VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley17
GarthE.Pauley:[email protected]
LastUpdated:January2008
Copyright©2009(GarthE.Pauley).
VoicesofDemocracy,ISSN#19329539.Availableathttp://www.voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/.
LYNDONB.JOHNSON,"WESHALLOVERCOME"(15MARCH1965)
GarthE.Pauley
CalvinCollege
Abstract: President Lyndon Johnson's "We Shall Overcome"
address is a landmark in U.S. history.Exhibiting uncharacteristic
eloquence, he made the principle of equal voting rights
meaningful through a vocabulary of shared interests and
aspirations (what he called "the American Promise") in order to
secure passage of America's most important civil rights law—the
VotingRightsActof1965.Moreover,thespeechhashadalasting
influenceonthemeaningofcivilrightsintheUnitedStates.
KeyWords:Johnson,LyndonB.;VotingRightsActof1965;Selma,
Alabama;AfricanAmericans—Suffrage;AmericanPromise.

President Lyndon Johnson's voting rights speech of March 15, 1965, is
considered a landmark of U.S. oratory. It is reprinted or excerpted in nearly every
anthology that chronicles the "great moments"or "great issues" of American history.
LeadingscholarsofAmericanoratory haveranked Johnson'sspeech asoneofthetop
ten American speeches of the twentieth century.
1
Even so, it is not unreasonable to
ask,"Isthespeechreallythatoutstanding?"Johnsonhardlycanbecountedamongthe
nation'sgreatorators.AndsomeconsiderthecivilrightscampaigninSelma,Alabama,
to have done more to ensure the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 than
Johnson'sspeech.
2

WhileitistruethatJohnsonwasnotagiftedpublicspeakeringeneralandthat
theSelmaprotestselicitedsupportforvotingrightslegislation,thevotingrightsspeech
is indeed an exceptional instance of political oratory. In an uncharacteristically
eloquentway,thepresidentinterpretedthemeaningoftheSelma
demonstrationsfor
a nation awakened to the problemof voter discrimination: His interpretation focused
ontheverymeaningofthenation,whathecalled"theAmericanPromise."Outofthat
interpretation, he crafted a compelling rationale for immediate passage of a strong
federal voting rights law. His language effectively framed public
and congressional
deliberations. His appeals helped cement equal voting rights as a fundamental
American principle. And at a moment marked by urgency and chaos, his message
providedfocusandclarity.Inshort,PresidentJohnson'sspeechisremarkablebecause
itmade theprincipleofequalvotingrightsmeaningfulandcompellingthrough
apublic
vocabulary of shared interests, motives, and aspirations in order to secure quick
passage of the country's most important civil rights law. Studying Johnson's address
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley18
alsoyieldsinsightsbeyondthespeechitself.Itcallsattentiontothefactthatfreedom
and equality are rhetorical terms whose meanings change and are redefined
throughout American history and to the challenges of building moral consensus
throughoratory.
Speaker
Born and raised in the Texas Hill Country during
the early twentieth century,
Lyndon Johnson's childhood experiences did not predispose him to become an
advocateofracialjustice.Rather,hisupbringingincludedtheformsofsocializationthat
typically lead to racial prejudice: ethnocentrism, a lack of meaningful interracial
contact,andracialstereotyping.Despitehisassertionstothecontrary,Johnsoncarried
some of this prejudice with him into adulthood, and even as president he sometimes
referred to African Americans with derogatory terminology when speaking behind
closed doors. Yet Johnson also inherited sympathy for the downtrodden from his
family, and a personal identification with the disadvantaged was a distinguishing
element of his
personality from an early age. Although these convictions shaped his
attitudestowardcivilrightsissues,Johnsondidnotpossessakeenappreciationofthe
uniquelyracialdimensionsofAfricanAmericans'oppression.
3

Johnson's lack of racial consciousness, as such, during his early political career
hardly was inconsistent with the outlook of many white liberals. In his formative
political experiences during the 1930s and 1940s, Johnson demonstrated a
commitmenttoequalopportunityandfairnessthatearnedhimareputationasafriend
of the poor—white or black. As Texas director of the National Youth Administration,
Johnson lobbied for equal access to education and vocational training, and as U.S.
congressmanfrom thetenth districtofTexas, hefoughtforequal treatmentforracial
minoritiesinfederalhousingandagriculturalprograms.YetJohnsonalsovotedagainst
every civil rights bill brought to the floor during his terms in the U.S. House of
Representatives, including antilynching, antipoll tax, and Fair Employment Practices
Committee (FEPC) measures. He voted against these same measures during his early
careerintheU.S.Senate,towhichhewaselectedin
1948.Johnsonmayhaveopposed
theproposals—asheclaimed—becausetheystoodnochanceofpassage,whilevoting
for them would have cost him his political career. He also emphasized that federal
legislationtoendlynchingandthepolltaxwouldviolatethe"states'rights,"thoughit
is unclear to what extent Johnson believed this commonplace of Southern rhetoric.
However,hisstatedoppositiontoanantilynchingbillalsorevealedhisinsensitivityto
uniquelyracialformsofoppression,asJohnsonimpliedthatlynchingwasnodifferent
than any other type of murder. And he also claimed that anti lynching, antipoll tax,
andFEPClegislationwasnotgermanetotheissueofcivilrights,whichhestatedshould
beadvancedthoughmeasuresthatwouldprovide forbetterhousing,bettereducation,
betterhealthcare,andbetterwages.
4

The first civil rights bills Johnson supported were ones he helped usher in
through the U.S. Congress as Senate majority leader. As he fixed his sights on the
presidency,Johnsonbelievedheneededtoguideacivilrightsbilltopassageinorderto
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley19
demonstrate to Washington powerbrokers and the American people that he was not
justaparochialpoliticianbeholdentoSoutherninterests.Whilehehadnotbecomean
allout civil rights advocate, Johnson's basic commitment to equal opportunity and
accessalignedwithhispersonalambitiontohelpproducethefirstpiece
offederalcivil
rights legislation in ninety years. In 1957, Johnson brokered a political compromise
when it seemed that powerful Southern senators and their liberal adversaries would
lock horns over a comprehensive civil rights bill written by President Dwight
Eisenhower's attorney general—and thus fail to accomplish anything. Although the
resultinglegislative
compromise,theCivilRightsActof1957,wasarelativelytoothless
law that focused exclusively on the right to vote, Johnson emphasized that at least
Congress had passed something and suggested that breaking the logjam had cleared
thewayformoremeaningfullegislationinthenearfuture.Indeed,Johnsondidtryto
maneuveramoremeaningfulbillthroughCongressin1960buthadtobrokeranother
compromise due to Southern legislators' influence in the Senate. Some liberal critics
were skeptical and assailed Johnson for watering down both civil rights bills, but
Johnson received widespread national praise for his legislative miracles and for
sheddinghisparochialism.Heaccruedpoliticalcapitalfortheseaccomplishmentsthat
furtheredhispresidential ambitions and evenconvincedsome civil rights leadersthat
hewassincereinhisdesiretohelppassmeaningfulcivilrightslegislation.
5

Johnson's presidential hopes were dashed during the 1960 campaign, but this
personalsetbackultimatelyledtoadeepeningofhiscommitmenttocivilrights.Asvice
president,hewasappointedchairmanofacomm itteethatinvestigatedandattempted
to rectify cases of employment discrimination. Through this position, Johnson came
into regular contact with blatant forms of racial discrimination and also learned that
existinglawsgavethefederalgovernmentlittlepowertomakethingsright.Asaresult,
he developed a stronger, more immediate understanding of bigotry that led him to
become a firm supporter of civil rights. He began to speak out publicly against racial
prejudice and was a strong advocate of President John F. Kennedy's comprehensive
civil rights bill. By the time Johnson ultimately guided the bill to passage, following
Kennedy's assassination in 1963, even those civil rights leaders who were formerly
skepticalpraisedhisdeepunderstanding andconviction on
civilrights.And theliberal
critics who derided Johnson for weakening civil rights measures as Senate majority
leaderhadtoadmithekepthisword:TheCivilRightsActof1964wasameaningfullaw
thatcontainedtheprovisionsexcisedfromthe1957bill,includingonesthatprohibited
discriminationinplacesofpublicaccommodationandcreatedapermanentFEPC.
6
Not content to wait for further action on civil rights, Johnson immediately
turned to the issue of voting rights, on whic h he had developed a deepseated
commitment. He believed voting was the fundamental right in a democracy, one
guaranteedtobefreefromracialdiscriminationbytheU.S.Constitution.
Andhecame
to believe that the only way to help African Americans achieve genuine equality was
through equal access to the ballot box. When voting rights demonstrations in Selma,
Alabama, dramatized the problem of voter discrimination for the entire nation,
Johnson seized the moment to help guide federal voting rights legislation—a law his
JusticeDepartmenthadbeendevelopingsince1964—toswiftpassage.
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley20
Like most politicians, Johnson's commitment to civil rights—including equal
votingrights—wasnotunadulterated.Thoughoftenheraldedasthegreatestcivilrights
presidentinU.S.history,itisnotfreedomfromprejudiceoralifelonguncompromising
commitmenttoracialjusticethatwarrantssuchpraise.Johnson'sachievementsoncivil
rights were the result of personal ambition, political calculations, duty, idealism, and
personalconviction.Moreover,hisambitionledhimtowranglewithcivilrightsissues,
an experience that deepened his understanding, which in turn shaped his principles.
His political calculations led him to pursue realistic goals but were tempered by his
sense of what his office required of him and by his idealism. His personal prejudices
were moderated by his commitment to fairness and equal opportunity in public life.
Johnsonwasaflawedbutgiftedpoliticianwhomaturedontheissueofcivilrightsand
used his considerable political skills to help pass the first four civil rights laws since
Reconstruction.
ThatJohnsonusedhislegislativeacumentoshapeU.S.historyisnotsurprising,
whereasthefact thathemotivatedthe nationthroughpublic speaking isremarkable.
Johnson possessed considerable skill in his interpersonal communication (often
referredtoas"theJohnsontreatment"),buthe
generallywasapoorpublicspeaker.In
private conversations, he sought to understand his listeners—their aspirations,
principles,passions, obligations, and weaknesses—andtousethat understanding asa
foundation for convincing, cajoling, and coercing them. In public discourse, however,
he often seemed unable to connect with an audience so diverse in
its makeup. And
Johnson's efforts to ingratiate himself to people and, often, to dominate them
interpersonallycould not be transferred topublicspeech.Moreover, although hehad
taught public speaking and coached debate during his career as a schoolteacher in
Texas, Johnson himself usually seemed affected and uncomfortable when speaking in
public—expressing his ideas in a monotonous voice with awkward gestures and poor
articulation, eyes glued to his speaking script. He appreciated eloquence but failed to
studyand practicethetechniques of successfulpublic orators, andhegenerallyfailed
tofindaspeakingstylethatfithisnature.
Despite a general lack of skill, Johnson spoke a great deal as president,
delivering more than sixteenhundred speeches during his five years in the White
House—very nearly as many as delivered by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy
combined during the previous twelve years. Many, perhaps most, of these speeches
were stilted and forgettable, but
Johnson was capable of delivering successful
speeches.Indeed,hedeliveredoneofthemostsignificantpresidentialspeechesinU.S.
historywhen,inthespringof1965,heurgedAmericanstofulfilltheirnation'spromise
by guaranteeing that all of its citizens have an equal right to voteandtoshare in the
benefits of democracy. This speech, often referred to as the "We Shall Overcome"
speech,wasJohnson'sgreatestoratoricaltriumph.
Context

During the midnineteenth and twentieth centuries, African American leaders
and their white allies expended significant political energy on attempting to secure
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley21
equal access to the ballot box, especially following the ratification of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (in 1868 and 1870, respectively).
TheamendmentsdeclaredthatAfricanAmericanswerecitizensandforbadedepriving
themof thevoteon account oftheir "race,color,or previousconditionof
servitude."
Southernstatesattemptedtokeepthemfromvoting,however,throughmethodsthat
were not racially discriminatory at face value but that clearly aimed to keep African
Americansaway fromthepolls.Civil rights advocates won significant victories against
manyofthesemethods in the U.S.Supreme Court, but successthroughlitigationwas
slow, costly, and incomplete. There was significant African American political
mobilization after anespecially important legal victory against a persistent method of
voterdiscriminationinSmithv.Allwright:Registration,education,andgetoutthevote
campaignswereorganizedthroughouttheSouth.Buttheirfoesquicklydevelopednew
methods
topreventAfricanAmericansfromvoting,includinggerrymandering,literacy
and understanding tests, slow processing of voter registration applications, relocation
of polling places, delay tactics, threats, and physical intimidation. Exhausted,
frustrated, and a little demoralized, advocates of equal voting rights came to believe
that a genuine victory would come only through
federal legislation, and thus focused
their crusade on the Congress and—especially—the president. By 1964, civil rights
advocateshadachievedsignificantvictoriesagainstdiscriminationineducation,places
of public accommodation, and employment. Because of persistent prejudice and the
shortcomings of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1963, though, the ballot
box
remained inaccessible to many African Americans, especially in the South. Thus, civil
rightsleadersfocusednearlyalloftheirenergiesononegoal—therighttovote.
7
At nearly the same time that African American leaders were gearingup for an
assaultonvoterdiscrimination,PresidentJohnsonwasdirectinghisJusticeDepartment
todraft a new law toensure the guaranteesoftheFifteenthAmendment. During the
summerof1964,apresidentialtaskforceoncivilrightsidentifiedvoter discrimination
as the nation's chief civil rights problem and advised the administration to advance
measures "to insure the speediest possible accession of Negroes to voting rolls,
especially in the South."
8
In the fall, partisan advisers suggested that in addition to
upholdingthepromisesoftheConstitution,anewvotingrightslawthatbroughtmore
African Americans to the polls might help compensate for the loss of support for
DemocratsintheSouthbroughtonbytheadministration'scivilrightsinitiatives.
Most
of the president's advisers, however, counseled a cooling off period on civil rights
legislation following the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and party politics were not a
significantfactormotivatingthepursuitofanewvotingrightslaw.
Rather, Johnson was motivated by his convictions, his desire to pass his own
civil rights law, his vision of a "Great Society," and his aspiration to be a great
presidentialreformer.InmidDecember1964,hedirectedtheattorneygeneraltoburn
themidnightoilanddevelopavotingrightsmeasurewithinafewdayssothatitwould
bereadyfor
the1965legislativeagenda.InhisStateofthe UnionaddressonJanuar y 4,
1965, President Johnson urged members of Congress to "eliminate every remaining
obstacle to the right and opportunity to vote" and announced he would send them a
detailed proposal on voting rights within six weeks. Aware that guiding a new voting
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley22
rightslawto passagewould bea significantpolitical challenge,Johnsonaimed torally
public support in addition to persuading legislators. On January 15, he called Martin
Luther King, Jr. and urged him to publicize the worst cases of voting prejudice to get
Americansbehind a federalvotingrights act,
alaw Johnson said wasapriorityforhis
electedtermaspresident.HetoldKingthatifcitizensweretoseeadramaticexample
ofthevoterdiscriminationandintimidationintheSouth,theywoulddemandactionto
makethingsright,tomaketheelectoralsystemfair.
9

ExhibitingtheextremeoppositiontoAfricanAmericanvotingJohnsonbelieved
would get the public's attention, Selma, Alabama, was the site of a nascent voting
rights campaign that had begun with a mass meeting on January 2. Three days after
talkingwiththe president,KingledthedemonstratorsinSelmainamassmarchonthe
countycourthousetoregister to vote and to dramatizevoter discrimination in Selma.
Neither goal was achieved that day. But in the following days, local law enforcement
officials assaulted the demonstrators in full view of journalists—who published and
broadcast graphic reports and pictures of the violence across the nation. The Selma
campaignbecameapoliticaldrama,ascivilrightsleadersandthepresidentexpected,
but did not immediately succeed in creating an overwhelming public demand for
immediate legislative action. Rather, many Americans' first reaction was that the
government should provide protection for the demonstrators. And although the
campaigndidprovide"freshimpetus"amongmembersofCongress"tonewlegislation
toassureNegroestherighttoregisterandvote,"legislatorsdidnotcommitthemselves
passionately to the cause. In February, King penned a public letter that focused
attention on the fact that in Selma "there are more Negroes in jail . . . than on the
voting rolls," but the campaign still struggled to trigger an intense, urgent outcry
among citizens or legislators. Late in the month, leaders of the Selma campaign
plannedformoreconfrontationaldemonstrationsandactsofcivildisobediencetohelp
achieve the goal discussed by King and Johnson. Local law enforcement officials—led
by Sheriff Jim Clark—indeed responded to the tactics with increased violence, killing
onedemonstrator andbeatingothersbrutally.Butitwastheplanfordemonstratorsto
marchfiftyfourmilestothestatecapitolinMontgomerytopetitionfortheirrightson
March
7thataimedtheconfrontationinSelmatowardadecisive,dramaticclimax.
10
Had Alabama law enforcement officials turned the demonstrators around by
blockingthehighwaytoMontgomery,asmanyofthemarchersanticipated,theSelma
campaign well might have failed to galvanize support for a federal voting rights act.
Instead, they acted the roles civil rights leaders reluctantly hoped they might. Soon
after six hundred marchers set out from a local church around 4:00 p.m. on Sunday,
March 8, they encountered an intimidating force of state troopers and the local
sheriff's posse on the Edmund Pettus Bridge. A large crowd of local white citizens
jeeredthe marchersfrom the side of the road,
whilea cadre of journalists waited for
the action. When the marchers came within fifty feet of the troopers, the officer in
charge ordered them to stop and disperse within two minutes. March leaders John
LewisandHoseaWilliamsbeganspreadingthewordthatdemonstrators shouldkneel
andpray beforeactingon the officer's orders.Onlyone minute aftertheorder, while
most of them still were kneeling to pray, the officer issued an astonishing order with
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley23
furor:"Troopers,advance!"Themarchersquicklywereoverrun.Statetroopersclubbed
them, flailed them with bullwhips, and seared them with electric cattle prods.
Horsemen from the sheriff's posse then charged into the panicked crowd of
demonstrators and began to thrash them, too, as local bystanders cheered, "Get the
niggers!" Troopers fired tear gas into the crowd, as the vicious beatings continued.
Broken, bleeding, weeping, vomiting marchers lay strewn across the highway, while
those still able to move tried feeblyto escape. Some assailants pursued the escapees
back into Selma's African American neighborhood for further battering, as others
blocked ambulances from reaching the wounded on the bridge. Eventually, the
bloodbath ended. Remarkably, no one was killed. But the severely routed marchers
sustained broken ribs, arms, legs, and teeth, severe lacerations, skull fractures,
concussions,anddamagetotheireyesandlungs.
11

Soonaftertheattack,journalistswhowereonthescenedisseminatedpictures
andaccountsofthebrutalitytoastunnednation.ABCTVeveninterrupteditsevening
moviewithaspecialnewsbulletinthatincludedfifteenminutesofvideofootagefrom
theassaultinSelma.Thefollowingday,thefrontpagesofnewspaperswerefilledwith
imagesandstoriesoftheviolenceagainstthosepetitioningforequalvotingrights.The
confrontation,madeespeciallysalientbyitsvividvisualdepiction,becameasymbolof
Southern efforts to maintain white supremacy at all costs. Writers called the day
"Bloody Sunday," and the bloodshed made many Americans feel shame and disgrace.
Overwhelmingnumbersofcitizensexpressedshockthatsuchanoutragecouldhappen
in the United States: The violence stirred the nation's conscience and made a deeper
impression than perhaps any demonstration during the civil rights movement.
MembersofCongressexpressed"angeranddisgustatAlabama'sviolentrepressionof
theNegromarchers."Newspapersreportedthatthemarchhadmobilized"formidable
nationalsentimentbehindnewcivilrightslegislation."
12
AlthoughJohnsonhadendorsedtheSelmacampaignimplicitlyinhistelephone
conversation with King, the unexpected bloodshed there created a political climate
morecomplicatedthanthepresidenthadanticipated.Theprocessofdraftingabillwas
slowerthananticipated,asJusticeDepartmentattorneysfounditdifficulttodevelopa
straightforward
methodofensuringtheguaranteesoftheFifteenthAmendment(that
voting should be free from racial discrimination) without stating in affirmative terms
who comprised the electorate—something not provided for by the Constitution and
whichwouldrequireaconstitutionalamendment.YetthepressureontheWhiteHouse
to send legislation to Congress intensified as the situation in Selma escalated. The
Justice Department completed a draft of a federal voting rights bill on March 5, and
JohnsonsolicitedinputfrommembersofCongresstostrengthenthebillandpavethe
way for passage rather than introduce it immediately. Following "Bloody Sunday,"
pressure on
the White House to send a bill to the legislature rose sharply and
continued to increase as the president still pursued the prudent, deliberate—but
slower—course of shoring up the bill and support for it among congressional leaders.
Widelycriticizedforhisperceivedinaction,Johnsonreceivedatleastsomesupportfor
hisstrategy:DuringaspecialreportonMarch12,aCBSNewscommentatorobserved,
"Legislationwrittenintheheatofemotionusuallyisbadlegislation."OnMarch13,the
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley24
Justice Department finally completed its revisions to the bill, accepting mostly minor
changes to its language made in the following days. And so in these exigent
circumstances,Johnson plannedtoaddress the Congress andthenationonMarch 15
to provide them with the "information, details, explanation, and justifications" he
believedtheywantedtohearinregardtohisvotingrightsmeasure.
13
AfterJohnsonhaddeclaredinJanuaryhisintentiontosubmitavotingrightsbill,
theWashington Post reportedthat passinglegislation"may require allthe persuasion
thePresidentcanmuster."Clearly,thedemonstrationsinSelmahadmadethegeneral
caseforvotingrightslegislationaneasieronetoargue.ButJohnsonhadaspecificcase
to make, and persuading the public to support his strong voting rights bill while
convincing Congress to pass it quickly without watering it down still required
considerable rhetorical skill. Moreover, although the primary purpose of Johnson's
speechwasinstrumental,italsostroveforeloquence—toinspirelistenersbyassigning
deepmeaningtoeventsintheworldthroughcompellingappealsthatwerebothtimely
andtimeless.WhenhesteppedtothepodiumintheHousechamberoftheU.S.Capitol
at 9:02 p.m. on March 15, President Johnson, his im mediate audience, and his
television audience of over seventy
million, understood the significance of the words
hewasabouttospeak.
14
Interpretation
Initially, Johnson planned only to deliver a written message to Congress to
accompany his legislative proposal but came to believe that such communication
would be insufficient for advancing his legislative goal and for enacting his duties as
chiefspokesmanforthenation.PresidentsrarelydeliverspecialmessagestoCongress
in person to advocate for a specific bill, especially on domestic policy; Harry Truman
had been the last president to do so. Such speeches are risky, as they put the
president's credibility on the line and chance making members of Congress resentful,
feelingtheyarebeingcoercedintoactionand
havingtheirlawmakingdutiesusurped.
Johnsondidnotdecideforcertaintomakeapublicspeechuntilnearlythelastminute,
followinga meeting withmembersofhis administrationandcongressional leaderson
the evening of March 14. The meeting reinforced his belief that a public speech was
neededtocalmthe publicand assurethemthat thefederal governmentwas working
tosolvetheproblemofvoterdiscrimination.Moreover,Johnsonbelievedheneededto
use "every ounce of moral persuasion the Presidency held" to ensure passage of the
votingrightsbill.
15
Unlike the bill, the address was prepared in haste by White House
speechwriters,astheyfirstreceivedtheassignmentduringthelatehoursofMarch14.
The final text was a synthesis of multiple speech drafts, previous press conference
statements, and speeches Johnson had delivered as vice president. Presidential aides
finalizedandeditedtheaddressthroughoutthedayonMarch15,completingtheirtask
just moments before Johnson headed over to the capitol. As was usual practice, the
presidentwasnotinvolveddirectlyinthespeechwritingprocessdespitehislaterclaim
that he "penciled in changes and rewrote sections" of the address. Johnson took full
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley25
creditforthespeech,however,ashispresssecretarysuccessfullycoordinatedaplanto
communicate the following falsehood to the press: "The President wrote the speech.
Hetalkedoutwhathewantedtosay—andasdraftswerepreparedinresponsetohis
dictation, the President personally edited and revised." In
fact, Johnson's only direct
contributions to the speech came during its delivery, as he personalized some of the
languageandinserteda fewphrasesandshortsentences. Givenhisdetachmentfrom
thespeechwritingprocess,theresimplywasnotimetomakechangesbeforespeaking;
PresidentJohnson receivedthereadingcopyjustpriorto deliveringthe message,and
hewasforcedtospeakfromthemanuscriptforthefirstseveralminutes,asithadnot
yetbeenloadedontotheTelePrompTer.
16
Atsome point duringthespeechwriting process,someoneat theWhiteHouse
titled the speech "The American Promise." And although usually known by its most
memorableline("Weshallovercome"),theofficial titlebetter encapsulatesJohnson's
message. His speech used the word "promise" in both its meanings, referring to the
nation'svowanditspotential.Bothsensesofthewordimplyastory.Thoughmakinga
vow is a standalone act, it beckons further action: The vow must be kept or broken.
Havingpotentialisastateofbeingbutalsosignalsfutureaction:Thepotential mustbe
fulfilled or neglected. Stories are an especially significant form of communication, as
theycanhelpusmakesenseoftheworldandoftencontainmorallessonsthatpointto
an appropriate course of action. They contain a logic, or narrative reasoning, that
frames our decisionmaking in situations similar to those depicted in story. They
reinforceourculturalvalues.Inthepoliticalsphere,storiesshapeapeople'scollective
sense of self, their national identity, by telling and retelling their past, present, and
future.Suchstoriesinviteidentificationamongcitizensandbetweencitizensandtheir
government. Understanding the power of narrative, Lyndon Johnson attempted to
persuadehis listenerstoactinorder toguaranteeequalvotingrights—and more—by
depicting contemporaryexigenciesand decisions as part of the story of theAmerican
Promise.Thatstoryisthecentralrhetoricalfeatureofhisspeech.
Johnson began his address in a manner that suggested his message would
transcend the current exigency facing the nation: He asserted that he spoke for "the
destinyofdemocracy"(2).
17
Indeed,thecurrentcrisiswascritical,heclaimed,because
it constituted a "turning point in man's unending search for freedom" (4) and "equal
rights" (6). It is an episode in the story of the American Promise, Johnson reasoned,
which is a guarantee of freedom and equality—and the potential to be "the greatest
nationonEarth"(7).JohnsonsuggestedthatdenyingequalrightstoAfricanAmericans,
exemplified by the violence in Selma, represented a threat to "the values and the
purposesandthemeaningofourbelovednation"(9).HeclaimedthattokeepAfrican
Americans from enjoying the freedom and equality assured by the Declaration of
Independence and the battle cries of the Revolution would be to break our nation's
promiseandneglectourpotentialto"failasapeopleandasanation"(10).Ofcourse,
none of the dictums quoted by the president ("All men are created equal";
"Government by consent of the governed"; "Give me liberty or give me death")
constituted a direct promise to African Americans regarding political freedom or
equality.Yet Johnson interpreted themto have an expansive meaning that appliedto
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley26
thepresentproblem.Andsincethestoryoftheforwardmarchoffreedomandequality
isperhapstheUnitedStates'"masternarrative,"hisproposedpoliticalreformismade
to seem a natural progression in American history. In short, he seized the rhetoric of
democratic freedom and equality—transforming the meaning of
the two principles in
theprocess—tohelpguaranteeequalvotingrightstoAfricanAmericans.
18
At the same moment President Johnson argued that the issue confronting the
county was of historic significance, he also emphasized the importance of time. He
suggested that although the United States long had kept African Americans from
enjoyingthebenefitsoffreedomandequality, ithadnotbrokenitspromise—yet.But
sincedestinyhadcrossedourpathatthisparticulartime,heclaimed,thedecisivepoint
intimehadarrived.Thepresidentassertedthatassuchamomentcamealong"rarely
in any time," (9) the nation must seize the opportunity. Articulating a similar theme
about midway through the speech, he described the country's promise as "unkept,"
(51)notbroken,andurgedimmediateactionbystressingthatthe"timeofjusticehas
nowcome"(52).Johnsonclaimed,"Thistime,onthisissue,theremustbenodelay or
no hesitation or no compromise with our purpose," (42) adding that "the time for
waitinghasgone"(43).
The themes of promise and urgency established in the beginning of Johnson's
speechwerecentraltothemessage'soverallrhe toricalpower,astheytransformedthe
political problem of voter discrimination into something even grander: a threat to
Americaitself. And the effort to solve that problem took on a grand, almost religious
imperative—asdescribedbythepresident—sinceitimplicatedAmerica'sdestiny,faith,
andmission.HesuggestedtheUnitedStatesrepresentedachosennation,"thefirst...
inthehistoryoftheworldtobefoundedwithapurpose"(13).Invokingapassagefrom
theBible,Luke9:25,heclaimedthenationwouldloseitsverysoulifitfailedtoachieve
its purpose of upholding the democratic model of government, its promise to ensure
freedom and equality. President Johnson took on the role of prophet in his speech,
recallingthenationtoitsoriginaltask.Asthegiftoftheprophetisvision,hesuggested
that by taking a penetrating look at current events to see their underlying meaning,
onecouldtrulyunderstandwhatwasatstake:theheartandsoulofthenation.
By imbuing his narrative of the American Promise with a religious
dimension,
Johnsontappedintotheculturaltraditionscholarsusuallyrefertoascivilreligion—the
collection of symbols, beliefs, values, and rituals that give sacred meaning to political
life;thetranscendentsenseofrealitythroughwhichapeopleinterprettheirhistorical
experiences. His message articulated three key myths in American civil religion: that
theUnitedStateshasacovenantthatmakesitscitizensachosenpeople,thatithasa
specialpurpose,andthatitsfoundingwasaconsecratedactthatdefinedthemeaning
of the nation.
19
In doing so, the president encouraged his audience to experience
current events as part of a transcendent reality. As the nation's prophet, he called to
mindits purpose,pointedout itssinsand thewages of sin,and identifiedthe path to
redemption.
Attheendofthefirstsectionofhisspeech,Johnsonrelatedtheissueofvoting
rights to the American Promise directly. Whereas earlier he had described the issue
confrontingthe nationin abstracttermsoffreedomandequalrights, henowmadeit
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley27
clearthatensuringAfricanAmericansequalaccesstothe franchisewascentraltothe
nation's promise and purpose. He claimed that the nation's Founding Fathers
established"therighttochooseyourownleaders"as"themostbasicrightofall,"and
that the history of America, at its essence, was
"the history of the expansion of that
righttoallofourpeople"(16).Thepresidentmadethepresentcourseofactionclear:
"EveryAmericancitizenmusthaveanequalrighttovote.Thereisnoreasonwhich[sic]
can excuse the denial of that right. There is no duty that
weighs more heavily on us
than the duty we have to ensure that right" (17). As the central idea of Johnson's
speech, he returned to this theme in his conclusion, enacting the role of the prophet
unequivocallyandputtingapointonthenation'ssacredduty:"Abovethepyramidon
thegreatseal of the United Statesitsays . ..'God has favored our undertaking.'God
willnotfavoreverythingthatwedo.ItisratherourdutytodivineHiswill.ButIcannot
helpbelievingthatHetrulyunderstandsandthatHereallyfavorsthe undertakingthat
we begin here tonight" (90). President Johnson intuited the will of God to be on the
side of voting rights legislation and suggested that by enacting such legislation, the
nationcouldkeepitspromiseandconfirmitscovenantrelationshipwithGod.
To a great extent, Johnson's speech is persuasive to
the extent it invested
eventswithdeepmeaningforitslisteners.HisstoryoftheAmericanPromiseaimedto
helphisaudiencemakesenseofadisturbingcrisisinaparticularway,toseeitaspart
ofalargercontextofevents.By emphasizingtheideaofapromise,he
providedalogic
that framed his listeners' decisionmaking: They should act to keep their promise. His
storyreinforcedthevaluestowhichthenationmustrecommititselfthroughaction.It
reaffirmed America's national identity and identified citizens with their government.
When listeners found Johnson's speech compelling, it was likely because he induced
them to want to guarantee voting rights in order to honor their status as a chosen
people and to live out the nation's sacred purpose. He effectively appealed to their
patriotic duty, infused with a religious imperative. Moreover, for those listeners who
feltshamefollowing Bloody Sunday,Johnsonprovidedawayto purge their guilt. The
violence in Selma was horrific, but the president suggested it may serve a significant
purpose, since it has "summoned into convocation all the majesty of this great
government" (7). The violence in Selma can be made meaningful, he implied, by
enactingvoting
rightslegislation.
It is difficult to know whether President Johnson's speech converted many
opponents of equalvoting rightstohisside, but this wasnothis only persuasive aim.
Evenso,asevidencedbyhislegislativestrategiesduringhis tenureasSenatemajority
leader, Johnson understood that voting was a weak spot in many Southerners'
oppositiontocivilrights.Hebelievedthatalthoughsegregationistswantedtomaintain
whitesupremacythroughvoterdiscrimination,many stillfelt—inspiteofthemselves—
their actions were wrong. The president may not have converted them to active
supporters of voting rights legislation, but he likely persuaded some to accept it
passively.HisspeechhelpeddemoralizetheSouthernoppositiontoequalvotingrights
bymaking racialdiscriminationat theballot box seemfundamentallyunAmerican,at
odds with what the nation was all about. It squarely put segregationists on the losing
side of an issue of principle: None could
argue convincingly that voter discrimination
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley28
was consistent with American values. Cultivating even passive acceptance was a
significant rhetorical accomplishment for Johnson, as it had the potential to help
Congresspasshisvoting rightsbill morequicklyandto encouragecompliancewith its
provisions once it became law. In addition to weakening his opposition, the address
encouragedtheuncommittedtoidentifythemselveswithahallowedcause.Moreover,
it bolstered voting rights supporters. Johnson further justified their outrage over the
violence in Selma by instilling it with a grander source of indignation. He made them
feelasthoughtheweightofAmericanhistorywasontheirside,that
equalvotingrights
was foreordained. His claim that the "time of justice has now come" (52) made their
cause feel exceptionally urgent. His heady proclamation, "We shall overcome" (46)
madeprogressseemunstoppable.
To appreciate the rhetorical ingenuity of the voting rights address, it is helpful
toconsideralternatepersuasive
strategiesJohnsonmighthaveemployed.Theaddress
is impressive precisely because he and his speechwriters made discerning choices
amongtheavailablemeansofpersuasion.Forexample,thepresidentcouldhavemade
astrongcaseforequalvotingrightsgroundedintheU.S.Constitution.Indeed,anearly
draft of the speech, based
on the written message sent to Congress with the
legislation, focused on the mandate of the Constitution. After all, the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibits racial discrimination at the ballot box and gives Congress the
authority to pass legislation in order to secure that guarantee. Johnson simply could
havedemandedthat the
Congressdo its consti tutionalduty(aclaim hein fact made,
albeit very briefly). However, making that the centerpiece of his speech would have
entered him into a tedious legal argument with Southern opponents of voting rights,
who in the past had demonstrated they were game for a protracted argument of
exactlythatsort.ApleaforCongresstodoitsconstitutionaldutyalsowouldhaveput
theAmericanpeopleonthemarginsofthedecisionmakingprocessbyfocusingonthe
responsibilities of the federal government. And though possessed of a reasonable
appeal, such a plea would have been less inspiring than his appeal to the American
Promise:JohnsonpresentedastirringdefinitionofthemeaningofAmericaratherthan
themeaningoftheConstitution,asignificantbutarcanedocumenttomanycitizens.
Rather than grounding his argument in the American promise, Johnson also
could have made an explicitly moral argument
decrying racial prejudice, including its
expression through voter discrimination. Indeed, in 1963 he had advised President
KennedytodeliveracivilrightsspeechthatwouldmakeSouthernersfeeltheywereon
the wrong side of an issue of conscience. Perhaps Johnson believed in 1965 that the
violenceinSelmaalreadyhadaccomplishedthatgoal.Moreover,hadhemade amoral
argument against racial prejudice, he would have risked alienating listeners who
harboredpersonalprejudiceagainstAfricanAmericansbutstillsupported—orcouldbe
persuaded to support—equal voting rights. As demonstratedby the address, Johnson
and his speechwriters found a way for him to speak with moral authority, as the
nation'spresidentandprophet,withoutpreachingtohislistenersabouttheirpersonal
transgressions.
Above all, instead of focusing his rhetoric on constitutional or moralistic
appeals, President Johnson simply assumed those issues to be resolved: "There is no
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley29
constitutionalissue.ThecommandoftheConstitutionisplain.Thereisnomoralissue.
Itiswrong—deadlywrongtodenyanyofyourfellowAmericanstherighttovote"(37
39).ByfocusingonwhathedescribedtobetheunresolvedissueofAmerica'spromise,
he employed a rhetorical appeal
that transcended issues of state and federal rights
(which Southerners always raised in debates about constitutional questions of civil
rights)andissuesofpersonalmorality.
Other rhetorical features of the president's speech were important. For
instance, his claim that existing civil rights laws could not solve the problem of voter
discrimination
helped head off a counterargument by Southerner legislators who
counseleddelayfollowingthepassage oftheCivilRightsActof1964,whichcontained
worthlessprovisionsonequalvotingrights.
It was Johnson's transcendent appeal to the American Promise, however, that
was most persuasive and that cultivated overwhelming support for the voting rights
bill.Intheircoverageofhisspeech,manyjournalistslaudedthepresidentforinvoking
andaffirming"themostsacredanddeeplyheldconvictionsofanation,"whichbrought
"the present chapter of the struggle for human rights into proper perspective."
20[
Citizens echoed these sentiments in their letters and telegrams to the White House.
And when editorialists urged swift passage of the president's bill, their appeals
employed the language of Johnson's narrative: The New York Times even suggested
passagewasaforegoneconclusionbecausea"peoplethathasrespondedunflinchingly
to every trial of national purpose . . . will not fail this test."
21
Moreover, following
PresidentJohnson'sspeech,members ofCongress deliberatedvotingrights legislation
using the language of America's destiny, promise, and purpose. Senators and
congressmenclaimedthatthenationmust"makegoodonitspromise...[to]fulfillthe
revolutionarydreamoffreedomandequalityforallAmericans"by"passingabillwhich
[sic]fullyinsuresthateveryAmerican...hastherighttovote"—whichwillrepresenta
step "along this nation's honored march toward further fulfillment of our traditional
goals of equal opportunity and equal treatment." Congress indeed passed the final
votingrightsbilllessthanfive
monthsafterJohnson'sspeech.Thepresidentsignedthe
Voting Rights Act of 1965 into law on August 6, emphasizing at the signing ceremony
thatAmericahadrightedahistoricalwrong,enacteditssacredprinciples,confirmedits
promise,andnowwouldendeavorto"fulfilltherightsthatwenowsecure."
22
Legacy
Politicalrhetoricthatfindsawaytotranscendconflictsofbeliefandsentiment
isuncommon, especially whenitinvolves issues of right andwrong.Johnson's speech
helpedtranscendthoseconflictsbyfocusingoncivicvirtueandcivicduty.Byappealing
to and reinforcing a shared language of moral
consensus—the narrative of the
AmericanPromise—JohnsonmadealastingcontributiontoU.S.politicalandrhetorical
history.AsastatementofAmericanprinciplesthatrelatedtotheissueofequalvoting
rights,hisspeechhasenduringsignificance.Perhapsthisalsowaspartofhisintent,as
he wanted to be eloquent and wanted to go down in history as a great civil rights
president.
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley30
Johnson's speech also has enduring significance on the issue of civil rights
becauseit representedan effort tomodifythemeaning of twokeyideas in American
historywhileincorporating themintoamoreexpansivevisionofthenation'spromise.
HisnarrativeoftheAmericanPromisewasmainlyastory
ofthenation'scommitment
to freedom and equality. The speech began by identifying these two ideas in a
conventional way: Freedom is discussed in terms of political liberties, and equality is
discussedintermsofequalrightsorequalopportunity.Thecontemporarystrugglefor
civil rights, he suggested, was about guaranteeing those principles. But as the
president'sspeechcontinued,heemphasizedhowthatstruggleforcivilrightswasnot
justastruggleforfreedomitselfbutratherforthe"thefruitsoffreedom,"(56)notjust
astruggleforequalrightsorequalopportunitybutrathertohelpensureequalityas
an
actualcharacteristicofAmericanlife.Johnsonemphasizedtheexerciseoffreedomand
equality, which he claimed "takes much more than just legal right" (75). Rather than
only guaranteeing equal rights and opportunities (opening the gates of equality), he
suggested that to "mak e good on the promise of America" (63) also meant giving all
citizens"thehelpthattheyneedtowalkthroughthosegates"(77).Heinvitedcitizens
to think not only about political rights but also about the circumstances under which
freedomandequalityflourish.Whereasfreedomandequalitycanbethoughtofasthe
protections and privileges given to all citizens by law, as principles of
nondiscrimination, Johnson also defined them as goals to be achieved. Perhaps most
notably, the voting rights speech was one of the first messages in which President
Johnsonattemptedtoredefinethemeaningoftheideaofequalopportunity toinclude
the concept of affirmative action, the help needed to achieve what he later called
"equality as a fact and a result" not "just equality as a rights and a theory." This
redefinitionofequalopportunityattractedlittleattentionatthetime,perhapsbecause
itwas subsumedinto thestoryof the AmericanPromise—which,at somelevel,many
citizensthemselvesfelttomeanmorethanjustaguaranteeofbasiclegalprotections.
Indeed, as the word promise denoted potential as well as guarantee, Johnson's
narrative emphasized the nation's potential to become a "Great Society" (a common
themeinhisrhetoricduringthistime):anationinwhichcitizensareeducated,healthy,
housed, and employed; a nation in which the experience of freedom and democracy
flowsfromthoseprinciples.
23
Studying President Johnson's speech is significant as a reminder that the
languageof theAmericanPromisehasbeen asite ofstrugglethroughoutthe nation's
history. Though they are universal terms in American political rhetoric, freedom and
equality are part of an ongoing process of definition and redefinition, of ongoing
debates about their meaning. Neither freedom nor equality embodies a single idea;
rather each symbolizes a mixture of values and meanings. For example, freedom has
meant—at various times—the right to political selfdetermination, the right to make
individual choices free from coercion, the capacity for ethical action, and more. The
meanings
of equality have included equal rights, equal treatment, and actual parity.
Though their meanings change, freedom and equality remain authoritative terms in
politicaldiscourse:Toseizecontroloftheminapoliticaldebateistoacquiresignificant
rhetoricalpower.OneoftheverytermsJohnsonsoughttoredefinetogainsupportfor
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley31
his civil rights program is in the process of being redefined. Participants in recent
debates about affirmative action, including court cases about college and university
admissions policies, seek to define and control the meaning of equality. Even the
meaning of civil rights—a term whose meaning has been identified strongly with
the
civilrightsmovement—isnowcontested,astheadvocatesofstateballotproposalsto
outlawaffirmativeactionprogramsrefertothemas"civilrightsinitiatives."
24
Since Johnson's speech helped establish the meaning of freedom and equality
as employed during the congressional deliberations over the Voting Rights Act, his
messagemaycontinuetohavesignificantinfluence.ThelawrequiresthattheCongress
mustperiodicallyreviewand,ifdeemedappropriate,renewsomeoftheprovisionsof
theVotingRightsAct:Themostrecentrenewalcamein2006.Federallegislatorsoften
looktotheintentofformerCongresseswhenrenewingpreviouslyenactedlaws,andin
1965 the 89th Congress described its intent in the president's terms of fulfilling the
American Promise of freedom and equality. Despite some wrangling during the 2006
deliberations,membersofCongressultimatelyseemedtoagreethat"'thelibertiesand
freedomembeddedintherighttovotemustremainsacred.'"
25
Finally,studyingJohnson's speechshouldencouragereflectiononthenatureof
presidentialrhetoric,especiallyonmattersperceivedtohaveamoraldimension.That
presidentswillusetheirofficeasabullypulpittoserveasthenation'smoralleaderand
spokesperson is a common assumption of the modern presidency. Like all orators,
presidents are susceptible to misusing of the power of moral leadership: They may
reducecomplexproblems tosimple questionsof rightorwrong,demonizethose who
oppose them, assert moral consensus when none exists, appeal to listeners' base
motives in the language of virtue, or enact the role of moral spokesperson with
arrogance rather than humility. Even so, the nation sometimes needs its president to
ascendtothebullypulpittoexhortittowardapublicgoodthatwouldnotberealized
withoutmoving,inspiringoratory.Butfindingasharedmorallanguageout ofwhicha
president can fashion a persuasive appeal is difficult. President Johnson effectively
grounded his appeals in a potent narrative that focused on public morality—his
listeners'civicdutytokeepandfulfillthesacredAmericanPromise.Butasthecitizenry
continues to become more religiously and culturally diverse, less schooled in the
narratives of the nation's
history, more aware of how such narratives can be used to
justifydepravedcausesaswellas honorableones, andperhapslessinfluencedbythe
moralauthorityofthepresidency,presidentsmayfinditespeciallytrickytobuildmoral
consensus through oratory. Consider this problem from a perspective afforded by
studying Johnson's speech. He usedoratorytohelp secure the significantpublic good
of equal voting rights, primarily by appealing to the American Promise—of which the
Constitution is one expression—rather than the Constitution itself. But could Johnson
havecraftedsuchastirring,persuasiveappealonthebasisofconstitutionalguarantees
alone? Would his listeners have found it as moving, meaningful, and motivational?
Wouldwefinditaseloquenttoday?
________________________
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley32
Garth E. Pauley (Ph.D., The Pennsylvania State University) is associate professor of
rhetoric in the Department of Communication Arts & Sc iences at Calvin College in
GrandRapids,Michigan.

Notes
1StephenE.LucasandMartinJ.Medhurst,WordsofaCentury:TheTop100
AmericanSpeeches,19001999(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2007).
2DavidZarefsky,"LyndonB.Johnson,"inAmericanOratorsoftheTwentieth
Century:CriticalStudiesandSources,ed.,BernardK.DuffyandHalfordR.
Ryan
(Westport,CT:GreenwoodPress,1987),224;HarvardSitkoff,TheStruggleforBlack
Equality,19541992,rev.ed.(NewYork:HillandWang,1993),182183.
3RobertDallek,FlawedGiant:LyndonJohnsonandHisTimes,19611973(New
York:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),113114.
4Dallek,LoneStar
Rising:LyndonJohnsonandHisTimes,19081960(NewYork:
OxfordUniversityPress,1991),367370.
5RobertA.Caro,TheYearsofLyndonJohnson,vol.3,MasteroftheSenate
(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,2002),8621011;Dallek,LoneStarRising,517527.
6SeeRobertMann,TheWallsofJericho:LyndonJohnson,HubertHumphrey,
RichardRussell,andtheStruggleforCivilRights(NewYork:HarcourtBrace,1996),318;
andStevenF.Lawson,"CivilRights,"inExploringtheJohnsonYears,ed.,RobertA.
Divine(Austin:UniversityofTexasPress,1981),97.
7AlexanderKeyssar,TheRighttoVote:TheContestedHistoryofDemocracyin
theUnitedStates(NewYork:BasicBooks,2000),108111,244249,257264.
8TaskForceIssuePaper:CivilRights,June17,1964,OfficeFilesofBillMoyers,
Box94,LyndonB.JohnsonPresidentialLibrary.
9LouisMartintoJohnBailey,November17,
1964,LegislativeBackground:
VotingRightsActof1965,Box1,LyndonB.JohnsonPresidentialLibrary;Matthew
ReeseJr.toLyndonJohnson,December1964,OfficeFilesofLeeWhite,Box3,Lyndon
B.JohnsonPresidentialLibrary;LyndonJohnsontoNicholasKatzenbach,December14,
1964,RecordingsofTelephoneConversations,WH6412.02,LyndonB.Johnson
PresidentialLibrary;LyndonJohnson,PublicPapersofthePresidentsoftheUnited
States:LyndonJohnson,1965,vol.1(Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPrintingOffice,
1966),5;LyndonB.JohnsontoMartinLutherKingJr.,January15,1965,WH6501.04,
RecordingsofTelephoneConversations,LyndonB.JohnsonPresidentialLibrary.
10
DavidJ.Garrow,BearingtheCross:MartinLutherKingJr.andtheSouthern
ChristianLeadershipConference(NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1986),378395;"Negro
VotingRights,"CongressionalQuarterlyWeeklyReport23.8(1965),269.
11TestimonyfromHoseaWilliams,JohnLewisetal.v.GeorgeWallace,
GovernorofAlabamaetal.,
NRCA21ANMCVCA2181TESTMNY,NARASoutheast
Region,NationalArchives.
VoicesofDemocracy3(2008):1733Pauley33
12"Selma—AnAssessment,"ChristianScienceMonitor,March15,1965,14;
NanRobertson,"JohnsonPressedforaVotingLaw,"NewYorkTimes,March9,1965,1.
13EricSevareidscript,"WalterCronkiteandtheNews,"LegislativeBackground:
VotingRightsActof1965,Box1,LyndonB.JohnsonPresidentialLibrary;LyndonB.
JohnsontoNicholasKatzenbach,March11,1965,WH6503.06,Recordingsof
TelephoneConversations,LyndonB.JohnsonPresidentialLibrary.
14RobertBaker,"JohnsonMayAskBanonVoterLiteracyTests,"Washington
Post,January6,1965,A1.
15LyndonB.Johnson,VantagePoint:PerspectivesofthePresidency,19631969
(NewYork:Holt,Rinehart&Winston,1971),164.
16Speechdrafts,President'sRemarkstoAccompanyVotingMessage,March
15,1965,StatementsofLBJ,Box141,LyndonB.JohnsonPresidentialLibrary;Johnson,
VantagePoint,164165;LadyBirdJohnson,AWhiteHouseDiary(Holt,Rinehart&
Winston,1970),252253;JackValentitoLyndonJohnson,March16,1965,Legislative
Background:VotingRightsActof1965,Box1,LyndonB.JohnsonPresidentialLibrary.
17LyndonB.Johnson,PresidentJohnson'sVotingRightsAddress,March15,
1965,WHCA269/70,AudioCollection,LyndonB.JohnsonPresidentialLibrary.Allof
theremainingpassagesfromJohnson'sMarch,15,1965,speechbeforetheU.S.
Congressarecitedwithreferencetoparagraphnumbersinthespeechthat
accompaniesthisessay.
18EricFoner,TheStoryofAmericanFreedom(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1998),
xvi.
19SeeRobertN.Bellah,BrokenCovenant:AmericanCivilReligioninaTimeof
Trial,2nded.(Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress,1992),3;RoderickP.Hart,The
PoliticalPulpit(WestLafayette,IN:PurdueUniversityPress,1977),12;andRussellB.
Nye,ThisAlmostChosenPeople:EssaysintheHistoryofAmericanIdeas(EastLansing:
MichiganStateUniversityPress,1966),165.
20"America'sConscience,"ChristianScienceMonitor,
March17,1965,14;"Mr.
Johnson'sStrongCalltoAction,"KansasCityStar,March16,1965,26.
21"WeShallOvercome,"NewYorkTimes,March17,1965,44.
22U.S.Congress,Senate,89thCongress,1stsession,CongressionalRecord,111,
pt.4,5105,5223,5163,pt.11,11025,11076,pt.
12,16280,16267,pt.14,19200;
LyndonB.Johnson,PublicPapersofthePresidentsoftheUnitedStates:LyndonB.
Johnson,1965,vol.2(Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPrintingOffice,1966),811815.
23SeeLyndonB.Johnson,PublicPapersofthePresidentsoftheUnitedStates:
LyndonB.Johnson,1965
,vol.2(Washington,D.C.:GovernmentPrintingOffice,1966),
635640;andDavidZarefsky,"LyndonJohnsonRedefines'EqualOpportunity':The
BeginningsofAffirmativeAction,"CentralStatesSpeechJournal31(1980):8594.
24Foner,StoryofAmericanFreedom,xivxviii.
25LaurieKellman,"HouseRenewsVotingRightsActUnchanged,"July
14,2006,
CBSNews.com,August13,2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07/14/ap/politics/mainD8IRNHO85.shtml.