-

tensive forward deployment of US military forces that characterized the

Cold War years, however, there will be a need for increased exercises and

displays of power projection capability to demonstrate US global reach.

To that end, it is important to recall the boost to US conventional

capabilities and deterrence brought about by the revolution in military

aairs touted by Secretary Perry as an oset strategy—a conventional

version of the rst such strategy that wielded US nuclear prowess to

oset perceived Soviet conventional superiority in Europe at the be-

ginning of the Cold War. Although the Pentagon seems lately to have

eschewed the phrase “third oset,” the components of that conventional

strategy—advanced computing, big data analytics, articial intelligence,

autonomous unmanned systems, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics,

and biotechnology—are specically enumerated in the 2018 National

Defense Strategy.

Most importantly, the greatest departure from Cold War formulations

of conventional deterrence theory is the idea that it will be necessary to

use force to create deterrence. In that regard, the continued deployment

and employment of US conventional forces overseas in Iraq, Afghani-

stan, and elsewhere in the prosecution of terrorists and insurgents well

document that capability and credibility. But an unwillingness to use

force, or to shy away from supporting US interests over concern of ril-

ing a would-be peer-competitor, will quickly squander any opportunity

to dissuade. What needs to be avoided, as Professor Richard Betts ar-

gues, is “ambivalent deterrence: rhetorical bobbing and weaving rather

than strategic planning.”

Conventional deterrence may break down on

occasion, but such events can demonstrate the price of failure, rejuve-

nate its credibility, and contribute to a new period of stability. Declared

and resourced appropriately, conventional deterrence can produce long

cycles of stability instead of constant, overlapping intervals of conict—

something to be sought in a new era of great power competition.

Put in place, an accepted policy of general extended conventional de-

terrence is oered not only as a component of military strategy in a

new security environment but also as a guide to planning the general-

Robert P. Haa Jr.

112 S S Q ♦ W 2018

purpose forces and capabilities the United States and its allies will need

to underwrite that strategy. At the macro level, the implications for force

planning for general extended conventional deterrence appear to be as

follows:

For US Ground Forces

Under current guidance, the US Army (and Marine forces) are di-

rected to develop and maintain the capacity for deterring and defeat-

ing aggression by a major power in a single large-scale operation while

deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere. In either case, a rapidly

deployable, exible contingency force with an emphasis on airborne,

air assault, and light infantry forces will be required. Heavy mechanized

forces can hedge against larger contingencies, but they may be dimin-

ished in role and size owing to the time it takes to deploy them from

CONUS. erefore, returning a heavy brigade to Europe seems a rea-

sonable way of strengthening conventional deterrence in Central Eu-

rope. Prepositioning can be used to lessen deployment time to Eastern

Europe, and strategic airlift will remain important to get the troops to

the war on time.

For US Naval and Marine Forces

Power projection, rather than sea lane protection and control, will

become the mainstay of US naval forces in underwriting conventional

deterrence, and its geographic focus will increasingly become the Indo-

Pacic region. e instruments of that task will remain the carrier battle

groups and amphibious ready groups, augmented by attack submarines.

As advanced by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, “these

naval assets are mobile, can defend and sustain themselves in proximity

to an adversary, and have the oensive capabilities to deny and pun-

ish aggression immediately.”

A deterrence force composed of surface

combatants, submarines, amphibious forces, and associated aircraft and

unmanned systems would be capable of interdicting enemy naval forces,

attacking coastal targets supporting aggression, or destroying valuable

coastal targets to punish the enemy.

For US Air Forces

Just as strategic air forces were the centerpiece of the strategy of “mas-

sive retaliation” in the 1950s, so will they be in underwriting extended

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conventional deterrence in the future. Long-range strategic bombers,

particularly stealthy ones, will play an ever more important role in

deterring great power conict because they are stabilizing; can carry

large, varied, precise payloads; can project heavy repower on short-

notice from US bases; and are both exible and survivable. A proposed

expansion in the number of Air Force squadrons from 312 today to 386

in the future would be a major contribution to conventional deterrence—

particularly if the emphasis is placed on “bombers, tankers and com-

mand/control/communications/intelligence systems.”

e United States has a major role to play in ensuring stability and

security in a new world order and possesses unique military capabilities

to deter acts of aggression that would threaten that order. However, the

conventional deterrence theories and strategies of the past that were sub-

ordinated to a bipolar strategic nuclear competition are neither relevant

nor welcome. As Richard Betts warns, the concept of deterrence “has al-

most vanished from the vocabulary of strategic debate. U.S. policymakers

need to relearn the basics of deterrence and rediscover its promise as a

strategy.”

A coherent concept of general extended conventional deter-

rence can guide US military strategy in pursuit of a more stable and

secure future international order and can guide prudent force planning

in a time of great power confrontation.

Notes

1. For an introduction to post–Cold War US grand strategy choices, see Barry R. Posen

and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 21,

no. 3 (Winter 1996/97): 5–53, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.21.3.5. For a more recent analysis, see

Robert P. Haa, “Defense Decisions for the Trump Administration,” Strategic Studies Quarterly

11, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 25–48, https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents

/Volume-11_Issue-1/Haa.pdf. For an historical look at grand strategy, see John Lewis Gaddis,

On Grand Strategy (New York: Penguin Press, 2018).

2. US Department of Defense (DOD), Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of

the United States of America (Washington, DC: DOD, 2018).

3. DOD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 4.

4. Austin Long, Deterrence from Cold War to Long War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009),

7, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG636.html.

5. George H. Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction

Inc., 1986).

6. Classical deterrence theory was developed in the 1950s and 1960s by a group of “rst

wave” deterrence theorists including Bernard Brodie, William Kaufmann, Herman Kahn,

omas Schelling, and Jack Snyder, who assumed that states could be treated as unitary

Robert P. Haa Jr.

114 S S Q ♦ W 2018

rational actors. See Paul Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis, and Roy Radner, “Deter-

rence in the Nuclear Age: e Search for Evidence,” in Perspectives on Deterrence, ed. Stern,

Axelrod, Jervis, and Radner (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). See also Long, De-

terrence from Cold War to Long War; and Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon (New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1983). For an excellent research survey of conventional defense litera-

ture, see Charles T. Allan, “Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out

of the Nuclear Fire,” Washington Quarterly 17, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 203–33, https://doi

.org/10.1080/01636609409443417.

7. Patrick Morgan has called deterrence “the subject of one of the more elaborate at-

tempts at rigorous theory in the social sciences.” See Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis

(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977), 26. e following also relies on Paul K. Huth’s

denitions in Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press, 1988).

8. Among the more prominent of deterrence critics, from which this list is taken, are

Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. See their work, Psychology and

Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

9. See Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); and John Orme, “Deterrence Failures: A

Second Look,” International Security 11, no. 4 (Spring 1987): 96–104, https://www.jstor.org

/stable/2538838.

10. See Barry Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and

Prospects (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 2007).

11. William J. Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” Foreign Aairs 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991):

66–82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20044914.

12. See John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press, 1989), 211. e diculty of separating conventional deterrence from its theater and

strategic nuclear linkages is demonstrated in works such as those by omas Boyd-Carpenter,

Conventional Deterrence into the 1990s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); and Gary Guertner,

Deterrence and Defense in a Post-Nuclear World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).

13. omas Schelling, Arms and Inuence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 63.

14. See Robert Jervis, “Deterrence eory Revisited,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (January

1979), 289–94, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009945?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents.

15. Paul Nitze, “Deterring Our Deterrent,” Foreign Policy, no. 25 (Winter 1976–77):

195–210,

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148029. Nitze argued that it would not be rational for

the United States to respond with a countervalue nuclear strike after the USSR had launched

an eective counterforce rst strike on the United States, because of an assumed countervalue

retaliation by the Soviet Union.

16. omas Schelling, e Strategy of Conict (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1981).

17. See Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence; and Joshua Epstein, Strategy and Force

Planning (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), 6–7.

18. Perhaps practitioners of a new conventional deterrent should reread Henry Kissinger:

“In my view, what appears balanced and safe in a crisis is often the most risky. Gradual escala-

tion tempts the opponent to match every move; what is intended as a show of moderation

may be interpreted as irresolution. . . . A leader . . . must be prepared to escalate rapidly and

brutally.” Henry Kissinger, e White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), 621.

19. Caution applies when declaring an American ability to project power against near-

peer competitors owing to what have been termed the anti-access/area denial capabilities of

potential adversaries. See Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, Meeting the

e Future of Conventional Deterrence: Strategies for Great Power Competition

S S Q ♦ W  115

Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenge (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary

Assessments, 2003).

20. See DOD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 4.

21. Michael O’Hanlon, e Future of Land Warfare (Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-

tion Press, 2015), 82–90 and 104–8.

22. DOD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 3. For the “third oset,” see

Robert Martinage, Toward a New Oset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to

Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments, 2014).

23. Richard K. Betts, “e Lost Logic of Deterrence,” Foreign Aairs 92, no. 2 (March/

April 2013): 97, https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-02-11/lost-logic

-deterrence.

24. Michael O’Hanlon, e $650 Billion Bargain (Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-

tion Press, 2016), 46–48.

25. Bryan Clark, Peter Haynes, Jesse Sloman, Timothy Walton, Restoring American

Seapower: A New Fleet Architecture for e United States Navy (Washington, DC: Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017).

26. Michael O’Hanlon, “What We Can Learn from—and Add to—the New Air Force

Vision,” Order from Chaos (blog), 17 September 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order

-from-chaos/2018/09/17/what-we-can-learn-from-and-add-to-the-new-air-force-vision/.

27. Betts, “Lost Logic of Deterrence,” 99.

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