Case 1:10-cv-00139-RMC Document 22 Filed 01/08/20 Page 19 of 24
authority to enforce its lawful orders, including “the power to construe and interpret the language
of the judgment”
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and to modify a decree of injunctive relief.
19
Moreover, the Final Judgment
expressly contemplates the Court’s authority to grant an extension, providing that the decree would
expire ten years from the date of entry “[u]nless this Court grants an extension.”
20
Where, as here, the parties have consented to a proposed modification of an antitrust
judgment, the issue before the Court is whether modification is in the public interest.
21
The Court
should “approve an uncontested modification so long as the resulting array of rights and
obligations is within the zone of settlements consonant with the public interest today.”
22
The
“district court may reject an uncontested modification only if it has exceptional confidence that
adverse antitrust consequences will result – perhaps akin to the confidence that would justify a
court in overturning the predictive judgments of an administrative agency.”
23
18
Heartland Hosp. v. Thompson, 328 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12 (D.D.C. 2004).
19
New York v. Microsoft, 531 F. Supp. 2d 141, 167 (2008) (quoting United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 46 F.3d 1198, 1202 (D.C.Cir.1995) (finding that in addition to authority under a final
judgment, “[t]he Court may also modify the Final Judgments under its power in ‘equity to modify
a decree of injunctive relief,” which the D.C. Circuit has described as “long-established, broad,
and flexible.”).
20
Final Judgment § XV.
21
As discussed below in Section VI, the requirements of the Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h),
do not apply to actions such as this one. Courts nevertheless should apply in this context a “public
interest” standard of review akin to the review standard embodied in the Tunney Act because that
standard pre-dates the Tunney Act and therefore applies even where the Act does not. See United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (In passing the Tunney Act,
“Congress did not purport to alter antitrust precedent applying the public interest in reviewing
consent decrees.”); cf. also United States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 565 & n. 7 (2d Cir.
1983) (the “court must, of course, consider protection of the ‘public interest’”; the “Tunney Act…
provides useful guidance to the courts in deciding how modification procedures should be
addressed”); United States v. Swift & Co., No. 58 C 613, 1975 WL 864, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17,
1975) (applying “public interest” review – but not the Tunney Act – to a jointly proposed
modification to antitrust consent decree).
22
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F. 2d 283, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Western Elec. I”).
23
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Western Elec. II”).
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