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away rather than, as in the Balkans, they operated mere tens of miles away and had the
support of an enormous intelligence apparatus in country. Bin Laden exercised very
good operational security on par with or better than senior Serb war criminals.
General Hugh Shelton, the senior military adviser to the President, me and other
Principals, was serving as Commander in Chief of the US Special Operations Command
when I recommended that the President name him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
He had enormous experience in planning and carrying out special operations missions
during a special forces career that started in Vietnam. During the efforts to seize war
criminals in the Balkans, on many occasions I witnessed him quickly analyze the
strengths and weaknesses of “snatch” plans presented to him by the relevant commander,
who was not a special operations officer, and give guidance for fixing weaknesses,
developing alternative approaches or simply dropping ill-conceived plans destined to fail.
I found General Shelton’s military advice to be focused on military success, not risk
aversion.
Let me also note for the record that few public officials have been more supportive of
special forces than have I. I wrote and pushed through to enactment the legislation
creating the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and giving it extraordinary
authority, including special budget and procurement authority possessed by no other
military command and that in many respects made it a fifth service beside the Army,
Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force. Rep. Dan Daniels and Senator Sam Nunn
participated in that effort, along with later efforts to increase resources devoted to
USSOCOM. My legislation also created the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations & Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC) and his organization to ensure that
USSOCOM had an advocate in the Pentagon. All of this was done in 1986 over the
strenuous objections of the civilian and military DOD leadership of the day. When the
DOD leadership of the day balked at filling the ASD SOLIC position, not unlike 2001-
2003, I and some colleagues stopped confirmation of other Pentagon positions until a
nominee was named. When it became clear that the Secretary of Defense’s first
candidate to be ASD SOLIC viewed his mandate from his superiors to be to strangle
rather than support the new organizations, I and others blocked his confirmation. DOD’s
response was to leave the position vacant, again not unlike 2001-2003, and so we passed
legislation mandating that the Secretary of the Army, John Marsh, who supported my
efforts, would also serve as Acting ASD SOLIC until the position was filled. After
becoming Secretary of Defense, I selected the Commander of the USSOCOM to be the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the principal military adviser to the President and to me,
ensuring that a deep knowledge and appreciation of special forces, their capabilities and
how best to use them were in place at the very top of the Defense Department and
informing all decisions on military planning and operations.
At the other end of the spectrum, it has also been suggested that we should have waged
war in Afghanistan and militarily toppled the Taliban. Prior to September 11, it is my
judgment that no President could have won U.S. public or congressional support for
invading Afghanistan, much less support from Afghanistan’s neighbors whose active
cooperation would have been required for us to conduct such a war. After September 11,