As before, however, it is important that much less controversial principles support similar
conclusions. Philosophical skepticism about state authority can be grounded in the widely
endorsed idea that people are, quite simply, not naturally subordinated to others. In this view,
something like voluntary consent or acceptance is required for people to be subject to the
authority of the state. For many, states have failed to satisfy this requirement.
Such philosophical anarchism, as it is often called, does not presuppose, but instead lends
support for libertarian views. The main reason for states being illegitimate is that they use
force where, absent consent or something similar, force is impermissible. States violate
people’s rights when they punish (or threaten to punish) a person for activities that endanger
no one else, such as riding a motorcycle without a helmet, taking drugs, refusing to purchase
health insurance, engaging in consensual sexual relations, or gambling. States violate
people’s rights when they expropriate their rightful possessions, impose unjust taxes, commit
fraud, or demand bribes. States violate people’s rights when they forcibly prevent them from
innocently contracting and associating with others, exercising their religion, occupy certain
professions because of their ethnic background, gender, or sexual orientation, and much,
much more.
Even though libertarians are generally quite hostile to state authority, this does not mean that
the state cannot permissibly undertake certain minimal activities. This includes most
obviously the enforcement of individual rights and freedoms. These activities do not
presuppose state authority since such activities are permissible with or without people’s prior
consent (unless, of course, such activities involve the violation of rights themselves).
Some controversy surrounds the question of whether people can be legitimately taxed to
finance these permissible state activities. Some think so, on the grounds that, roughly stated,
people can be required to pay for the morally permissible activity of rights enforcement
(Hayek, 1960). However, this is a difficult argument to sustain, for it remains unclear why the
very same ideas that require consent for other worthy state activities would not also require
consent for the financing of rights enforcement.
Of course, much of modern life seems to require a state. States structure and regulate much
of human life, they maintain peace and order, and they provide important public goods. And
while in most countries throughout history and around the world, the state has been a major
source of violence and oppression, there is no denying that many states also do many valuable
things. To many, then, the state seems indispensable. And to many, this seems a good
argument for thinking, contrary to libertarianism, that the state must be justifiable in some
way or other.
One popular argument for state authority holds that states can be legitimate if they are
democratic. Libertarians tend to be very skeptical about this view. A large body of empirical
findings has shown that voters tend to be radically uninformed, ignorant, and indeed biased
about political issues. And democratic deliberation does little, if anything, to improve this.
Indeed, it seems like it is rational for people to remain ignorant about politics. Given that
one’s causal influence on the quality of political decisions is negligible, and it is costly in
terms of time and effort to become informed, it is rational for people to remain ignorant. Most
people thus vote in ways that have more to do with signaling their ideological allegiance or
virtues, and less with the merits of the issues (Caplan, 2008; Somin, 2016; Brennan, 2016;
Pincione & Tesón, 2011).