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It is interesting to note that the mission statements of
Jim Cramer and of The Motley Fools are very
similar. Cramer states that he wants to “educate
people, entertain people, and help them make money”
(Becker, 2005, p. 10). The Motley Fools mission
statement says that they are “here to educate, amuse,
and enrich” (Giacomino & Akers, 2011, p. 37).
These mission statements have entertainment and
influence as core values. If the efficient-market
hypothesis was completely valid and investors only
bought and sold stocks based on effective financial
evaluations of financial performance, then the
financially unrelated investment advice and
entertainment value of Cramer and The Motley Fools
would have no weight in the capital markets;
however, event studies show otherwise.
3. Event Study Analysis
3.2
Mad Money
An event study analysis is critical in
determining the celebrity endorsement effect of Jim
Cramer on the efficient-market hypothesis. An event
study focuses on variables that occur during a
specified period of time. In the past, event study
analyses have been used to analyze what type of
effect events have on profitability (Agrawal &
Kamakura, 1995). Results from event analysis
indicate that celebrity endorsements have positive
effects on the return of stock prices around the day of
endorsement. (Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995).
The three event studies analyzed for Jim
Cramer all show similar results: an increase in
volume of shares traded after Cramer’s
recommendations and abnormal stock returns greater
than 1.00% that decrease back to normal levels over
time (Karniouchina et al., 2009; Neumann & Kenny,
2007). Neumann and Kenny (2007) analyzed 216
recommendations by Jim Cramer from July 26, 2005
to September 9, 2005. During the first trading day
after a buy recommendation aired, “abnormal returns
of 1.06%, 1.09%, and 1.00% relative to the market
model, CRSP index, and historical mean (were)
realized” (Neumann & Kenny, 2007, p. 605). In
addition, the estimated volume for the particular
stocks increased by 27.78% the day after the show
date, suggesting abnormal buying and selling after
mentioning them on his show (Neumann & Kenny,
2007). Engleberg, Sasserville, and Williams (2006)
found similar results in their event study of 246 initial
recommendations given by Cramer between July 28,
2005 and October 10, 2005 (p. 2). The cumulative
abnormal return for the study was 6.71% for its value
three days before the recommendation and 1.96%
overnight (Engleberg et al., 2006, p 2). A turnover
ratio was also computed in the study showing that the
volume of shares traded of “smaller firms is 317% of
its typical size the day of recommendation, 890% the
day following recommendation, and 451% on the
second day following the recommendation”
(Engleberg et al., 2006, p. 7). Karniouchina et al.
(2009) also showed abnormal returns of 1.07% and
1.23% on the opening and closing sections of the
show (p. 251). The event studies all portray the
increased volume and abnormal returns of the stock
picks of Jim Cramer.
When looking at Jim Cramer as a celebrity
and professional expert, it is apparent that even
though his show is not an advertisement, it is
definitely persuasive and is lacking ambiguous
statements normally involving stock picks
(Karniouchina et al., 2009). Contrary to an
advertisement where individuals watch paid
promotions, people watching Jim Cramer’s show are
actively looking for recommendations (Karniouchina
et al., 2009). Cramer’s expertise as a celebrity is
a
reflection of his track record. Even though Cramer is
not trying to sell anything, his track record is
important to his career as a stock analyst
(Karniouchina et al., 2009). It is because of this
endorsement and professional value offered to naïve
investors that abnormal returns occur after his
recommendations.
3.3 Analyst Recommendations
According to Barber and Odean (2008),
investors are more likely to buy rather than sell
stocks that catch their attention (Barber & Odean,
2008). With the explosion of information available
on the Internet, it has become increasingly easy for
stocks to catch the attention of investors. When
analysts such as The Motley Fools change
recommendations, they advertise them publicly and
investors are able to buy or sell, reacting to them
immediately (Barber et al., 2001). Analyst
recommendations are key determinants of trading
volume from day to day. Investors react to changes
in recommendation by security analysts at the end of
the trading day (Barber et al., 2001). Abnormal gross
returns from analyst recommendations are on average
4.13% for buy recommendations and 4.91% for the
sell recommendations (Barber et al., 2001, p. 561)
One of the most famous studies of analyst
recommendations occurred with the very popular
“Dartboard” column of The Wall Street Journal. In
the study by Barber and Loeffler (1993), stocks
picked in the “Dartboard” column by professional
experts of The Wall Street Journal earned abnormal
returns of 4% and abnormal volume for six days after
the picks appeared in the column (Barber & Loeffler,
1993, p. 277). In addition, one of the most famous
analysts, The Motley Fools, also shows abnormal
volume and returns. When The Motley Fools
announce a buy recommendation there is an average
price increase of $3.36 to $3.72 per share and during
the three day period following there is an average
increase of $6.08 to $6.87 per share. In addition,
there is a 126.53% increase in the volume of trades
during an announcement, followed by a 114.43%
increase the day after (Hirschey, Richardson, &