US.
Department of Justice
Office of Legislative Affairs
Washington,
D.C. 20530
January 27, 2000
Office of the Assistant Attorney General
The Honorable John Linder
Chairman, Subcommittee on Rules and
Organization of the House
Committee on Rules
U.S.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
We have carefully reviewed the testimony presented to the Subcommittee on Rules
and Organization of the House at its hearing on July 15, 1999; on "Cooperation, Comity, and
Confrontation: Congressional Oversight of the Executive Branch." The Department of Justice
appreciates the Subcommittee's interest in this area, and we would like to take this opportunity
to present in this letter, for the benefit of both Members of Congress and the public at large, the
approach we take to the issues raised at the hearing. As always, we are committed to cooperating
with your Subcommittee, and all committees of Congress, with respect to the oversight process.
The testimony presented at the hearing suggests to us that there is a need for improved
communication and sensitivity between the Executive and Legislative Branches regarding our
respective institutional needs and interests. It also suggests that there is considerable
misunderstanding about the principles that govern the Department's longstanding positions and
practices on responding to congressional oversight requests. We hope that this discussion of
those governing principles will be helpful to the Committee and foster an improved
understanding of the Department's interests in responding to oversight requests.
General Approach
The oversight process is, of course, an important underpinning of the legislative process.
Congressional committees need to gather information about how statutes are applied and funds
are spent so that they can assess whether additional legislation is necessary either to rectify
practical problems in current law or to address problems not covered by current law. By helping
Congress be better informed when it makes legislative decisions, oversight promotes the
accountability of government. The information that committees gather in this oversight capacity
is also important for the Executive Branch in the future implementation of the law and its
participation in the legislative process. We have found that the oversight process can shed
valuable light on Department operations and assist our leadership in addressing problems that
might not otherwise have been clear.
President Reagan's November
4,
1982 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies on "Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional Requests
for Information" sets forth the longstanding Executive Branch policy on cooperating with
Congressional oversight:
The policy of this Administration is to comply with Congressional requests for
information to the fullest extent consistent with the constitutional and statutory
obligations of the Executive Branch . . . [E]xecutive privilege will be asserted
only in the most compelling circumstances, and only after careful review demon-
strates that assertion of the privilege is necessary. Historically, good faith
negotiations between Congress and the Executive Branch have minimized the
need for invoking executive privilege, and this tradition of accommodation should
continue as the primary means of resolving conflicts between the Branches.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the obligations of Congress
and the Executive Branch to seek to accommodate the legitimate needs of the other:
The framers . . , expect[ed] that where conflicts in scope of authority arose
between the coordinate branches, a spirit of dynamic compromise would promote
resolution of the dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and
effective functioning of cur governmental system. Under this view, the
coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively adversary relationship to one
another when a conflict in authority arises. Rather, each branch should take
cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation
through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the
particular fact situation.
United States v. American Tel. & Tel Co.. 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Attorney
General William French Smith captured the essence of the accommodation process in a 1981
opinion: "The accommodation required is not simply an exchange of concessions or a test of
political strength. It is an obligation of each branch to make a principled effort to acknowledge,
and if possible to meet, the legitimate needs of the other branch." Opinion of the Attorney
General for the President, Assertion of Executive Privilege in Response to a Congressional
Subpoena 5 Op. O.L.C. 27, 31 (1981).
In implementing the longstanding policy of the Executive Branch to comply with
Congressional requests for information to the fullest extent consistent with the constitutional
and statutory obligations of the Executive Branch, the Department's goal in all cases is to satisfy
legitimate legislative interests while protecting Executive Branch confidentiality interests.
Examples of confidential information include national security information, materials that are
2
protected by law (such as grand jury information pursuant to Rule 6(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and taxpayer information pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103); information the
disclosure of which might compromise open criminal investigations or prosecutions or civil
cases or constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and predecisional deliberative
communications (such as internal advice and preliminary positions and recommendations).
We believe that it must be the Department's efforts to safeguard these important
Executive Branch institutional interests that have led to the frustrations expressed during the
Subcommittee's hearing We hope that we can reduce those frustrations in the future by setting
forth here our perspective on some of the more important institutional interests that are
implicated during the course of Congressional oversight.
Open Matters
Much of the testimony at the hearing addressed oversight of ongoing Department
investigations and litigation. Although Congress has a clearly legitimate interest in determining
how the Department enforces statutes, Congressional inquiries during the pendency of a matter
pose an inherent threat to the integrity of the Department's law enforcement and litigation
functions. Such inquiries inescapably create the risk that the public and the courts will perceive
undue political and Congressional influence over law enforcement and litigation decisions. Such
inquiries also often seek records and other information that our responsibilities for these matters
preclude us from disclosing. Consequently, we have sought whenever possible to provide
information about closed, rather than open, matters. This enables Congress to analyze and
evaluate how statutory programs are handled and the Department conducts its business, while
avoiding the potential interference that inquiries into open matters entail.
The open matters concern is especially significant with respect to ongoing law
enforcement investigations. The Department's longstanding policy is to decline to provide
Congressional committees with access to open law enforcement files. Almost 60 years ago,
Attorney General Robert H Jackson informed Congress that:
It is the position of the Department, restated now with the approval of and at the direction
of the President, that all investigative reports are confidential documents of the executive
department of the Government, to aid in the duty laid upon the President by the
Constitution to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed," and that congressional
or public access to them would not be in the public interest....
40 Op. Att'y. Gen. 45, 46 (1941). Attorney Genera! Jackson's position was not new. His letter
cited prior Attorney General letters taking the same position dating back to the beginning of the
20th century (id. at 47-48).
The rationale for this policy is set forth in a published opinion of the Office of Legal
Counsel issued by Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel
3
during part of the Reagan Administration. See Response to Congressional Requests for
Information Regarding Decisions made Under the Independent Counsel Act, 10 Op. O.L.C. 68,
76-77 (1986). Mr. Cooper noted that providing a Congressional committee with confidential
information about active criminal investigations would place the Congress in a position to exert
pressure or attempt to influence the prosecution of criminal cases, Id at 76. Congress would
become, "in a sense, a partner in the investigation," id, and could thereby attempt to second-
guess tactical and strategic decisions, question witness interview schedules, debate conflicting
internal recommendations, and generally attempt to influence the outcome of the criminal
investigation. Such a practice would significantly damage law enforcement efforts and shake
public and judicial confidence in the criminal justice system. Id at 76-77.
Decisions about the course of an investigation must be made without reference to
political considerations. As one Justice Department official noted 30 years ago, "the Executive
cannot effectively investigate if Congress is, in a sense, a partner in the investigation. If a
congressional committee is fully apprised of
all
details of an investigation as the investigation
proceeds, there is a substantial danger that congressional pressures will influence the course of
the investigation." Memorandum for Edward L. Morgan, Deputy Counsel to the President, from
Thomas E. Kauper, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Submission
of Open CID Investigation Files 2 (Dec. 19, 1969).
In addition to the problem of Congressional pressure and the appearance of such pressure,
the disclosure of documents from our open files could also provide a "road map"of the
Department's ongoing investigations. The documents, or information that they contain, could
come into the possession of the targets of the investigation through inadvertence or a deliberate
act on the part of someone having access to them. The investigation would be seriously
prejudiced by the revelation of the direction of the investigation, information about the evidence
that the prosecutors have obtained, and assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of various
aspects of the investigation. As Attorney General Jackson observed:
Disclosure of the [law enforcement] reports could not do otherwise than seriously
prejudice law enforcement. Counsel for a defendant or a prospective defendant, could
have no greater help than to know how much or how little information the Government
has,
and what witnesses or sources of information it can rely upon. This is exactly what
these reports are intended to contain.
40 Op. Atty. Gen at 46, The Department has similar interests in the confidentiality of internal
documents relating to its representation of the United States in civil litigation. Our litigation files
usually contain confidential correspondence with client agencies as well as the work product of
our attorneys in suits that frequently seek millions of tax dollars. They also contain "road maps"
of our litigation plans and preparations, as well as confidential reports from experts and
consultants. Those plans could be seriously jeopardized and our positions in litigation
compromised if we are obliged to disclose our internal deliberations including, but not limited to,
4
our assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of evidence or the law, before they are
presented in court. That may result in an unfair advantage to those who seek public funds and
deprive the taxpayers of confidential representation enjoyed by other litigants.
In addition, the reputations of individuals mentioned in internal law enforcement and
litigation documents could be severely damaged by the public release of information about them,
even though the case might ultimately not warrant prosecution or other legal action. The
Department takes very seriously its responsibility to respect the privacy interests of individuals
about whom information is developed during the law enforcement process or litigation.
Internal Department Deliberations
With respect to oversight on closed matters, the Department has a broad confidentiality
interest in materials that reflect its internal deliberative process. In particular, we have sought
to ensure that all law enforcement and litigation decisions are products of open, frank and
independent assessments of the pertinent law and facts -- uninhibited by political and improper
influences that may be present outside the Department. We have long been concerned about the
chilling effect that would ripple throughout government if prosecutors, policy advisors at all
levels and line attorneys believed that their honest opinion
be it "good" or "bad" may be the
topic of debate in Congressional hearings or floor debates. These include assessments
of evidence and law, candid advice on strengths and weaknesses of legal arguments, and
recommendations to take or not to take legal action against individuals and corporate entities.
The Department must seek to protect this give-and-take process so that the participants in
the process can vigorously debate issues before them and remain able to provide decisionmakers
with complete and honest counsel regarding the conduct of the Department's business. If each
participant's contribution can be dissected by Congress in a public forum, then the free and
candid flow of ideas and recommendations would certainly be jeopardized. The Supreme Court
has recognized the legitimacy of this "chilling effect" concern: "Human experience teaches that
those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern
for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process."
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974). Our experience indicates that the Department
can develop accommodations with Congressional committees that satisfy their needs for
information that may be contained in deliberative material while at the same time protecting
the Department's interest in avoiding a chill on the candor of future deliberations.
The foregoing concerns apply with special force to Congressional requests for
prosecution and declination memoranda and similar documents. These are extremely sensitive
law enforcement materials. The Department's attorneys are asked to render unbiased,
professional judgments about the merits of potential criminal and civil law enforcement cases.
If their deliberative documents were made subject to Congressional challenge and scrutiny,
we would face a grave danger that they would be chilled from providing the candid and
independent analysis essential to just and effective law enforcement or, just as troubling, that
5
they might err on the side of prosecution simply to avoid public second-guessing. This in turn
would undermine public and judicial confidence in our law enforcement processes, untoward
consequences we are confident that Congress, like the Department, wishes to avoid,
Privacy
In addition to these concerns, disclosure of declination memoranda would implicate
significant individual privacy interests as well. Such documents discuss the possibility of
bringing charges against individuals who are investigated but not prosecuted, and often contain
unflattering personal information as well as assessments of witness credibility and legal
positions. The disclosure of the contents of these documents could be devastating to the
individuals they discuss. We try to accommodate Congressional needs for information about
declinations whenever possible by making appropriate Department officials available to brief
Committee Members and
staff.
This affords us an opportunity to answer their questions, which
can be helpful because it can include the context and process that accompanied the decision.
Hence, the discussion with staff may provide useful information and minimize the intrusion on
individual privacy and the chill on our attorneys' preparation of future deliberative documents.
Line Attorneys
The Department also has a strong institutional interest in ensuring that appropriate
supervisory personnel, rather than line attorneys and agents, answer Congressional questions
about Department actions. This is based in part upon our view that supervisory personnel, not
line employees, make the decisions that are the subjects of congressional review, and therefore
they should be the ones to explain the decisions. More fundamentally, however, we need to
ensure that our attorneys and agents can exercise the independent judgment essential to the
integrity of law enforcement and litigation functions and to public confidence in those decisions.
Senator Orrin Hatch has recognized the legitimacy of the Department's practice in this area.
observing that Congressional examination of
line
attorneys "could chill career Department of
Justice lawyers in the exercise of their daily duties." See Letter to Attorney General Janet Reno
from Senator Orrin Hatch, dated September 21, 1993. Representative Henry Hyde has likewise
opposed Congressional interviews of
line
prosecutors. See Letter of Representative Hyde to
Representative Carlos Moorhead, dated September 7, 1993. By questioning supervisors and
ultimately the Department's Senate-confirmed leadership, Congress can fulfill its oversight
responsibilities without undermining the independence of
line
attorneys and agents.
* * *
In sum, the Department recognizes that the process of Congressional oversight is an
important part of our system of government. We are committed to cooperating with oversight
requests to the fullest extent consistent with our constitutional and statutory responsibilities,
6
We welcome your suggestions about how we should work together to accommodate the needs
of our respective branches of government. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you would like
to discuss these matters further I intend at all times to work diligently with you toward
satisfying the respective needs of our coordinate branches.
Sincerely,
Signature of Robert Raben
Robert Raben
Assistant Attorney General
cc: The Honorable Tony Hall
Ranking Minority Member
7