Considerations and Lessons for the
Development and Implementation of
FAST PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Part of the World Bank Fast Payments Toolkit
MAIN REPORT • SEPTEMBER 2021
B | Fast Payment Systems: Preliminary Analysis of Global Developments
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FINANCE, COMPETITIVENESS & INNOVATION GLOBAL PRACTICE
Payment Systems Development Group
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. THE FAST PAYMENTS TOOLKIT 11
3. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING FAST PAYMENT DEVELOPMENTS 13
4. PAINTING THE BIGGER PICTURE: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 15
4.1 Module A: Structure of a Fast Payment Arrangement 15
4.1.1 Motivation to Introduce Fast Payments 15
4.1.2 Fast Payment Stakeholder Ecosystem and Approach to Setting Up a Fast Payment 18
Arrangement
4.1.3 Funding and Pricing to Participants 23
4.2 Module B: System Specifications and Operating Procedures 25
4.2.1 Infrastructure Development 27
4.2.2 Technical Specifications 32
4.2.3 Network Connectivity 38
4.2.4 Clearing and Settlement 40
4.2.5 Interoperability 43
4.3 Module C: Features of Fast Payment Arrangements 45
4.3.1 Payment Instruments, Payment Types Supported, and Use Cases/Services 45
4.3.2 Overlay Services and Aliases 49
4.3.3 Access Channels 51
4.3.4 User Uptake 56
4.4 Module D: Legal and Regulatory Considerations, Risk Management, 57
and Customer Dispute Resolution
4.4.1 Legal and Regulatory Considerations 57
4.4.2 Risk Management 57
4.4.3 Dispute Resolution and Customer Complaints 61
5. KEY LEARNINGS AND FORWARD OUTLOOK 66
5.1. What’s Next for Fast Payments? 69
ii | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Acknowledgments 72
Appendix B: Glossary, Acronyms, and Abbreviations 76
Appendix C: Primer on Fast Payments 82
Appendix D: Study Methodology 86
Appendix E: Full Jurisdiction List 88
Appendix F: The 25 Jurisdictions Shortlisted for a More Detailed Review 91
Appendix G: Methodology for Selecting the 16 Deep Dives 93
Appendix H: Questionnaire for Primary Research 97
ENDNOTES 103
BOXES
Box 1: Fast Payments versus Other Types of Payment System Arrangements 2
Box 2: Defining Fast Payments 7
Box 3: Ownership of Fast Payment Arrangements 19
Box 4: Messaging Standards for Payments/Financial Transactions 33
Box 5: Customer Authentication in the European Union 35
Box 6: Application Programming Interfaces 37
Box 7: Cross-Border Aspects 44
Box 8: Request to Pay in Fast Payment Arrangements 48
Box 9: Aliases for Fast Payments 50
CHART
Chart 1: Fast Payments Toolkit Illustration 12
FIGURES
Figure 1: Overview of Fast Payments Framework 3
Figure 2: Global Fast Payments Landscape 9
Figure 3: Fast Payment Statistics across Select Jurisdictions (2019) 9
Figure 4: The Fast Payments Toolkit 11
Figure 5: A Project Development Life Cycle for Fast Payments 13
Figure 6: Fast Payments Framework 14
Figure 7: Components of the Different Modules 15
Figure 8: Key Motivators for Introducing Fast Payments 16
Figure 9: Primary Fast Payments Implementation Drivers, as per Survey Findings13 16
Figure 10: Fee Structure in Fast Payment Arrangements for Participants 25
Figure 11: Messaging Standards Adopted 33
Figure 12: Observed Clearing Models 40
Figure 13: Participant Settlement Models Adopted for Fast Payment Arrangements 41
Figure 14: Payment Instruments Supported by Fast Payment Arrangements 46
Figure 15: Transaction and Message Flow for Push and Pull Payments 46
Figure 16: Payment Types 46
Figure 17: Use Cases Supported by Fast Payment Arrangements 47
Figure 18: Access Channels and Their Relevance for Fast Payments 52
Figure 19: Access Channels Supported by Fast Payment Arrangements 53
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | iii
Figure 20: QR Code Payment Process 54
Figure 21: Primary FPS Adoption Drivers as per Survey Findings 55
Figure 22: Benefits and Potential Sources of Fraud Associated with Real-Time Payments 62
Figure 23: Stakeholder Mapping of Key Learnings 67
Figure 24: Iberpay’s Integration of a Distributed Ledger with STC Inst. 70
TABLE
Table 1: Key Learnings 4
Table 2: Select Findings on Motivation 17
Table 3: Select Findings on Role of Governments and Regulators 17
Table 4: Select Findings on the Division of Roles between Overseer, Operator, and Owners 20
Table 5: Select Findings on Participants in Fast Payment Arrangements and Access Criteria 22
Table 6: Select Findings on Industry Body Collaborations 24
Table 7: Select Findings on the Classification of Fast Payment Arrangements as per 24
Their Systemic Importance
Table 8: Select Findings on Funding 24
Table 9: Select Findings on Fee Structures 26
Table 10: Select Findings on New Infrastructure Development versus Existing System Upgrades 28
Table 11: Select Findings on System Development Timelines and Services Available at Launch 29
Table 12: Select Findings on External Vendor versus In-House Development 30
Table 13: Select Findings on Participant Onboarding Process 31
Table 14: Select Findings and Insights into Current Use of Messaging Standards 34
Table 15: Select Findings and Insights into Customer Authentication 36
Table 16: Select Findings and Insights into the Use of APIs in the Context of Fast Payments 38
Table 17: Select Findings on Network Connectivity 39
Table 18: Select Findings on the Clearing and Settlement Models Used for Fast Payments 42
Table 19: Select Findings on Interoperability 43
Table 20: Select Findings and Insights into Request-to-Pay Functionalities and Services 49
Table 21: Select Findings on Overlay Services 50
Table 22: Select Findings on Aliases 52
Table 23: Select Findings on End-User Pricing 56
Table 24: Select Findings on Awareness Initiatives 56
Table 25: Select Findings on Legal and Regulatory Considerations 58
Table 26: Select Findings on Credit and Liquidity Risk 59
Table 27: General Findings on Operational Risk Management 60
Table 28: Select Findings on Cyber Resilience 62
Table 29: Select Findings on Inter-Participant Disputes 63
Table 30: Select Findings on End-Customer Disputes 65
Table 31: Key Learnings from the Application of the Fast Payment Framework 68
EXHIBITS
Exhibit A1: External Advisory Experts Group 72
Exhibit A2: Contributors to Interviews and Surveys 73
Exhibit A3: Organizations That Provided Inputs and Perspectives 74
Exhibit B1: Glossary 76
iv | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
Exhibit C1: Emergence of Fast Payment Arrangements over the Years 82
Exhibit C2: Key Characteristics of Fast Payment Arrangements 83
Exhibit D1: Study Approach 87
Exhibit E1: Complete List of Jurisdictions/Systems Studied—Regional Classification 88
Exhibit F1: List of Jurisdictions Shortlisted for Desk Research 91
Exhibit F2: Geographic and Category-wise Distribution of the 25 Shortlisted Jurisdictions 92
Exhibit F3: Key Parameters Studied in the 25 Shortlisted Jurisdictions 92
Exhibit G1: Jurisdictions with Live Fast Payment Implementations Mapped by Region, Country 94
Income Level, and Gross Domestic Product
Exhibit G2: Feature List for Comparison of Jurisdictions 94
Exhibit G3: Feature Comparison across Cluster A 95
Exhibit G4: Feature Comparison across Cluster B 95
Exhibit G5: Feature Comparison across Cluster C 95
Exhibit G6: Feature Comparison across Cluster D 95
Exhibit G7: Final List of 16 Jurisdictions for the Deep Dives 96
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The project was led by Holti Banka (Financial Sector Spe-
cialist, World Bank) and Nilima Ramteke (Senior Financial
Sector Specialist, World Bank) under the overall guidance
of Harish Natarajan (Lead Financial Sector Specialist, World
Bank) and Mahesh Uttamchandani (Practice Manager, World
Bank). The team is grateful to Massimo Cirasino (Senior
Consultant, World Bank), Jose Antonio Garcia Luna (Senior
Consultant, World Bank), and Maria Teresa Chimienti (Senior
Financial Sector Specialist, World Bank) for their valuable
inputs and comments. Maimouna Gueye (Senior Financial
Sector Specialist, World Bank), Ivan Daniel Mortimer Schutts
(Senior Operations Officer, International Finance Corpora-
tion), Marco Nicoli (Senior Financial Sector Specialist, World
Bank), and Ryan Rizaldy and Arif Ismail (both of International
Monetary Fund) provided useful comments as peer review-
ers. Ivan Daniel Mortimer Schutts (Senior Operations Offi-
cer, International Finance Corporation) provided not only
peer-review comments but also detailed written inputs for
specific aspects. The team would like to thank the exter-
nal advisory group that was formed to provide insights and
inputs for this project as well as all individuals and institu-
tions that provided written and/or verbal inputs. (A detailed
list can be found in appendix A.) The team would also like to
acknowledge Deloitte for its contributions with research and
analysis, namely Sandeep Sonpatki, Vijay Ramachandran,
Shweta Shetty, Yashna Sureka, Sangeet Deshmukh, Shazada
Allam, Karan Sharma, Pranav Sood, Guneet Chamtrath, and
Maneesh Tiwari. (A Detailed list of contributors can be found
in appendix A.) Editorial assistance was provided by Charles
Hagner, and graphic design was provided by Naylor Design,
Inc. This project would not have been possible without the
generous support of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
For more than two decades, the World Bank has guided and
supported jurisdictions as they develop a safe, reliable, and
efficient National Payments System (NPS). In this context,
the World Bank has been monitoring developments in fast
payments and has undertaken a detailed study of fast pay-
ment implementations across the world. The policy toolkit
provides guidance on the aspects that authorities need to
consider when developing a Fast Payment System (FPS) and
incorporating the same in their NPS reform agenda. The tool-
kit is based on the analysis of multiple FPS implementations
across the world.
The Fast Payments Toolkit consists of the following three
components. Moreover, a dedicated website (https://fast-
payments.worldbank.org) has been created to house the
document, along with the components, and is expected to
be updated periodically to track fast payment implementa-
tions around the world.
1. Considerations and Lessons for the Development and
Implementation of Fast Payment Systems (this report/
guide)
2. Detailed analysis of FPS in a set of representative juris-
dictions
3. Focus notes on specific technical topics deemed highly
relevant for fast payments (see figure 4)
The specific tool that is developed in this guide has been
informed mainly by 16 deep-dive jurisdiction reports. These
16 jurisdictions, while not exhaustive, are quite diverse in
terms of their models/approaches to implementing and
operating their fast payment arrangement.
1
Therefore, the
guide is general enough to be applicable to different coun-
try circumstances.
The guide is being made publicly available along with
the 16 deep-dive reports and 16 specific technical topic
notes. Intermediate desk research on the global landscape
and the exploration of an additional 25 jurisdictions have
also informed the guide.
DEFINITIONS
Fast payments (also referred to as “instant payments,” “real-
time payments,” and “immediate payments”) are payments
where the transmission of the payment message and the
availability of final funds to the payee occur in real time or near
real time, and as near to 24 hours a day, seven days a week
(24/7) as possible. The associated service offered by payment
service providers (PSPs) is referred to as a fast payment ser-
vice, and the underlying scheme and system is referred to as
a fast payment scheme and fast payment system.
FPSs come in various flavors. Some are newly purpose-
built systems; others are part of an existing payment system
and are simply a new scheme (enhancement using the exist-
ing system) or service. Further, some have a number of fea-
2 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
tures, some of which are offered as overlay services. Hence,
to account for these differing implementation options, the
term fast payment arrangements is used in the report.
When referring to a specific system, the term FPS is used.
2
When referring to a specific scheme, the term fast payment
scheme is used. And when referring to a specific service, the
term fast payment service is used.
The features that characterize fast payment arrange-
ment vis-à-vis other types of payment systems are dis-
cussed in box 1.
METHODOLOGY AND KEY CONSIDERATIONS
The analysis presented in this guide has been structured on
the basis of a Fast Payment Framework, created ex profeso
and illustrated in figure 1.
Module A: Three insights are covered in this module: moti-
vation to introduce fast payments; stakeholder ecosystem
and approach to setting up a fast payment arrangement;
and funding and pricing aspects.
Module B: This module focuses on assessing the current
state of technology in aspects such as payment processing
and telecommunications. Five insights are covered in this
module: infrastructure development; technical specifica-
tions; network connectivity; clearing and settlement; and
interoperability.
Module C: This module focuses on assessing customers’
needs, such as speed, payment certainty, simple and con-
venient user experience, pricing, clarity on the timing of
delivery, and integration with bank account/mobile wallet/
e-money, among others. Four specific insights are covered
in this module: payment instruments, payment types sup-
ported, and use cases/services; overlay services and aliases;
access channels; and user uptake.
Module D: This module focuses on some institutional
requirements pertaining to fast payments. Three key insights
are discussed here: legal and regulatory considerations; risk
management; and customer dispute resolution. Some of
these aspects are typically covered under the scheme rules
of a payment system. Scheme rules define the way the sys-
tem will operate and the behavior and interaction of partic-
Conceptually, the characteristic features of fast pay-
ments are real-time availability of funds to the bene-
ficiary and the possibility to make payments 24/7/365
or close enough, regardless of the amount and type of
beneficiary (as long as the latter has an account where
the funds can be credited).
Other payment systems, such as real-time gross set-
tlement (RTGS) systems, already give the possibility to
credit an end users account in real time. The material-
ization of this depends largely on the technical inter-
faces developed by RTGS participants between the
system and their internal core banking systems.
In contrast, most RTGS systems are not able to fulfill
the other feature of offering round-the-clock availability
for ordering and executing real-time payments. Indeed,
round-the-clock availability of real-time payments is a
clear differentiator of fast payment arrangements versus
other payment systems.
3
Beyond these core characteristics, the technology
behind many fast payment arrangements supports
the development and launch of multiple, previously
unheard of, value-added functionalities and services
for end users (payers and payees). Those new func-
tionalities promote and facilitate increased uptake and
regular usage of fast payments for multiple purposes.
This is a significant difference between them and
RTGS systems, as most of the latter were built to cater
solely to the needs of banks—and eventually other
participating PSPs.
For operators and overseers/regulators, real-time
availability of funds to beneficiaries and round-the-
clock availability of systems to execute payments also
raise some unique challenges. Robust management of
operational risks, including business continuity, is more
important than ever to ensure ongoing trust in fast
payments. Moreover, possibilities for committing fraud
seem to have expanded, as there is no lag between
when a payment is initiated and when the funds are
transferred to the beneficiary, coupled with settlement
finality offered by most fast payment arrangements.
BOX 1 FAST PAYMENTS VERSUS OTHER TYPES OF PAYMENT SYSTEM ARRANGEMENTS
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 3
ipants. Scheme rules are defined to minimize risks, maintain
integrity, and provide a common, convenient, secure, reli-
able, and seamless payment experience to customers.
Insights into the various aspects that are highly relevant for
fast payments are mapped to the various modules of the
Fast Payment Framework, and on this basis, key consider-
ations and learnings are drawn.
Overall, the analysis has clearly shown that the key levers
for the adoption and uptake of fast payments have been the
immediate availability of funds, even for small-value trans-
actions, and the catalyst role of central bank in fostering the
development of fast payment systems.
Other crucial elements that have fostered uptake include
the following:
i. Coverage and openness of the fast payment arrange-
ment, including a large variety of use cases, participation
of a wide range of PSPs, and affordable pricing
ii. Convenience and ease of access, including accessibility
through mobile phones, the use of aliases such as mobile
numbers, the use of application programming interfaces
(APIs), and common messaging standards
iii. A robust preexisting market context—namely, penetra-
tion of internet and mobile phones, quality and speed of
other payment options, and overall competitiveness of
the payments market
iv. Awareness-raising and educational campaigns for end
users by public authorities, operators, and participants
LESSONS LEARNED AND FORWARD OUTLOOK
The more detailed key findings and learnings target spe-
cific—often multiple—stakeholders and are organized
across the typical life cycle of a payment infrastructure proj-
ect, as depicted in table 1.
Conceptualize Design & Implement Go-Live & Post Implement
Module A: Structure—Covers an assessment of objectives and developing structural and pricing components in order to drive collaboration and
innovation of the fast payment arrangement
Module C: Features—Covers an assessment of customer requirements and determining payment instruments, payment types, use cases and access
channels with the goal of driving up user uptake
Module B: Specifications—Covers an assessment of technology and designing technical specifications and development components to achieve
interoperability
Module D: Legal and Governance Considerations—Covers an assessment of governance requirements and deciding legal and regulatory frame-
works, risk management practices, and dispute resolution mechanisms in order to enhance safety and security
ASSESS
Get the focus right
DESIGN
Get the concept right
LAUNCH—SCALE
Get the system to thrive
FIGURE 1: Overview of Fast Payments Framework
4 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
PROJECT CONCEPTUALIZATION STAGE
1
Have clarity on the objective, including motivations/drivers for
developing fast payment services in their jurisdiction.
5 Develop a plan for investing in infrastructure and recovering
cost over a period of time, and avoid focusing on achieving
profitability in the short run. The central bank should
work together with stakeholders to identify the long-term
benefits of the project (direct and indirect) and the broader
long-term interests of the NPS.
2
Obtain knowledge of fast payment arrangements in other
jurisdictions, including the key features of their operating
models and service offerings.
6 Develop a good understanding of the infrastructure
available in the broader ecosystem (for example, phone and
communication network penetration) to determine which
user needs and expectations the fast payment arrangement
will be able to meet at launch and in its early stages of
development.
3
As part of the design, focus on establishing a core platform
and associated services on top of which other stakeholders
can innovate and build further services.
7 Give due regard to the existing payments infrastructure
setup, including such aspects as current familiarity with real-
time payments, instruments available (for example, push
and pull), NPS integration, support of use cases, settlement
models, the accounting practices applicable to payments,
and other banking activities operating 24/7, among others.
4
Underpin the business case with a clear vision of the role
for the fast payment arrangement in terms of use cases and
services it can offer to PSPs and the market in general. This is
critical for developing a credible business plan and garnering
industry support.
8 Study the existing internal infrastructure of banks and other
potential PSPs and assess their ability to achieve immediate
fund transfers with certainty. Jurisdictions could consider
agreeing on minimum criteria for participation up front, in
a way that ensures that at least the major banks and some
other smaller banks and non-bank PSPs can be ready to join
by the predecided “go-live” date.
PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION STAGE
9 Assign a top-notch project-management team.
The relevant stakeholders should also identify personnel
with experience and competency and assign them the
responsibility of project development and implementation.
They should also be made duly accountable for the project.
Ensure continuity of the people/team assigned to this task
to avoid delays in implementation.
16 Ensure fair, transparent, and risk-based access criteria that
do not preclude membership based on institution type.
This is critical to foster innovation and ongoing competition
in the payment ecosystem, recognizing, though, that
many smaller and mid-sized PSPs may opt for indirect
participation, given the financial and technical requirements
for direct participation.
10 Ensure structured planning and implementation to help
mitigate implementation delays, including those related to
stakeholder onboarding. It is essential to give participants
sufficient time to adapt—that is, for contract negotiation,
internal system development, and implementation.
17 Consider using APIs that have proven most useful for the
connectivity of smaller participants and of other third
parties (for example, entities that provide payment-
initiation services), and to foster standardization of APIs in
the payments market.
11 Going live with a basic service—with limited features—can be
a good strategy to get the ball rolling. The design of the fast
payment arrangement should nevertheless be flexible enough
to accommodate multiple use cases/services based on dynamic
market needs (that is, the “plug and play” approach).
18 Ensure that the pricing scheme(s) for participants promotes
quick participant adoption. The joining fee, fixed fees (if
any), and variable fees should not act as barriers for smaller
players. At the same time, the operator should ensure
sustainability in the medium- to long-term timeframe.
12 Consider user experience as a critical factor that needs to be
kept in mind while designing and developing a fast payment
arrangement. Focus should be placed on providing a seamless
experience across all access channels. The elements that help
enhance the customer experience include the use of aliases
and services provided by third parties (for example, payment
initiation).
19 Ensure that pricing policies for end users foster uptake in
the short term, for which public authorities may encourage
participants to offer fast payments as a low-cost (or even
zero-cost) payment service. However, in the medium term,
this will need to be reconsidered to ensure that participants
have an incentive to introduce additional services and
features.
13 Design and implement a strong governance framework for
the fast payment arrangement. All participants (banks and
non-banks) should be represented and have a say in the
decision-making. The voices of external key parties, such
as fintechs and telcos, also need to be heard and given due
consideration.
20 Give due attention to the type of messaging standard
adopted. The decision to adopt a particular message
standard—proprietary or ISO—should be based on a careful
analysis of the costs and benefits and factor in the need to
facilitate the interoperability of domestic payment systems
and, eventually, to enable cross-border payments. While
other possibilities exist, ISO 20022 is emerging as a leading
messaging standard for fast payments.
TABLE 1: Key Learnings
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 5
TABLE 1, continued
Finally, while many jurisdictions have implemented fast pay-
ments, their paths have varied significantly, owing to dif-
ferences in the regulatory environment, support from the
broader ecosystem, consumer preferences, support from
the existing payments and ICT infrastructure, and existing/
competing offerings. Each jurisdiction’s uptake, experi-
ences, and success have also varied. Similarly, the ownership
and operating models have varied, and no particular model
is more likely to succeed or fail.
14 Undertake comprehensive testing before launch (operator
and participants). A fully functional central testing platform
for intra- and inter-participant testing can help identify issues
early in the implementation phase.
21 Establish a clear, documented, effective risk-management
framework to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the
various risks, including those concerning potential criminal
activity (for example, money laundering, the financing of
terrorism, cyberattacks, and data breaches). Participants
should also be mandated by their supervisor to set up
robust internal controls for operational risks.
15 Have a comprehensive rulebook that contains all relevant
rules, parameters, standards, and controls for the operational
efficiency and overall soundness of the fast payment
arrangement. This also promotes a level playing field for
participants.
22 Agree on the settlement model and measures for the
mitigation of settlement risk between operators/manager
and operator/manager and participants. The measures
should be cost efficient. Key decision factors include
whether non-banks will be direct participants (for example,
settling operations on their own behalf) and the specifics
of the local ecosystem (for example, settlement services
provided by the central bank or commercial banks).
PROJECT “GO-LIVE” AND POST-IMPLEMENTATION STAGE
23 Collaborate during post-implementation to ensure that the
fast payment arrangement will be able to reach its maximum
potential over time.
27 Review risk-management frameworks periodically to
mitigate evolving requirements and threats, including cyber.
Technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine
learning can help operators/managers detect failures in
compliance and combat evolving threats.
24 Generate customer awareness in the initial years to
increase registrations and uptake. Customers often require
handholding to familiarize themselves with the new service
and its functionalities.
28 Adapt some of the oversight tools and overall approach
when it comes to fast payments, to ensure that the relevant
systems or underlying arrangements operate safely and
efficiently on an ongoing basis (applicable for regulators/
overseers).
25 Keep the customer registration process simple, to increase
uptake.
29 Leverage payments data to introduce innovative and
customized solutions for end users (for system operators
and system participants) without compromising data-
protection and privacy aspects.
26 Adopt a product road map approach for new use cases/
services and functionalities that shares the vision of the
owner/operator with all participants (and other relevant
stakeholders, such as telcos), ensuring that these stakeholders
will be able to adopt these changes in a timely manner.
30 Evaluate on an ongoing basis whether the system continues
to meet the evolving ecosystem needs; fosters the safety,
efficiency, and reliability of the NPS; and has the right
governance arrangements. Take appropriate actions based
on the evaluation.
6 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
INTRODUCTION
EMERGENCE OF FAST PAYMENTS
For what concerns payment infrastructures, in most juris-
dictions, the National Payments System (NPS) traditionally
comprised a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system for
large-value and time-critical payments; an automated clear-
ing house (ACH) for lower-value payments (for example,
using electronic fund transfer instruments or checks); card
payment processing systems/switches; e-money clearing-
houses (some jurisdictions are merging this with card pay-
ment infrastructure and, in a few cases, with ACH systems);
and mechanisms for cross-border payments.
The global payments industry is nevertheless experienc-
ing a paradigm shift driven by technological innovation, the
changing priorities of central banks and other public author-
ities,
4
changes in economics, demographics, and customer
1
needs for faster, cheaper, and more convenient means of
making payments. As part of this evolution, a new type of
payment service, fast payments, emerged and has been
rapidly gaining track worldwide. Appendix C of this guide
provides details on the main features and evolution of, and
current trends in, fast payments.
Some of the benefits of fast payments derive from their
effect on competition and potential to bolster dynamic
efficiency gains. Immediate access to funds, coupled with
low fees, can reduce what economists refer to as “switching
costs” and make it easier to use multiple accounts. Switch-
ing costs are barriers to changing accounts and can include
those costs that may impede clients from using different
institutions to conducting different types of transactions.
Fees, delays in access to funds, and impediments posed by
user experience or operational constraints may dissuade cli-
The Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures
(CPMI) of the Bank for International Settlements defines
fast payments as follows:
Fast payments are defined as payments in which the
transmission of the payment message and the avail-
ability of final funds to the payee occur in real time or
near real time and on as near to a 24-hour and 7-day
(24/7) basis as possible.”
For the purposes of this guide, emphasis is placed on
the immediate availability of funds to the beneficiary
of a fast payment transaction—which can be an indi-
vidual, a firm, or a government agency—and that these
transactions can be made during an operational win-
dow during the day that is as large as possible, tending
toward 24/7 availability.
BOX 2 DEFINING FAST PAYMENTS
7
ents from using a different institution for a transaction, even
if they would derive other gains from doing so, such as from
higher interest rates or lower fees.
A reduction in these frictions can also have an impact on
what is referred to as “multihoming.” This relates primarily to
multisided platforms, of which retail payment systems are an
example. Clients may choose to use a single platform (for
example, an account or payment service) or may subscribe
to multiple platforms (multihoming) to interact with differ-
ent users and services or benefit from differential pricing.
An example would be when clients hold an account with
a conventional retail bank as well as an e-commerce pay-
ment service provider (PSP). They may be able to transact
(or have significant advantages) with merchants on Alib-
aba only from their Alipay account; other payment services,
such as for the receipt of salaries or to make interbank
transfers, may require an account at a retail bank.
FPSs can also enhance “platform competition” for retail
payments. Traditionally, alongside cash, card payment net-
works in most countries have dominated retail payments.
With some exceptions, credit transfer systems were not
used to make time-sensitive payments at the point of sale.
FPSs, coupled in particular with the evolution of payment
initiation and merchant services, are changing this. Open
banking arrangements are enabling new independent
providers to offer more choices to both merchants and
consumers, enabling fast payments to compete with card
networks and beginning to focus more competition on val-
ue-added services.
Fast payments have important but ambiguous effects on
multibanking.
5
On the one hand, if FPSs have broad net-
work reach or are accompanied by extensions in interop-
erability, in theory they can diminish the need for clients to
hold multiple payment accounts in which they hold depos-
its. Knowing they can reach many or most other transaction
counterparts quickly, or connect their account via payment
overlay services, they may choose to concentrate their funds
in a primary institution. On the other hand, reductions in
barriers to making transfers between accounts may lead
to an increase in multihoming. Consumers may be able to
choose more readily between different service providers for
different kinds of payments and other financial services in
the knowledge that they can transfer funds between them
instantly at little or no cost. This can shift the focus of com-
petition between financial institutions away from price and
network reach toward other features, such as interest rates
or value-added services.
The pro-competition effects of fast payments may
already be playing a role in some markets. For instance, in
the corporate world, where instant low-cost transfers have
been available for many years, multiple accounts have long
been used to “sweep” balances overnight from different
institutions into a single cash-management institution.
Similarly, in retail markets, while the specific impact of fast
payments is difficult to disentangle from other forces, it
is reasonable to expect that speed and ease of transfers
diminish barriers to picking different services from differ-
ent institutions.
While the specific cause and effect may be difficult to
distinguish, it seems likely that fast payments can have
beneficial impacts on contestability and competition
between services. To achieve this, they should be coupled
with improved access mechanisms (for example, apps), low
fees, and a wide scope of participants or transaction coun-
terparts. The immediacy and ease with which funds can
be transferred between such accounts is likely to enhance
competition between, and uptake of, third-party services
beyond those offered by the institution at which a current
account is held.
Among others, fast payments also play a key role in
the digitization of government payments, either as critical
infrastructure in the end-to-end government’s payments
architecture or by providing incentives for the adoption
of digital payments by the end user. Fast payments have
positive direct and indirect spillovers in the digitization of
government payments when they are leveraged in the gov-
ernment’s payments architecture or when fast payments
are made available to the public on a general basis. One
direct benefit of leveraging fast payments through the gov-
ernment’s payments architecture is real-time collection of
revenue, which allows the government to increase its expen-
diture capacity and efficiency. A similar benefit is perceived
from disbursement of time-sensitive payments, such as
wages, vendors payments, and social-protection payments.
For the latter, in most cases, social-protection payments are
directed to vulnerable segments of the population, and for
many recipients, such payments constitute their main source
of income—hence, the relevance of leveraging payments
infrastructure that allows the delivery of financial aid in the
expected time. Furthermore, payments made by the gov-
ernment to address emergency situations are supported
by fast payment schemes, which allow the completion of
urgent transactions in real time and the delivery of financial
aid in a timely manner.
8 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
FIGURE 2: Global Fast Payments Landscape
8
FIGURE 3: Fast Payment Statistics across Select Jurisdictions (2019)
9
JURISDICTION SYSTEM NAME
(YEAR OF LAUNCH)
TRANSACTION VALUE AS
PERCENTAGE OF GDP
TRANSACTION VOLUME
PER CAPITA
Australia NPP (2018) 12% 10.84
Bahrain Fawri+ (2015) 4% 3.84
China IBPS (2010) 112 % 10.02
Hong Kong SAR, China FPS 29% 5.82
India UPI (2016) 15% 9.16
Nigeria NIBSS Instant Payment (2011) 81% 7. 05
Thailand PromptPay (2016) 78% 36.85
UK
FPS (2008) 88% 36.46
Currently, several jurisdictions across the globe have imple-
mented fast payments, and several others have announced
their plans to go live.
6
These are illustrated in figure 2.
7
Many of these implementations have been propelled—if
not directly led—by central banks. The basic principle across
all the jurisdictions remains essentially the same: to provide
a fund transfer facility through which final beneficiaries can
be credited in real time and that is available for making pay-
ments for as many hours as possible each day.
The growth in the contribution of fast payments has
been significant. Figure 3 shows the yearly transaction value
processed via the fast payment arrangement in selected
jurisdiction as well as the number of fast payment transac-
tions per capita.
Live
Under development
Live-Not Full-Fledged
Note: SCT Inst and BCEAO have been considered as a single jurisdiction
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 9
10 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
ELEMENTS UNDERLYING A FAST PAYMENT
ARRANGEMENT
In practice, fast payment arrangements consist of the follow-
ing components or layers, known to form a payment system:
The core clearing and settlement infrastructure: Some
fast payment arrangements run existing/incumbent
platforms; in other cases, a brand-new platform has
been created ex profeso for fast payments.
The operator, which can be a private-sector, public sec-
tor entity, or based on a public-private sector model
The scheme or rulebook that governs the relationship
between the participants, the operator, and other rele-
vant parties
10
The overseer (and eventually also the regulator), which
is typically the central bank
Participating institutions
End-user solution(s)
Overlay services
To account for differing implementation options, the term
fast payment arrangements is used throughout this doc-
ument. When referring to a specific system the term FPS
is used.
11
When referring to a specific scheme the term fast
payment scheme is used. And when referring to a specific
service, the term fast payment service is used.
All these elements are described in the following chapters
of this report on the basis of the empirical findings from the
analysis of specific FPSs. (See figure 4.)
THE FAST PAYMENTS TOOLKIT
The development and implementation of a safe, reliable,
and efficient NPS is a crucial component of the World Bank’s
work in the financial sector, given its link to financial inclu-
sion, stability, and economic development. In its unique role
in guiding and supporting jurisdictions as they develop pay-
ments and market infrastructure, the World Bank has under-
taken a study of fast payment implementations across the
world to develop this policy toolkit for fast payment devel-
opment and implementation (hereinafter the Fast Payments
Toolkit or toolkit).
2
The toolkit has been designed to guide jurisdictions and
regions on the likely alternatives and models that could assist
them in their policy and implementation choices when they
embark on their own fast payment implementation journeys.
The guide, the deep-dive reports for 16 jurisdictions, and
the focus notes are being made available as part of the Fast
Payments Toolkit. (See chart 1.)
FIGURE 4: The Fast Payments Toolkit
Global landscape of jurisdictions Profiles of 25 jurisdictions*
Deep dive reports for
16 jurisdictions*
1. Framework for fast payments implementation
2. Options / decisions across the course of the implementation journey
3. Key insights from fast payments implementations
4. Key takeaways / recommendations
1. QR codes
2. APIs
3. Customer authentication
4. Messaging standards
5. Consumer protection
6. Dispute handling, reversal,
chargeback and refunds
7. Fraud risks and AML/CFT
8. Pricing structure
9. Proxy identifiers and
database
10. Access aspects
11. Cross-border payments
12. Interoperability aspects
13. Oversight aspects
14. Scheme rules
15. Future of fast payments
16. Infrastructure and
ownership aspects
Main Report
Focus Notes
FAST PAYMENTS TOOLKIT
11
12 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
CHART 1: Fast Payments Toolkit Illustration
COMPONENT OUTCOME
Global landscape Overview of global FPS landscape, containing information on:
Fast payments overview
Customer features
Technological capabilities
System participation
16 Deep-dive reports/case
studies
16 in-depth reports:
1. Australia: NPP
2. Bahrain: Fawri+
3. Chile: TEF
4. China: IBPS
5. European Union: SCT Inst
6. Hong Kong SAR, China: Faster Payment
System (FPS)
7. India: UPI and IMPS
8. Kenya: PesaLink
16 Focus technical notes (as
stand-alone notes)
Specific topic notes on topics of
foundational and technical relevance to assist in fast payment implementations.
9. Malaysia: RPP
10. Mexico: SPEI
11. Nigeria: NIP
12. Poland: Express Elixir
13. Singapore: FAST
14. Thailand: PromptPay
15. United Kingdom: Faster Payments
Service (FPS)
16. United States: RTP
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING
FAST PAYMENT DEVELOPMENTS
As part of this guide, a framework for analyzing fast payment
developments (hereinafter the Fast Payments Framework)
has been created. This framework considers facts and expe-
riences from all jurisdictions studied, but the main inputs
have been extracted from the 16 jurisdictions in which a
deep-dive analysis was performed. These 16 jurisdictions,
while not exhaustive, are quite diverse in terms of their
models/approaches to implementing and operating their
fast payment arrangement. Indeed, the selection of these
16 jurisdictions was not random; rather, the express intent
was to get a diverse mix of countries across various geo-
graphic regions and also adequate coverage across matured
or developed and emerging economies.
12
Therefore, the
proposed framework is considered general enough to be
applicable to different country circumstances.
This Fast Payments Framework has two components:
phases, and thematic areas or modules.
In turn, there are three phases: (i) assess; (ii) design; and
(iii) launch and scale. These are aligned to a project devel-
opment life cycle that suits fast payments and is illustrated
in figure 5.
Then there are four broad thematic areas/modules: (a)
the structure of the fast payment arrangements; (b) busi-
ness and technical specifications and operating procedures;
(c) features of the fast payment arrangement; and (d) legal,
regulatory, and governance considerations and risk manage-
ment. These are presented/matched under respective areas
along with additional elements in figure 6.
Figure 6 accordingly collates all these components with
the specific elements that ought to be looked at within each
of the components. The framework is further elaborated
and put into practice in section 4 of this guide.
3
| 13
The main elements underlying each of the three phases
are as follows:
Assess: A detailed assessment of objectives, technology,
customer requirements, and governance requirements
is critical to set the right precedent. Some jurisdictions
set up independent consultations to arrive at the “best”
concept for their fast payment arrangement. An alterna-
tive is cooperation between the central bank and rele-
vant stakeholders using existing cooperative bodies.
Design: Key decisions are taken across multiple param-
eters to “get the concept right.” A deep understanding
of design considerations, from the structure of the fast
payment arrangement to pricing and funding, technical
specifications, front-end functionality, risk-management
and dispute-resolution practices, and so on is essential.
FIGURE 5: A Project Development Life Cycle for
Fast Payments
C
o
n
c
e
p
t
u
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
D
e
s
i
g
n
a
n
d
I
m
p
l
e
n
t
a
i
o
n
G
o
-
l
i
v
e
a
n
d
P
o
s
t
-
I
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
13
14 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
Launch and Scale: Once an arrangement goes live, the
various stakeholders can start obtaining benefits, either
directly from the new arrangement or indirectly via the
competitive pressures it exerts over other service offer-
ings. Then it is critical to get the new arrangement to
thrive. The launch-and-scale phase is characterized by a
need for continuous improvements and enhancements
to keep up with technological advancements and evolv-
ing consumer needs.
As for the broad thematic areas or modules, these mainly
cover the following aspects:
a. Structure of the fast payment arrangement: Focuses
on the key drivers and objectives for considering the
development of a fast payment project and covers an
assessment of the motivations, proposed arrangements,
stakeholder community, and pricing and funding issues,
among others.
b. System specifications and operating procedures: Cov-
ers an assessment of technology and the determination
of technical specifications and system development
components.
c. Features of the fast payment arrangement: Looks at
customer requirements and determining payment instru-
ments, payment types, uses cases, and access channels
with the goal of driving up user uptake.
d. Legal, regulatory, and governance considerations and
risk management: Covers an assessment of legal and
regulatory aspects and deciding on governance require-
ments, risk-management practices, and other aspects to
enhance safety and security.
The insights obtained from the deep-dive analyses and
interviews with many other institutions are mapped to the
different modules as per the proposed framework. This
approach and the actual insights are analyzed in the next
section of this guide.
FIGURE 6: Fast Payments Framework
LIFECYCLE—FAST PAYMENTS ARRANGEMENTS
ASSESS DESIGN LAUNCH & SCALE
Objectives
Collaboration &
Innovation
FPS Stakeholders Funding Pricing
Inter-operability
System Development Settlement
Customer
Requirements
User Adoption
Aliases & Overlay
Services
Access Channels
Legal &
Governance
Considerations
Safety & SecurityLegal & Regulatory
Risk Management
Dispute Resolution &
Customer complaints
Conceptualize Design & Implement
D
A
C
B
Go-Live & Post-
Implementation
Current State
Technology
Technical Specifications &
Network Connectivity
Payment Instruments, Types
&
Use Cases / Services
PAINTING THE BIGGER PICTURE:
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?
Insights into the various aspects and elements that are
highly relevant for fast payments have been drawn from the
comprehensive analysis of 16 jurisdictions, as well as from
nearly 70 primary interviews and secondary research. These
insights have been analyzed as components under the dif-
ferent modules. (See figure 7.)
These insights are described below, along with juris-
diction-specific inputs and any trends that may have been
identified, to provide the reader with a holistic view of the
decisions/options available.
4.1 MODULE A: STRUCTURE OF A FAST PAYMENT
ARRANGEMENT
The following three insights are covered within this module:
Motivation to introduce fast payments
Stakeholder ecosystem and approach to setting up a
fast payment arrangement
Funding and pricing
4
FIGURE 7: Components of the Different Modules
4.1.1 Motivation to Introduce Fast Payments
Jurisdictions across different parts of the world have imple-
mented fast payment arrangement (some have more than
one). The motivation for going for FPS varies across such
themes as financial inclusion, digitization, and driving inno-
vation, among others. (See figure 8.)
The section below details the motivations to introduce
fast payments, covering the findings and insights. These are
presented under following heads: (i) stakeholder-specific
drivers; (ii) public authorities’ initiative/role (for example,
NPS overseers, government agencies, and so on); and (iii)
unique motivators.
i. Stakeholder-Specific Drivers
Perspectives on fast payments differ across stakeholders in
terms of what the drivers of fast payment implementation
are or ought to be.
In general, based on the analysis of 16 jurisdictions, it has
been observed that when the fast payment project is led by
Module A: Structure
1. Motivation to introduce
fast payments
2. Stakeholder ecosystem
and approach to
setting up fast payment
arrangement
3. Funding and pricing
Module B: Specifications
1. Development of fast
payment arrangement
2. Technical specifications
3. Network connectivity
4. Clearing and settlement
5. Interoperability
Module C: Features
1. Payment instruments,
payment types supported
and use cases/services
2. Overlay services and
aliases
3. Access channels
4. User uptake
Module D: Legal &
Governance Considerations
1. Legal and regulatory
considerations
2. Risk management
3. Dispute resolution and
customer complaints
15
16 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
Need for fast
payments
Market/regulator
driven
Enhance customer
experience
Drive
innovation
Digitize
payments
Financial
inclusion
FIGURE 8: Key Motivators for Introducing Fast Payments
the public sector, the agenda is driven by financial inclusion,
payments infrastructure development, and payment digiti-
zation initiatives. (See figure 9.) Central banks have played a
major role in most of these projects.
As can be observed from the jurisdiction-specific anal-
ysis in table 2, financial inclusion has served as a driver in
Bahrain, India, and Mexico. In contrast, when the project is
led by other stakeholders, or when the project is to enhance
the basic infrastructure and functionalities already imple-
mented, some of the drivers differ and/or are expanded—for
example, toward enhancing customer experience and con-
venience to further incentivize customer uptake.
FIGURE 9: Primary Fast Payments Implementation Drivers, as per Survey Findings
13
STAKEHOLDER PRIMARY FPS IMPLEMENTATION DRIVERS
Public
authorities
Digitization of payments
Leading innovation in the jurisdiction
Enhancing consumer experience
Operator
Market push (recommendation by financial institutions, banking, and payments associations)
Enhancing consumer experience
Digitization of payments
Leading innovation in the jurisdiction
Payment
service
providers
Better customer experience
Innovation/newer channels, use cases, and technologies
Competitor participants’ fast payment offerings
ii. Role of Public Authorities
The majority of surveyed regulators and participants believe
that intervention and promotion of digital payment modes
by the government and/or central bank at a national level
is a critical driver for fast payment implementation.
In all but one of the jurisdictions shown in table 3, the
central bank or other public-sector entities were directly
involved in the discussions that led to the development and
implementation of fast payments. In Thailand, for example,
the government was involved from the conceptualization
stage. In Thailand, as well as in Hong Kong SAR, China, and
Malaysia, fast payments were introduced as part of a larger
program of government measures. In contrast, in Poland, the
development of fast payments was led by a technology and
infrastructure institution of the Polish banking sector. More
generally, it was found that over 75 percent of the jurisdic-
tions included in the deep dives had a push from the central
bank and/or other government agencies acting as a driver
for fast payment implementation.
FPS MOTIVATORS
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 17
Australia The Payments System Board of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) decided to undertake a “strategic review
of Innovation in the Australian payments system” in May 2010. The purpose was to identify opportunities for
innovation in the Australian payments system. The conclusion of this review included the need for establishing fast
payments. The key strategic objectives laid out by the RBA for the New Payments Platform (NPP) were to receive
low-value payments outside normal banking hours, to send more complete remittance information with payments,
and to address payments in a simple manner.
India The overarching objectives of the Immediate Payment System (IMPS) and the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) have
been facilitating financial inclusion and promoting digital payments. IMPS is a multichannel system that can be
accessed using mobile, ATM, internet banking, bank branches, and so on. With the basic infrastructure in place, the
Reserve Bank of India’s focus expanded toward cooperation and collaboration for enhancing customer experience
and convenience. To this end, an interoperable real-time 24/7 mobile-payment system, UPI, was launched in 2016.
14
Mexico The Interbank Electronic Payment System (SPEI) was introduced in the mid-2000s as Banco de México’s new RTGS
system. The objective was to process payments in real time, minimizing credit and liquidity risks. The system was
designed to offer a high level of services to users and participants, including provisions for business continuity
plans, adequate risk management, and legal certainty about a credit on the receipt account. Some years ago, it
was upgraded to offer real-time payments 24/7. To further enhance the user experience, in 2019, Banco de México
launched CoDi, which is a request-to-pay functionality that supports the use of QR codes, near-field communication
(NFC), and messages through the internet for payments.
United States In 2014, the Clearing House (TCH) launched its Future Payments Initiative based on the recommendations from its
supervisory board, which consists of several industry leaders from financial institutions. The aim was to develop
a strategic view of real-time payments based on an extensive study of payment needs in an increasingly digital
economy. TCH worked closely with the Federal Reserve, TCH banks, and industry associations, including the National
Automated Clearing House Association, American Bankers Association, Independent Community Bankers of America,
National Association of Federally Insured Credit Unions, and Credit Union National Association, to identify consumer
and business cases with the greatest need for fast payments that represent the best incremental value for customers.
The Future Payments Initiative considered the experience and lessons from other countries that had already
implemented fast payments. TCH also reviewed ways in which a fast payment arrangement for the United States
could maintain and improve the safety and soundness of existing payment systems.
TABLE 2: Select Findings on Motivation
TABLE 3: Select Findings on Role of Governments and Regulators
Bahrain There was a push from the government to adopt real-time transactions. The Central Bank of Bahrain consulted
with the BENEFIT Company, to provide a real-time payment solution. BENEFIT also handles POS and ATM switch
services in the country.
Hong Kong
SAR, China
With a view to driving innovation and ushering in the era of smart banking in Hong Kong SAR, China, the Hong
Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) in 2017 introduced several major initiatives in the banking sector. One was to
develop the fast payment system FPS and drive innovation by bringing e-wallets on the platform in addition
to banks.
Malaysia The Real-Time Retail Payments Platform (RPP) was created as part of a multiyear program to modernize and
future-proof Malaysia’s payments infrastructure. Pursuant to an industry-wide consultation facilitated by Bank
Negara Malaysia (BNM), PayNet built RPP to meet the emerging and future needs of the economy. In line with
the Interoperable Credit Transfer Framework issued by BNM, RPP was designed to provide fair and open access
to banks and eligible non-bank PSPs, to facilitate interoperability and seamless payments between bank
accounts and e-money accounts.
Poland The introduction of fast payments was market driven. Initially, banks were hesitant to participate in it because
they thought the existing system worked well. In this regard, the RTGS system took four to six hours to process
transactions, which was perceived to be fast enough, and there was no need for immediate payments. Krajowa
Izba Rozliczeniowa (KIR), a technology and infrastructure institution of the Polish banking sector, undertook
extensive research with end users to gauge customer needs and make them aware of the benefits of introducing
fast payments. Thus, KIR built consensus among customers by administering surveys and gauging their
receptiveness toward the initiative and then pitched it to banks. While fast payments were initially viewed as a
premium product, this view has changed over time.
Thailand The National e-Payment Master Plan was created by the government with an objective to have an integrated
digital payment infrastructure. Under this master plan, the PromptPay system was created to facilitate easy, safe,
and convenient fund transfers for all—general public, businesses, and government. Initially, only bulk/batch payment
service was developed in PromptPay, and it was used to transfer government welfare disbursements. This helped
create awareness among the public about the system. In January 2017, the new credit transfer service was enabled
in PromptPay, allowing for real-time person-to-person (P2P) interbank fund transfers.
continued
18 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
iary of the central bank. As shown in table 4, the latter is
the case in China, Hong Kong SAR, China, and Malaysia.
In certain jurisdictions, such as Mexico, the central bank
owns, operates, and oversees SPEI. The operator can also
be a completely independent entity. It is also important to
note that most jurisdictions already have existing retail pay-
ment system operators (for example, for the domestic bulk
payment systems and/or payment card switch). In some
cases, these same entities also operate the fast payment
arrangement. For example, in Thailand, National Interbank
Transaction Management and Exchange (ITMX) was chosen
as PromptPay’s operator, as it already had technical capa-
bilities and was the largest payment system operator in the
country. Overall, there seems to be a slight predominance
of private-sector entities as operators of fast payment
arrangements.
ii. Participants and Access Criteria
Participation of banks and non-bank PSPs of varied cate-
gories is crucial to the success of the fast payment arrange-
ment. Furthermore, to encourage participation by banks
and non-bank PSPs, surveyed overseers and operators
believe that regulatory push/incentives are required in the
initial years following launch. Jurisdictions can have either
only direct participants or a combination of direct and
indirect participants.
Participants in a payment system can be direct or indirect.
In the case of fast payments, direct participants are typically
banks with a direct link to the underlying payment system
infrastructure and having a settlement account at the cen-
tral bank’s settlement system—if settlement occurs in central
bank money. The settlement can take place in commercial
bank money as well. Indirect participants are other financial
institutions or other PSPs using the payment system infra-
structure either directly or via a sponsor primary participant
and leveraging the sponsors settlement account with the
central bank for settlement of their transactions. A few fast
payment arrangements allow participation of intermediary
PSPs that receive and transmit transfer of funds on behalf
of other participants. For example, SCT Inst in the European
Union allows intermediary banks to provide services to orig-
United Kingdom In the early 2000s, the Cruickshank Report was published, providing the foundation for the development of fast
payments in the country. The report pointed out the lack of innovation and need to upgrade the existing retail
payment systems. (For example, even if other payment systems, such as BACS, were available, cash was still the
most dominant payment instrument.) This led the government to mandate the Office of Fair Trade to provide
recommendations for innovating the payments landscape in the United Kingdom. The office drafted a report that
was taken to the Payment Systems Task Force, which was charged with developing fast payments to reduce the
payment cycle from three days to a single day. This led to the development of the Faster Payments Service (FPS)
in May 2005.
TABLE 3, continued
4.1.2 Fast Payment Stakeholder Ecosystem and
Approach to Setting Up a Fast Payment
Arrangement
The fast payment ecosystem typically consists of the central
bank (and, in some cases, other regulators), the operator, the
owner(s), participants, third-party providers, and end users
(that is, individuals, merchants, and government agencies).
The following four aspects have emerged as key compo-
nents of this insight and are covered in the sections below:
(i) the division of roles between the overseer, owner, and
operator; (ii) participants and access criteria; (iii) industry
body collaborations; and (iv) the systemic importance of fast
payment arrangements.
i. Division of Roles between the Overseer, Owner, and
Operator
Central banks typically play a major role as overseers and,
in some cases, also as operators (and owners) of the fast
payment arrangement.
Central banks typically play the role of overseer of payment
systems (and very often the broader NPS). The overseer role
is generally accompanied by a regulatory function. In some
cases, depending on the institutional setting, this regulatory
function may be shared with a different regulatory authority
or performed independently by the latter. A fast payment
arrangement is usually considered a critical national pay-
ment infrastructure. Therefore, the overseer puts in place a
monitoring mechanism to try to ensure that it operates in
a safe and efficient manner. Toward this end, the overseer
requires the operator to have adequate measures in place to
address operational risk, liquidity risks, security, anti-mon-
ey-laundering (AML), and other relevant aspects.
Box 3 provides details on observed ownership alterna-
tives of fast payment arrangements. Additional information
on ownership and funding is provided in section 4.1.3.
The operator or scheme owner is responsible for ensur-
ing compliance with the scheme rulebook, operating pro-
cedures, and official regulations. The operator can be a
separate legal entity owned by participating commercial
banks and, in some cases, by the central bank on its own
or jointly with participants. The operator may be a subsid-
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 19
Both public-sector ownership (most often by the cen-
tral bank) and private-sector ownership of fast payment
arrangements are common, with an overall prevalence
of the latter. In some cases, there is co-ownership of
the central bank with commercial banks or other pri-
vate-sector entities. Moreover, the ownership structure
may change over time, often driven by the needs of
the market, the broader objectives of the owners, and
regulatory requirements. For example, some systems
have moved from public ownership to cooperative
user/membership-based organizations, and in some
cases from there to other corporate arrangements like
privately owned or publicly listed companies.
Central bank ownership of fast payment systems is
often observed in cases where the central bank also
operates some of the traditional key infrastructures for
retail payments, such as the check clearinghouse and/
or the automated clearinghouse for credit transfers and
direct debits. This may be an indication that the central
bank considers this arrangement as a natural continu-
ation of its role as operator of retail payment systems.
Other reasons for central bank ownership can include
trying to ensure universal participation of eligible pay-
ment service providers (PSPs) and/or the notion that
ownership control is critical for truly enhancing financial
inclusion in a particular country context.
Public-sector ownership of retail payments infra-
structure may raise pricing issues which need to be
carefully considered. In some cases, the costs of devel-
oping the infrastructure are absorbed by the central
bank in pursuit of its public policy objectives. In other
cases, the central bank may be subsidizing operational
costs, and therefore pricing of services to participants
may not be reflecting the true costs of operating the
fast payment system. In this regard, if those subsidies
are kept beyond the short-term, central banks ought
to consider the implications for long-term competition
and efficiency.
15
Another aspect that needs to be considered is the
potential conflict of interest that may arise between the
central bank’s role as an operator of the retail payments
infrastructure and its role as an overseer. The central
bank should seek to avoid any impression that it might
use its role as overseer of private sector systems to
support unfairly the operation of its payment systems.
The central bank may therefore make a clear functional
and, if possible, also organizational separation of the
two functions within the central bank’s organizational
chart.
16
Private ownership of fast payment systems also
entails some potential concerns. When these systems
are owned solely by large participant banks closely tied
to the market, they may be less willing to open the sys-
tem and provide access to smaller banks or to non-bank
PSPs. Also, a fast payment system entirely owned by the
private sector is likely to require high upfront invest-
ment and transaction pricing consistent with a target
investment recovery period, usually medium-term. High
per transaction prices may deter participation, espe-
cially of PSPs that cater to low-income customers.
A central bank may intervene to ensure that a for-
profit focus is balanced with a vision that considers the
medium- to longer-term needs and developments of
a market, fosters innovation, makes it possible for all
types of PSPs to join and achieves regular usage by
lower-income users and small and micro enterprises.
Central banks in their role as regulators/overseers
must also make sure that their interventions to ensure
broad participation in the system do not dis-incentiv-
ize future investments by shareholders. In other words,
mandating participation without giving due consider-
ation to the investment and others costs that are borne
by shareholders before they are able to realize or even
clearly foresee a reasonable profit may limit future
investments to grow the business and introduce van-
guard technologies.
More generally, even in circumstances where the pri-
vate sector in a given country appears unable to come
to an agreement to develop a fast payments system and
the central bank decides to intervene to take a more
developmental role (i.e., ownership/operation), the cen-
tral bank should consider this as a starting point and,
from the outset, design the system in a manner that
would enable system participants to innovate and, even-
tually, facilitate the transfer of ownership of and opera-
tional responsibility for the system to the private sector.
Finally, regardless of the ownership model, it is highly
desirable that the owner/operator involve all relevant
BOX 3 OWNERSHIP OF FAST PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS
continued
20 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
TABLE 4: Select Findings on the Division of Roles between Overseer, Operator, and Owners
Australia New Payments Platform Australia (NPPA) is the owner and operator of the NPP. The RBA is responsible for the
oversight and regulation of payment systems in the country and empowered to set financial stability standards for
clearing and settlement facilities. Furthermore, the RBA is the operator of the settlement module (that is, the Fast
Settlement Service) that supports the NPP. NPPA was formed by the RBA as a result of an industry collaboration in
response to the “strategic review of Innovation in the Australian payments system.”
Chile Centro de Compensación Automatizado (CCA) is a private ACH and the owner and operator of Transferencias
en Línea (TEF), which is Chile’s fast payments. CCA is owned by three banks: Banco de Chile, Banco Santander,
and Banco de Crédito e Inversiones. These three banks have equal shareholding in CCA. Since June 1, 2019, the
Financial Market Commission (Comisión para el Mercado Financiero, or CMF) has been the lead supervisory entity
of financial markets in Chile and also the supervisor of TEF.
18
China The People’s Bank of China is the owner of the Internet Banking Payment System (IBPS). It is being operated
by China National Clearing Center, which is a public institution fully owned by the People’s Bank of China and
responsible for the operation, maintenance, and management of IBPS.
European Union The European Central Bank is the overseer of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) Instant Credit Transfer (SCT Inst)
scheme, while the Euro Retail Payments Board fosters the integration of euro retail payments across the European
Union. The European Payments Council (EPC) is the scheme manager and responsible for performing the functions
of management and evolution of the SEPA scheme as defined in the rulebook. PSPs must be connected to at least
one clearing and settlement mechanism (CSM) to receive or send payments. Following a decision by the European
Central Bank’s Governing Council, by November 2021 PSPs that have adhered to the SCT Inst scheme and are
accessible in TARGET2 must also become reachable in the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service.
They will still be able to participate in another CSM in addition to TIPS, if they choose to do so. Those CSMs will
also be connected to TIPS to ensure pan-European reachability.
Hong Kong SAR,
China
Hong Kong’s FPS is owned and overseen by the HKMA, and the operator is Hong Kong Interbank Clearing Ltd., a
private company jointly owned by HKMA and the Hong Kong Association of Banks.
India The National Payment Corporation of India (NPCI) is the owner and operator of IMPS and UPI. The PSS Act of 2007
designates the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) as the authority for regulation and supervision of payment systems in
India. NPCI has been authorized by the RBI to operate IMPS and UPI.
Kenya The Central Bank of Kenya is the overseer of the fast payment arrangement PesaLink. The Kenya Bankers
Association is the owner of PesaLink but formed a separate entity called Integrated Payment Services Ltd. to
operate it.
Malaysia BNM is the overseer of payment systems in Malaysia, including the RPP. PayNet is the owner and operator of
RPP. PayNet, formed by the merger of MyClear and MEPS, operates Malaysia’s shared payment infrastructures for
wholesale and retail payment transactions. PayNet is owned jointly by BNM and 11 commercial banks.
Mexico Banco de México is the owner, operator, and overseer of SPEI. In 2019, Banco de México restructured the
Directorate of Payment Systems to Directorate General of Payment Systems and Market Infrastructures to avoid
conflict of interest and the duplication of human capital in these specialized roles. The central bank also created
different directorates under the general directorate to fulfill its role as the operator and overseer (and regulator) of
payment systems. This restructuring applies to all the payment systems operated by Banco de México.
continued
BOX 3, continued
stakeholders of a fast payment system in its governance
arrangements. For example, a special consultative body
or a consultative committee representing the interests
of the wider participant/user base (beyond the initial
shareholders) might be created for consultation on a
regular basis or in relation to particular decisions of the
organization’s Board of Directors.
17
A major effect of this
involvement of multiple stakeholders is to signal that
ownership is not a sine qua non condition for having a
say in the decision making of the organization. In any
case, ownership should not be necessarily considered
static; opening ownership to PSPs or other institutions
different from the initial shareholders should be evalu-
ated and eventually revised periodically.
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 21
Singapore Banking Computer Services Pvt. Ltd. operates Fast and Secure Transfers (FAST). The scheme owner for FAST is the
Singapore Clearing House Association, which comprises the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and all the
large commercial banks.
Thailand The National ITMX is the owner and operator of PromptPay, whereas the Bank of Thailand (BOT) acts as its overseer.
National ITMX was created as part of Payment System Road Map 1 (2002–04) published by the BOT. It is a legal
entity owned by Thai banks. National ITMX was chosen as the developer and operator of PromptPay, as it already
had the existing technical capability to operate the system and was the largest payment system operator running
four payment systems (that is, ATM switch, card switch, bulk payments, and single fund transfers for branches and
ATMs) when PromptPay was announced.
United Kingdom Pay.UK acts as the operator of FPS. Bank of England and the Payment Systems Regulator oversee and regulate FPS.
As a background to this sharing of roles, in 2019 a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Bank
of England, Financial Conduct Authority, and Payment Systems Regulator to set out the roles and responsibilities of
the bodies with respect to the payment landscape.
United States TCH is the owner and operator of Real-Time Payments (RTP). TCH is a banking association and payments company
that is owned by 24 commercial banks. TCH is regulated and examined regularly by supervisory staff from the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
TABLE 4, continued
inator and/or beneficiary banks in cases where they are not
themselves direct participants in a CSM.
Systems that were introduced around 2010 initially
started by allowing only banks to be participants. The
rationale for allowing only banks to be participants was
that banks are comprehensively regulated and subject to
stringent capital requirements and thus are considered to
be safe options for being participants in the FPS. For exam-
ple, liquidity risk with banks is usually low, as they have
access to several liquidity sources, often including intraday
lending from the central bank to settle their positions. Non-
bank PSPs in some cases do not have settlement accounts
with the central bank; hence, their direct participation was
a challenge. In these earlier systems, non-banks came in as
a second step in select jurisdiction cases (such as India and
the United Kingdom) to promote innovation, improve cus-
tomer experience, increase competitiveness of offerings,
and drive financial inclusion.
Varying access models for participation of non-bank PSPs
across jurisdictions include the following:
19
Indirect participants: They are required to sign a com-
mercial agreement with a bank that is a direct partic-
ipant to use the payments infrastructure. PromptPay
(Thailand), PesaLink (Kenya), and FPS (Hong Kong SAR,
China), among others, have adopted this model.
Direct participants: Eligible non-bank PSPs can be di-
rect participants and fulfill their settlement obligations
through their own settlement account at the central
bank. System such as RPP (Malaysia) and SPEI (Mexico)
have adopted this model.
Direct connection to infrastructure but indirect for
settlement: Non-bank PSPs can connect directly to
the infrastructure but fulfill their settlement obligations
through a commercial bank. In India, IMPS has adopted
this model.
Most jurisdictions studied (see table 5) do not mandate
the participation of banks but have seen a positive uptake
from them. This can be attributed to the fact that most
banks were involved from the conceptualization stage
and that banks willingly joined the resulting fast payment
arrangement. In contrast, in other jurisdictions, specific
actions have been taken to promote the participation of
banks. In Bahrain, for example, the Central Bank of Bah-
rain mandated that all banks provide inward Fawri+ trans-
actions (real-time P2P fund transfers). Additionally, some
jurisdictions introduced incentive measures to boost par-
ticipant adoption.
In any case, different regulatory requirements need to
be fulfilled by banks and other PSPs to qualify for direct or
indirect participation. Still, at present, a slight majority of
the jurisdictions studied allow only banks as direct partici-
pants. However, this is changing, and jurisdictions that did
not allow direct participation by non-bank PSPs in their fast
payment arrangement in the recent past are now allowing
it (for example, Singapore and probably also Kenya in the
near future).
22 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
TABLE 5: Select Findings on Participants in Fast Payment Arrangements and Access Criteria
Australia The NPP allows as full participants authorized deposit-taking institutions or restricted authorized deposit-taking
institutions with the RBAs Exchange Settlement Accounts (ESA) membership. These authorized deposit-taking
institutions include banks, building societies, and credit unions.
20
The NPP has been designed to provide different pathways for entities to leverage the NPP’s functionality. Financial
institutions can either become full participants through direct membership or opt for indirect membership. They
can also become “Settlement Participants” (they can perform clearing functions on behalf of a NPP full participant)
and “Identified Institutions” (they can perform clearing and settlement functions on behalf of a NPP full participant).
The NPP also allows “Connected Institutions” to connect directly with the system. The latter are able only to
initiate payments from a customer’s account and do not provide clearing and settlement services. Connected
institutions need to meet the technical and other associated requirements.
Bahrain A directive from the Central Bank of Bahrain provides the eligibility criteria for licensed banks and non-bank PSPs to
participate, while the central bank’s rulebook provides the overall regulatory requirements, conditions and process
of licensing, and regulation and supervision of licensees that provide regulated financial services in the kingdom.
The license application must be in the prescribed form and include the following:
A business plan specifying the type of activities to be conducted
Application forms for all controllers
Application forms for all controlled functions
Hong Kong SAR,
China
A direct participant is a licensed bank in Hong Kong under the Banking Ordinance (Cap. 155 of the Laws of Hong
Kong) that also participates in the Clearing House Automated Transfer System (CHATS) of the relevant currency in
Hong Kong. An indirect participant is a stored-value facility (SVF) licensed by the HKMA under the Payment Systems
and Stored Value Facilities Ordinance. It has access to all FPS services and engages a direct participant for settling
funds in FPS.
India Banks and prepaid payment instrument licensees are allowed to participate in both IMPS and UPI. Separately, UPI
allows third-party payment initiation service providers, such as Google Pay and Amazon Pay, that connect to banks.
This has facilitated a foray of fintechs into the payment system that brought greater technological know-how and
better customer experience.
Kenya Member banks of the Kenya Bankers Association are direct participants in PesaLink, while payment service
aggregators such as fintechs are allowed as indirect participants. There are plans to upgrade the existing switch to
allow the latter entities to connect directly to the PesaLink infrastructure. In this regard, Integrated Payment Services
Ltd. has onboarded the vendor, and the project is expected to be completed in 2021.
Malaysia Participation in the prior FPS was limited only to banks. Pursuant to the Interoperable Credit Transfer Framework
issued by BNM, which came into effect July 1, 2018, PayNet has implemented an open-access regime where all
banks and eligible non-bank e-money issuers are allowed to participate in the RPP as direct participants. As the RPP
settles all transactions in the RTGS system, non-banks that are not direct participants in the latter may appoint a
settlement bank to settle the RPP transactions on their behalf.
Mexico All banks and non-bank financial entities that are regulated and supervised by Banco de México or other Mexican
financial authorities are eligible to participate in SPEI.
21
The access requirements are essentially the same for all
participants, thus ensuring equal treatment. Banco de México requires institutions that intend to participate in SPEI
to satisfy the operational risk-management and information-security requirements it has established. It also has a
review procedure to determine whether applicants meet the legal requirements for participation established in the
SPEI regulation.
SPEI participants are also able to participate in the overlay service CoDi if they fulfill a functionality certification
and satisfy technological requirements specific to CoDi. Banks participating in SPEI that have more than 3,000
accounts and offer fund transfers through an app are also obligated to offer CoDi to their customers.
Poland Only banks participate in Express Elixir, as they have settlement accounts with the National Bank of Poland. Since non-
banks do not have access to the Sorbnet (Poland’s RTGS system) account, they do not participate in Express Elixir.
Singapore MAS has allowed non-banks to become direct participants in FAST since February 2021.
Thailand PromptPay allows only commercial banks in Thailand to become direct participants.
More specifically, to become a full participant in PromptPay, financial institutions must meet one of the following
requirements:
Be a commercial bank under the Commercial Banking Act of 1962
Be a financial institution established by specific law
Moreover, interested financial institutions need to pay a membership fee and comply with the business rules set by
National ITMX.
Non-bank PSPs are allowed to become indirect participants through sponsor banks. Indirect participants are
required to sign a commercial agreement with a direct participant before connecting indirectly with PromptPay.
continued
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 23
iii. Industry Body Collaborations
Industry bodies can play an important facilitating role in
the development of fast payment projects.
Some jurisdictions have collaborations with industry bod-
ies, such as banking associations. Many of these associations
play a key role in creating a collaborative ecosystem by driv-
ing consensus among participant banks and therefore have
often been relevant contributors to the deployment of fast
payments. Banking associations also ensure the effective
implementation of guidelines/regulations, including those
governing pricing schemes, risk management, and dispute
resolution. This ensures the safety and resiliency of the pay-
ment systems. In some cases (see table 6, as well as the case
of Poland), industry bodies have gone beyond and actually
funded or developed the fast payment project.
IV. Systemic Importance of Fast Payment
Arrangements
Statutory definitions of systemic importance, where they
exist, may vary somewhat across jurisdictions, but, in gen-
eral, a payment system is systemically important if it has the
potential to trigger or transmit systemic disruptions. This
includes, among other things, systems that are the sole pay-
ment system in a country or the principal system in terms
of the aggregate value of payments; systems that handle
mainly time-critical, high-value payments; and systems that
settle payments used to effect settlement in other systemi-
cally important financial market infrastructures (FMIs).
In some jurisdictions, fast payment arrangements are
considered to be or have been designated a systemically
important payment system (SIPS) by the central bank.
United Kingdom Currently, both banks and non-banks can become direct participants. While non-bank PSPs were initially not
allowed as direct participants, with the motive to promote competitiveness, a new access model was developed
in 2018 that allows non-banks to connect directly to the central infrastructure of FPS. At the same time, they need
not have a settlement account at Bank of England’s RTGS system by becoming a “Directly Connected Non-Settling
Participant.” In this case, they are required to have an agreement with a sponsor bank that settles their transactions
at the RTGS system.
United States RTP allows every federally insured depository institution in the United States to connect. These institutions can
connect with the system either directly or through third-party service providers (TPSPs). RTP participation rules
define the following four participant categories:
Funding participant: The participant that has become a party to the RTP Prefunded Balance Account Agreement
and requests and receives disbursements from the Prefunded Balance Account to its Federal Reserve account. In
case it is a sending participant, it is required to fulfill prefunding obligations.
Non-funding participant: The participant that is not a funding participant and has designated a funding agent
to act on its behalf to prefund in accordance with the RTP participation rules and RTP operating rules.
Receiving participant: The participant that holds the receivers account and receives a payment message.
Sending participant: The participant that holds the senders account and initiates a payment message.
Non-bank PSPs such as PayPal and Venmo use RTP. They submit transactions via their bank, just as any other
commercial user would do.
Through this designation, they become subject to the Prin-
ciples for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs) published
by CPMI and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO).
In other cases, fast payment arrangements are designated
“prominently important payment systems” or “system-wide
important payment systems.”
22
In either case, only a subset
of the PFMIs becomes applicable to them. Two of the four
jurisdictions described in table 7 classify their fast payment
arrangement as systemically important. In one (Mexico),
the classification as systemically important derives from the
RTGS system, as fast payments run on this same platform.
4.1.3 Funding and Pricing to Participants
Fast payments require sophisticated infrastructure that
translates into important investments. Fast payments also
require attention to proper and effective pricing policies.
The infrastructure underlying fast payments should be able
to handle large volumes and values of payments, execute
multiple processes within seconds, and run clearing and set-
tlement reliably with minimal errors and reconciliation issues
across all participants. This requires significant investments
in technology and operations during the project develop-
ment phase.
In practice, the following two main types of funding
mechanisms have been observed (see table 8):
Funding by public authorities: Public authorities, in
particular the central bank, provide full or partial fund-
ing to the fast payment arrangement and therefore are
full owners or co-owners. Examples include Australia,
TABLE 5, continued
Kenya Financial Sector Deepening, a nonprofit organization that supports the development of an inclusive financial market
in Kenya, built the business case for PesaLink. It played an instrumental role throughout the development of the
system.
Thailand The National e-Payment Plan was driven by the government, although funding of PromptPay project was through
the Thai Bankers Association, which works to execute BOT policies and projects through consensus. The BOT has
provided approval to the association to establish the Payment Systems Office, which plays an important role in
driving self-regulation among commercial banks. It also helps in interbank dispute resolutions. The Payment Systems
Office has established a governance structure in the form of a joint steering committee that comprises members
from commercial banks in Thailand.
Mexico SPEI is the central bank’s RTGS system and therefore the core FMI in Mexico, and it is deemed a SIPS as per the
Payment Systems Law.
Singapore Payment systems in Singapore can be classified as a SIPS or as a “system-wide important payment system.” FAST is
classified as a system-wide important payment system and designated under the Payment Services Act.
Thailand The BOT has deemed the ITMX system to be a “prominently important retail payment system.” ITMX includes an
interbank retail fund transfer system, such as ATM pool, bulk payment system and the PromptPay module for fast
payments.
United Kingdom FPS is recognized by HM Treasury under part 5 of the Banking Act (2009) as a systemically important FMI and is
overseen by Bank of England.
TABLE 6: Select Findings on Industry Body Collaborations
TABLE 7: Select Findings on the Classification of Fast Payment Arrangements as per Their Systemic Importance
TABLE 8: Select Findings on Funding
Hong Kong SAR, China, Malaysia, and Mexico. The rea-
sons for public funding include ensuring prompt im-
plementation of the fast payment arrangement and/or
keeping final prices low or affordable for end users (of-
ten for a limited period of time), among others.
Funding by private sector: Participants in the arrange-
ment provide full funding through ownership of the
operating entity, banking associations, or other means.
Examples include Kenya, Thailand, the United Kingdom,
and the United States (RTP).
On the other hand, the owner(s) of the fast payment
arrangement can price the services provided to participants
based on considerations such as the following:
Generating profits
Recovering investments, covering operational expenses,
and preparing for future investment needs
Recovering operational expenses only
The pricing strategy will depend on ownership (that is, pri-
vate ownership will generally entail seeking profits or at least
fully covering costs) and whether there is some type of ini-
tial or ongoing funding from public authorities and other
operational arrangements.
In practice, the pricing structure of fast payment arrange-
ments for services provided to participants generally com-
prises a combination of the following:
Australia Twelve authorized deposit-taking institutions committed to funding the building and operation of the NPP
and became the founding members and co-owners of the operator NPPA. The RBA played a significant role in
establishing the broad direction of the industry’s efforts and is also one of the founding members and co-owner of
NPPA.
Hong Kong SAR,
China
FPS is a HKMA-funded project.
Mexico SPEI development costs have been borne by Banco de México.
Poland Express Elixir was funded by system operator KIR, which is owned by multiple banks in Poland; the central bank is
the largest shareholder.
Thailand Funding for PromptPay was provided through the Thai Bankers Association, which coordinated with commercial
banks.
United States The cost of developing RTP has been shared by the consortium of commercial banks that own the operator TCH.
24 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 25
Joining fee: Participants are required to pay a joining
fee while onboarding the system. In general, the joining
fee is structured to cover the due diligence that the op-
erator must carry out to onboard the bank or other PSP
and is usually proportional to the size of the participant.
Jurisdictions such as Hong Kong SAR, China, India, Ma-
laysia, and Thailand charge a joining fee to system par-
ticipants. In Australia, direct participants are required to
become shareholders of the operator NPPA.
Variable or per-transaction processing fees: These are
usually structured to cover the full complement of the
operating expenses. Jurisdictions such as Australia, India,
and the United States charge a per-transaction fee to the
participants. RTP in the United States applies the same fee
to all participants with no volume discounts, no volume
commitments, and no monthly minimums. In Hong Kong,
participants are charged on a per-transaction basis, and
fees also depend on the transaction amount. In Thailand,
a variable fee is applied based on the number of monthly
transactions processed and follows a tiered approach.
Annual/fixed fee: This is often used to cover a portion
of the base operating expenses, recoup investment costs,
and build up a reserve to fund future investment costs. It
can be the only applicable fee or charged in addition to
other fees. In Australia, apart from the joining fee, an an-
nual fee is charged by the RBA for the services it provides.
(See table 9.) In Mexico, the fixed annual fee is calculated
by distributing system costs among participants based on
the relative proportion of each participant’s payments.
Different strategies can be followed to determine how much
to load on fixed fees versus variable fees. A higher fixed fee
relative to transaction fees is beneficial for participants with
higher transaction volumes, whereas lower fixed fees rela-
tive to transaction fees are beneficial to participants with
lower transaction volumes. Some operators might apply
a tiered structure for the fixed fee based on the size and
nature of the participant. Combinations that were observed
are shown in figure 10. In certain cases, especially in com-
plex fast payment arrangements, the operator could have
additional avenues to charge fees to third-party apps, for
third-party aggregators that are connected and/or for val-
ue-added services such as data analytics and fraud scoring.
In some cases, participants also pay interchange fees (for
example, India and Thailand).
Participants usually recover the various costs they incur
for participating in the fast payment arrangement by way
of charges to their customers (that is, the end users). In
many jurisdictions, transaction fees to end users have been
capped (for example, by the overseer) to promote adoption,
limiting the avenues of revenue for the participants. This is
the case in Bahrain, Mexico, and Thailand, among others. A
few jurisdictions, including Bahrain and Malaysia, have even
waived the transaction fee up to a certain transaction-value
threshold. Table 9 provides additional details on participat-
ing fee structures and customer pricing.
For more details, refer to the special topic note on pricing
structure, which forms part of the Fast Payments Toolkit.
4.2 MODULE B: SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS AND
OPERATING PROCEDURES
This module focuses on assessing the current state of tech-
nology in aspects like payment processing and telecom-
munications. The following five insights are covered in this
thematic area/module:
1. Infrastructure development
2. Technical specifications
3. Network connectivity
4. Clearing and settlement
5. Interoperability
JURISDICTION
JOINING
FEE
ANNUAL
FEE
VARIABLE FEE/
TRANSACTION
FEE
Australia
Bahrain
Chile
Hong Kong
SAR, China
India
Kenya
Malaysia
Mexico
Singapore
Thailand
UK
USA
FIGURE 10: Fee Structure in Fast Payment Arrangements
for Participants
26 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
TABLE 9: Select Findings on Fee Structures
Australia All direct participants are required to become shareholders of NPPA, which operates on a fixed-cost-recovery model;
operating costs are recovered from shareholders according to their size (shareholder band). The fixed-cost-recovery
model provides an incentive to direct participants to increase the volume on the platform, as the marginal cost for
additional transactions is very small, and this in turn influences the pricing offered to “Identified Institutions.” NPPAs
ultimate aim is to move to a unit transaction cost per transaction once volumes stabilize.
A wholesale fee could also be charged to all participants, which will be the same regardless of participant size. An
application fee is also payable to NPPA for new participants, along with a dispute-resolution fee charged by NPPA.
The RBA charges only direct participants and settlement participants for the use of their ESA accounts.
The fee charged by direct participants to submembers is based on the bilateral agreement between the parties.
No guidelines have been provided by the RBA/NPPA. Transaction charges to end users depend on the commercial
decisions of participants, and no upper cap has been set by the RBA/NPPA.
Hong Kong SAR,
China
Participants are charged fees on a per-transaction basis, but the fee is also dependent on transaction amount.
Participants are also charged a clearing-house admission fee and an interchange fee. Banks and SVFs have been
given the liberty to decide the fee levied on end users.
India The fee charged by NPCI is set by the NPCI board; inter-participant charges are decided by the IMPS/UPI steering
committee; and transaction user charges are decided by the participants.
Malaysia RPP participants pay an admission fee and monthly subscription fees. To encourage adoption, PayNet had waived
both the admission fee for participants who were onboarded before December 31, 2019, and the monthly
subscription fees for the initial first six months of participation. Additionally, PayNet applies a transaction-processing
fee that varies according to the transaction type.
In terms of customer pricing, for individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises, the transaction fee is
waived (by order of BNM) for any transfers up to RM 5,000. For transfers above RM 5,000, a transaction fee may
be applicable, although some banks are also waiving this fee to encourage adoption.
Mexico Banco de México has adopted a pricing scheme that aims to cover the full costs of developing, maintaining,
and operating SPEI without affecting its adoption adversely. Fees charged to participants reflect marginal zero
processing costs, to incentivize among participants an efficient use of SPEI and reduce entry barriers.
More specifically, Banco de México has established a scheme in which participants pay a fixed fee that allows
them to send and receive an unlimited amount of payments. The annual fixed fee varies for different participants
and is calculated by distributing total costs based on the share of each participant in the total number of payments
made through the system during a specific period (the last five years). In addition, participants are required to pay
an “operations fee” that is calculated on the basis of multiple factors, such as the number of returns for which a
participant is liable, fund transfer orders done through CLS Bank, and the number of bytes retransmitted by SPEI
at a participant’s request.
Regarding charges to end users, Banco de México forbids charges for receiving payments, but it allows
participants to decide user charges for sending payments. All participants are required to register their customer
fees with Banco de México.
For payments made through the overlay CoDi, Banco de México has waived off end-user charges, including the
merchant discount rate. Participants charge no fees to the payer or payee.
Singapore FAST and PayNow operate on a cost-recovery basis. MAS does not regulate the pricing of payment services, and
banks can make their own commercial decisions.
Thailand Fees charged by National ITMX comprise a fixed fee (joining fee) and a variable fee. The joining fee is based on the
following two components:
1. Size of the bank: Three tiers have been created based on size (that is, large, medium, and small). Larger banks are
required to pay a higher joining fee.
2. Number of services to which participants subscribe: Participants can choose the services availed through
PromptPay. The majority of charges are associated with fund transfer services, as it determines the amount of
investment needed to connect with PromptPay.
The variable fee is based on the number of monthly transactions submitted by a participant. This also follows a
tiered approach. Large banks usually process a higher number of transactions and are given a cheaper tier.
There is also an interchange fee between the participants for PromptPay transactions.
There are no charges to individuals for payments through digital channels such as internet banking and mobile
banking, whereas there are some nominal charges for channels such as ATMs and branches. These charges have been
regulated by the BOT and vary between zero and B 10 for individuals and between B 10 and B 15 for juristic persons.
United Kingdom The following categories of charges need to be paid by each participant:
Relevant fee for onboarding each new participant
A monthly fee from each participant that directly connects to the system
Volume fee to cover the anticipated annual volume
continued
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 27
TABLE 9, continued
United States RTP follows the same pricing structure for all participants, with no volume discounts, no volume commitments,
and no monthly minimums, to ensure that financial institutions of all sizes participate on the same terms. System
participants are not required to pay joining fees while onboarding the system. Participants pay only for the
transactions they originate.
There is an inter-participant fee in the form of a “Request for Payment Incentive Fee.” Upon each successful RFP
credit transfer sent in response to a request-for-payment message, the participant that initiated the request for
payment owes the incentive fee to the participant initiating the RFP credit transfer. TCH facilitates the collection and
disbursement of these fees between the participants.
There is also a network connectivity fee, which is calculated by TCH and charged as a pass-through on a monthly
basis. Connectivity costs apply to any participant with a direct connection. In the case of a TPSP, the connectivity fee
is shared by the financial institutions connecting through it.
Each RTP participant is free to decide the transaction charges that apply to end users.
4.2.1 Infrastructure Development
Infrastructure development is a complex process that must
be evaluated holistically. Jurisdiction-specific approaches
vary based on their existing ecosystem, customer needs, and
the supporting infrastructure.
The following aspects of infrastructure development
are covered as part of this section: (i) a new platform ver-
sus upgrading an existing one; (ii) development timelines;
(iii) choosing an external vendor partner versus leveraging
in-house capacity; and (iv) participant onboarding.
It is noted that during infrastructure development, cer-
tain amendments to existing acts have been made or new
acts and regulations have been introduced. These aspects
are discussed in Module D, as part of the insight into legal
and regulatory considerations.
i. New Platform versus Upgrading an Existing One
Most fast payment arrangements have been developed
as new infrastructures, as existing platforms were felt to
be inadequate to cater to the very dynamic needs of fast
payments.
During the preliminary desk research, it was found that
nearly 90 percent of the 25 jurisdictions examined, devel-
oped their fast payment arrangement over a new platform.
Jurisdictions make the decision based on factors such as
existing capabilities, cost implications, customer experi-
ence, and supporting infrastructure. Typically, it has been
observed that most jurisdictions evaluated the option of
building over an existing payment platform but eventually
created a new one, as their existing system could not cater
to the dynamic needs of fast payments.
Key outcomes of the analysis include the following (see
table 10 for additional details):
Jurisdictions developed new platforms because existing
capabilities did not support the technology, security, or
infrastructural requirements of fast payments, such as
24/7 transaction processing, multiple channels, and sig-
nificantly higher volume/scale of transactions. Among
others, this was the case of Australia, Bahrain, and Poland.
Other reasons for developing a new platform included
promoting continuous innovation and leveraging the
latest technologies (for example, India and Malaysia),
and facilitating broader digitization initiatives (for ex-
ample, Hong Kong and Thailand).
In a few cases (such as Mexico), the jurisdiction opted
for upgrading an existing platform.
23
ii. Development Timelines
Most jurisdictions have adopted a phased approach for
implementing their fast payment arrangement. The aver-
age implementation time of a basic fast payment func-
tionality and service is between one and three years.
The timelines for fast payment implementation depend on
such aspects as the functionalities that are intended to be
available at launch, whether the timeline has been man-
dated by public authorities, and the time taken to get par-
ticipants on board, among other factors.
Most jurisdictions have adopted a phased approach for
implementation. (See table 11.) For example, many jurisdic-
tions went live with a rather basic infrastructure enabling
P2P payments. The infrastructure implementation of a basic
28 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
fast payment functionality and service takes an average of
one to three years. However, in some cases, even the imple-
mentation of this basic functionality took much longer, as
was the case in Australia.
The phased approach is decided based on consider-
ations such as the overseer mandating participation, system
readiness, participant readiness, and even customer readi-
ness. Mandating that banks with a large customer base par-
ticipate (at least in receive mode) can play an important role
in achieving critical mass.
Over the years, the operators subsequently introduced
upgrades and additional functionalities in terms of pay-
ment types, use cases, and channels. A few operators have
also opened their basic infrastructure for third-party pro-
viders to introduce more innovative payment solutions in
the market.
Australia The NPP was built as a new platform to create a thriving environment for innovation (that is, to have the mechanism
for more business services to exist on top of the platform).
At the time of infrastructure development, the RBA and the industry considered upgrading the existing direct-entry
system, instead of building a new platform from scratch. However, it was concluded that the direct-entry system
would not be the right starting point and that an entirely new platform was needed, as this would be the least
disruptive approach to both participating institutions and businesses and would allow those businesses that had a
need for new services to access them.
Bahrain The Electronic Fund Transfer System (EFTS) was built as a new platform, as it was envisaged that the existing
RTGS system would be unable to support a large volume of transactions. EFTS supports Fawri+ for real-time P2P
payments, Fawri for deferred payments, and Fawateer for bill payments.
India UPI was built as a new platform. UPI offers an architecture framework and a set of standard specifications for
application programming interfaces (APIs) to facilitate online payments. UPI evolved as a payment platform driving
open and interoperable payment standards driven at the front end using mobile devices for P2P and person-to-
merchant services.
UPI has made buying and selling through fintech app solutions easier, for both e-commerce providers and
consumers. This has created a huge demand in the fintech industry, as UPI has opened a host of opportunities for
start-ups and e-commerce players to come up with innovative solutions that elevate the customer experience.
Malaysia Instead of enhancing the prior Instant Transfer System, which operated on the legacy ATM/card switch and ISO 8583
messaging standard, the RPP was built as a new platform to provide a more open and scalable platform on which
better overlay services could be developed. The objective was to develop an agile system that supports a richer
messaging standard (ISO 20022) that could be improved continuously as the nature of the payments landscape
changes.
Mexico SPEI was developed in-house by Banco de México to handle all transactions—both high- and low-value
transactions—and provide the desired service levels for large volumes. Although SPEI was a new platform when
launched in 2004, Banco de México wanted to ensure a seamless transition for participants, so it reutilized the
front-end components of the previous RTGS system (that is, SPEUA). Operating hours were extended to 24/7 in
2015. In 2019, Banco de México launched CoDi (in the form of a request-to-pay functionality) to enhance the user
experience for retail payments.
Poland KIR already operated Elixir (a conventional payment platform) that enjoyed high adoption. However, for fast
payments, KIR decided to develop a new platform (Express Elixir), as it believed the nature of these payments is
quite different. For example, the protocols of conventional payment platforms cannot be used for instant payments
due to the different response times or data sizes of the latter. Parameters such as security, liquidity, and settlement
mechanism also work differently.
TABLE 10: Select Findings on New Infrastructure Development versus Existing System Upgrades
iii. External Vendor Partner versus Leveraging
In-House Capacity
The advantages and disadvantages of having an external
vendor versus leveraging in-house development vary by
jurisdiction. A majority of the jurisdictions analyzed in this
study opted for an external vendor.
The main benefit of onboarding a vendor partner seems to
be that they already have prebuilt, tested solutions. These
can be customized and leveraged.
Jurisdictions that decide to bring in an external vendor
typically go through a request-for-proposal process for ven-
dor shortlisting and onboarding. Some of the key selection
criteria for vendors include prior experience implementing
fast payments or other payment systems, implementa-
tion timelines, the ability to customize to the jurisdiction’s
requirement, and an experienced team and agile delivery
methods, among others.
24
In some jurisdictions, external
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 29
TABLE 11: Select Findings on System Development Timelines and Services Available at Launch
continued
JURISDICTION
YEAR OF
LAUNCH
TIME TO
IMPLEMENT SERVICES MADE AVAILABLE AT LAUNCH REMARKS
Australia (NPP) 2018 Six years The NPP went live with use cases such as
P2P payments, merchant payments, and
bill payments. In 2019, NPPA published
a road map with plans to roll out the
“Mandated Payments Services,” which will
enable use cases such as request to pay,
future-dated payments, and bulk payments.
All participating financial institutions are
required to implement this capability by
December 2021. Thus, it is anticipated that
financial institutions will begin to roll out
these services in early 2022.
The implementation of the NPP took
approximately six years and was preceded by
a two-year “strategic review of innovation”
by the RBA. The initial target to launch the
NPP was 2016. After the launch of the NPP,
a few major banks were slow to make the
new system available to their customers due
to issues with internal systems and service
providers.
Bahrain
(Fawri+)
2015 Two years Fawri+ supports P2P payments. The
request-to-pay transactions can be made
through BenefitPay, the national e-wallet
payment system. Fawateer supports bill
payments.
The banks experienced delays updating their
systems, processes, and infrastructures.
China (IBPS) 2010 9-12
months
IBPS supports multiple use cases/services,
such as P2P payments, bill payments, and
recurring payments (credit card repayment,
loan repayment).
In November 2009, the development
process of IBPS started. In August 2010,
technical preparation, system verification,
and other critical processes were completed.
The first group of participating institutions
went online for trial operation on August
31, 2010. In December 2010, the second
group of participating institutions entered
into operation, while the third group did
so in January 2011, thereby completing the
nationwide launch of IBPS.
European
Union (SCT
Inst)
2017 One year SCT Inst supports multiple use cases, such
as merchant and bill payments and bulk
and future-dated payments.
The EPC’s SEPA request-to-pay scheme has
been developed, and the adherence process
for PSPs has started.
Hong Kong
SAR, China
(FPS)
2018 One year FPS supports merchant payments, request
to pay using QR codes, bulk/batch
payments, and bill payments.
India (IMPS
and UPI)
IMPS—
2010
Less than
12 months
IMPS went live with use cases such as
P2P payments, merchant payments, bill
payments, and bulk/batch Payments.
IMPS allowed inclusion of non-banks (prepaid
payment instruments) as participants
in 2011. It also extended support for channels
such as internet banking and ATMs as
adoption of the mobile-banking channel
was then low.
UPI—
2016
Less than
12 months
UPI went live with use cases such as
P2P payments, merchant payments, bill
payments, bulk payments, and request
to pay. Future-dated payments were
launched under UPI 2.0 in 2018. UPI also
extended support for use cases such as IPO
subscription, signed QR, invoice in the box,
and foreign inward remittances.
Prior to rollout of UPI, NPCI conducted a
pilot launch with 21 member banks.
Kenya
(PesaLink)
2017 Two years,
six months
PesaLink supports bill payments and
bulk payments as use cases. There are
discussions to roll out request-to-pay use
case.
It was necessary to take buy-in from all
participating banks that posed a challenge
during implementation.
Malaysia (RPP) 2018 One year Currently, RPP supports P2P and merchant
payments.
New use cases—that is, request to pay,
consent (e-mandates), real-time debit,
and cross-border payments—are under
development.
30 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
TABLE 11, continued
JURISDICTION
YEAR OF
LAUNCH
TIME TO
IMPLEMENT SERVICES MADE AVAILABLE AT LAUNCH REMARKS
Mexico (SPEI) 2004 Two
years, four
months
Initially, it facilitated P2P payments and
bulk/batch payments. The overlay service
CoDi, which enabled request-to-pay
functionality, was developed in 16 months
and was launched in September 2019. CoDi
complements other use cases, such as
merchant payments and bill payments.
SPEI has expanded its operating hours
(currently 24/7) and participation criteria
to meet the growing needs of the Mexican
payments market.
Poland
(Express Elixir)
2012 One year,
six months
Express Elixir currently supports merchant
payments, request to pay, and bill
payments. It plans to provide bulk and
batch payments in the future
Thailand
(PromptPay)
2017 One year,
six months
The credit transfer service was launched in
January 2017. Interbank bill payment service
was enabled on November 2017. Request-
to-pay functionality (PayAlert) was enabled
in March 2018. The e-donation service was
launched in July 2018.
Initially, PromptPay was supposed to go live in
November 2016. Due to technical issues, it was
delayed by two months. Since then, more use
cases, additional payment types, and access
channels have been enabled.
United
Kingdom
(FPS)
2008 Three years FPS supports forward-dated payment,
bill payment, standing orders, and bulk
payments use case. In 2020, a request-to-
pay functionality and confirmation of payee
was launched.
United States
(RTP)
2017 Two years,
six months
RTP system went live with use cases such
as P2P payments, request to pay (called
“request for payment”), bulk payments,
merchant payments, and bill payments.
It took 12 months to define the system
requirements in collaboration with market
participants. Additionally, it took 12 months for
system development and six months for testing
and to onboard the initial six participants.
vendors are also contracted to operate and maintain the
system for a period.
Table 12 presents findings on the choices made by select
jurisdictions in this area. While the majority of jurisdictions
analyzed opted for an external vendor to develop a new
platform, some still went for an in-house development by
the central bank (for example, Mexico) or the existing opera-
tor of a retail payment system (for example, Thailand).
iv. Participant Onboarding
Many operators of fast payment arrangements have
already defined comprehensive and well-structured on-
boarding processes for participants.
As shown in table 13, most operators in the jurisdictions
analyzed have defined the requirements and processes for
participant onboarding. In general, the following main steps
TABLE 12: Select Findings on External Vendor versus In-House Development
Australia The industry committee contracted SWIFT to build the NPP’s basic infrastructure. SWIFT is also responsible for
operating the system. Additionally, the industry realized early on that it was important to have an initial consumer-
oriented “convenience” service at launch for the platform to have traction. Thus, BPay was selected as the vendor
to design the first overlay service (that is, Osko, the customer-oriented convenience service).
Malaysia RPP was built by a shortlisted vendor—ACI. This company was chosen from other applicants, as their solution was
agile and could be configured easily.
Mexico SPEI’s development was done using the in-house capability of Banco de México. As SPEI is the most important
payment system, Banco de México consciously decided not to hire an external vendor. Additional factors for
in-house development included development cost and considerations regarding the proprietary communication
protocol used by Banco de México.
United Kingdom The entire platform was built from scratch. An invitation to tender was circulated to five bidders. The successful
joint bid resulted in Voca and LINK establishing a joint venture company called Immediate Payments Ltd.
United States TCH partnered with Vocalink to develop RTP. A request for proposals was issued for vendor selection, and three
service providers responded to TCH. After the selection process laid out by TCH, Vocalink was onboarded to
develop the system in December 2015.
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 31
in the onboarding process were identified through the deep
dives:
Interested entities have to communicate their intention
of joining the fast payment arrangement to the operator
and the central bank (or, when applicable, to another
public authority acting as the regulator and/or overseer).
The operator provides initial membership documen-
tation to the applicants. Upon submission of the par-
ticipation application and supporting documents, the
operator accepts the application if all eligibility require-
ments have been satisfied. A membership fee (or equiv-
alent) is often due at this time.
Prospective participants are required to establish a
secure connection with the core infrastructure to ex-
change payment and nonpayment messages with the
operator and other participants. All prospective par-
ticipants then have to go through extensive testing/
certification to verify that they meet the technical re-
quirements to connect to the system and to be able to
operate satisfactorily. In some countries, the operator
also requires an external auditor to conduct an audit of
the participant before going live.
Upon successful completion of the testing/certification,
prospective participants have to enter into an agree-
ment/contract with the operator by which they agree
to observe and abide by the rules and operating proce-
dures laid out by the central bank and the operator it-
self. A common operating procedure across the globe is
the continued availability of a participant’s fast payment
gateway from the point of going live.
Australia The NPP has designed a comprehensive and well-structured onboarding process for participants. Major steps
during the onboarding process are as follows:
Application process: NPPA provides initial membership documentation. The applicant provides completed
participation application and supporting documents.
Acceptance of participant application: NPPA accepts application if all eligibility requirements have been satisfied
and determines the applicant’s proportionate share of investment. (All direct applicants are required to become
shareholders of NPPA.)
Plan and build: The participant develops the project plan and builds the system as per the technical design.
Certification and onboarding: The participant is required to meet test requirements (system/buddy testing).
Once all testing and certification is completed, the participant is onboarded
Bahrain For participation in EFTS, participants need to fulfill the following technical requirements, and testing is done prior
to onboarding:
Documentation (participants need to enter a contract with BENEFIT), and technical requirement documents are
provided.
Participants also need to adopt the standard ISO 20022 messaging format.
Prior to going live with the system, participants must complete the certification cycle. This includes initial testing
with EFTS simulators as per predefined test scripts.
European Union Applicants are required to submit to the EPC an executed undertaking and original adherence agreement, along
with supporting documentation. As per the internal rules specified by EPC, an application date is specified when
an applicant becomes a participant.
Hong Kong SAR,
China
The onboarding process consists of the following:
Enrollment with HKMA for Hong Kong dollar-denominated (HKD) fast payments and/or Bank of China (Hong
Kong) Ltd. for renminbi (RMB) fast payments.
Signing of confirmation letters agreeing to observe and abide by the HKD FPS rules and RMB FPS rules,
respectively, as well as relevant operating procedures upon completion of enrollment.
After the completion of the onboarding process, Hong Kong Interbank Clearing Ltd. conducts testing with the
intended participants to ensure they are technically ready.
Kenya Participants must follow Integrated Payment Services standards along with a rigorous testing process. An external
auditor conducts an audit of the participant before going live.
Mexico For participation in SPEI, interested entities must communicate their intention to Banco de México. After this, the
entity must complete the following:
Certification testing to verify the technical requirements to operate in SPEI
Operational risk-management and information-security requirements as established by Banco de México
Documentation (participants must enter into a contract with Banco de México)
TABLE 13: Select Findings on Participant Onboarding Process
continued
32 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
Singapore Every participant has a comprehensive onboarding process in place. All prospective participants must go through
an extensive industry testing before going live. The testing comprises the following three key stages:
Pretest: The focus is on making sure that the system and connectivity are stable before proceeding to the next
step.
Industry test: This is the main testing stage that covers both functional and nonfunctional test cases.
Production acceptance test: Controlled live cutover. Transactions are processed using pre-identified accounts
before opening the FPS to all customers of the participant.
Thailand For participation in PromptPay, interested entities need to pay the membership fee and must comply with the
business rules set by National ITMX. Other major steps include the following:
Certification testing to verify the technical requirements to operate in PromptPay
Undergo technical assessment
Documentation (participants must enter into a master agreement with National ITMX)
United Kingdom Pay.UK undertakes risk assurance to consider the risks relating to the intended operation of a new participant
applicant for entry to FPS. Participants need to provide self-certification for assurance. It covers the following
aspects:
Sufficient controls will be in place and working for all risks that could affect FPS processing, operations, or service
from the point of going live
Their compliance with the FPS scheme rules from the point of going live
The continued availability of their FPS gateway from the point of going live
United States For participation in RTP, an interested entity must communicate its intention to TCH. After this, the prospective
participant must undergo the following:
Certification testing to verify the technical requirements for handling both payment and nonpayment messages
Documentation (participants must enter into a participation agreement with TCH)
TPSPs also have to certify all the entities connecting through it or the core banking solution (in the case of large
TPSPs).
TABLE 13, continued
4.2.2 Technical Specifications
The following sections detail the findings and insights into
the following select technical specifications that are most
relevant for fast payments: (i) messaging standards; (ii) cus-
tomer authentication; and (iii) APIs.
i. Messaging Standards
The ISO 20022 messaging standard is becoming the global
benchmark for fast payments. Many operators that are still
using other standards have expressed a desire to migrate
to ISO 20022. Cost emerged as a key aspect delaying or
even impeding this migration.
Messaging formats are standards for electronic data
exchange between institutions participating in a payment
system relating to several message categories, such as
orders, invoices, customs documents, remittance advices,
and payments.
25
Uniform messaging standards are critical
to standardize payment flows with an increasing number of
cross-border transactions and the advent of multiple pay-
ment systems. More specifically, messaging standards gen-
erally facilitate the following:
Identification of senders and receivers
Key attributes of a payment transaction, such as curren-
cy, amount, and value date
Additional information alongside settlement data and
format to enable the onward transmission and process-
ing of transactions
The main messaging standards for domestic payment trans-
fers include ISO 8583, SWIFT MT Standards, and ISO 20022,
among others.
Desk research and the deep-dive analyses conducted for
this Fast Payments Toolkit showed that ISO 20022 and ISO
8583 are currently the major messaging standards adopted
by operators. A few have adopted XML-based proprietary
messaging formats or proprietary messaging tools. (See fig-
ure 11.)
The main insights obtained in this area from the deep
dives and select jurisdiction analyses (see table 14) are the
following: (i) Operators are looking at adopting messaging
standards that have controls and procedures in place (a) to
protect message data from unauthorized disclosure and
financial crime, (b) that help ensure the accuracy, complete-
ness, and validity of messages and their delivery, and (c) that
meet service availability requirements. In this context, many
operators have migrated or intend to migrate to ISO 20022.
(ii) The cost of upgrading messaging standards entails a
significant investment in resources and technology by the
operators of the FPS and its participants.
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 33
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
an international standard-setting body, has defined
various standards for facilitating the flow of messages
related to payments/financial transactions. These stan-
dards have evolved due to the dynamic nature of pay-
ments and technological advancements.
The ISO 8583 messaging standard was designed for
high-volume, low-latency payment instructions. It is pre-
dominantly used for card payments (ATMs and point-of-
sale terminals). Messages do not contain invoices and
beneficiary information that are not required for card
payments. Over the years, some payment systems have
modelled clearing and settlement functions using ISO
8583. One unique feature of this standard is that it was
designed to support pull payments, and for this reason,
it still has a huge role in transactions that are based on
the auto-debit mechanism, particularly merchant pay-
ments where the merchant is driving the collection. Sim-
ilarly, it can be used for direct debits. However, it offers
limited capability for information exchange and has an
unstructured format for exchanging the data. Due to this
limitation, system participants may be unable to provide
customized offerings to their client base.
ISO 20022 provides flexibility, as user institutions can
modify payment messages over time based on evolv-
ing requirements. It also facilitates structured, well-de-
fined, and data-rich information exchanges. ISO 20022
is the first messaging standard that has gone beyond
information exchange and allows the standardization of
messaging components, for which it is emerging as the
global benchmark for real-time payments. Many opera-
tors that are still using ISO 8583 have expressed a desire
to migrate to ISO 20022.
During migration to ISO 20022, it is important to
define business requirements, clearing and settlement
confirmations, and reporting mechanisms. Therefore, it
is critical to have a clear definition of market practices.
The financial institutions also have different automation
capacity and time-to-market requirements. Addition-
ally, it is also important to have a road map that defines
how information would be shared between financial
institutions after migration to a new standard.
BOX 4 MESSAGING STANDARDS FOR PAYMENTS/FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
1984
1987
1990
1995
2004
ISO 7775
ISO 9992-1
ISO 15022
ISO 20022
ISO 8583
JURISDICTION
ISO
20022 ISO 8583 PROPRIETARY
Australia
Bahrain
Chile
China
EU
Hong Kong
SAR, China
India
1
(IMPS)
(XML-UPI)
Kenya
2
Malaysia
FIGURE 11: Messaging Standards Adopted
JURISDICTION
ISO
20022 ISO 8583 PROPRIETARY
Mexico
(Binary)
Nigeria
(XML)
Poland
Singapore
Thailand
UK
3
USA
1 India’s IMPS is planning to migrate to XML format
2 Kenya’s PesaLink is planning to migrate to ISO 20022
3 UK’s NPA (new system under development) will use ISO 20022
34 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
For more details, refer to the focus note on messaging
standards, which forms part of the Fast Payments Toolkit.
ii. Customer Authentication
Operators and participants typically apply the same cus-
tomer-authentication standards to users of fast payments
as they do to users who perform transactions via other
payment systems.
Authentication is the means to ascertain a customers
identity as the rightful initiator of a payment transaction.
Looking at this more generically, it is the process of veri-
fying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a
prerequisite to allowing access to resources in an informa-
tion system.
27
Customer specifications across fast payment
arrangements are typically based on regulations issued by
central banks. Globally, there is a push toward using more
robust customer authentication to reduce fraud and make
fast payments more secure—with a focus on payments that
TABLE 14: Select Findings and Insights into Current Use of Messaging Standards
Australia The NPP adopted the ISO 20022 messaging standard, as it is flexible and extensible and therefore enables richer
and more complete remittance information (280 characters) to be sent with a payment than other systems (for
instance, the 18 characters currently available for direct-entry payments). It also envisioned a day where there might
be enough fast payment arrangements in the world with ISO 20022 messaging capabilities. This would enable the
linking of domestic fast payment arrangements through ISO 20022 capabilities, which could effectively replace
correspondent banking.
Bahrain Adopted ISO 20022, as it was the most widely used messaging format for fast payments, and countries were
developing their system on this messaging standard.
European Union SCT Inst adopted ISO 20022, as it has been adopted widely throughout the European Union (it has been adopted
for SEPA credit transfers and direct debits) and worldwide and would therefore provide easier integration with other
fast payment arrangements for cross-border payments.
Hong Kong SAR,
China
ISO 20022 was adopted because it provides a rich data format and allows the use of standardized Chinese
characters, thus meeting participants’ need to carry different kinds of payments through the FPS.
India IMPS adopted ISO 8583, as support for this standard was available with many banks at that time and speed to
market was the priority for NPCI.
UPI adopted XML-based proprietary messaging standard primarily because of the flexibility, ease of reading, and
scalability it offered. It was felt that the flexibility provided by ISO was limited. For example, data elements such as
tag length could not be custom-defined as per requirement. The payload was much higher in ISO than in native
XML. Native XML protocol has provided the flexibility to have message-level acknowledgement, which has proved
useful for message-level delivery and sanctity. Native XML protocols have allowed UPI to provide lots of innovative
services—for example, check transaction status and validation of payment address in a short period. Hence, the
view was that by adopting a proprietary XML format, changes would be lesser and quicker to implement.
Mexico SPEI uses a propriety messaging standard developed by Banco de México. This protocol was established to make
the exchange of information efficient and includes security checks that validate the authenticity of the participant
that generates instructions.
26
An assessment was undertaken by Banco de México to compare ISO 20022 with this
proprietary standard, and it was found that the weight/size ratio between the standards is 7:1. Banco de México
also considers that its proprietary standard is very efficient and has no plans for migrating to ISO 20022. SPEI
participants have also expressed no desire to migrate to an international standard.
Thailand Most commercial bank systems and ATM networks use ISO 8583, whereas the PromptPay fast payment solution is
based on ISO 20022. To resolve this issue, an adaptor was developed to translate messages from ISO 8583 to ISO
20022 and vice versa.
United States ISO 20022 was chosen, as it enables a rich and consistent flow of information. Further, the use of ISO 20022
enables multinational financial institutions and corporations to utilize one message standard across all their
payment-related activities. The use of ISO 20022 also positions RTP to support cross-border commerce and
interoperability with other schemes, as real-time payments evolve in the global marketplace.
are initiated remotely. However, strong customer authentica-
tion (SCA) may hinder a seamless customer experience. Box
5 describes SCA as conceptualized in the European Union’s
revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2), along with other
issues on customer authentication.
SCA requirements and the need to balance these with a
seamless customer experience are bringing major changes
in security guidelines and operations. For example, as more
account information and payment options are centralized
on a single device used by consumers, the later are expected
to have greater control and convenience.
The main insights into customer authentication stem-
ming from the analysis of select jurisdictions are discussed
in table 15. A general trend is that specific customer-au-
thentication requirements are issued by the financial insti-
tutions that participate in the fast payment arrangement,
rather than by the operator of the latter or the regulator.
Some regulators do issue general guidelines to participants
in connection with these requirements.
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 35
Payment authentication and authorization include the
steps of a transaction where a customer confirms who
they claim to be (authentication) and is granted permis-
sion for the transfer (authorization).
28
Given that most
fast payment arrangements have settlement finality, and
that a transaction, once processed, cannot be reversed,
customer authentication becomes critical. The use of
biometrics in sender authentication is also becoming
increasingly common. Whether a transaction is initiated
by the payer or payee, authentication typically takes
place at the payers end. For a pull payment, the initia-
tor of the payment (payee) does not authenticate itself,
and the customer authentication takes place at the pay-
ers end, using one or more factors of authentication.
In SCT Inst, strong customer-authentication (SCA)
guidelines are mandated as part of the revised Payment
Services Directive (PSD2). The core principle is to reduce
payment fraud with minimal impact on the customer
experience—that is, without introducing too much fric-
tion into the payment process.
29
SCA is an authentica-
tion process that validates the identity of the user of a
payment service or of the payment transaction. More
specifically, SCA indicates whether the use of a payment
instrument is authorized.
30
The European Central Bank
has developed draft regulatory technical standards
31
specifying the following: the requirements of SCA; the
exemptions from the application of SCA; the require-
ments that security measures have to comply with to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the payment
service users’ personalized security credentials; and the
requirements for common and secure open standards
of communication between account-servicing payment
service providers (ASPSPs), payment-initiation service
providers, account-information service providers, pay-
ers, payees, and other PSPs.
32
The proposed guidelines are key to achieve the
objectives of PSD2 and introduce new requirements for
authenticating online payments. PSD2 requires PSPs to
apply SCA when a payer initiates an electronic payment
transaction. PSPs include banks and other providers.
SCA applies to all customer-initiated online payments
across Europe. The main objectives of SCA are to min-
imize fraud, to create a more secure environment for
online payments, to protect the confidentiality of the
users financial data, including personal data, and to
add extra layers of protection by authenticating pay-
ments with additional identifying factors. The SCA
check requires the following: possession (that is, “some-
thing you have,” such as a card or phone), inherence
(“something you are,” such as a fingerprint, an iris scan,
or your voice), and knowledge (“something you know,”
such as a PIN, password, or piece of memorable infor-
mation).
The following two additional elements of SCA are
also sometimes leveraged for multifactor authentica-
tion:
Somewhere you are” (location), which is common-
ly detected by a users internet protocol address
Something you do” (behavior), least commonly
used, in which actions such as gestures or touches
(for example, on a picture) are observed to prove
identities
The main challenge with implementing SCA require-
ments while maintaining a seamless and consistent
user experience is largely determined by the ability of a
firm (financial institution and ASPSP) to take advantage
of all available PSD2 SCA exemptions. In particular, to
take advantage of the Transaction Risk Analysis Exemp-
tion, ASPSPs will need not only to adopt advanced and
effective capabilities to detect and report payment
fraud that are able to determine, in real time, whether
a particular transaction presents a low risk of fraud but
also to consistently maintain overall fraud below levels
predefined by the regulatory technical standards.
Countries such as Bahrain, India and Mexico use
multifactor authentication techniques for fast pay-
ment transactions. The specifications across schemes
are based on regulations by central banks. Globally,
there is a push toward using SCA to reduce fraud and
make online payments more secure. However, strong
multifactor customer authentication may hamper
seamless customer experience, and it is critical for
organizations to strengthen authentication mecha-
nisms while paying adequate attention to maintaining
customer experience.
BOX 5 CUSTOMER AUTHENTICATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
36 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
For more details, refer to the focus note on customer
authentication, which forms part of the Fast Payments Toolkit.
iii. Application Programming Interfaces
Public authorities and operators worldwide believe that
APIs are already revolutionizing the fast payment space,
and that innovative solutions will continue to emerge
through them.
APIs boost interoperability by providing easy access to fast
payment arrangements and other aspects of banking, such
as account details, lending, and other use cases. APIs also
open the opportunity to create several interactions between
stakeholders in the payment ecosystem (including third-
party application providers) and consumers: from support-
ing the ability to initiate payments to assisting e-commerce
transactions and other payment experiences, among many
other applications. Box 6 provides details on APIs and their
relevance for fast payments.
TABLE 15: Select Findings and Insights into Customer Authentication
Australia There are no specific customer-authentication standards for making a NPP payment, as these payments are initiated
by logging into the internet and mobile-banking application of a participating financial institution. This means
that NPP payments are subject to the same fraud and security protections—including customer-authentication
standards—that participating entities use for all of their internet and mobile-banking transactions (that is, two-factor
authentication).
Bahrain The central bank mandated banks to have SCA and authorization. Customers need to log in to their mobile or
internet banking access channel and enter the beneficiary IBAN, which contains 22 alphanumeric characters, to
complete the transaction process.
33
Hong Kong SAR,
China
HKMA has issued general guidelines to banks for customer authentication. Since 2018, all banks and SVFs have to
ensure two-factor authentication. FPS does not impose any additional customer-authentication measures.
India IMPS uses two-factor authentication. The factors are the following:
Mobile number and mobile PIN for mobile transactions
Card and ATM PIN for ATM channel
User ID and internet banking password/transaction password for internet banking channel
For UPI, one-click, two-factor authentication is used. Device binding is used as the first factor, and the UPI
PIN is used as the second factor. The mobile number is used for authenticating the first transaction, and the
device fingerprint through the device is binding for subsequent transactions. While the system supports using
biometrics (Aadhaar) as the second factor, it has not been implemented yet. Risk is further reduced by dividing
the authentication requirements between the PSP and issuer bank: the first factor is validated by the PSP, and the
second factor is validated by the remitter bank.
Mexico To send an SPEI transfer through electronic channels, end customers have to use two-factor authentication. All
SPEI participants are required to provide secure electronic channels and two-factor authentication schemes
to their customers, according to regulatory guidelines from the National Banking and Securities Commission
(Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores or CNBV) and Banco de México.
34
These authorities are considering the
harmonization of customer-authentication standards, as these currently vary based on the nature of the participant
(that is, bank vs. non-bank).
United Kingdom The Financial Conduct Authority, in consultation with the European Banking Authority, has mandated banks to
implement SCA to enhance the security of payments and limit fraud. The implementation will span from September
14, 2019, to December 31, 2020, and the Financial Conduct Authority will continue to monitor the extent to which
participants meet the expectation to provide any alternative means of authorization.
APIs are revolutionizing the fast payment space, and
in most jurisdictions, operators and public authorities are
clearly aware of this. (See country-specific insights and
findings in table 16.) Fast payment operators generally
define the API framework (for example, the main attributes
that an API must possess to be used in connection with
the system). While regulation is important to help ecosys-
tems move toward maturity, it is also important to allow
market forces to act as drivers to encourage innovation,
flexibility, and change. In this regard, evidence shows that,
in some jurisdictions, APIs for payments were part of a
broader financial-services evolution to drive innovation
across all aspects of banking. In other jurisdictions, APIs for
payments were specifically developed/mandated. Further-
more, many jurisdictions are approaching APIs in stages
across other aspects of banking—that is, account details,
lending, and other use cases.
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 37
An API provides access to service functionality and
data within an application or a database. APIs can be
used as a building block for the development of new
interactions with humans, other applications, or smart
devices.
35
In the context of web applications, the term
APIs generally refers to JavaScript APIs in browsers. Of
the various API types, standard communication protocol
(SOAP), Representational State Transfer (REST), Graph
Query Language (QL), gRPC, Thrift, and REST are used
most commonly, as they offer greater flexibility (by sup-
porting multiple data formats and call types) and can be
understood easily.
APIs makes it easier for external applications to
access specific services. Open banking, through the
use of APIs, serves as a catalyst for fast payments by
supporting the integration of more and more financial
institutions. Standardized APIs enable inventive ways for
providers to extend their digital capabilities and cater to
the varied needs of customers across market segments
while remaining cost efficient.
The functionalities being made available through
APIs include merchant payments, transaction history,
business-to-business payments, e-commerce pay-
ments, authentication, account balance, bill payments,
profile management, P2P payments, and reversals.
Product categories of open APIs in the digital finan-
cial services space include consent/identity, ecosystem
expansion, data, and money movement APIs.
36
Key driv-
ers for API innovation and growth are the demand for
newer products that fintechs wish to cater to and banks
increasingly trying to compete in the fintech playing
field. The following are some of the common APIs used
in the payments space:
APIs for participants to connect to a payment sys-
tem (for example, to the fast payment arrangement)
APIs that enable direct participants to connect to
the central infrastructure via third-party providers
Bank APIs that allow indirect participants or cus-
tomers to use the bank’s interface
Payment/account-initiation APIs
Open banking APIs that allow third-party apps to
interact with the bank and to initiate payments over
the API
Other adjacent APIs, such as confirmation of payee,
which is used to validate the recipient information
before initiating the faster payment
Request to pay
APIs for information reconciliation and monitoring
APIs used in the settlement process for connection
to the central bank
Account aggregators
APIs help businesses and consumers access fast pay-
ments and initiate payments at any time and from any
location. There is potential for APIs to be used (or are
already being used) for communication between dif-
ferent players in the fast payment ecosystem, such as
between payer and payer bank, payer bank and third-
party players, and beneficiary bank and merchant,
among others.
As APIs are used more and more, and considering
the benefits of using APIs, there is a case to be made
for API standardization.
37
API standardization promotes
trustworthiness and reliability. Standardization of APIs
for functions such as payments or the submission of
reports (to the regulator) can reduce duplication of
functionality and lead to cost optimization by promot-
ing reuse.
38
API standardization, apart from others have
the following benefits:
Allows technology to be leveraged more effectively
and enhance customer experience while maintain-
ing security
Simplifies development and implementation of ca-
pabilities, lowers costs, and reduces project devel-
opment life cycle
APIs contribute toward the reduction of fraud by
facilitating quick communication with less friction
APIs can help meet customer expectations by en-
abling value-added services and driving innovation
in the payments space
BOX 6 APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACES
38 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
For more details, refer to the focus note on APIs, which
forms part of the Fast Payments Toolkit.
4.2.3 Network Connectivity
Strong and secure network connectivity is a necessary
condition for the sound operation of the different compo-
nents of a fast payment technical infrastructure.
As mentioned earlier, during the onboarding process, par-
ticipants are required to establish a secure connection with
the core technical infrastructure. This technical connection
allows participants to exchange payment and nonpayment
messages with the operator and with other participants.
The operator transmits, reconciles, confirms, and submits
instructions for inter-participant settlement. The operator
can also provide additional support services, such as the fol-
lowing:
39
Translation between messaging formats
Defining and handling of error responses
Additional fraud detection and money-laundering
transaction-monitoring services
Calculation of switch fees and interparty fees
Reporting and providing of dashboards to participants
and possibly the regulator
Stakeholders need to determine the messaging protocol
for the communications between participants and the fast
payment infrastructure and to establish a secure connection
with the infrastructure using alternatives such as through
the following:
40
A proprietary communication network
The internet
Existing messaging system such as SWIFT or ATM switch
Third-party APIs
Jurisdiction analysis (see table 17) shows that as expe-
rience is gained operating fast payment infrastructures,
some jurisdictions have made a distinct separation between
the technical connection and settlement of funds, so that
participants can connect to the system under a variety of
approaches. In this model, participants can designate a TPSP
to send and receive payment and nonpayment messages.
It was also found that for most arrangements the access
framework also enables smaller financial institutions (gen-
erally lacking the necessary technical capability) to connect
easily to the system, also through APIs, as in the case of the
United Kingdom. Participants can also appoint an agent
financial institution to fulfill their settlement obligations.
TABLE 16: Select Findings and Insights into the Use of APIs in the Context of Fast Payments
Australia The NPP API framework defines the key technical approach and mandatory data attributes for NPP APIs, aligned
to ISO 20022. It is designed to support interoperability and standardization. APIs play an important role in helping
innovators and third parties to use the NPP’s capabilities. While NPPA does not mandate the use of this framework,
it encourages NPP participants, TPSPs, and software developers to refer to this framework or build further upon it
when developing API solutions for NPP transactions.
India There are standardized APIs only for UPI payments. UPI provides flexibility to support extensive APIs because it
uses a proprietary XML-based messaging format. Due to this, the adoption of APIs has been encouraging by banks
and third-party application providers. APIs are extended by banks or NPCI for either connecting to PSPs/UPI for
transactions or other value-added services, such as checking transaction status and retrieving transaction details.
More recently, APIs are also being used for customer account aggregation for business use cases.
Mexico Limited APIs are provided by Banco de México. SPEI allows the use of limited-purpose APIs for value-added services
such as checking transaction status and retrieving transaction details. CoDi, the overlay request-to-pay service, also
runs on an array of APIs that are open to all SPEI participants. Furthermore, Banco de México is considering allowing
access to third-party open APIs.
United Kingdom Under the framework developed by the Open Banking Implementation Entity (OBIE), three types of licenses are
granted: account-information service provider, payment-initiation service provider (PISP), and card-based payment
instrument issuer. Payment initiation, account aggregation, and card-based conformation of funds, among other
services, are provided through these. The scope of the PISP includes domestic, international, schedule future dated,
and standing order payments.
The open-banking framework covers the technical and nontechnical elements, such as customer experience
guidelines, operational guidelines (to track and monitor APIs developed by banks), the dispute-management
process, the liability framework, the TPP accreditation process, a conformance testing tool, dynamic client
registration, an API monitoring tool, and security specifications.
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 39
TABLE 17: Select Findings on Network Connectivity
Australia The NPP is a distributed switch of individual “payment access gateways” that route and exchange financial
messages between each other. It also allows “Connected Institutions” to connect directly with the system. These
institutions are able to initiate payments only from a customer account and do not provide clearing and settlement
services. “Connected Institutions” need to meet the technical and other associated requirements for setting up a
payment access gateway in their own environment. Financial institutions can also have indirect membership, solely
to perform either clearing or both clearing and settlement on behalf of a directly connected NPP full participant.
India When IMPS was launched, it was based on the existing National Financial Switch (that is, the switch for ATM
transactions) operated by NPCI. The National Financial Switch was the core technological infrastructure supporting
NPCI services. Gradually, IMPS operations were shifted to its own switch (called the Bharat Switch). Although the
Bharat Switch was developed by an external vendor, NPCI owns the source code.
UPI has its own central switch through which participants establish connection to the infrastructure. A key to
the ubiquity of UPI has been participation of third-party application providers. These are typically large technology
companies/merchants/aggregators/fintechs that connect to banks and provide UPI services to end users. Such
services may include the onboarding of both customers and merchants by PSPs for transfers and/or merchant
payment transactions, respectively.
1. Connectivity for third parties can be segregated on the basis of architecture:
Bank architecture–dependent model
Single PSP model
Multibank model (NPCI has mandated third-party application providers processing more than 5 percent of
UPI’s monthly volume to follow this model)
Service app model
Web/mobile app-based collect
QR/intent-based approach
2. Bank architecture–independent model (third party can connect to NPCI UPI central switch with limited
functionality)
Mexico SPEI uses an open-communication protocol that was specifically designed and does not require any specific
architecture, programming language, or operating system. Banco de México provides participants with the protocol
and all technical characteristics, so participants can choose between developing their own software for connecting
their internal systems to SPEI or hiring a technical provider for this purpose.
United Kingdom Participants can connect to FPS using the two following alternatives:
Through physical cables
Using third-party APIs
If a participant connects through physical cables, it incurs costs, such as those for setting up the data center, the
physical cables, and establishing the cross-linkage connection. Typically, it costs between $300,000 and $1 million
to connect to the system using a physical network. There are additional expenses, such as a due-diligence cost for
an audit at the data center to maintain data security.
In contrast, if the participant opts to connect through third-party APIs, the above costs are reduced. Some players
(for example, Form 3 and Payport) have connected to the central infrastructure using physical cables and provide
technical support to other participants using APIs. The connectivity approach is suitable for small PSPs, as it reduces
the onboarding time while allowing them to connect directly.
Directly connected settling participants are directly connected to the central infrastructure of FPS and can carry
out their own settlement, while directly connected non-settling participants are directly connected to the central
infrastructure but require the former for settlement. Indirect agencies rely on direct participants for connection and
settlement.
United States RTP has made a distinct separation between the technical connection and settlement of funds. This allows
participants to connect directly with the system but fulfill settlement obligations through other financial
institutions. Alternatively, the participants can designate a TPSP to act on their behalf as agent to send and receive
transmissions of payment messages, payment message responses, and nonpayment messages, using the TPSP’s
technical connection.
40 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
4.2.4 Clearing and Settlement
Clearing and settlement are core functions for ensuring
a swift, safe, and seamless flow of funds from one par-
ticipant to another. Different models for clearing and
settlement exist in practice. The choice depends on sev-
eral country- and system-specific considerations. While
deferred net settlement is prevalent at present, real-time
settlement models are becoming more common in new
fast payment implementations.
Three types of inter-participant clearing models were
observed as part of the study (see figure 12 and table 18):
Hub approach: A third-party organization (for example,
a clearinghouse) acts as a hub handling the clearing be-
tween the participants and manages the downstream
settlement with the central bank. The participants pre-
fund the account or pledge collateral, and the clear-
inghouse performs real-time clearing and provides up-
dates to the participants. The hub also sends settlement
instructions to the central bank’s RTGS system, where
the actual movement of funds occurs. Jurisdictions that
have adopted a hub approach include India, Singapore
and the United Kingdom.
RTGS-based approach: The RTGS system supports clear-
ing and undertakes settlement of fast payment transac-
tions. The RTGS system does not validate payment in-
structions received as part of the arrangement, and any
failure of payment results in the return of the payment
instruction to the originating participant. This approach
has been adopted by Mexico and the United States.
Distributed clearing: Validation and confirmation of
payment instructions are carried out by the participat-
ing bank. Clearing is carried out in real time on a 24/7
basis. Subsequently, the payer bank instigates the settle-
ment instruction to the central bank, which is processed
on a real-time basis. Australia follows the distributed
clearing approach.
Regarding settlement, the choice of a settlement model
has important consequences on safety and efficiency. The
two major payment settlement models for fast payments as
observed in this study are (i) deferred net settlement and (ii)
real-time settlement.
Deferred net settlement -(DNS): In a DNS model, the
settlement of inter-participant obligations occurs on a net
basis at some later time, at the end of a predefined cycle
either once or multiple times during a day. This model is
more efficient, as it reduces the liquidity needs. However,
a DNS system has its inherent risk, as the buildup of net
debit positions may give rise to credit risk if not properly
managed by appropriate risk-mitigation measures such as
debit caps, guarantee funds, prefunding, collateral arrange-
ments, and so on.
Real-time settlement: In a real-time settlement model,
there is continuous settlement of funds on an order-by-or-
der basis. In this model, a fast payment transaction will be
completed only if the relevant originating participant has
adequate balances in its settlement account with the central
bank (or other entity acting as the settlement agent). Credit
risk between participants is therefore eliminated, and real-
time settlement enables immediate finality of all payments.
FIGURE 12: Observed Clearing Models
Hub
Approach
RTGS
Approach
Distributed
Clearing
Approach
ii
iii
ii
BANK A
CENTRAL BANK
REAL TIME 24x7x365
CENTRAL BANK
THIRD PARTY
CENTRAL BANK
BANK B BANK A BANK B BANK A BANK B
CLEARING
CLEARING
Mirror A/Cs
RTGS SettlementRTGS Settlement
RTGS Settlement
i
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 41
However, demands on liquidity in this model are higher, and
additional tools are generally required to manage liquidity
risk. The latter may include access to the intraday credit
facility from the central bank that is available for the RTGS
system, though this facility is typically restricted to banks.
There is also the issue that the RTGS system may be regularly
closed for some hours during the day, in which case, a fast
payment arrangement using this settlement model would
face obvious difficulties to achieve real-time finality. Juris-
dictions are observed to be increasing the operating hours
for RTGS; some jurisdictions are making the RTGS available
on a 24x7 basis.
Figure 13 shows the actual settlement models chosen
by jurisdictions for fast payments. A DNS model has been
adopted by 11 of the 16 jurisdictions studied. Neverthe-
less, the broader analysis of the more than 50 jurisdictions
showed that real-time settlement is witnessing increased
uptake, especially for new fast payment implementations.
Another trend that was observed in several jurisdictions
(see table 18) is the adoption of prefunding for the fast pay-
ment arrangement, as in Poland and the United States. Pre-
funding in this case means that PSPs are required to place
cash deposits in a segregated escrow account (or equivalent)
to cover their expected transactions. Through prefunding,
payment orders can be processed in real time, with no credit
or liquidity risks. However, prefunding carries a cost, such as
interest loss on the respective funds and opportunity costs.
41
Finally, in all the jurisdictions studied, the central bank is
involved in the settlement of inter-participant positions. Final
settlement occurs in the RTGS system or RTGS-equivalent
account maintained with the central bank of the country.
The rationale for adopting DNS or real-time settlement
for FPS is based on market arrangements already in place
for other retail payment systems. Whether the FPS is to be
operated by the central bank itself, the system design and
access to the RTGS, and whether the RTGS will be available
on a 24x7 basis are also factors to consider when adopting a
particular model for settlement. The benefit of DNS is liquid-
ity saving due to netting, whereas continuous availability
of funds is required for settlement in a real-time model.
42
The timing of inter-PSP settlement in a DNS arrangement
varies across jurisdictions. DNS generates credit exposures
between the PSPs, as the PSP credits the funds in the
account of its customer before receiving the funds from the
PSP of the payer, an implicit credit and a consequent credit
risk. The credit and liquidity risk in DNS may exacerbate if
not managed and mitigated. Some of the measures that
are implemented to mitigate the risk associated with DNS
are (i) limits on the maximum value of individual fast pay-
ments that can be processed; (ii) loss-sharing agreements
that detail, ex ante, how the surviving participants would
cover the loss created by a defaulting participant; (iii) limits
on the maximum net debit or credit positions that can be
established between participants, or on the maximum gross
aggregate positions; (iv) collateralization of the debit posi-
tions, either with securities or cash collateral, to ensure that
resources are available to support settlement; and (v) the
prefunding of positions by individual participants, by means
JURISDICTION
DEFERRED NET
SETTLEMENT
REAL TIME
SETTLEMENT
Australia
Bahrain
Chile
China
EU
Hong Kong
SAR, China
India
Kenya
FIGURE 13: Participant Settlement Models Adopted for Fast Payment Arrangements
JURISDICTION
DEFERRED NET
SETTLEMENT
REAL TIME
SETTLEMENT
Malaysia
Mexico
(Hybrid)
Nigeria
Poland
Singapore
Thailand
UK
USA
42 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
TABLE 18: Select Findings on the Clearing and Settlement Models Used for Fast Payments
Australia The NPP uses a real-time settlement model with a distributed clearing system. This has been the norm in Australia
for many years. This clearing approach was chosen over a hub model because distributed clearing provides
resilience—that is, if one node goes down, the other nodes can continue to be operational.
Chile Final inter-participant settlement is performed on a DNS basis. Participants in TEF can choose either to clear
transactions through a private clearinghouse (that is, Combanc) and perform final settlement via the central bank’s
RTGS system at the end of the day or to settle their obligations directly in RTGS.
European Union For SCT Inst, PSPs must be connected to at least one CSM to receive or send payments. They can choose between
pan-European providers such as TIPS or RT1 or regional providers such as STET, Equens Worldline, CEC, Iberpay, and
others.
43
Transactions processed through TIPS are settled immediately in central bank money. ACHs offering SCT Inst
services settle in their own books, although settlement is backed by funds held in a central bank account. In other
words, the CSM’s account at the central bank is used to support settlement in the CSM’s books.
In July 2020, European Central Bank’s Governing Council decided that all PSPs that have joined SCT Inst and are
reachable in the central bank’s RTGS system, as well as all ACHs offering SCT Inst services, would have to join TIPS,
to ensure full reachability among scheme participants.
44
Following the implementation of these measures, it will still
be possible to settle transactions internally in a private CSM, but the funds backing these transactions will be held in
TIPS, and cross-CSM transactions will be settled in TIPS.
Hong Kong SAR,
China
FPS uses real-time settlement across the books of the HKMA (for Hong Kong dollars) and Bank of China Hong
Kong (for renminbi) as long as sufficient funds are in the FPS ledger accounts of the originating participant. Each
settlement participant has a settlement account (including a CHATS ledger account and an FPS ledger account)
with HKMA in accordance with the conditions for the operation of the settlement account, whereas each clearing
participant keeps an account with a settlement participant. Settlements are irrevocable and enjoy immediate
finality.
India Settlement service in IMPS and UPI is provided by NPCI (by virtue of its “Type D” RTGS membership) using a DNS
model. Settlement occurs in the RBI’s RTGS system. Participant settlement positions are passed as “Multilateral Net
Settlement Batches” using the Net Settlement Interface. While the approach and process remain similar, IMPS and
UPI settlements were separated by NPCI within the first year of UPI’s launch because the net obligations had to
arrive separately for the two systems in line with legal and regulatory requirements. The RTGS system, operated by
the RBI, has been available around the clock on all days since December 2020.
Settlement for IMPS and UPI now takes place six times a day 365 days a year with the RTGS system now being
available on all days. NPCI is planning to extend the number of settlement cycles to eight in the near future.
DNS was chosen owing to its a priori appropriateness for systems handling substantial volumes. Lower liquidity
requirements were also deemed crucial. As per the RBI’s directions, clearinghouses (such as NPCI) need to publish
the time of arrival at the net settlement position for members to ensure adequate funds availability. Also, the time
between arriving at the net settlement position and the actual posting of this position should be as short as possible.
Mexico SPEI has adopted a hybrid real-time settlement system for payments. It uses a multilateral offsetting algorithm
running in quick successions (every three seconds or a configurable number of payments) to clear and settle
transactions. The algorithm selects those transactions that can be settled based on available balances in the
participants’ settlement accounts and clears and settles in batch mode. The transactions that cannot be settled
because of a lack of liquidity remain in the queue, except for CoDi transfers. At the start of operations, participants
transfer funds from their accounts at Banco de México’s Account Holders Service System (SIAC) to their SPEI
account. At the end of the day, positive balances in SPEI are credited to banks’ current accounts in SIAC or to a
concentration account within the system for participants without a SIAC account.
Poland Express Elixir has adopted a prefunding model where all participating banks deposit funds in a fiduciary account
maintained by the National Bank of Poland, whose balance determines whether a participant may submit payment
orders. On this basis, each participant has a defined limit of transactions, and transactions are executed only up to
that limit. If the limit for sent orders is exceeded, the payment order is rejected immediately.
United States Settlement in RTP is done using a real-time settlement model through a fully prefunded account that is jointly
owned by all the participating financial institutions in the Federal Reserve. All payments are prefunded by the
sending participant into the joint account. RTP verifies and reserves settlement capacity by the sending participant
before forwarding the payment to the receiving participant, eliminating the risk of settlement failure. In case the
sending participant has an insufficient prefunded position to cover a payment, the core infrastructure will reject
the payment. Overdrafts or negative prefunded positions are also not permitted in the RTP system. The use of a
prefunded model eliminates the settlement risk and enables immediate finality of all payments.
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 43
of cash coupled with operational controls that keep posi-
tions from exceeding prefunded amounts. In contrast, indi-
vidual fast payments involve the provision of irrevocable and
unconditional funds by the payee’s PSP to the payee. The
technological capability and capacity of the RTGS to settle
FPS in real time is also one of the factors to consider when
deciding on the settlement model to be adopted. Real-time
settlement implies that the PSP credits the funds to its cus-
tomer only after settlement between PSPs has taken place.
As a result, this settlement model avoids credit risk between
participating PSPs and the need for having risk-mitigation
measures to mitigate credit risk. The consequence, how-
ever, is that PSPs continuously require sufficient liquidity to
ensure the settlement of fast payments.
4.2.5 Interoperability
Interoperability among payment instruments and arrange-
ments—including fast payments—is a crucial feature of
the NPS.
Some jurisdictions are already working on enabling
retail cross-border payments via their fast payment
arrangements.
Interoperability in the context of fast payments is enabled
by a set of technical, process, and operational standards.
45
Common standards create a common language between
banks and other PSPs for processing transactions and facil-
itate a seamless and efficient flow of information. Having
a common standard across the whole payment ecosystem
can also facilitate the integration of fast payments into
other components of the NPS. Interoperability can also exist
between PSPs, between payment instruments, and for such
use cases as cross-border payments.
Table 19 provides details on interoperability as per the
findings of the study. Perhaps the main aspect that emerges
from this table is that the participation of non-banks in fast
payment arrangements paves the way for interoperability
between banks and non-bank PSPs. Through this participa-
tion, be it direct or indirect, most of the systems that were
analyzed already support bank account-to-wallet transac-
tions and vice versa.
Some jurisdictions are also working on enabling retail
cross-border payments via their fast payment arrange-
ments. For example, in Australia, the NPP infrastructure
and associated rules framework have been enhanced
and extended to support the domestic leg of an inbound
cross-border payment with the creation of the scheme-ag-
nostic business service International Funds Transfer Instruc-
tion. This enables correspondent banks to send these
payments to the ultimate beneficiary or customer over the
NPP as the final leg of the cross-border payment process.
In the European Union, SCT Inst One Leg (Out) transactions
for international transactions beyond the European Union
are currently under development. The EPC has granted
licenses to some non-eurozone countries, allowing them to
use the building blocks of the scheme for non-euro trans-
actions. In Kenya, banks have integrated with international
money-transfer operators to facilitate inward remittances
through PesaLink. In the case of Singapore and Thailand,
Australia Currently, the NPP does not support account-to-wallet transactions and vice versa. However, these transactions may
be facilitated through over-the-top services provided by overlay service providers in the future. NPP payments can
be made only by logging into the internet and/or mobile-banking application of a participating financial institution
and authorizing a payment. The NPP enables transfers between accounts at different participating financial
institutions, including between banks and non-banks.
China Credit transfers, direct debits, and e-wallets are supported as payment instruments. IBPS supports account-to-wallet
transactions and vice versa.
India IMPS supports account-to-wallet transactions and vice versa. Such interoperability was supported by handling
fields such as account identifiers with either an account number or a wallet number based on the instrument. Other
aspects that were considered include differences in rules, such as permissible transaction limits or threshold balance
requirements for prepaid payment instruments (PPIs). The RBI has allowed PPI issuers to give the holders of full-KYC
PPIs (that is, PPIs that are compliant with know-your-customer requirements) interoperability through authorized
card networks (for PPIs in the form of cards) and UPI (for PPIs in the form of electronic wallets).
Malaysia Both banks and eligible non-bank PSPs (including wallet providers) participate in RPP. The RPP platform promotes
interoperability and facilitates seamless payments between accounts maintained with banks (bank accounts) and
non-bank participants (e-money accounts).
Mexico SPEI allows direct participation by all regulated financial institutions. This allows interoperability between all
participant banks and non-bank PSPs (that is, transfers between banks and non-banks).
Nigeria NIBSS Instant Payment (NIP) allows both banks and mobile-money operators to participate in its system as direct
participants, and transactions between the two are interoperable.
Thailand Credit transfers and e-wallets are supported as payment instruments. PromptPay supports account-to-wallet
transactions and vice versa.
TABLE 19: Select Findings on Interoperability
44 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
The key difference between a domestic payment sys-
tem and a cross-border payment arrangement is that a
cross-border arrangement does not fall under a single
set of laws and regulations. In practice, most cross-bor-
der payments today are processed using a proliferation
of bilateral agreements between institutions, often
leveraging international messaging networks for com-
munication (but not for payment processing).
A number of industry players have launched new
services or partnerships to improve the speed, transpar-
ency, and cost of cross-border payments through the
innovative use of traditional systems or services or by
leveraging new technology, such as distributed ledger
technology. Some of these different approaches and
examples are summarized below:
SWIFT has launched global payment innovation
(gpi) Instant, a new service for real-time cross-bor-
der payments and transfers. SWIFT gpi Instant car-
ried out pilots with Australia’s NPP for payments
between Australia and China; Singapore’s FAST,
which involved 17 banks across seven countries
(that is, Australia, Canada, China, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Singapore, and Thailand); and banks
and TIPS in Europe. The new service is being rolled
out initially in the British market and Lloyds Banking
Group is the first to go live. The gpi Instant ser-
vice works by connecting SWIFT gpi with real-time
domestic infrastructure. It enables banks to use ex-
isting infrastructure to provide better service 24/7,
with faster speeds, clarity on fees, and predictability
about when an end beneficiary’s account will be
credited.
International card networks such as Visa and Mas-
tercard have also pursued opportunities to leverage
their infrastructures to improve cross-border pay-
ments. Visa’s B2B Connect platform
46
is an API-based
non-card network that uses distributed ledger tech-
nology to settle large-value transactions between fi-
nancial institutions in the Visa network. B2B Connect
provides a single, multilateral network that incorpo-
rates not only payments messaging but also ID-au-
thentication and security features to allow banks to
exchange cross-border payments on a same-day or
next-day basis. Mastercard has recently announced
a partnership with the international money-transfer
start-up TransferGo to develop the near-real-time
exchange of cross-border payments for consumers
and businesses.
47
The initiative will leverage Master-
card Send and TransferGo’s remittance network to
allow customers to circumvent legacy correspon-
dent banking networks to speed the processing of
cross-border payments.
The two largest global remittance providers have
been active in developing partnerships to speed
up cross-border transaction processing. In October
2020, Western Union announced real-time payout
capabilities in 80 countries,
48
while MoneyGram has
partnered with institutions such as Visa to enable
fast payments between certain corridors. More re-
cent entrants in the international remittance space,
such as Wise (formerly TransferWise), have also seen
success in recent years by providing international
transfers at lower cost and faster speed than legacy
remittance providers, including the ability for cus-
tomers to compare the cost of international transfers
between Wise and other PSPs (including fintechs, re-
mittance providers, and financial institutions).
Ripple has developed a network based on distrib-
uted ledger technology for cross-border payments.
The RippleNet network allows financial institutions to
send and receive international payments from a single
prefunded account. RippleNet allows for fiat-to-fiat
BOX 7 CROSS-BORDER ASPECTS
continued
the MAS and BOT linked PayNow and PromptPay in 2021.
Challenges identified include aligning with regulations,
complying with KYC/AML guidelines, risk control, and
robust data security measures.
The main challenges identified in enabling real-time
cross-border payments include agreeing on a common
messaging standard and devising a viable clearing and
settlement model, including rules for foreign currency
exchange. Box 7 provides a deeper discussion of aspects
related to integrating fast payment arrangements across
borders.
For more details, refer to the focus notes on interopera-
bility aspects and on cross-border aspects, which form part
of the Fast Payments Toolkit.
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 45
transactions as well as the use of the XRP digital cur-
rency to bridge between different jurisdictions.
The G-20 has published a road map to enhance cross-
border payments ahead of the G-20’s October 2020
meeting.
49
The Financial Stability Board’s road map
includes five focus areas, four of which are centered
on enhancements to current cross-border payment
arrangements and improvements that can be made to
existing payment systems that can enhance the speed,
cost, transparency, and service levels experienced by
consumers and businesses when sending or receiving
international payments, as well as potential changes
that may be needed for regulatory and supervisory
frameworks. The fifth focus area looks at the potential
for the development of new payment infrastructures
and arrangements.
As with domestic payment systems, prior to the
deployment of a new cross-border linkage or multilat-
eral cross-border payment system, all relevant stake-
holders should have a firm understanding of the goals,
use cases, and target audience. The relevant authorities
should analyze the following aspects: (i) determine key
use cases/goal of FPS for cross-border FPS; (ii) assess
existing payment systems for cross-border use; (iii)
assess existing legal/regulatory frameworks; (iv) identify
participating markets and participants in the fast pay-
ment arrangement; (v) determine an appropriate gov-
ernance structure; (vi) determine key functionality and
technical specifications; (vii) develop scheme rules and
operational guidelines; (viii) develop tender specifica-
tions and assessment criteria (if applicable); (ix) assess
tender responses and select a technology provider (if
applicable); and (x) test and implement the cross-bor-
der arrangement.
A cross-border fast payment arrangement will require
cooperation between financial institutions and national
authorities from multiple jurisdictions. This international
cooperation is absolutely vital.
B O X 7, continued
4.3 MODULE C: FEATURES OF FAST PAYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS
This module focuses on assessing customers’ needs, such
as speed, payment certainty, a simple and convenient
user experience, pricing, clarity on the timing of delivery,
and integration with bank account/mobile wallet/e-money,
among others. The following four specific insights are cov-
ered in this module:
1. Payment instruments, payment types supported, and
use cases/services
2. Overlay services and aliases
3. Access channels
4. User uptake
4.3.1 Payment Instruments, Payment Types
Supported, and Use Cases/Services
The availability of key use cases, such as P2P and per-
son-to-business (P2B, or merchant and bill payments), is
critical for fast payment uptake and growth. While P2P
payments have been the genesis of many fast payment
arrangements, P2B payments—including through request
to pay—are accelerating generalized adoption.
For what concerns payment instruments, all fast payment
arrangements studied support credit transfers, and some
also support direct debits and e-money as payment instru-
ments. (See figure 14.) Direct debits are currently supported
in China, Hong Kong SAR, China,
50
India, Nigeria, and Sin-
gapore, among others, and they are being developed in
Australia and Malaysia. E-money payment instruments are
supported in Chile, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Mexico,
Nigeria, Thailand, and the United States.
Push and pull instruments are an alternate classification
of payment instruments. (See characteristics in figure 15.)
Push-payment instruments include credit transfers and
e-money, while pull-payment instruments include checks
and direct debits. Credit and debit cards are conceptually a
pull transaction.
All fast payment arrangements studied have adopted a
credit-push methodology that requires the payer to specify
the account number (or proxy identity where aliases exist)
of the payee in the payment message. This ensures that the
payer controls the transactions that are initiated via her/his
account. A few, including Bahrain, India, Poland, Thailand,
and the United Kingdom, have also adopted credit pull. In
cases such as Mexico’s SPEI, the request-to-pay functionality
is implemented as a credit push, as the movement of funds
is initiated by the payer once it gives authorization to pro-
ceed with the request.
46 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
Furthermore, the adoption of fast payments depends
largely on the type of payment types and use cases/
additional services provided by it. Arrangements supporting
more payment types and use cases witnessed higher uptake
and overall growth compared to arrangements with limited
offerings.
Regarding payment types, these include payments
between and among individuals, businesses, and govern-
ments. Every payment type can be segmented into cat-
egories, depending on the direction of the flow of the
transaction. (See figure 16.)
JURISDICTION
CREDIT
TRANSFER
DIRECT
DEBIT E-MONEY
Australia
Bahrain
Chile
China
EU
Hong Kong
SAR, China
India
Kenya
FIGURE 14: Payment Instruments Supported by Fast Payment Arrangements
JURISDICTION
CREDIT
TRANSFER
DIRECT
DEBIT E-MONEY
Malaysia
Mexico
Nigeria
Poland
Singapore
Thailand
UK
USA
FIGURE 15: Transaction and Message Flow for Push and Pull Payments
Flow chart for push transactions
PAYMENT MESSAGE DIRECTION
MONEY FLOW DIRECTION
Payment
System
Payer bank
Payer PayeePayee bank
Flow chart for pull transactions
PAYMENT MESSAGE DIRECTION
MONEY FLOW DIRECTION
Payment
System
Payee bank
Payee PayerPayer bank
FIGURE 16: Payment Types
PAYER
PAYEE CONSUMER BUSINESS GOVERNMENT
Consumer P2P P2B P2G
Business B2P B2B B2G
Government G2P G2B G2G
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 47
FIGURE 16: Payment Types
FIGURE 17: Use Cases Supported by Fast Payment Arrangements
JURISDICTION P2P
MERCHANT
PAYMENT
BILL
PAYMENT
REQUEST
TO PAY
BULK
PAYMENT
FUTURE-DATED
PAYMENT
Australia
1
Bahrain
2
Chile
China
EU
3
Hong Kong
SAR, China
India
4
Kenya
Malaysia
5
Mexico
Nigeria
Poland
Singapore
Thailand
6
UK
USA
1 In Australia, use cases such as Request to Pay, Future Payments and Bulk Payments are under development
2 In Bahrain, Request to Pay is supported by BenefitPay and Bill Payments by Fawateer
3 In EU, Request To Pay is under development4In India, UPI also supports Non-Financial Transactions, Initial Public Offering
Subscription, and Foreign Inward Remittance
5 In Malaysia, new services, i.e. Request To Pay, Consent (e-Mandates), Real-Time Debit and Cross-Border Payments are under
development
6 In Thailand, PromptPay also supports e-Donation
In turn, use cases/services are specific situations in which
a payment product or service could potentially be used,
such as for bill payments and merchant payments. Actual
uses cases supported by fast payment arrangements in the
studied jurisdictions are illustrated in figure 17.
The P2P payment type and use cases associated with it
have been the genesis of many fast payment arrangements.
As customers grew used to fast payments, they became
more comfortable making merchant, bill, and government
payments via this same platform. Furthermore, to increase
merchant and bill payments, operators and participants in
jurisdictions such as Hong Kong SAR, China, India, and Thai-
land have also provided incentives in the form of cashback
offers, discounts, and coupons.
In any case, an important lesson is that large-scale adop-
tion of P2P payments has been a cornerstone for the adop-
tion of other payment types.
During the study, it was found that operators have
adopted two main methods of introducing payment types
and use cases.
48 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
In certain jurisdictions, operators have defined the var-
ious payment types and associated use cases based on
their understanding of the market. These were intro-
duced in one go or in phases. For example, PromptPay
in Thailand started only with inter-bank credit transfers.
After its launch, support for several use cases/services,
such as cross-bank bill payments, request to pay, and
e-donations, were introduced in a phased manner.
A few jurisdictions adopted a different method: The op-
erator introduced the fast payment arrangement and let
various market players decide on various use cases. Exam-
ples include SCT Inst in the European Union, Mexico, Po-
land, and the United Kingdom. For example, operators in
Mexico and Poland were of the view that market players
are in the best position to determine the use cases suit-
able for the local market and that their responsibility is to
provide a robust underlying infrastructure that is flexible
enough to support various innovative use cases.
Australia and Thailand provide examples of fast payments
enabling business and government payment types and their
associated use cases/services. In Australia, the NPP enables
businesses to extend usage to accept merchant payments.
Additionally, the NPP has published its own QR code stan-
dard for both dynamic and static QR codes that merchants
can use. In 2019, NPPA published a road map with plans to
roll out the Mandated Payments Services, which is the core
capability to enable use cases such as request to pay, bulk/
batch payments, and scheduled future payments. The devel-
opment of this capability will involve considerable effort to
implement, requiring changes to existing back-office pro-
cesses and systems. All participating financial institutions are
required to implement this capability by December 2021.
In Thailand, merchant payments are allowed in PromptPay
through the request-to-pay functionality and via QR codes.
After the launch of standardized Thai QR codes, support
for QR payment was enabled by launching MyPromptQR in
September 2019. Furthermore, government agencies in the
country are processing social-assistance cash transfers and
tax refunds through PromptPay, which has resulted in signif-
icant increases in user registration in PromptPay.
Finally, one of the most noteworthy features in many fast
payment arrangements is the availability of a request-to-pay
functionality, as it offers a wide range of use cases across
consumers and businesses. Request to pay also offers an
effective alternative to card payments and traditional direct
debits. Box 8 provides more details on the essentials of a
request functionality.
Further, table 20 provides details on select findings on
the request-to-pay functionality in fast payments studied for
this guide. One key issue that emerged from the analysis of
the jurisdictions in this table is that request to pay increases
convenience to payers by eliminating the need to input mul-
tiple information details. Through this, recipients (in partic-
ular, merchants) can efficiently and seamlessly notify payers
of the underling payment obligation so the payers can take
action, but payers retain full control over the actual payment
process (that is, the actual flow of funds).
In essence, a request-to-pay functionality enables a
payee to make a request for the initiation of a pay-
ment by a payer. The payee and payer may be persons,
businesses, or any other payment account holders. The
essential steps in a request-to-pay process are the fol-
lowing:
A request is made by the payee.
The payer is provided with information on the
amount, the purpose of the transaction, and payee
information.
The payer decides to approve or decline the re-
quest, resulting in the authorization (or refusal) of
the payment.
Upon approval of the payment request, the pay-
ers PSP is instructed to execute a payment to the
payee.
Some of the standard use cases associated with request
to pay include P2P payments, e-billing/invoicing,
e-commerce payments, and point-of-sale payments.
Jurisdictions such as India, Thailand, the United King-
dom, and the United States, offer request-to-pay
services as an underlying functionality of their fast pay-
ment arrangement, whereas other jurisdictions, such as
Mexico, have introduced this functionality as an overlay
service.
BOX 8 REQUEST TO PAY IN FAST PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 49
TABLE 20: Select Findings and Insights into Request-to-Pay Functionalities and Services
India The UPI system supports request to pay, through which a user can request a payment using the UPI ID or saved
contacts. After this, the payer has to authorize the payment to complete the transaction. Payers can define minimum
and maximum validity time (or a default is set). An alert is also sent to payers before the collect request expires.
Incrementally, certain security measures are added, including the following:
An option for customers to block UPI IDs to restrict future requests
Validation of core banking name
Standardized SMS for payers
Option to save requests (marked as ”safe”)
Velocity checks are performed, and there is a cap on transactions that can be initiated each day and week.
Kenya Currently, PesaLink is upgrading its capabilities. Once completed, it will support new use cases, such request to pay,
which will be instrumented as a pull-payment facility.
Mexico Banco de México introduced a standardized request-to-pay functionality through the overlay service CoDi. It was
designed to simplify and homogenize the experience of requesting a payment or answering a request to pay by
payers. It has complemented such use cases/services as bill payments and merchant payments.
In practice, CoDi’s introduction has resolved the problem of inputting a lot of information. Security elements
in CoDi are embedded in the request-to-pay message. Once a message is received, a payer will be redirected to
her/his banking app and to the last step of the sending process of a traditional SPEI transfer order, in which all the
information of the recipient account is already pre-populated and only a final validation is required. Banco de México
has mandated banking institutions that offer a mobile-phone application and have more than 3,000 accounts to
provide the CoDi services.
Thailand The request-to-pay functionality PayAlert was enabled in March 2018 as an underlying functionality of PromptPay.
The service allows vendors and businesses to send notifications to consumers to request payments. It consists of the
following two steps:
Notification: Retailers/online sellers send messages along with their PromptPay IDs to buyers to request payments.
Payment: Buyers/payers receive messages via bank channels such as mobile banking and choose to confirm
payments.
United Kingdom In 2020, the request-to-pay functionality was launched, and “Confirmation of Payee” was also launched during the
same period. It enables banks to verify the credentials of payees before processing transactions.
United States RTP supports request-to-pay services. This functionality provides payees with an effective method to initiate a
potential transaction, while also combatting fraud and allowing the payer to maintain control over the payment flow.
(For example, the payer is provided with the necessary pre-populated information to authorize the payment, and
only the payer can initiate the actual flow of funds.)
4.3.2 Overlay Services and Aliases
Overlay services and aliases have proved critical for increas-
ing the velocity of uptake of fast payments and therefore
have been or are being developed in most jurisdictions.
Overlay services enable support for access channels such as
QR codes and additional use cases such as request to pay,
schedule future payments, reconciliation, and aliases. With
the help of overlay services, customers can typically make
payments via mobile devices through user-friendly applica-
tions and aliases, thus enhancing customer experience.
Table 21 describes the experience of selected jurisdic-
tions with overlay services. Most of them introduced overlay
services as a follow-up, after the fast payment arrangement
went live. Certain jurisdictions’ offerings, such as Malaysia’s
DuitNow, Poland’s BLIK, and the United Kingdom’s Paym,
are explicitly called out as overlay services. In the case of
Mexico, overlay is owned by the operator, whereas in Aus-
tralia and Poland, they are operated by separate entities. Yet
in other cases, such as Singapore, the owner of the overlay
service is a separate entity, but the entity operating them is
the fast payment operator.
Aliases are regarded as a subcategory of overlay services
and entail the use of mobile numbers, email IDs, and so on
as proxy addresses for customer account numbers, allowing
end users to make transactions without needing to know
the specific account number of the payee, which is typically
hard to remember. Some fast payment arrangements even
offer proxy look-up for customer convenience. The simplic-
ity associated with aliases has also been a major driver for
widespread adoption of fast payments.
Payment system operators need to establish proxy data-
bases to facilitate alias mapping. Globally, operators have
adopted the following two main approaches for develop-
ing their proxy databases: (i) A centralized database: The
mapping of the proxy identifier to accounts takes place
through a central repository. A central database offers the
most straightforward implementation of the proxy service.
(ii) A decentralized database: An authentication message is
sent to the beneficiary bank or other PSP to map the proxy
identifier to the final beneficiary’s account. Box 9 provides
a more detailed discussion on the use of aliases for fast
payments.
50 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
TABLE 21: Select Findings on Overlay Services
Australia Osko, owned and operated by Bpay, a separate entity, is an overlay service on the NPP. It is a consumer-oriented
convenience” service that works together with banks and other financial institutions to enable NPP payments using
existing online banking. More than 70 entities have rolled out Osko, and approximately 80 percent of transactions
through the NPP are actually Osko-related transactions.
Entities implemented Osko so they could easily route direct credit/entry transactions via Osko without changing
the customer experience. This ensures common messaging, which allows end users to understand the service
irrespective of which PSP they use. Osko payments can be used for person-to-person, person-to-business, business-
to-person, and business-to-business payments.
Malaysia DuitNow allows customers to send money instantly on a 24/7 basis to mobile numbers, National Registration ID Card
(NRIC) numbers, passport numbers, or business registration numbers. DuitNow supports future-dated and recurring
transfers.
Mexico In 2019, Banco de México launched CoDi as an overlay service that added a request-to-pay functionality over the
SPEI rail. CoDi also facilitates payments through proximity-based channels such as QR codes and NFC.
Poland The Express Elixir system supports only bank account numbers to make fast payments. BLIK, an overlay service
provider, uses Express Elixirs core capabilities to enable users to make real-time P2P transfers. BLIK enables the use
of a mobile number as an alias.
Singapore PayNow, the overlay service, is owned by the Association of Banks in Singapore, which is a separate entity from the
owner and operator of FAST. PayNow acts as an initiating interface of payments in FAST for retail customers of nine
participating banks.
Proxy identifiers or aliases are unique identifiers that
allow individuals and the business sector to transact
in a seamless manner without needing to know the
beneficiary’s bank account details (such as bank name,
bank account number, or branch code).
51
The simplicity
associated with aliases has been a major driver for their
widespread adoption, as a bank account number (10
digits long or longer) is difficult to remember. A proxy
service can also help prevent bank account information
theft, reverse look-up attacks, and automated skim-
ming of customer information. Proxy identifiers should
be easy to remember, easy to share without risk, and
interoperable.
52
Apart from these parameters, cost and infrastructure
requirements need to be evaluated when choosing the
proxy identifiers. Implementation costs for a proxy ser-
vice depend on its construction, capacity requirements,
and data storage requirements. The most common
proxy identifiers used in payment systems are mobile-
phone numbers, email addresses, national ID numbers,
corporate registration numbers, and payment scheme/
service specific proxy identifiers.
Payment systems generally offer proxy look-up ser-
vice as a key offering to enhance the customer conve-
nience. PayPal and Apple Pay, among many others, are
also offering customers a choice to use proxy identifiers
(mobile numbers or email addresses) as a substitute to
card numbers while making payments.
Proxy identifiers can be stored on centralized or
decentralized databases that are encrypted and used
for proxy identifier or alias mapping. Participants should
also have suitable verification processes in place when
customers are registering an alias. Proxy identifiers can
be verified through several methods, such as biomet-
rics (when smartphone capabilities are available), and
via SMS and the verification of one-time passwords
(when biometrics are not available). The use of biomet-
ric authentication provides superior security. The choice
of a proxy database varies across different payment sys-
tems based on the regulatory environment, competition,
and prevalent market practices in a particular jurisdic-
tion. In Australia, a centralized database was put in place,
as it had a centralized regulatory authority along with a
single payment system operator, while in the European
Union’s SCT Inst, where multiple countries are involved,
it is quite difficult to establish a centralized database.
When choosing a proxy identifier, making it easy to
remember is important from a customer perspective,
as the intention is to simplify the payments experience.
The uniqueness of a proxy identifier is important from a
technical perspective so that the payment system accu-
rately identifies where to send the payment or request
BOX 9 ALIASES FOR FAST PAYMENTS
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 51
By far, mobile-phone numbers are the most common
form of alias. Furthermore, in most cases, the use of aliases is
not enabled by the operators of fast payment arrangements
but by the participants in those arrangements, often via an
overlay service, as shown in table 22.
For more details, refer to the focus note on proxy data-
bases and aliases, which forms part of the Fast Payments
Toolkit.
4.3.3 Access Channels
Internet and mobile banking are the dominant channels in
fast payments, although many arrangements still support
transactions through branches.
Newer access channels, such as QR codes, are becom-
ing significant drivers of fast payment adoption from both
a participant and regulator perspective.
Further, jurisdictions where financial inclusion has been
a driver for the launch of fast payments have also enabled
the USSD channel to overcome the barrier of smartphone
and data requirements.
for payment. If the capability is introduced as a core
functionality, there is more flexibility in how the capa-
bility can be used. While launching the proxy service,
strong customer-verification standards need to be put
in place to prevent the registration of fraudulent aliases.
It is also critical to ensure that necessary controls are in
place to prevent cybersecurity breaches and to estab-
lish independent testing of endpoints to ensure that
controls are working as intended in all channels.
It is important to establish data-security and privacy
measures while launching a proxy service. In addition,
PSPs need to obtain consent from customers to use a
particular proxy identifier. Payment system operators
also need to put in place rules regarding fraud risk
management and liability and to ensure that register-
ing parties have suitable verification processes in place
when customers are registering an alias.
BOX 9, continued
Mobile phone number
Corporate registration number (Business ID)
Scheme specific proxy identifier
Bank Account / Passport / National Identity Document / Driving License
Proxy identifiers
Base identifiers
Email address National identity number
Access channels refer to the modes used by customers to
initiate fast payment transactions. Among others, access
channels include branches, ATMs, self-service kiosks, mobile
banking, internet banking, and QR codes. Figure 18 illus-
trates the various access channels and their current rele-
vance for fast payments from a global perspective, while
figure 19 shows the channels supported by the actual fast
payment arrangements analyzed as part of the deep dives.
Although fast payments can be made through bank
branches/ATMs, these traditional channels are not preferred
by customers in most countries; instead, digital channels
such as internet banking and mobile banking are primarily
used. QR codes are increasingly emerging as key channels,
especially for P2B use cases, and adoption is widespread in
jurisdictions such as China and India, among others.
The following access channels are further discussed
below: (i) QR codes, (ii) NFC, (iii) Unstructured Supplemen-
tary Service Data (USSD), and (iv) agents.
52 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
Australia PayID is the addressing service that enables users, through their financial institution, to link their account to a simple,
easy-to-remember, unique identifier. The types of PayID are an email address, phone number, Australian Business
Number, Australian Company Number, Australian Registered Body Number, or Australian Registered Scheme Number.
However, the type of PayIDs available vary from institution to institution. The majority offers only a phone number,
email address, Australian Business Number, or an organization identifier, such as the company’s name.
PayIDs can be registered and managed only by participating financial institutions with encrypted account details.
This service also provides confirmation of the payee’s account name when a PayID is entered, which reduces the risk
of misdirecting a payment compared with using an account number to address a payment.
PayID has a secure central database to store all PayID information and is operated by SWIFT as part of the NPP
platform. PayID sits in the infrastructure of the NPP. (That is, it is a part of the core capability of the platform and is an
enabler that can be used by any overlay service.). However, NPPA does not have access to personal information in the
addressing service. Only participants in the NPP have access to PayID information.
India IMPS allowed a mobile number and mobile-money identifier (MMID) as aliases. MMID faced challenges during its
initial years, as it is difficult to remember due to its structure. Subsequently, the MMID format was simplified. Learnings
were incorporated in UPI by introducing a simplified UPI ID and its seamless creation process.
UPI uses a virtual payment address (VPA) that acts as a unique identifier and is independent of a bank account
number and other details. Users can set their custom VPAs, which can then be used to send or receive funds. It is in
the format of username@handle or username@bank or username@upi. In the VPA, “username” refers to the username
that customers can set in the UPI app, whereas “handle,” “bank,” and “upi” are the identifiers of banks or third-party
applications and are called “handles.” Addresses with the suffix “@UPI” act as global identifiers, for which address
resolution is performed at the UPI’s end. UPI ID data is mapped at the PSP’s end for address resolution.
Malaysia The DuitNow service was launched as part of RPP in December 2018. It enables a payer to make a seamless transfer
simply by inputting the recipient’s common identifier (DuitNow ID), which is linked to the recipient’s account. The
DuitNow ID that is supported under the DuitNow service includes the recipient’s mobile-phone number, NRIC
number, passport number, and business registration number.
Mexico SPEI allows a mobile number as an alias or proxy to complete payments. This is done in a decentralized database,
as customers have to link their mobile numbers with their PSP. To complete a transaction, customers have to input a
mobile number together with the PSP name. The central bank is considering including the national ID number as an
alias in the future.
Poland The overlay service BLIK supports the mobile number as an alias.
Singapore PayNow, the overlay service, enables retail customers to move Singapore dollar funds from one bank to another in
Singapore through FAST by using only their mobile number or Singapore NRIC/FIN. PayNow also allows recipients to use
the Unique Entity Number, the standard ID number of a business entity registered in Singapore, as a proxy address.
Thailand PromptPay uses proxies such as the national ID, mobile numbers, corporate registration numbers (tax ID number),
merchant ID, or e-wallet ID. Alias mapping is decentralized in PromptPay. Banks are required to map a customer’s ID
with the bank account number. Customers can use as an alias only a mobile number registered with a bank account.
United States RTP does not support the use of aliases or proxies for payments. There are no plans to launch RTP’s own social alias/
proxy service because the market is already well served and existing alias/proxy services might transition to RTP
payments to clear and settle transactions.
Nevertheless, the RTP network allows third parties to enable alias or proxy payments. For example, PayPal and
Venmo already use the RTP network for transfers to their client banks or credit union accounts using aliases. TCH has
also entered into partnerships with Zelle to provide settlement services.
FIGURE 18: Access Channels and Their Relevance for Fast Payments
TABLE 22: Select Findings on Aliases
Branch
Internet/Mobile Banking
Terminals
(ATMs, Kiosks)
Advanced contactless and
checkout channels (QR,
NFC, Bluetooth)
Agent Networks
Unstructured
Supplementary
Service Data (USSD)
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 53
i. QR Codes
Recent advances in the payments landscape have been
toward channels that support contactless and seamless
checkout experiences, such as QR codes. These are becom-
ing increasingly common, among both merchants and cus-
tomers. As part of the desk research, it was found that over
50 percent of fast payments in 25 jurisdictions examined,
support QR codes as an access channel. QR codes are clas-
sified based on two broad dimensions: the type of infor-
mation (static or dynamic) and the presenter of the code
(merchant or consumer).
The cost for smaller merchants to accept digital payments
has come down with QR codes. The initial cost for accep-
tance infrastructure for card payments through point-of-sale
JURISDICTION
INTERNET MOBILE
BANKING
BRANCH
BANKING
ADVANCED
CHANNELS
TERMINALS
(ATMS KIOSKS) USSD
AGENT
NETWORKS
Australia
(QR Code)
Bahrain
(QR Code)
Chile
China
(QR Code)
EU
(QR Code)
Hong Kong
SAR, China
(QR Code)
India
(QR Code, NFC)
Kenya
Malaysia
(QR Code)
Mexico
(QR Code, NFC)
Nigeria
(POS)
Poland
Singapore
(QR Code)
Thailand
(QR Code)
UK
1
USA
1 QR code under development
FIGURE 19: Access Channels Supported by Fast Payment Arrangements
machines for merchants is usually over $100, whereas the
cost for QR code payment infrastructure (QR code sticker)
can be as little as $1. The ongoing maintenance expense for
static QR codes is limited and basically comprises reprint-
ing the sticker in the event of wear and tear. Moreover, QR
codes provide the flexibility to invoke various other periph-
eral services, such as redirecting to a merchant’s website or
running promotional campaigns. Hence, these additional
features also foster customer adoption of QR codes, owing
to an enhanced customer experience.
Public authorities around the world observed the success
in select Asian jurisdictions and are working toward advanc-
ing QR payments to promote financial inclusion. For exam-
ple, central banks in emerging markets such as Ghana have
54 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
recently announced the launch of the Universal QR Code
and Proxy Pay platforms, in their quest to increase the usage
of digital payments.
In India, further to innovations in the QR code space,
Google Pay has also enabled Audio QR (Tez) for payments.
Certain jurisdictions, such as Mexico, enable QR code–based
payments through their overlay service. In Poland, standards
for presenting data via QR code were issued for the wider
payment ecosystem. However, a specific set of standards
for QR codes was not rolled out with the introduction of
Express Elixir or in the overlay BLIK, because QR codes have
not received much traction as a channel in the Polish market.
Nevertheless, the operator of Express Elixir built the platform
so that payments via QR codes can be enabled easily in the
future, should the need arise.
QR codes can also facilitate interoperability when they
are standardized. Jurisdictions such as Australia, Bah-
rain, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand have based
their standard on EMVCo’s merchant presented QR speci-
fications, as these are being adopted by a growing num-
ber of operators and participants. In India, the Bharat QR
and UPI QR are interoperable, and customers can pay
as per their will, regardless of the app they are using.
53
This has countered the inconvenience associated with mul-
tiple QR codes for different wallets for both the merchant
and the customer.
54
1
Merchant generates and displays QR code based on merchant details
Consumer scans QR code using a mobile application to initiate the transaction, with CDCVM if required
Mobile application sends the transaction initiation request to the Network
The Network processes the transaction and informs the Merchant and the Consumer of the transaction outcome
Displays
transaction
result
Scan
NETWORK
MOBILE TRANSACTION POI MERCHANT
ISSUER
PAYMENT NETWORK
ACQUIRER
1
2
2
3
4
Displays
transaction
result
Point of Initiation (POI)
generates QRC based
on merchant details
Transaction outcome
4
Transaction outcome
4
Transaction initiation
3
FIGURE 20: QR Code Payment Process
Dynamic merchant presented
Consumer presented
Scan
Auth request
with EMV data
Auth response
Decode QR and
extract chip data
Transaction
result
MOBILE
APPLICATION
QR Code
Reader
POI
MERCHANT
ACQUIRER ISSUER
PAYMENT
NETWORK
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 55
For more details, refer to the focus note on QR code stan-
dards, which forms part of the Fast Payments Toolkit.
ii. Near-Field Communication
NFC is a proximity-based access channel that allows the
transfer of payment messages and data wirelessly through
smartphones and other devices. It is widely used for facil-
itating merchant payments at NFC-enabled terminals. For
example, fast payment arrangements in China, India,
55
and Mexico (for the CoDi overlay service) support NFC as an
access channel.
iii. Unstructured Supplementary Service Data
USSD is a common technology for communication between
GSM handsets and the back-end computer systems of
mobile-network operators. It can be used on any phone,
including feature phones. USSD is among the easiest and
most affordable technologies to deploy, especially for
mobile-network operators, because there are no additional
merchant or customer hardware requirements apart from
mobile phones.
In India, to facilitate transactions for non-smartphone
and non-internet users, an interoperable platform based on
USSD has been developed connecting all mobile-network
operators. This was envisioned as an initiative of the finan-
cial-inclusion agenda to reach out to the digitally excluded.
USSD allows customers to check bank balances, view mini-
statements, and initiate fund transfers through their fea-
ture phones. Challenges were observed before the launch,
as many stakeholders from the telecom industry had to be
onboarded, and aspects related to revenue sharing had to
be ironed out. User adoption of this channel has faced chal-
lenges over the years as well. Reasons range from limited
user awareness, customer charges, frequent session time-
outs/higher failure rates, and uneven user experience.
iv. Agent Networks
Agent networks are a channel that allows an assisted form of
banking (typically found in emerging and developing econ-
omies) in which non-bank entities facilitate customer bank-
ing transactions. Agent networks are utilized to initiate fast
payments in jurisdictions such as India, Kenya, and Nigeria.
In India, customers can make payments through an
agent who acts as a trustworthy middle layer to guide a
transaction. A key use case has been domestic migrant
remittances, where the customers are not digitally savvy
enough to make payments on their own, and risk sensitivity
is also high because remittances involve a major portion of
their income.
4.3.4 User Uptake
Low end-user prices, ease of use, and multiple use cases
appear to be the main drivers of user uptake.
Jurisdictions have seen a range of growth drivers for fast
payment uptake by end users, such as user experience,
low user prices, convenience, and pushes from the govern-
ment and the central bank, among others. The availability
of use cases is also critical: the P2P use case has been the
major driver of user uptake so far, while the person-to-busi-
ness (P2B) use case is also growing rapidly. As per survey
responses, different stakeholders perceive different drivers
to be key to the adoption of fast payments. This is illustrated
in figure 21.
Two key drivers are discussed below: end-user pricing
and awareness campaigns.
i. End-User Pricing
Low end-user prices and transaction costs, as well as ease of
access to initiate payments (for example, via digital channels
such as the internet and, especially, mobile banking), have
also been critical for end-user uptake.
FIGURE 21: Primary FPS Adoption Drivers as per Survey Findings
STAKEHOLDER PRIMARY GROWTH DRIVERS FOR FAST PAYMENT ADOPTION
Central bank/
other regulator
Interoperability among payment instruments and systems
Lower cost over other payment modes
Availability of key use cases—that is, P2P, P2B, and bill payments
Initiatives for encouraging merchant acceptance of fast payments
Operator
Availability of key use cases—that is, P2P, P2B, and bill payments
Government intervention and promotion of digital payments at a national level
Banking and digital penetration in the jurisdiction
Participant
Availability of key use cases—that is, P2P, P2B, and bill payments
Banking and digital penetration in the jurisdiction
Initiatives for encouraging merchant acceptance of fast payments
56 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
Regarding pricing, not long ago, end users in some juris-
dictions had to pay extra for fast payments, as these were
considered a premium service. As shown in the jurisdiction
analysis in table 23, it is clear that increased competition
played an important role in reducing prices, as operators
and PSPs look to acquire end users and merchants to use the
innovative use cases/services. Further, some central banks
have issued guidelines either reducing or waiving end-user
costs/merchant fees associated with fast payment transac-
tions. India is an outlier in the area of pricing, as various
incentives have been introduced for certain users (instead of
making further direct reductions of end-user fees).
ii. Awareness Initiatives
Awareness initiatives—including marketing campaigns driven
by operators themselves or individual participants, awareness
drives, public announcements, and social-media marketing—
have generally been successful at promoting user uptake. As
shown in table 24, most jurisdiction-specific experiences in
this area have included the production and dissemination
TABLE 23: Select Findings on End-User Pricing
TABLE 24: Select Findings on Awareness Initiatives
Australia The fee charged to customers for fast payments was only marginally higher than that charged for overnight
payments. Additionally, Osko was implemented so that banks could easily route direct credit/entry transactions via
Osko without changing the customer experience significantly. This helped increase adoption by making it seamless
for the customers.
India A referral bonus scheme for individuals was introduced wherein existing users of the Bharat Interface for Money
(BHIM) UPI app are incentivized to onboard new users. A bonus is paid to both referrer and referee. A cashback
scheme for merchants was also introduced to incentivize merchants for receiving payments on the BHIM UPI
app. Merchant cashback is paid out on completion of a minimum of 50 credit transactions, of which at least
20 transactions are from valid unique UPI users. TPSPs are also providing incentives, such as cashbacks and
promotional vouchers, for using their applications for UPI payments.
Kenya During the initial months of COVID-19, the central bank mandated all the participants to waive end-user charges
for three months. This led to a surge in transactions during the period.
Malaysia BNM has mandated that the transaction fee be waived for individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises for
transfers up to RM 5,000.
Mexico Transactions via the overlay CoDi (that is, request to pay) are free of charge for both the payer and the payee. (If
the latter is a merchant, then the merchant discount rate is zero.)
Thailand In March 2018, PromptPay decided to waive charges for transactions through electronic channels. Moreover,
competition within the banking sector has also played an important role driving the adoption of PromptPay. For
example, banks have provided cashbacks on using the cross-bank bill payment service to customers.
Singapore Retailers are not charged, and charges were waived also for corporations, to boost adoption at the time of launch.
Australia NPPA ran an above-the-line advertising campaign for a limited time introducing PayID, the platform’s aliasing service.
As a scheme, marketing is a core function for BPay, and it provides flyers, digital media, brochures, and outdoor
advertisements, and it also provides co-branded material to each financial institution. BPay launched a marketing
campaign for Osko that included a variety of digital and physical channels.
Bahrain BENEFIT worked on national promotional campaigns to raise awareness and adoption of BenefitPay transactions.
Hong Kong SAR,
China
HKMA undertook a range of measures to popularize FPS before its launch, including advertisements that detailed
its benefits to users. HKMA developed a series of educational and promotional materials, such as announcements
for broadcast on television and radio, as well as videos and electronic banners for digital platforms. HKMA also
participated in trade fairs to promote the FPS with small and medium-sized enterprises and corporations.
India Multiple promotional campaigns were launched by all ecosystem participants, including NPCI. For example, “UPI
Chalega”—a UPI awareness campaign—was launched by NPCI in association with the participants.
Kenya During the launch of PesaLink, Integrated Payment Services Ltd. invested in marketing activities to persuade
customers to make payments through PesaLink.
Malaysia Consumers were educated via social-media and print channels. While the participants were responsible for
communicating to their customers, PayNet, as the operator, also performs customer education and usage
campaigns. Additionally, BNM undertakes outreach initiatives to foster greater public awareness and confidence in
the usage of e-payments.
Singapore MAS worked closely with the Association of Banks in Singapore from April to July 2020 to launch an active campaign
to promote PayNow and PayNow Corporate. The initiative also included a media campaign and consumer outreach
efforts to raise public awareness of these e-payment solutions.
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 57
of educational and promotional materials before the initial
launch of fast payments. In some cases, this was done not by
the operator alone but by the various participants (individu-
ally or through industry organizations).
4.4 MODULE D: LEGAL AND REGULATORY
CONSIDERATIONS, RISK MANAGEMENT,
AND CUSTOMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION
This module focuses on some institutional requirements
pertaining to fast payments. The following three key insights
are discussed here:
i. Legal and regulatory considerations
ii. Risk management
iii. Customer dispute resolution
The legal and regulatory framework provides the sound
legal footing for operations of FPS. The scheme rules pro-
vide the operational clarity of a payment system. Each FPS,
designed and developed by an individual central bank/
operator, has its own scheme rules. Scheme rules define the
way the system will operate and the behavior and interac-
tion of participants. Scheme rules are defined to minimize
risks, maintain integrity, and provide a common, conve-
nient, secure, reliable, and seamless payment experience to
customers. Framing rules, standards, and guidelines with a
certain degree of flexibility helps make implementation and
subsequent upgrades easy. For example, to facilitate interop-
erability, scheme rules could define a high-level framework
that bridges differences across solutions and addresses only
areas that are essential for interoperability. Defining scheme
rules while also supporting geography-specific rules and
regulations brings variation and uniqueness to each imple-
mentation.
Every scheme has its own set of unique rules, applica-
ble to all scheme participants. These rules specify the mini-
mum requirement framework applicable to all members for
operating while upholding the safety, security, soundness,
integrity, and interoperability of the FPS. Scheme rules are
defined and modified by schemes to support the use and
advancement of services. Several factors need to be consid-
ered while defining scheme rules for an FPS. These range
from the way different participants interact and the mes-
saging formats they would use to communicate to the type
of transactions that would be offered to customers and the
settlement between the different participants.
A more detailed discussion on scheme rules in the context
of fast payments can be found in the respective focus note
that is part of the toolkit.
4.4.1 Legal and Regulatory Considerations
A sound regulatory and legal backing and high gover-
nance standards are critical aspects for a fast payment
arrangement to operate safely and efficiently and to thrive.
A robust legal and regulatory framework promotes innova-
tion in payments while at the same time ensuring the secu-
rity and safety of the payment arrangements. The key pieces
of legislation that are applicable to fast payments typically
include the domestic regulations and laws pertaining to pay-
ment systems and services, banking, and the central bank,
although some peripheral regulations or laws are applicable
in some cases, such as those related to open banking, digital
ID, KYC guidelines, and consumer protection.
Due to the instant nature of fast payments, the legal
framework needs to provide legal protections on such issues
as the moment in which payments are final and when the
funds are legally transferred from sender to receiver.
56
The
legal framework should also provide a sound basis for pro-
tecting the netting and settlement arrangements.
Table 25 shows that, in practice, these provisions were
generally not created for fast payments ex profeso but
already existed for the RTGS system and/or other systems
that are designated as systemically important by the central
bank. In such cases, the key task has been to ensure their
applicability also to the fast payment arrangement.
Moreover, operators in most of the jurisdictions assessed
as part of this guide have published a detailed scheme
rulebook (or system rules) as well as detailed procedures.
The scheme rules and detailed operating procedures shall
address the various categories of participants (that is, direct
participants, indirect participants, and overlay service pro-
vides, if applicable) and clearly indicate which of them apply
to what kind of participant.
4.4.2 Risk Management
Fast payment arrangements are exposed to the same core
risks as other payment systems.
During the deep-dive analysis, it was observed that most
fast payment operators have adopted an enterprise-wide
risk-management framework to manage all identified risks.
Others have opted to focus on payment system–specific risks
and, on this basis, built their risk-management framework.
The sections below detail risk management, covering the
following specific risks and areas: (i) credit and liquidity risks;
(ii) operational risk; (iii) compliance with AML and combat-
ting the financing of terrorism (CFT) guidelines; and (iv) des-
ignating fast payment arrangements as SIPS.
58 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
i. Credit and Liquidity Risk
Credit and liquidity risks vary across fast payment arrange-
ments depending on the settlement model adopted. Of
the seven participants that responded to this part of the
survey, four believe that managing these risks is more chal-
lenging in fast payments than in other payment systems.
The choice of settlement model brings certain implications
for stakeholders in the payments ecosystem when it comes
to managing credit and liquidity risks. The main aspects and
risk implications (and the need of risk mitigators) of a DNS
model or a real-time settlement model were discussed in
that section. This section covers issues that are particular
to fast payment arrangements and provides details on how
operators in the different jurisdictions studied are managing
these risks. (See table 26.)
A significant difference between fast payments and other
types of payment systems is that the liquidity needs extend
beyond normal business hours, due to operations being
performed 24/7. This is relevant for fast payment arrange-
ments that use either a real-time settlement model or a
DNS model. In the first case, participants may be unable to
access certain liquidity sources (for example, central bank
credit, interbank loans, and so on). In DNS models, liquidity
risk may arise if inter-PSP settlement cycles are to be exe-
Hong Kong SAR,
China
The Clearing and Settlement Systems Ordinance came into effect in November 2004. It governs payments in
Hong Kong. However, in 2015, this ordinance was amended and retitled as the Payment Systems and Stored Value
Facilities Ordinance to introduce a regulatory regime for SVFs. The latter are participants in FPS.
India Under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act of 2007, the RBI took the following two actions:
Created the Board for Regulation and Supervision of Payment and Settlement Systems Regulations
Issued the Payment and Settlement Systems Regulations
NPCI is regulated by the RBI and governed by the board, comprising representatives from member banks as well as
independent directors.
Mexico The legal and regulatory framework supporting SPEI activities is comprised of Banco de México’s Organic Law
and the Payments Systems Law. Circular No. 13/2017, Circular 14/2017 (SPEI Rules), and the SPEI Operating Manual
complete SPEI’s legal basis.
Under the SPEI Regulation, the settlement of transfer orders takes place through a clearing process in accordance
with the Payment Systems Law. Once SPEI settles a transfer order and sends the corresponding settlement notice
to both the issuer and the receiver, the order is considered accepted for all purposes. It also covers the netting
arrangements (as SPEI uses hybrid settlement). Other key topics covered by the SPEI Regulation include access
requirements and the fee framework.
United Kingdom The Financial Service (Banking Reform) Act of 2013 led to the formation of the Payment Systems Regulator. HM
Treasury designated eight payment systems, including FPS, to be regulated by the Payment Systems Regulator for
the purposes of part 5 of the aforementioned act.
United States The legal framework supporting RTP activities comprises the RTP operating rules and RTP participating rules, along
with existing payments laws, wherever applicable. The RTP operating rules have been drafted to define the rights
and responsibilities of participants and TCH with respect to RTP.
Among other topics, the participation rules address general eligibility requirements, the process for connecting
to RTP through a TPSP, and requirements in the event of a change of name, form of organization, or control of a
participant.
TABLE 25: Select Findings on Legal and Regulatory Considerations
cuted outside normal business hours in an effort to avoid
building up large net debit positions. Even if settlement is
executed in working hours in the next working day, during
non-working hours participants in an arrangement using
DNS that applies risk-mitigation techniques may be unable,
for example, to post additional collateral to continue send-
ing payment orders without these being rejected.
In practice, as shown in table 26, the facilities that sup-
port the management of credit and liquidity risks depend
on multiple elements particular to each jurisdiction, starting
from whether a DNS settlement model or a real-time settle-
ment model has been adopted. The sophistication of each
jurisdiction’s financial infrastructure and financial markets
also determines the type(s) of risk-management arrange-
ments that can be put in place.
ii. Operational Risk
System reliability, cyber resilience, and containment of
fraud are among the critical operational risk considerations
for operators of platforms that process fast payments.
As per CPMI-IOSCO, operational risk is the risk that deficien-
cies in information systems or internal processes, human
errors, management failures, or disruptions from external
events will result in the reduction, deterioration, or break-
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 59
TABLE 26: Select Findings on Credit and Liquidity Risk
Australia The RBA launched a new automated liquidity-management tool that is built into RITS while developing the Fast
Settlement Service (FSS). Through this tool, institutions are able to adjust the amount of funds available in the FSS and
RITS allocations of their ESA at the RBA by setting upper and lower “trigger points” on their FSS allocation and ensure
that funds are available for both NPP and RITS transactions. The RBA also offers standing facilities, such as intraday
repurchase agreements (repos), as well as “open” repos, to direct and settlement participants that settle FSS payments
outside business hours and on weekends/public holidays.
57
The RBA is not exposed to any credit risk from the settlement
of NPP payments in the FSS. NPP payments are settled using the members FSS allocation, which cannot be overdrawn.
However, RITS settlement hours are between 7:30 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. on business days, while the FSS settles NPP
transactions 24/7. To address this, all ESA funds are transferred to the FSS allocation when RITS is not operating. The
RBAs existing standing facilities can also be used to assist with liquidity management, by making additional ESA funds
available on prespecified terms.
Hong Kong
SAR, China
To manage credit risk, a sweeping mechanism is in place in CHATS and FPS to support liquidity transfers between
Hong Kong dollar-denominated (HKD) CHATS ledger accounts and HKD FPS ledger accounts during CHATS operating
hours. To facilitate banks’ liquidity management for settling FPS transactions once HKD CHATS is closed, banks are
allowed to borrow HKD funds from the HKMA, by entering into sale and repurchase transactions. HKMA accepts only
high-quality securities to minimize credit exposures.
There is no loss-sharing arrangement in FPS. In case of a failed settlement, the defaulting party will be fully liable for
the failed payment. Each participant has a responsibility to ensure that it has enough liquidity to fulfill its payments in
a timely and orderly manner. Default procedures are in place and regularly drilled to minimize the impact of a default
on the system and participants.
India NPCI has introduced the concept of a net debit cap, wherein limits are allotted to participants in IMPS and UPI as per
the Settlement Guarantee Mechanism Policy. The net debit position is calculated after each transaction to minimize
risk, and transactions are declined once the limit is 100 percent utilized. Net debit cap limits are reinstated for every
settlement cycle except on specified holidays, as and when decided by the RBI for RTGS services.
NPCI has also constituted a settlement guarantee fund comprising pledged cash collaterals and pooling of
funds by way of committed lines of credit. In the event of a temporary failure, the amount is replenished by the
defaulting member bank(s). In the event of permanent failure of a member bank(s), the net obligation of the
default member bank(s) shall be borne by the surviving member banks that have participated on that day in that
cycle. The recovered amount from the surviving member banks is used to replenish the funds utilized from the
settlement guarantee fund to meet the settlement.
Mexico In SPEI, there is no credit risk between participants, as SPEI does not establish procedures for participants to
extend credit among themselves. Banco de México mitigates liquidity risks through the following two mechanisms:
Obtaining credit up to the value of assets that are deposited with Banco de México
Depositing liquid securities issued by the federal government, the Institute for the Protection of Bank Savings, and
Banco de México itself under a repurchase agreement
SPEI operates 24/7 and begins and ends its operations for value date purposes at 6:00 p.m. To achieve 24/7
operations, Banco de México implemented a mechanism to provide liquidity to participants after 6:00 p.m. The
mechanism works as follows: every banking day, at 6:00 p.m., SPEI closes Day T, and Banco de México transfers the
balance from participants’ SPEI accounts to their SIAC (general ledger) accounts. A few seconds later, SPEI opens with
zero balances. Banco de México then extends fully collateralized credit to participant banks in their SPEI accounts
according to each bank’s standing instructions, and payment exchange resumes. The credit is registered
in participant banks’ SIAC accounts when the latter opens at 7:00 p.m. (which is considered T+1).
Individual payments are capped at Mex$8,000 ($400) outside banking hours.
United
Kingdom
The United Kingdom follows a net sender cap mechanism to control settlement risk. This cap is the maximum
amount that participants are allowed to send having netted off the value received from the value sent at that time. To
eliminate settlement risk, each participant is also required to hold a cash sum equal to the value of the net sender cap
in a separate Reserves Collateralization Account.
United States Settlement risk is eliminated in RTP by using fully prefunded real-time settlement. TCH has a sole discretion to
determine the prefunding requirement for the following:
Sending participant that is a funding participant in the system
Sending participant that is a non-funding participant but has a current prefunded position (participants with a
funding obligation)
Each funding provider
During Fedwire operating hours, participants with funding obligations and funding providers are required to monitor
their current prefunded position and provide supplemental funding to the Prefunded Balance Account if the current
prefunded position falls below the prefunded requirements. During non-Fedwire hours, supplemental funding is
provided in advance to ensure that the funding provider’s or participant’s current prefunded position is sufficient to
cover its anticipated payment origination activity.
Funding providers and participants with funding obligations may have arrangements with each other to transfer
liquidity through RTP Payments if their current prefunded position becomes low during non-Fedwire hours. Such
liquidity transfers must be reported to TCH within 10 banking days following the day on which the liquidity transfer
occurred, using procedures specified by TCH.
60 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
down of services provided by an FMI.
58
Operational failures
can damage an FMI’s reputation or perceived reliability, lead
to legal consequences, and result in financial losses incurred
by the FMI, participants, and other parties. In certain cases,
operational failures can also be a source of systemic risk.
Based on these considerations, as per principle 17 of the
CPMI-IOSCO PFMIs, operators/managers should establish a
robust framework to manage operational risks with appro-
priate systems, policies, procedures, and controls.
Some of the main aspects that are analyzed under oper-
ational risk include operational reliability, scalability, physical
and information security, business continuity, and interde-
pendencies with other payment and settlement systems.
In this sense, aspects such as cyber resilience and combat-
ting fraud are part of overall operational risk management.
General findings and insights into operational risk manage-
ment are described in table 27. Fraud and cyber resilience
issues are discussed in more detail later as part of this same
section. As per table 27, it is clear that operational risk con-
tainment continues to be a top-of-mind issue for opera-
tors, regulators, and participants, and such proven tools as
business-continuity procedures are already standard across
fast payment arrangements. Operators are also increasing
requirements for participants to control operational risk,
including fraud. These requirements are often mandated by
overseers/regulators.
Australia NPPAs Incident Management Framework defines response/service-level agreements for identified risk/event types.
Participants are required to have 24/7 operational support teams and resourcing to respond to alerts or incidents.
Financial institutions that offer PayID payments are required to have controls in place to monitor, detect, and shut
down any attempts to misuse the PayID service. This includes technical capabilities, such as automated lockouts,
when usual activity is detected.
Participants are required to have real-time fraud-protection and detection controls and capabilities, including
KYC and AML controls and policies in place at the time of onboarding. NPP payments are subject to the same
fraud and security protections that financial institutions use for all their internet and mobile-banking transactions.
Bahrain Directives on EFTS from the Central Bank of Bahrain require BENEFIT and participating banks to have
comprehensive information-security policies, standards, practices, measures, and controls to ensure the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information/data processed or held to deliver EFTS services to customers.
European Union For SEPAs SCT Inst scheme, comprehensive guidelines on fraud reporting have been drafted under PSD2
regulations. The EPC has a risk-management annexure that is disclosed only to participants and contains the
mechanism for handling operational and fraud-risk activities.
Hong Kong SAR,
China
In terms of the day-to-day operational risks associated with FPS, system operation is monitored continuously in
terms of transaction volume, response time, whether service levels are met, system health, and so on. An instant-
response procedure in case of a system/operational incident has also been developed. Business-continuity and
contingency plans are also in place.
India NPCI has constituted a Risk-Management Committee that reviews and approves the risk-management framework
and policies proposed by the management team.
The operational risk-management framework includes key elements such as the measurement, monitoring,
reporting, identification, evaluation, and control of risk. NPCI also performs operational risk-assessment procedures
when new systems, activities, and processes are introduced or undertaken. The procedural guidelines are published
and contain various risk guidelines along with definitions of the roles and responsibilities of each participant in the
ecosystem (sponsor, submember, PSP, and so on).
Mexico Banco de México has an automated risk-management tool for mitigating operational risks in SPEI. There is constant
monitoring through timers, and when SPEI is not able to meet the desired service level, a back-up system is
activated to ensure business continuity.
Poland No centralized guidelines have been issued for a risk-management framework by the regulator, the National Bank of
Poland, or KIR. Nevertheless, all payment systems have to adhere to international best standards as described under
the CPMI-IOSCO PFMIs and all other relevant guidelines mandated by the European Central Bank.
Singapore MAS has issued PSN03 Notice on Reporting of Suspicious Activities and Incidents of Fraud,
59
which comprises
guidelines for licensees, operators, and settlement institutions with regards to fraud-risk management.
United Kingdom Confirmation of Payee is a name-checking service that has been identified by the Payment Systems Regulator
and the payments industry as an important tool to help prevent authorized push-payment scams and accidentally
misdirected payments. The service checks whether the name of the account to which a payer is sending money
matches the name that the payer has entered.
TABLE 27: General Findings on Operational Risk Management
continued
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 61
Fraud is generally defined as an act or omission that is
intended to cause wrongful gain for one person and wrong-
ful loss for another, either by concealing facts or otherwise.
While fast payments provide several clear benefits, they also
generate vulnerabilities. (See figure 22.) The rapidly growing
number of transactions also makes the operations related to
exception management more intense.
In 2018, the CPMI published the report Reducing the Risk
of Wholesale Payments Fraud Related to Endpoint Secu-
rity.
60
This toolkit targets primarily wholesale payments. Nev-
ertheless, its elements are broad enough that they can be
applied as well to fast payment arrangements.
For more details on fraud and fraud management, in
addition to the CPMI report, refer to the special topic note
on fraud and AML/CFT, which forms part of the Fast Pay-
ments Toolkit.
Cyber resilience is an integral part of operational risk
management for all payment systems and other FMIs. It
has gained significant prominence in recent years due to
incidents involving malware infections, hacking, and so
on. According, CPMI-IOSCO in 2016 published Guidance
on Cyber Resilience for Financial Market Infrastructures.
61
Under this guidance, five primary risk-management catego-
ries (governance, identification, protection, detection, and
response and recovery) and three overarching components
(testing, situational awareness, and learning and evolving)
should be addressed by operators/management across an
FMI’s cyber resilience framework.
Several jurisdictions have adopted measures that comply
with these guidelines, as shown in table 28. One import-
ant finding of the jurisdictions analyzed here is that there
does not seem to be a fast payment-specific angle to cyber
resilience or, in some cases, the corresponding measures (for
example, launching a cyber resilience committee or imple-
menting cyber resilience-monitoring tools) have broader
applicability than solely to fast payment arrangements (for
example, to all payment systems, and even for the banking
system as a whole).
United States TCH applies an operational risk-management framework to RTP. This framework includes significant resources
devoted to system reliability and resiliency, security (for example, physical, operational, and network security),
incident response, overall risk management, and comprehensive business-continuity plans.
TCH has also established a tiered approach to fraud prevention and mitigation, as not all financial institutions
participate in real-time payments at the same level. All participating financial institutions are required to do the
following:
Comply with guidelines from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council as applied through prudential
regulator examination
Report fraudulent behavior to TCH and/or the sending financial institutions
React to alerts from the centralized activity-monitoring utility
Apart from these, there are additional compliance requirements for financial institutions that support RTP and
permit third-party payments. In addition to the centralized fraud monitoring, TCH has the ability to limit RTP
activities of participating institutions that violate system rules and risk-management requirements.
TABLE 27, continued
iii. AML/CFT Compliance
With real-time payments, there are growing concerns about
a potential increase in financial crimes such as money laun-
dering and the financing of terrorism. This is because fast
payment arrangements shorten the payment processing
time and, with this, also decrease the ex ante time dedicated
to AML/CFT analysis and fraud detection. In other words,
in just a few seconds, system participants need to perform
AML/CFT checks to ensure a secure payment environment
for both customers and financial institutions.
As a result, participants processing real-time payments
need to optimize their AML/CFT screening and fraud-detec-
tion processes while efficiently managing client-related risk.
To fill this gap, an increasing number of third-party provid-
ers are offering real-time payment fraud-detection software
that enables the AML/CFT checks and sanctions screening
processes to be carried out within seconds by using cut-
ting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence and
machine learning.
In most of the jurisdictions studied for this guide, public
authorities have not issued guidelines for KYC/AML policies
with specific applicability to fast payment arrangements.
Participants are required to comply with the general KYC/
AML guidelines issued by public authorities for banking/
financial services.
For more details, refer to the focus note on fraud and
AML/CFT, which forms part of the Fast Payments Toolkit.
4.4.3 Dispute Resolution and Customer Complaints
Addressing disputes and customer complaints in a robust
and expeditious manner enhances the public’s trust in fast
payments.
Disputes are common irrespective of the type of pay-
ment method and system. Laws and rules that handle such
disputes tend to differ by payment mechanism as well as
jurisdiction.
62 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
SPEED
SETTLEMENT
FINALITY ALIASES
HIGHER
TRANSACTION LIMIT
DATA-RICH
TRANSACTIONS
Benefits
Facilitate
transaction
completion in
real time and
ensures near-
cash experience
for end
customers
Transactions
through fast
payments systems
are irrevocable
in nature.
This provision
protects financial
institutions from
potential defaults
Enables ease-of-
payments and
provides customer
convenience
With evolution of fast
payment systems,
daily transaction limit
for payments would
eventually increase
With widespread adoption
of messaging standard like
ISO 20022 that facilitates
better reconciliation,
improves interoperability,
business automation and
enriched reporting. It will
also enable businesses to
better match customer
payments to invoices,
oversee their collections,
predict cash flows,
and track cross-border
payments
Potential
considerations
Gives financial
institutions
scant time
to monitor
activities
Certainty of
immediate
availability of
funds
With use of
aliases and proxy
identifiers in real
time payments, it
also presents security
concerns around
identity frauds
The increased limit
would present cyber
criminals lucrative
opportunities for
frauds and financial
crimes
This might also increase
the risk of exposure to
malwares that could be
embedded in payment
attachments or links
FIGURE 22: Benefits and Potential Sources of Fraud Associated with Real-Time Payments
Australia NPPA has appointed an external security consultant as corporate IT security advisor who provides external guidance
regarding cybersecurity and conducts an annual IT security audit.
Hong Kong SAR,
China
The Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative was implemented in December 2016 to raise the cyber resilience of
Hong Kong’s banking system. The initiative is underpinned by the following two pillars:
The Cyber Resilience Assessment Framework is a risk-based framework for authorized institutions to assess
their own risk profiles and benchmark the level of defense and resilience that would be required to accord
appropriate protection against a cyberattack.
The Professional Development Programme is a localized certification scheme and training program for
cybersecurity professionals, structured to train and nurture cybersecurity practitioners in the banking and IT
industries and to enhance their cybersecurity awareness and technical abilities to conduct cyber resilience
assessments and simulation testing
Furthermore, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing Platform provides an effective infrastructure for sharing intelligence on
cyberattacks. The timeliness of receiving alerts or warnings from a commonly shared intelligence platform can help
the banking sector as a whole to prepare for possible cyberattacks
India NPCI’s Risk-Management Committee carries out periodic reviews of the various technological and cybersecurity-
related developments. It also oversees the security incidents, information, cybersecurity assessments, and security-
monitoring activities carried out by the Information Security Division.
NPCI has also adopted measures that comply with CPMI-IOSCO guidance.
Mexico To ensure the cyber resilience of SPEI, Banco de México has adopted measures that comply fully with the guidelines
issued by CPMI-IOSCO.
Singapore MAS makes it mandatory for financial institutions to comply with the following requirements:
Establish and implement robust security for IT systems
Ensure that updates are applied to address system security flaws in a timely manner
Deploy security devices to restrict unauthorized network traffic
Implement measures to mitigate the risk of malware infection
Secure the use of system accounts with special privileges to prevent unauthorized access
Strengthen user authentication for critical systems as well as systems used to access customer information
Thailand National ITMX has acquired the Intelligence Threat Management Service of UIH, an external cybersecurity vendor,
for the monitoring, communication, and possible remediation of external threats, such as zero-day attacks,
advanced persistent threats, and exploits.
Further, National ITMX has also adopted measures that comply with CPMI-IOSCO guidelines.
United Kingdom A cybersecurity framework has been adopted that helps to identify and protect from cyberattacks.
TABLE 28: Select Findings on Cyber Resilience
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 63
Fast payments generally achieve settlement finality
immediately, and transactions become irrevocable and irre-
versible. Therefore, in general, account-based fast payments
tend to be guaranteed funds with very limited instances of
dispute rights. Nevertheless, some jurisdictions have carved
out instances where the payer is entitled to a refund for
fraudulent transactions, and the fraud payment risk is borne
by either the payer’s or the payee’s financial institution.
Other fast payment operators are beginning to define dis-
pute-management requirements. These range from “light
Australia In Australia, Regulations for NPP provide a detailed mechanism for dispute resolution, including the following items:
Definition of dispute: This defines both the different parties between which a dispute can arise, and which
disputes are eligible to be referred for resolution.
Commencement of proceedings: This details the different scenarios under which dispute-resolution proceedings
may be commenced by either the NPPA or the aggrieved participant (including submembers).
Resolution of disputes: This states that a dispute can be referred to the NPP Operating Committee or NPP board
either for resolution or directly for arbitration. In addition, it sets out the various criteria and conditions for the
same.
Fees and costs: There are numerous fees and costs associated with dispute resolution, and these are detailed in
the regulations. NPPA is to be reimbursed for all costs and expenses incurred by it in resolving a dispute.
Chile Participants are encouraged to settle inter-participant disputes bilaterally and formulate their own guidelines for
the same.
India NPCI has a dedicated dispute-resolution system—the Bharat Clearing and Settlement System—for resolution
of IMPS disputes. In BCS-IMPS, all disputes are settled in every settlement cycle. Similarly, the Unified Real-Time
Clearing and Settlement—which is a back-office system for UPI—validates and processes the disputes raised by
members. The adjustments are performed along with the previous business day’s approved transactions. Member
banks are required to perform reconciliation daily and raise adjustments, if needed. Member banks are also advised
to handle the reconciliation operations on all days, irrespective of Sundays and other public holidays, and to have a
round-the-clock help desk. In case the participant is not satisfied with the decision of the NPCI’s dedicated panel,
the dispute shall be referred to the RBI.
The following interbank dispute and adjustment scenarios have been identified:
Beneficiary timed-out transaction:
- Customer account is credited, but response got timed out (beneficiary to NPCI)
- Customer account is not credited, and response got timed out (beneficiary to NPCI)
- Customer account is not credited, and response got timed out (beneficiary to NPCI)—After reconciliation, it is
found that the customer account cannot be credited because of a closed account, an inexistent account, and
so on.
Chargeback: In case of a wrong or incorrect beneficiary account.
Chargeback acceptance/representment: Chargeback acceptance is the only confirmation; there will not be any
fund movement between the beneficiary and remitter.
Pre-arbitration, pre-arbitration acceptance, and pre-arbitration rejection
Arbitration
Transaction credit confirmation: This option is provided only to notify the remitter bank that a customer account
has been credited either online or by initiating manual credit. This will avoid raising chargeback by remitter
bank.
Returns: Beneficiary bank can return the funds to the remitting bank where the beneficiary bank is not able to
credit their customer’s account.
European Union As per the SCT Inst scheme rulebook, a dispute-resolution committee is responsible for investigating complaints
from participants, including the dispute-resolution and appeal processes. Under the new rule published by the EPC
in 2020, this committee replaced the former Compliance and Adherence and Appeals Committee.
Mexico Guidelines on compensation of damages have been issued in SPEI rules and SPEI participant agreements. By using
digital signatures for all transactions, SPEI’s programming protocol ensures the authenticity of the information and
that the issuer cannot repudiate payments once they have been sent. Furthermore, participants are connected
to SPEI through a private network that uses encrypted communications. As the payment orders sent by the
participants are pre-signed, this acts is a mechanism to avoid the interbank disputes.
touch” models where payment inquiries are processed by
the operator without specific rules or decisioning to more
robust models with formal dispute requirements.
The section below discusses inter-participant disputes as
well as end-customer disputes.
i. Inter-Participant Disputes
This refers to the resolution of disputes between participants
in fast payment arrangements, typically arising out of non-
compliance with system regulations. Table 29 shows that to
TABLE 29: Select Findings on Inter-Participant Disputes
continued
64 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
resolve disputes between the participants effectively, some
system operators have put in place and publicized a dedi-
cated dispute-resolution mechanism to ensure effective and
time-bound resolution of these differences. This appears to
be more common when the operator is the central bank. In
other cases, there is no centralized dispute-resolution func-
tion/arrangement; participants are only urged to settle their
disputes bilaterally.
For more details, refer to the focus note on dispute han-
dling, refunds, reversals, and chargebacks, which forms part
of the Fast Payment Toolkit.
ii. Customer Disputes
An effective complaint-handling process is fundamental for
enhancing the customer experience and building trust in
fast payments.
A range of safeguards, such as SCA and having a list of
preapproved beneficiaries, can limit the number of disputes.
Despite these safeguards, disputes may arise. Given that
the transfer of funds takes place in real time, implementing
refunds, reversals, and chargebacks in fast payments is more
challenging than it is with card payments. Providing settle-
ment finality further reduces incidents of refunds, reversals,
and chargebacks.
Nigeria As per the Central Bank of Nigeria, each scheme shall establish its dispute-resolution mechanism to serve as an
additional mechanism that will help participants resolve disputes in a timely and cost-effective manner. Disputes
that arise between or across schemes may be referred through the director of the Payments System Management
Department of the central bank to the Payment Initiative Coordinating Committee for resolution.
Poland Participants are encouraged to settle inter-participant disputes bilaterally and formulate their own guidelines for
the same.
Singapore Participants are encouraged to settle inter-participant disputes bilaterally and formulate their own guidelines for
the same.
Thailand The National ITMX has a dedicated dispute-resolution mechanism that is followed by all the parties if there are any
disagreements between the member banks. National ITMX also has a dedicated web portal service for member
banks for interbank dispute resolution. No additional fee is charged by National ITMX for the dispute-resolution
process.
United Kingdom In 2016, specific guidelines were issued for the bank error recovery process in which a bank has duplicated a file
and sent some payment error. There are also guidelines for when complete files get duplicated, and timelines are
provided for all FPS participants to ensure that the funds are refunded to the originating bank.
United States RTP operating rules incorporate existing law (that is, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, regulation E, and
Uniform Commercial Code, article 4A) that sets forth a well-established framework regarding banks’ liability for
unauthorized transactions from their customers’ accounts, as well as specific requirements regarding the resolution
of errors from consumer accounts. This structure simplifies the account-holding financial institution’s dispute-
investigation processes and minimize the need for a detailed set of interbank dispute-resolution rule.
TCH does not act as a party to any dispute between participants regarding liability for erroneous or
unauthorized RTP payments. Such determination is left to the participants through any available dispute-
resolution and/or judicial process.
TABLE 29, continued
In cases where a dispute is filed and it is recognized by
the concerned parties that the transfer of funds was indeed
erroneous or fraudulent, one of the following subsequent
grievance-resolution mechanisms can be used:
The beneficiary makes a reverse transaction to the initial
payer as per the predefined process set out by the fast
payment operator, the participant, or TPSP.
The payer can notify the issuing bank about the errone-
ous or fraudulent transaction, and the issuing bank can
raise a chargeback request on behalf of the payer.
As per table 30, the most common case is that customer
disputes are handled by the participants with their cus-
tomers directly, with no involvement by the operator or
the payments overseer/regulator. However, some overseers/
regulators have issued minimum requirements in this area
(for example, Hong Kong SAR, China, Mexico, and Thailand).
Moreover, in some cases, a financial ombudsman can assist
customers with their disputes.
For more details, refer to the focus note on dispute han-
dling, refunds, reversals, and chargebacks, which forms part
of the Fast Payment Toolkit.
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 65
Australia In case of any complaints related to NPP transactions, the first point of contact for customers is the associated
financial institutions.
If an account has been compromised or funds have been taken from a users account without his/her
authorization, the user is required to contact his/her financial institution immediately.
If the user thinks someone has fraudulently used his/her information to create a PayID, the user should contact
his/her bank immediately, and the bank will help launch an investigation.
In addition, the Australian Financial Complaints Authority independently assists consumers and small businesses to
make and resolve complaints about financial firms.
Bahrain A directive from the Central Bank of Bahrain mandates that Fawri+ transactions are real time and irrevocable. Thus,
there are no specific guidelines for dispute resolution.
BENEFIT as an operator has customer-service and call centers to register customer complaints.
Chile No centralized guidelines have been issued by either the regulator or the system operator for the resolution of
customer complaints.
European Union For the SCT Inst scheme, no centralized guidelines have been issued by either the regulator or the system operator
for the resolution of customer complaints.
Hong Kong SAR,
China
The HKMA has detailed a set of procedures to be followed by banks and SVFs when a customer complains of a
transaction being processed to a wrong recipient.
India Customer complaints need to be resolved bilaterally between the participants within the timelines stipulated by
the RBI and NPCI. Moreover, in the case of UPI, it is mandatory to provide an option to raise complaints on the UPI-
enabled app.
In 2019, the RBI introduced an Ombudsman Scheme for Digital Transactions. It is an expeditious and cost-free
apex-level mechanism for the resolution of complaints regarding digital transactions undertaken by customers.
The Ombudsman for Digital Transactions is a senior official appointed by the RBI to resolve customer complaints
against payment system participants. To resolve a grievance, the complainant first has to approach the system
participant concerned. If the system participant does not reply within one month after receipt of the complaint,
if it rejects the complaint, or if the complainant is not satisfied with the reply given, the complainant can file the
complaint with the Ombudsman for Digital Transactions. Recently, NPCI launched Unified Dispute Resolution in
UPI to provide faster online dispute resolution.
Mexico SPEI rules establish guidelines on the service level for the end customers. Fraud-based disputes are handled directly
by the SPEI participants with their customers.
Banco de México has introduced the SPEI Information Module, which enables customers to monitor the status
of their payments. This information module allows customers, for example, to find out whether the payment was
returned for some reason or whether it was never made. With this information, users can check with their bank to
find out more details on the status of payment.
Poland Express Elixir participants are encouraged to formulate their own customer complaint-resolution procedures.
Customer also have the option to seek a legal remedy under the Polish Chamber of Commerce if guidelines
stipulated by the participants do not provide for impartial resolution of complaints.
Singapore Customer complaint registration and resolution (including fraud reporting) is handled directly between the FAST
participant and its customers.
Thailand The BOT has prescribed consumer-protection measures for PSPs, such as the specification of the terms and
conditions in service-level agreements for digital payment services, problem-solving procedures for service users,
business rules, dispute-resolution agreement, and the compensation for damages.
United Kingdom In case of an unauthorized transaction, a customer needs to report it to her/his financial institution. As the
next step, the financial institution starts the investigation within two days of the complaint. When the financial
institution finds clear evidence of a genuine mistake, then a request is initiated to the receiving financial institution.
If the recipient does not dispute the claim, the amount is returned within 20 days of the complaint. If the financial
institutions are unable to provide solutions for the disputes, the customer can report to Financial Ombudsman
Service to resolve the dispute.
United States There are no centralized guidelines for resolution of customer complaints. RTP operating rules nevertheless
oblige the sending financial institutions to put in place policies and procedures for handling customer claims
for unauthorized transfers and funds sent in error. Receiving financial institutions must also have policies and
procedures to respond to requests to reclaim funds sent in error.
TABLE 30: Select Findings on End-Customer Disputes
KEY LEARNINGS AND FORWARD OUTLOOK
The Fast Payments Toolkit, of which this guide is an integral
part, is intended to provide guidance to jurisdictions con-
sidering developing/upgrading their FPSs and, through the
various analyses included in the toolkit, eventually to assist
them when making policy and implementation choices. The
guide was informed mainly by the 16 deep-dive jurisdiction
reports, which in turn were integrated from more than 70
interviews with a variety of stakeholders across the ecosys-
tem (overseers, operators, and participants). The main find-
ings and learnings are discussed in this chapter.
Overall, the analysis demonstrated that the key levers for
the adoption and uptake of fast payments are the immedi-
ate availability of funds, even for very small-value transac-
tions, and central banks that play a leading role either as the
developers and operators of fast payment arrangements or
as catalysts for their development by the private sector (and
subsequently as overseers). Other important elements that
foster uptake include the following:
i. Coverage and openness of the fast payment arrange-
ment, including a wide range of use cases, participation
of a wide range of PSPs, and affordable pricing
5
ii. Convenience and ease of access, including accessibility
through mobile phones, the use of aliases such as mobile
numbers, the use of APIs, and a common messaging
standard
iii. A sound preexisting market context—namely, penetra-
tion of the internet and mobile phones, the quality and
speed of other payment options, and the overall compet-
itiveness of the payments market
iv. Awareness and educational campaigns for end users by
public authorities, operators, and participants
The more detailed key findings and learnings are discussed
below. The key learnings are summarized in figure 23, orga-
nized across the typical life cycle of a payment infrastruc-
ture project: the conceptualization stage, the design stage,
and the “go-live” and post-implementation stage. Each of
the key learnings is directed to one or more stakeholders
across the ecosystem (that is, the overseer, owner, operator,
and participants). Table 31 provides additional insights into
these key learnings.
66
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 67
REGULATOR OPERATOR PARTICIPANTS OWNER
P
H
A
S
E
I
P
H
A
S
E
I
I
P
H
A
S
E
I
I
I
1. Determine objectives for FPS launch
2. Understand market needs
3. Carry out stakeholder consultation
4. Assess other systems
5. Develop a business case
6. Garner industry support
7. Assess participants capabilities
8. Identify profit centers of participants
9. Take a long-term view
10. Carry out detailed
assessments of existing
infrastructure
Conceptualization
1. Generate customer awareness
4. Evaluate risk mitigation measures
2. Adopt a product roadmap approach
3. Implement robust oversight mechanism
5. Facilitate post launch engagements
6. Provide customized solutions by leveraging
payments data
Go-Live & Post Implementation
1. Ensure structured planning
2. Build a dynamic, scalable system
3. Incorporate scope of innovation
4. Provision of indirect participation
5. Provision of participation of non-bank players
6. Introduce appropriate pricing schemes
7. Build customer trust in the system
8. Leverage APIs for connectivity
11. Keep an adequate stress testing window
12. Adopt a common messaging standard
13. Decide on transaction limits & specifications
9. Focus on key development components
10. Incorporate robust risk management
framework
14. Assign a robust project
management team
15. Work in collaboration
16. Incorporate a strong, legal framework
17. Establish common Payment Scheme
governance
Design & Implementation
FIGURE 23: Stakeholder Mapping of Key Learnings
68 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
TABLE 31: Key Learnings from the Application of the Fast Payment Framework
PROJECT CONCEPTUALIZATION STAGE
1
Have clarity on the objective, including motivations/drivers for
developing fast payment services in their jurisdiction.
5 Develop a plan for investing in infrastructure and recovering
cost over a period of time, and avoid focusing on achieving
profitability in the short run. The central bank should
work together with stakeholders to identify the long-term
benefits of the project (direct and indirect) and the broader
long-term interests of the NPS.
2
Obtain knowledge of fast payment arrangements in other
jurisdictions, including the key features of their operating
models and service offerings.
6 Develop a good understanding of the infrastructure
available in the broader ecosystem (for example, phone and
communication network penetration) to determine which
user needs and expectations the fast payment arrangement
will be able to meet at launch and in its early stages of
development.
3
As part of the design, focus on establishing a core platform
and associated services on top of which other stakeholders
can innovate and build further services.
7 Give due regard to the existing payments infrastructure
setup, including such aspects as current familiarity with
real-time payments, instruments available (for example, push
and pull), NPS integration, support of use cases, settlement
models, the accounting practices applicable to payments,
and other banking activities operating 24/7, among others.
4
Underpin the business case with a clear vision of the role
for the fast payment arrangement in terms of use cases and
services it can offer to PSPs and the market in general. This is
critical for developing a credible business plan and garnering
industry support.
8 Study the existing internal infrastructure of banks and other
potential PSPs and assess their ability to achieve immediate
fund transfers with certainty. Jurisdictions could consider
agreeing on minimum criteria for participation up front, in
a way that ensures that at least the major banks and some
other smaller banks and non-bank PSPs can be ready to join
by the predecided “go-live” date.
PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION STAGE
9 Assign a top-notch project-management team.
The relevant stakeholders should also identify personnel
with experience and competency and assign them the
responsibility of project development and implementation.
They should also be made duly accountable for the project.
Ensure continuity of the people/team assigned to this task
to avoid delays in implementation.
16 Ensure fair, transparent, and risk-based access criteria that
do not preclude membership based on institution type.
This is critical to foster innovation and ongoing competition
in the payment ecosystem, recognizing, though, that
many smaller and mid-sized PSPs may opt for indirect
participation, given the financial and technical requirements
for direct participation.
10 Ensure structured planning and implementation to help
mitigate implementation delays, including those related to
stakeholder onboarding. It is essential to give participants
sufficient time to adapt—that is, for contract negotiation,
internal system development, and implementation.
17 Consider using APIs that have proven most useful for the
connectivity of smaller participants and of other third
parties (for example, entities that provide payment-initiation
services), and to foster standardization of APIs in the
payments market.
11 Going live with a basic service—with limited features—can be
a good strategy to get the ball rolling. The design of the fast
payment arrangement should nevertheless be flexible enough
to accommodate multiple use cases/services based on dynamic
market needs (that is, the “plug and play” approach).
18 Ensure that the pricing scheme(s) for participants promotes
quick participant adoption. The joining fee, fixed fees (if
any), and variable fees should not act as barriers for smaller
players. At the same time, the operator should ensure
sustainability in the medium- to long-term timeframe.
12 Consider user experience as a critical factor that needs to be
kept in mind while designing and developing a fast payment
arrangement. Focus should be placed on providing a seamless
experience across all access channels. The elements that help
enhance the customer experience include the use of aliases
and services provided by third parties (for example, payment
initiation).
19 Ensure that pricing policies for end users foster uptake in
the short term, for which public authorities may encourage
participants to offer fast payments as a low-cost (or even
zero-cost) payment service. However, in the medium term,
this will need to be reconsidered to ensure that participants
have an incentive to introduce additional services and
features.
13 Design and implement a strong governance framework for
the fast payment arrangement. All participants (banks and
non-banks) should be represented and have a say in the
decision-making. The voices of external key parties, such
as fintechs and telcos, also need to be heard and given due
consideration.
20 Give due attention to the type of messaging standard
adopted. The decision to adopt a particular message
standard—proprietary or ISO—should be based on a careful
analysis of the costs and benefits and factor in the need to
facilitate the interoperability of domestic payment systems
and, eventually, to enable cross-border payments. While
other possibilities exist, ISO 20022 is emerging as a leading
messaging standard for fast payments.
continued
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 69
demands from participants, end users, overseers, and the
other stakeholders in the broader ecosystem.
5.1 WHAT’S NEXT FOR FAST PAYMENTS?
FPSs are emerging as a new payment infrastructure that is
directly linked to transaction accounts and creating a truly
independent payment mechanism alongside the payment
cards that have dominated in-person and online payments
in many countries. Now that domestic payments between
transaction accounts (transaction accounts include bank
account, mobile-money accounts, and accounts maintained
with a licensed non-bank financial institution) happen in
seconds and at nearly zero cost, the adoption of FPS is gain-
ing traction. The BIS Innovation Hub is exploring how the
success of fast payments can improve the cross-border pay-
ments experience. The Nexus project provides a blueprint
14 Undertake comprehensive testing before launch (operator
and participants). A fully functional central testing platform
for intra- and inter-participant testing can help identify issues
early in the implementation phase.
21 Establish a clear, documented, effective risk-management
framework to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the
various risks, including those concerning potential criminal
activity (for example, money laundering, the financing of
terrorism, cyberattacks, and data breaches). Participants
should also be mandated by their supervisor to set up
robust internal controls for operational risks.
15 Have a comprehensive rulebook that contains all relevant
rules, parameters, standards, and controls for the operational
efficiency and overall soundness of the fast payment
arrangement. This also promotes a level playing field for
participants.
22 Agree on the settlement model and measures for the
mitigation of settlement risk between operators/manager
and operator/manager and participants. The measures
should be cost efficient. Key decision factors include
whether non-banks will be direct participants (for example,
settling operations on their own behalf) and the specifics
of the local ecosystem (for example, settlement services
provided by the central bank or commercial banks).
PROJECT “GO-LIVE” AND POST-IMPLEMENTATION STAGE
23 Collaborate during post-implementation to ensure that the
fast payment arrangement will be able to reach its maximum
potential over time.
27 Review risk-management frameworks periodically to
mitigate evolving requirements and threats, including cyber.
Technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine
learning can help operators/managers detect failures in
compliance and combat evolving threats.
24 Generate customer awareness in the initial years to
increase registrations and uptake. Customers often require
handholding to familiarize themselves with the new service
and its functionalities.
28 Adapt some of the oversight tools and overall approach
when it comes to fast payments, to ensure that the relevant
systems or underlying arrangements operate safely and
efficiently on an ongoing basis (applicable for regulators/
overseers).
25 Keep the customer registration process simple, to increase
uptake.
29 Leverage payments data to introduce innovative and
customized solutions for end users (for system operators and
system participants) without compromising data-protection
and privacy aspects.
26 Adopt a product road map approach for new use cases/
services and functionalities that shares the vision of the
owner/operator with all participants (and other relevant
stakeholders, such as telcos), ensuring that these stakeholders
will be able to adopt these changes in a timely manner.
30 Evaluate on an ongoing basis whether the system continues
to meet the evolving ecosystem needs; fosters the safety,
efficiency, and reliability of the NPS; and has the right
governance arrangements. Take appropriate actions based
on the evaluation.
TABLE 31, continued
In summary, while many jurisdictions have implemented
fast payments, their paths have varied significantly, owing to
differences in the regulatory environment, support from the
broader ecosystem, consumer preferences, support from
the existing payments and ICT infrastructure, and existing/
competing offerings. Each jurisdiction’s uptake, experiences,
and success have also varied. For example, ownership/oper-
ation by a central bank can be as effective (or ineffective) as
ownership/operation by the private sector. One important
conclusion is therefore that there is no single right way to
implement fast payments—what worked well in one place
may not work in the other.
It also needs to be acknowledged that the crux of a
thriving system lies in more than just a successful imple-
mentation. Jurisdictions must work consistently to incor-
porate enhancements and feedback so that fast payment
arrangements reach their maximum potential. Functional-
ities will need to be improved regularly to adapt to changing
70 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
for a scalable cross-border payments network that would
connect FPSs in multiple countries, enabling them to offer
cross-border payments that reach their destination within
60 seconds.
Moreover, crypto assets appear to be on the rise globally,
including some that certain individuals and firms consider
to be a medium of exchange. If these crypto assets with
payment capabilities gain more mainstream acceptance, a
question will arise as to whether or how they shall or could
become interoperable with existing payment systems,
including fast payment arrangements.
Likewise, several experimental projects have tested
how distributed ledger technology could be used in pay-
ments, considering the alleged benefits of programmability,
increased automation, transparency, and network resilience.
Recently, the industry has been giving more thought to how
this technology could be integrated with fast payments. For
example, some players in the industry believe that connect-
ing the latter to existing distributed ledgers would facilitate
programmable fast payments.
In this regard, in July 2020, five Spanish banks successfully
completed a proof of concept for an interbank smart pay-
ment platform managed by Iberpay, the owner and opera-
tor of Spain’s ACH and fast payment arrangement. Iberpay
connected a blockchain network to an existing payments
system. The effort included the deployment of an interbank
smart payment platform and a permissioned interbank
blockchain network. The proof of concept entailed the auto-
matic execution of SCT Inst payments triggered by busi-
nesses’ smart contracts running in the blockchain network,
and their settlement by connecting with the Spanish Retail
Payment System.
62
This arrangement requires interoperable
messaging between the blockchain network and Iberpay’s
fast payment arrangement to facilitate the automated exe-
cution of payments. Iberpay plays the role of system integra-
tor. This initiative is illustrated in figure 24.
As central banks continue to explore the development
of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs),
63
the interplay
between CBDCs and fast payments is likely to receive further
attention. A CBDC network and fast payments do not nec-
essarily have to compete. One potential option in this space
would be using the FPS payment rails for CBDCs.
In addition, the availability of FPS on a 24/7 basis and
facilitating payments for varied use cases is seen as a
national payments rail. The uptake of fast payments has
been encouraging across jurisdictions that implemented it.
For instance, the growth in transaction volumes in India’s
UPI between 2019 and 2020 was 135 percent. Growth has
been very rapid, reaching an annualized rate of around 12
fast payments per capita per year in just the second year of
operation.
The availability of FPS on a 24/7 basis has removed the
barriers of unavailability of systems matching the time zones
of varied countries for cross-border payments and has over-
come the delays for cross-border payments. The integration
of the national FPS for cross-border payments has signified
FIGURE 24: Iberpay’s Integration of a Distributed Ledger with STC Inst.
Company B
Bank 1
Bank 1
Bank 2
Bank 2
Company A
Bank 3
Bank 3
SMART PAYMENTS SPANISH PAYMENTS SYSTEMS
Smart
contracts
Smart
payments
red-i
Interbank
payments
network
Interbank
smart
payments
platform
Interbank
instant
credit
transfers
platform
Source: EPC
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 71
the role of the national FPS for cross-border payments. The
CPMI report Enhancing Cross-Border Payments: Building
Blocks of a Global Roadmap recognizes that interlinking
retail payment systems (including FPSs) and wholesale pay-
ment systems (such as RTGS systems) allows PSPs to inter-
act directly through the linked infrastructures and reduces
their reliance on traditional correspondent banking. The
project Nexus provides a blueprint and the design choices
to future-proof domestic payment systems for cross-border
payments. The Nexus gateway can help overcome, or work
around, some of the legacy design choices.
FPS that is accessed through mobile phones with rich
data availability are more amenable to integration with pro-
motions and marketing campaigns. This can be a strong
motivator for uptake by merchants. Related to this, the
evolution of “buy now, pay later” is enabling credit provi-
sions to be embedded as part of the payment process, in
some sense bringing capabilities usually seen with credit
cards to payments from transaction accounts. This is further
strengthened by the open-banking developments. When
combined with open banking, FPS is allowing the seam-
less embedding of payment processes within commercial
and social interactions, almost making the payment process
invisible to the user.
In addition, access to APIs has allowed data to flow freely
between the systems and participants. The functionalities
being made available through APIs include merchant pay-
ments, transaction history, business-to-business payments,
e-commerce payments, authentication, account balance,
bill payments, profile management, P2P payments, and
reversals. The “open-banking-type”
64
APIs have aided inter-
actions between banks and third parties as well as interac-
tions between a customer and its issuer payment system,
and they have also enabled merchants to accept payment
methods. How the implementation of, and access to, APIs
in turn supports “open banking” differs across jurisdictions.
For example, India’s legal framework and the European
Union’s PSD2 both support API-led banking, but they differ
in terms of their respective implementation strategy. NPCI
leverages the unified “India Stack”
65
that enables banks to
adopt APIs in a centralized way. On the other hand, PSD2
relies on individual banks to open their systems to others
and to provide the APIs to process the payments and access
account information data. This may lead to a situation where
individual banks may publish their own security architecture
and APIs. Although compliant with the standards proposed
by regulator, they may all differ at the implementation level
and be complex to integrate.
Among other things, open banking serves as an enabler
for FPS, as it catalyzes more and more players to partici-
pate in FPS and, as a result, helps FPS become a competi-
tive differentiator in the market. Open banking is perceived
differently across jurisdictions. Some countries, such as
Australia, Bahrain, and the United Kingdom, have created a
well-defined regulator-driven framework, while others, such
as the United States, have followed a more market-driven
approach. In the United Kingdom, open banking was man-
dated by the Competition and Markets Authority to increase
competition and innovation in the United Kingdom’s bank-
ing market and to rebalance markets in favor of consumers.
The impact on FPS of the rising uptake of open banking
is potentially huge. Offerings that blend both capabilities
stand to unlock the combined potential of open banking
and FPS by addressing new payments journeys in innovative
ways. Regulatory requirements and actions vary, but regu-
lators have been encouraging in their role as facilitators for
and enablers of reform. Open banking serves as a catalyst for
FPS by supporting the integration of more and more finan-
cial institutions into FPS and needs to be embedded within
the overall financial ecosystem.
Integration of FPSs into other financial market infra-
structures has furthered the usage of fast payments. For
example, investments in capital markets and payments for
future transactions are opening the gates for integration for
all markets. The access and integration of fintechs has fur-
thered innovation in the space.
EXHIBIT A1: External Advisory Experts Group
EXTERNAL ADVISORY EXPERTS GROUP
INSTITUTION REPRESENTATIVE TITLE
Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique
de l’Ouest (BCEAO)
Ms. Akuwa Dogbe Azoma Payment Systems Director
Committee on Payments and Market
Infrastructures (CPMI)
Mr. Umar Faruqui Member of Secretariat
European Central Bank (ECB) Ms. Mirjam Plooij Senior Market Infrastructure Expert
Central Bank of Egypt Mr. Ehab Nasr Assistant Sub-Governor, Payment Systems and Business
Technology Sector
Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance Ms. Christina Hulka Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer
Global System for Mobile
Communication (GSMA)
Mr. Bart-Jan Pors Director of Inclusive FinTech
National Payment Corporation of India
(NPCI)
Mr. Dilip Asbe Director and Chief Executive Officer
NPCI International Payments Limited
(NIPL)
Mr. Ritesh Shukla Chief Executive Officer
Bank of Jamaica Mrs. Novelette Panton Division Chief, Financial Markets Infrastructure
Bank of Jamaica Mr. Mario Griffiths (Alternate) Director, Payment System Policy and Development
Bank Negara Malaysia Mr. Yip Kah Kit Deputy Director, Financial Development and Innovation
Banco de México Mr. Miguel Diaz General Director of Payment Systems and Market
Infrastructures
South Africa Reserve Bank Mr. Tim Masela Head of Payment Systems Department
UK Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) Mr. Nick Davey Payment Specialist
UK Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) Ms. Nicole Coates (Alternate) Technical Specialist
APPENDIX A: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
72
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 73
Special acknowledgment is made of the following contributors for the interviews and surveys conducted with the jurisdic-
tions selected for the deep dives.
EXHIBIT A2: Contributors to Interviews and Surveys
NO. REGION
CENTRAL BANK/OTHER
REGULATOR OPERATOR PARTICIPANT
1 Australia Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) New Payments Platform Australia
Ltd. (NPPA)
National Australian Bank
Bpay
Osko
Cuscal
AusPay Network
2 Bahrain Central Bank of Bahrain BENEFIT Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait
3 Chile Comisión para el Mercado
Financiero (CMF)
Centro de Compensación
Automatizado (CCA)
Trans Bank
BNP Paribas
4 China People’s Bank of China (PBC) (China National Clearing Center)
CNCC
5 Europe European Central Bank (ECB) European Payments Council (EPC) Unicredit
CEC Belgium
Deutsche Bank
6 Hong Kong SAR,
China
Hong Kong Monetary Authority
(HKMA)
Hong Kong Interbank Clearing Ltd.
(HKICL)
NEAT
7 India Reserve Bank of India (RBI) National Payments Corporation of
India (NPCI)
SBI
Amazon Pay
ICICI Bank
8 Kenya Integrated Payment Services Ltd./
Kenya Bankers Association
Diamond Trust Bank
9 Malaysia Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) PayNet HSBC
10 Mexico Banco de México Banco de México Banco Santander
11 Poland National Bank of Poland Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa (KIR) Blik
12 Singapore Monetary Authority of Singapore
(MAS)
Banking Computer Services Pvt. Ltd.
(NETS)
DBS
13 Thailand Bank of Thailand (BOT) National Interbank Transaction
Management and Exchange (ITMX)
Kiatnakin Bank
KasiKorn Bank
2C2P
Thai Banker Association
14 United Kingdom Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) Pay.UK HSBC
Wise
Clear Bank
UK Finance
Ebury
15 United States Federal Reserve Board The Clearing House (TCH) Citibank
74 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
The following organizations provided technical inputs and perspectives to the focus notes. We are grateful for their support.
EXHIBIT A3: Organizations That Provided Inputs and Perspectives
NO. SPECIAL TOPIC NOTE ENTITY
1 Access to FPS Wise
2 APIs Central Bank of Mexico
Dapi
Sahamati
Wise
Form3
W3C
EMVCo
GSMA
3 Consumer protection Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
The International Financial Consumer Protection Organisation (FinCoNet)
Central Bank of Portugal
Reserve Bank of Australia
Financial Services Regulatory Authority, Canada
4 Customer authentication EMVCo
FIDO Alliance
GSMA
W3C
5 Dispute handling, reversal,
chargebacks, and refunds
Visa Inc.
6 Fraud risks and AML/CFT Banco de México
Datavisor
7 Messaging standards Mastercard
Nexo Standards
PwC India
SWIFT
8 Proxy identifiers and databases NPPA
SWIFT
Thai Bankers Association
9 QR codes Ant Group
Central Bank of Mexico
EMVCo
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 75
The team is indebted to the following individuals for their
consistent guidance, valuable insights, and overall recom-
mendations made while preparing this report:
Hassan Abouzeid, Colin Adams, Jonathan Adams, Agustin
Alcaide, Shafaq Al Kooheji, Ahmed Al Mahri, Riyad Al Maraj,
Hesa Al Sada, Hasan Al Shehabi, Stefan Antimov, Anuchit
Anuchitanukul, Oya Ardic, Siritida Panomwon Na Ayudhya,
Mohammed Aziz, Hemant Baijal, B. G. Mahesh, Américo
Cristian Becerra, Jessica Bilcock, Salman Bin Isa Al Khalifa,
Gian Boeddu, Keith Brown, Bonni Brodsky, Akhil Bhudiraja,
Claude Brun, Bianca Santillana Castellano, Matias Nuñez
Castro, Tanya Chakraborty, Yuk Ying Yuki Chan, Luo Charles,
Sovon Chaterjee, Aseem Chaturvedi, Fisher Chay, Christopher
Chazin, Jennifer Chien, Daniel Chippeck, George Chou, Vijay
Chugh, Nathan Churchward, Becky Clements, Nicole Coates,
James Colassano, Carlo Corazza, Raffaella Cozzolino, Edlira
Dashi, Nick Davey, Peter Davey, Dorothee Delort, Miguel
Diaz, Fabrizio Dinacci, Francesco Di Salvo, Małgorzata
Drążyk, Isaku Endo, Ahmed Faragallah, Luis Alberto Feldman
Silberman, Javier Francisco, Kate Frankish, Matthew Friend,
Paul Fung, Ilka Funke, Pablo Furche V, Mike Gallaher, Mihir
Gandhi, Daniel Delgadillo Garrido, Etienne Goosse, Mario
Diethelm Guallar, Patricia Guerra, Ulrike Guigui, Sara
Hammond, Sunita Handa, Chad Harper, Salvador Hernandez,
Rose Hong, Christina Hulka, Sandeep Indurkar, Claudia
Alarcon Inzunza, Elize Jackson, Ryan Jackson, Ian Jacobs,
John Jefferson, Peter Jensen, Huang Jing, Yip Kah Kit, Bonnie
Kantor, Abhinav Kapoor, Jay Karia, Karol Karpinski, Fern
Karsh, Craig Kennedy, Farouk Khimji, Yos Kimsawatde, Simon
Kleine, Jessica Kong, Barbara Kotschwar, Somkrit Krishnamra,
Jeeradech Kumlangkua, Vincent Kwok, Angel Lam, Eric Lam,
James Langlois, Mile Larby, Bastien Latge, Joyce Lau, Steve
Ledford, K. H. Lee, Grzegorz Leńkowski, Kristine De Lepeleire,
Supreecha Limpikanjanakowit, Leo Lipis, Adrian Lovey,
Haiyan Lyu, Mabel Lyu, Richard Mabbott, Rory Mazurkiewicz
MacFarquhar, Balakrishnan Mahadevan, Jeremy McDougall,
Brett McDowell, Kieran McKenna, David McPhee, Jeerasak
Meekaew, Elżbieta Michalik, Richard Miller, Aung Kyaw Moe,
Fredesvinda Montes, Adam Moulson, Timothy Neill, Wameek
Noor, Liz Oakes, Mia Oh, Habil Olaka, George Otiende , Seun
Owoeye, Bhavya Pandey, Carlo Parmers, Gerry Pelgrims,
Rina Penkar, David Pereira, Mirjam Plooij, Bart-Jan Pors, Brad
Pragnell, Michele Lo Presti, Normand Provost, Yashaswi Rao,
Ronald Fernando Raurich Giménez, Guillermo Rabadan,
Anjana Ravi, Tony Richards, Mauro Romaniello, David Rosa,
Angel Salazar, Elio Santoro, Kanishk Sarkar, Christian Schaefer,
Peter Schiesser, Adam Scott, Heba Shams, Dianne Shay, Saqib
Sheikh, Marc Schmitt, Brian Shniderman, Zainab Shukralla,
Paul Kwan Hang Sin, Mohit Singh, Rose Siriwardhana,
Matthew Soursourian, Jacques Soussana, Ian C. B. Spear, Mark
Stanhope, Gynedi Srinivas, Fabio Stragiotto, Katrina Stuart,
Xi Sun, Naveen Surya, Jessica Szeto, Zubin Tafti, Anthony Yu
Kun Tai, Maverick Tam, Jaydeep Thumar, Lars Trunin, David
Turner, Andres Vargas P, Andy White, Mark Williams, Nai
Seng Wong, Yinglian Xie, Meng Yan, Sylvia Yip, Toby Young,
Pierfrancesco Zaghetti, Alice Zanza, and Ji Zheng
EXHIBIT B1: Glossary
TERM DESCRIPTION
AI artificial intelligence
Alias Alternative identifier(s) to bank account holder details for increased convenience of the customer—for
example, a mobile number or national ID number
AML anti-money-laundering
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API application programming interface
Australia
ADI
AFCA
APRA
DCS
ESA
FSS
IFTI
NPP
NPPA
PSB
RADI
RBA
RITS
RTPC
authorized deposit-taking institution
Australian Financial Complaints Authority
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
distributed clearing system
Exchange Settlement Accounts
Fast Settlement Services
International Funds Transfer Instruction
New Payments Platform
New Payments Platform Australia Ltd.
Payments System Board
restricted authorized deposit-taking institution
Reserve Bank of Australia
Reserve Bank Information and Transfer System
Real-Time Payments Committee
Authentication Methods used to verify the origin of a message or to verify the identity of a participant connected to a
system and to confirm that a message has not been modified or replaced in transit
Bahrain
CBB
EFTS
PLPD
Central Bank of Bahrain
Electronic Fund Transfer System
Personal Data Protection Law
BIC Bank Identifier Code
BIS Bank for International Settlements
CDD customer due diligence
Channel Modes used by customers to initiate transactions on FPS—for example, a branch, the internet, a mobile
phone, a call center, or a letter
Chile
ACH
CCA
CMF
TEF
Automated Clearing House
Centro de Compensación Automatizado
Comisión para el Mercado Financiero
Transferencias en Línea
APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS
continued
76
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 77
TERM DESCRIPTION
China
IBPS
CNCC
PBC
Internet Banking Payment System
China National Clearing Center
People’s Bank of China
CFT combating the financing of terrorism
Clearing service A multilateral system or arrangement that provides its participants with clearing services for payment
instructions; the institution responsible for the computation of obligations and the transmission of
information through a payment system network
CPMI Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures
Credit risk The risk that a counterparty, whether a participant or other entity, will be unable to meet fully its financial
obligations when due, or at any time in the future
Debit cap Quantitative limits on the fund transfer activity of direct participants in a system
Deferred net settlement Netting that is deferred until a prearranged time (cycle) and settles on the final netted value at that time at
the settlement service provider
Direct debit Debit on the payer’s bank account initiated by the payee; these are usually preauthorized
Direct/primary
participants
Financial institutions that connect directly with the central clearing service provider to send and receive
payment messages and have a direct account with the settlement service provider
Dispute resolution Structured processes that address disputes or grievances that arise between the parties engaged in a
particular payment
Distributed clearing Validation and confirmation of the payment instruction are undertaken on a peer-to-peer basis between
both banks, before initiating downstream settlement at the central bank
DNS deferred net settlement
DRC dispute-resolution committee
EDIFACT Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport
e-KYC electronic know your customer
EU European Union
Europe
CSM
EBA
ECB
EPC
ERPB
GDPR
MIB
OBIE
PSD2
SCA
TIPS
clearing and settlement mechanism
European Banking Association
European Central Bank
European Payments Council
Euro Retail Payments Board
General Data Protection Regulation (legislative act of the European Union)
Market Infrastructure Board (governance body of the European Central Bank)
Open Banking Implementation Entity
Revised Payment Services Directive
strong customer authentication
Target Instant Payment Settlement
e-Wallet A software-based device that securely stores a users payment credentials linked to a current account, a
credit card, a debit card, or an e-money account for use in paying at physical stores or in e-commerce.
When this device is a smartphone, e-wallets holders can use their phone to make payments. This is
often referred to as a mobile wallet. Combined with fast payments, mobile payments offer multiple new
possibilities for P2P and P2B payments, among others.
Fast payments Payments in which the transmission of the payment message and the availability of funds to the payee
occur in real time or near real time and as near to 24 hours a day and seven days a week (24/7) as possible.
For the purposes of this study, emphasis is placed on the immediate availability of funds to the beneficiary
of a fast payment transaction—which can be an individual, a firm, or a government agency—and that these
transactions can be made during an operational window during the day that is as large as possible, with
trends toward 24/7 availability.
Float The period between when money is debited from a payers account and credited to a recipient’s account
and interest is not paid to either the sender or the recipient of the payment
FMI financial market infrastructure
GDP gross domestic product
EXHIBIT B1, continued
continued
78 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
TERM DESCRIPTION
General business risk The risk related to the administration and operation of a financial market infrastructure as a business
enterprise, excluding those related to the default of a participant or another entity, such as a settlement
bank, global custodian, or another FMI.
Hong Kong SAR, China
CFI
CHATS
HKAB
HKMA
SVF
Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative
Clearing House Automated Transfer System
Hong Kong Association of Banks
Hong Kong Monetary Authority
stored-value facility
Hub A central application that a third-party organization runs as a hub to handle the clearing between the
participants and manage the downstream settlement with the central bank’s RTGS
Hybrid settlement A settlement mechanism where payment can be processed either by deferred net settlement or real-time
settlement depending on the volume of transaction, time to process, or value of the transaction
IBA Indian Banks Association
IBAN International Bank Account Number
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
ITU International Telecommunication Union
India
CCIL
ERM
IMPS
MMID
NEFT
NPCI
PPI
RBI
SGF
TPAP
UPI
Clearing Corporation of India Ltd.
enterprise risk management
Immediate Payment Service
mobile-money identifier
National Electronic Funds Transfer
National Payments Corporation of India
prepaid payment instrument
Reserve Bank of India
settlement guarantee fund
third-party application provider
Unified Payments Interface
Indirect participant A financial institution using direct/primary participants as a sponsor for passing payment messages to the
clearing service provider and leveraging the primary participant’s account with settlement service provider
for settlement
Interoperability Technical or legal compatibility that enables a system or other mechanism (for example, a payment
instrument) to be used in conjunction with other systems or mechanisms
Intraday liquidity Liquid funds that can be accessed during the business day, usually to enable financial institutions to settle
payment obligations on both a payment-by-payment basis and DNS cycles
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
ISO International Organization for Standardization
Kenya
IPSL
KBA
Integrated Payment Services Ltd.
Kenya Bankers Association
KYC know your customer
Liquidity facility A facility that can be drawn upon by certain eligible entities; in some cases, the facility can be used
automatically at the initiative of the account holder, while in other cases, the liquidity provider may decide
explicitly on each single request
Liquidity risk The risk that a counterparty, whether a participant or other entity, will have insufficient funds to meet its
financial obligations as and when expected, although it may be able to do so in the future
Malaysia
BNM
NRIC
PayNet
RPP
Bank Negara Malaysia
National Registration Identity Card
Payments Network Malaysia Sdn Bhd
Real-time Retail Payments Platform
ML machine learning
MOU memorandum of understanding
EXHIBIT B1, continued
continued
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 79
TERM DESCRIPTION
Merchant discount rate Rate charged to merchants for processing transactions
Messaging standard A common definition of the syntax, structure, and semantics of a family of messages that are exchanged
between counterparts
Mexico
CNBV
CoDi
SIAC
SPEI
SPEUA
Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores
Cobro Digital
Account Holders Service System
Interbank Electronic Payment System
Extended Use Electronic Payments System
NDC net debit cap
Netting The offsetting of the value of obligations between or among participants in the payment system, thereby
reducing the value that needs to be transferred between participants to settle all the payment obligations
NFC Near-field communication—for example, using smart phones to make POS transactions
Nigeria
CBN
Central Bank of Nigeria
NIP NIBSS Instant Payment
NPS national payments system
PSB Payment Scheme Board
PICC Payment Initiative Coordinating Committee
NLP natural language processing
Operational risk The risk that deficiencies in information systems or internal processes, human errors, management failures,
or disruptions from external events will result in the reduction, deterioration, or breakdown of services
Overlay service Ancillary services that are often based on the real-time payments rails and are flexible, nimble drivers of
innovation
Oversight Oversight of payment and settlement systems and services is a central bank function whereby the
objectives of safety and efficiency are promoted by monitoring existing and planned systems, assessing
them against these objectives, and, where necessary, inducing change—for example, by a public authority
Payment system operator Institution responsible for operating a payment system
Payment types Payment types can be classified into the following three categories:
i) Individual payments:
Person-to-person (P2P) payments include transfers of money to family members/friends without an
underlying economic transaction (for example, remittances). Payments to other individuals in the social
context (for example, to repay for a shared restaurant bill) also fall into this category.
ii) Business payments:
Person-to-business (P2B) payments include retail payments associated with the purchase of retail
goods and services from businesses, irrespective of the size of the business.
Business-to-person (B2P) payments typically involve periodic transactions in compensation for the work
rendered by employees (that is, payrolls and other compensation-related payments, such as incentives)
and are therefore normally characterized by a large number of transactions of relatively small value.
Business-to-business (B2B) payments: When one business is the payee and another business is the
payer, it is called a B2B payment. B2B payments range from large-value payments associated with large
intra-industry transactions (which are not in the focus of this report) to retail payments between small,
medium-sized, and large enterprises
iii) Government payments:
Person-to-government (P2G) payments include obligations that individuals pay to central, regional, and
local public administrations.
Government-to-person (G2P) payments are characterized by a very large number of transactions,
normally of small individual value.
Government-to-business (G2B) payments are characterized by a large number of transactions, and
values vary widely, ranging from large-value procurement contracts to very small payments made with
a government credit card or debit card.
Business-to-government (B2G) payments are typically periodic payments and characterized by a large
number of transactions of varying sizes. B2G payments include corporate tax payments (for example,
income taxes, sales taxes, and value-added taxes), fees for government services (for example, company
registration, business permits, or licenses), penalties (for example, fines), and the employer’s share of
social-security contributions
EXHIBIT B1, continued
continued
80 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
TERM DESCRIPTION
Payment instrument Modes of payments that facilitate transactions between two parties. There are two types of payment
instruments: cash and non-cash. Non-cash payment instruments include checks, credit transfer, debit and
credit cards, direct debits, and e-wallets.
PBC People’s Bank of China
PFMI Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures
PISP payment-initiation service provider
Poland
KIR
NBP
Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A.
National Bank of Poland
Prefunding Prefunding is the requirement to hold segregated funds against a net debit cap or other agreed position in
a payment system that can always be used for final settlement to reduce or remove credit or liquidity risks
arising.
PSP payment service provider
Real-time settlement Settlement on a continuous, payment-by-payment basis, in real time.
Reconciliation A procedure to verify the purpose of a payment—for example, between an invoice or bill and a subsequent
payment
RFP request for proposal
RTGS real-time gross settlement
RTS regulatory technical standards
Settlement agent An entity that manages the settlement process for transfer systems or other arrangements that require
settlement; the settlement agent sometimes differs from the owner or settlement institution of the system
Settlement bank Either a central or a commercial bank used to effect fund settlements; an FMI typically maintains an account
at one or more settlement banks to conduct fund settlements between or among its participants
Settlement risk The risk that settlement in a fund or securities transfer system will not take place as expected; this risk may
comprise both credit and liquidity risk
Settlement service
provider institution
The institution across whose books transfers between participants take place to achieve settlement within
a settlement system—that is, the institution responsible for interbank/company settlement of payment
instructions—for example, central banks
Singapore
FAST
MAS
MEPS+
SACH
SCHA
Fast and Secure Transfers
Monetary Authority of Singapore
New MAS Electronic Payment and Book-Entry System
Singapore Automated Clearing House
Singapore Clearing House Association
SIPS systemically important payment system
SLA service-level agreement
SME small and medium-sized enterprise
Straight-through
processing (STP)
The automated end-to-end processing of trades and/or payment transfers, including the automated
completion of confirmation, matching, generation, clearing, and settlement of instructions, without the
need for rekeying or reformatting data
Stress testing An estimation of the credit and liquidity exposures that would result from the realization of an extreme but
plausible stress event—for example, credit and liquidity risks of counterparties
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
SWIPS System Wide Important Payment System
Systemic risk The risk that the inability of one or more participants to perform as expected will cause other participants
to be unable to meet their obligations when due
EXHIBIT B1, continued
continued
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 81
TERM DESCRIPTION
Thailand
BOT
CSS
PCI DSS
National ITMX
PIRPS
PSO
PSC
TBA
Bank of Thailand
Central Settlement System
Payment Card Industry—Data Security Standard
National Interbank Transaction Management and Exchange
prominently important retail payment system
Payment Systems Office
Payment Systems Committee
Thai Bankers Association
UAT user acceptance testing
UK
BoE
FCA
FPS
NSC
PSR
Bank of England
Financial Conduct Authority
Faster Payments Service
net sender cap
Payment Systems Regulator
USA
ABA
CUNA
ICBA
FDIC
FFIEC
FRB
NACHA
NAFCU
OCC
RTP
TCH
TLS
TPSP
American Bankers Association
Credit Union National Association
Independent Community Bankers of America
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
National Automated Clearing House Association
National Association of Federally Insured Credit Unions
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Real Time Payments system
The Clearing House
transport-layer security
third-party service provider
Use cases Specific situation in which a product or service could potentially be used
User charges Fees levied on end users for conducting a transaction in a payment system
USSD Unstructured Supplementary Service Data
Value date The day on which the payment, transfer instruction, or other obligation is due and the associated funds and
securities are typically available to the receiving participant.
XML Extensible Markup Language
EXHIBIT B1, continued
EXHIBIT C1: Emergence of Fast Payment Arrangements over the Years
THE EMERGENCE OF FAST PAYMENTS AROUND
THE WORLD
A few jurisdictions were pioneers in implementing fast pay-
ments when there were no global analogies and little mar-
ket demand. This was the case of, for example, Chile, South
Africa, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. Other juris-
dictions started considering fast payments late in the first
decade of the century after seeing the benefits and new
opportunities brought by fast payments.
Exhibit C1 depicts the emergence of fast payments glob-
ally over the years. While a few arrangements have been
APPENDIX C: PRIMER ON FAST PAYMENTS
present for a decade or more, it was in the last five years that
most jurisdictions implemented fast payments. The wider
emergence of fast payments was undoubtedly accompa-
nied by advances in IT, especially with increases in access,
adoption, and usage of smartphones.
The central bank has also been a major driving force for
fast payment implementation, either as an operator or cat-
alyst for a solution of this kind to be implemented. Certain
jurisdictions, such as Poland and the United States, saw pri-
vate operators introducing fast payments on their own due
to an increased market need for the same.
Jurisdictions with only banks as participants
Jurisdictions with both banks and non-banks as participants
Information not available
* Europe Sct. has been considered as 1 jurisdiction
+ System supports local currency
# Zengin became FPS in 2018 with implementation of More Time System
Spain Romania Ghana Mexico Kenya
India Australia Finland Serbia
Argentina Thailand
Europe Nicaragua Latvia
USA Bhutan
TEF
RTC
BiR
Chile
U.K.
South Korea South Africa
CEFTS
Straksbetalinger
Portugal
Denmark
Norway Turkey
Sri Lanka Bahrain Singapore
Italy
SCI Inst
HRK SCI Inst CERTIS
Sunqar
IPI
IPSIPS
IPS
BIPS
FPS
Anor
Philippines
Kazakhstan
HungaryAzerbaijanRussiaCzech Republic
Malaysia
Croatia
+
Bulgaria
+
Hong Kong Japan
#
Colombia UAE
Uzbekistan
SCI Inst CBN Paysett Instant Payments
India
Nigeria
Sweden
China
Poland
2001–09 2009–13 2 01315 2015 18 2018–2020
82
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 83
KEY CHARACTERISTICS AND BENEFITS PROVIDED
The key characteristics that are common across fast pay-
ment arrangements around the world are shown in exhibit
C2. While all these characteristics are very relevant, this Fast
Payments Toolkit has emphasized the immediate availability
of funds to the beneficiary—which can be an individual, a
firm, or a government agency—and that these transactions
can be made during an operational window during the day
that is as large as possible, with trends toward 24/7 avail-
ability
Implementation of fast payments has helped achieve the
following benefits:
Unlocking funds by providing beneficiaries with instant
access to funds
Meeting end-user demands for round-the-clock avail-
ability, which, together with immediate availability of
funds, reduces uncertainty and increases the availability
of working capital
Acting as an innovation layer for the launch of new
products and services
Bringing new alternatives for P2B payments and, in this
context, helping to drive financial inclusion and shift to
a more formalized economy
Today, millions are experiencing these benefits. Merchants
can accept fast payments remotely and can instantly access
funds in their transaction accounts, just as they would with
cash. This is particularly helpful to micro and small-business
owners, who can then pay suppliers on time and fulfill other
urgent payment obligations. Emergency funds from govern-
ments to individuals and businesses can be credited quickly.
In some cases, domestic remittances are swiftly reaching
family members in need, at a low cost.
Furthermore, fast payments have had a transformational
impact on the wider payments ecosystem They have sup-
ported innovation in the broader payments landscape and
increased end-user confidence in digital payment methods.
Select differentiators of fast payments when compared with
other payment methods/systems are the following:
66
Instant settlement finality for both the payee and the pay-
er, and the availability of final funds to the payee or the
beneficiary occurs in real time. In other payment meth-
ods, such as card purchases, while the payers account is
debited in real time, the funds may or may not be made
available to the beneficiary immediately. (It depends on
agreement between the acquirer and merchant.)
Transactions can be made through new modes of in-
terfaces, such as third-party mobile applications of
third-party providers.
New access channels and transaction-initiation meth-
ods, such as QR codes, have been introduced.
Membership is broader, and non-bank PSPs can also
participate as direct participants in some cases, or as
indirect participants.
Channel innovations are complemented with use cases
such as request to pay.
Payments are supported with the help of aliases, such
as phone numbers and email addresses, which increase
user convenience.
Fast payments are available around the clock.
The COVID-19 pandemic has also highlighted the grow-
ing relevance of fast payment. Many jurisdictions that have
implemented fast payments have seen a surge in adoption
and usage. For example, in Thailand, the government used
the PromptPay system to channel relief funds quickly to cit-
izens. In India, UPI transaction value grew about 8.3 percent
month on month between March and November 2020. By
contrast, it had grown about 4.5 percent month on month
during the same period in 2019. Transaction value surged
about 76 percent between February and November 2020.
The rapid adoption of fast payments, however, must
be balanced with appropriate safeguards and risk-man-
agement frameworks. Innovations in payments should not
come at the cost of overall security and safety.
It is crucial, for example, to put in place robust
fraud-mitigation mechanisms. For example,
the risk of social-engineering attacks, such as
phishing, affecting financial service users can
be higher with fast payments due to the imme-
diacy of fund transfers. These concerns need to
be mitigated with robust monitoring systems,
fraud-prevention tools, and training. Effective
dispute-resolution mechanisms for participants
vis-à-vis each other or the operator, and for end
users, should also be in place.
EXHIBIT C2: Key Characteristics of Fast Payment Arrangements
Instant and
continuous
Final Certain Secure
Payment should
be available
to beneficiary
immediately and
around the clock
Payment once
initiated should
be final and
cannot be
revoked
Both originator
and beneficiary
should know the
payment has
been completed
Payment should
reach the correct
beneficiary
securely
84 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
DRIVERS OF FAST PAYMENTS ADOPTION AND
UPTAKE
Adoption and uptake of fast payments vary significantly
across jurisdictions. The key lever seems to be the immediate
availability of funds, even for very small-value transactions.
The following elements have also shown to be important
determinants of uptake:
Coverage and openness of the system
Wider coverage helps maximize adoption and regular
usage by both businesses and consumers. The following
may drive wider coverage and openness:
- Capability to facilitate both individual and corporate
use cases: Restriction of fast payments to a narrow
set of transactions—for example, P2P but not P2B or
B2B—may limit potential use cases.
- Support for both push and pull payments: Accom-
modation of both types of payments helps to offer
a wider range of use cases/services to the end cus-
tomers. Authorization is mandated to ensure that
customer give consent prior to payment processing.
- Participation of non-bank PSPs and other fintechs:
The presence of more participants makes the system
more valuable to each participant. Together with tra-
ditional participants such as banks, inclusion of non-
bank PSPs, fintechs, and other technology compa-
nies will provide a wider user base and help boost
adoption.
- Affordability: Jurisdictions may see widespread
adoption owing to efforts—often led by public au-
thorities—to boost uptake that promote low or zero
fees to end users.
Technology, access channels, and ease of use
Difficulties or limitations for users to initiate payments
or an otherwise complex user experience may pose a
significant challenge to uptake and regular usage. The
following may ensure easy accessibility and a more user-
friendly experience:
- Accessibility via everyday devices: Many fast payment
arrangements have demonstrated the importance of
accessibility to services through mobile phones while
also providing more transaction-initiation options.
- The use of aliases (mobile numbers, national IDs,
email IDs, or other user-chosen IDs) makes it con-
venient for users to take advantage of the payment
services, which in turn promotes uptake.
- Accessibility to the arrangement for PSPs via APIs and
the usage of international messaging standards such
as ISO 20022, which enable PSPs and other non-
bank players to structure their service offering for fast
payment end users.
Preexisting market context
Uptake is likely to be higher in economies where the pre-
existing market context enables the use of real-time pay-
ments. The following are a list of the preexisting market
and technological factors that may affect the adoption of
FPS in a jurisdiction:
- Level of penetration/adoption of mobile phones
(both smart phones and feature phones) and the us-
age of internet services
- Quality and payment speed of other payment op-
tions (checks and so on)
- The market competitiveness level in the payments
space
Awareness programs
When public authorities, operators, and participants run
awareness and educational campaigns on fast payments,
uptake is likely to be higher.
INTEROPERABILITY
To facilitate a near-cash and seamless experience for all
types of users, there has been increased focus on the
interoperability of payment systems and payment instru-
ments. Interoperability allows customers to determine which
payment method to use based on the type of use case, user
experience, size of payment, and cost of transaction. With-
out interoperability, these decisions would be driven by
available solutions and offerings, as opposed to customer
preference.
Technical innovations have helped support interoperabil-
ity. Moreover, the fast payment infrastructure in many juris-
dictions has been used by other non-bank PSPs to design
and provide innovative payment solutions to the end cus-
tomers. A paradigm shift is anticipated toward standard-
ization in the payments industry, enabling interoperability
across payment mechanisms, clearing and settlement sys-
tems, and liquidity providers.
Open APIs can serve as interoperability enablers, as they
not only allow financial institutions to connect with other
systems but also foster innovation. In this regard, the impact
that rising uptake of open banking is having on fast pay-
ments (and payments in general) is significant.
67
The use
of APIs in fast payments is providing the foundation for a
widening array of new, innovative services from both incum-
bent, challenger banks and fintechs.
Near-real-time cross-border initiatives by global private
players, such as SWIFT Global Payments Innovation (gpi), Visa
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 85
Direct, Mastercard Send, and PayPal’s XOOM, can eventually
also drive interoperability between fast payment arrange-
ments in different jurisdictions. Adoption of common mes-
saging standards will also facilitate cross-border payments
EVOLUTION AND FUTURE TRENDS
Like other aspects of the payment ecosystem, fast payments
are in constant change. Most early arrangements entered
the market with simple P2P payments. As user confidence
grew, other payments types, such as to/from businesses and
to/from government, were introduced. Furthermore, while
push payments/credit transfers have been intrinsic to fast
payments since their launch, some jurisdictions are making
efforts to introduce pull-capability features.
Similarly, in the earlier versions, most fast payment
arrangement enabled payments only via bank account
numbers. This made small payments tedious, as people/
merchants had to share account details to initiate payments.
Hence, the use of aliases such as mobile-phone numbers or
email addresses as a proxy for bank account number/details
was introduced and became very popular, including for use
cases such as social commerce, where social networks and
media are used to conduct commerce between individuals.
Fast payments have also experienced a different journey
based on the market environment where they operate. For
example, due to the popularity of QR codes in Asia for mer-
chant and bill payments, fast payment arrangements in this
region have put significant effort in enabling the invoking of
payments through this channel.
Fast payment arrangements must keep adapting and
changing as the market conditions and people’s prefer-
ences change over time. Their operators/managers should
continue to be agile to accommodate other new features
and solutions. Various operators and participants are now
equipped with sophisticated analytical tools to help under-
stand payment patterns and offer innovative customized
solutions.
While new movements around crypto assets and central
bank digital currencies, among others, are taking place, fast
payments are likely to continue to play an important role
in the overall innovation in the payments space, and these
various innovations will coexist with one another.
SUSTAINABILITY
Currently, in most jurisdictions, the top banks have incurred
the capital expenditure or investment costs to create fast
payments. Some banks have used the implementation of
fast payments as an opportunity to overhaul their entire core
banking system. In other cases, it is the central bank that
has incurred most of the investment costs to implement fast
payments.
In this context, the business model currently being fol-
lowed by many arrangements around the globe—based on
very low or zero end-user fees to boost uptake—makes it
very difficult for these banks to recoup their expense, and
probably even the ongoing operational expenses, in the
short to medium term. In other words, current pricing strat-
egies for end users are not sustainable over the long run if
the fast payment arrangement is owned by the private sec-
tor and intends to make a profit or at least to recover all costs
incurred. The situation may be different where the central
bank is the owner.
Nevertheless, in several jurisdictions there seems to be
an understanding that capital expenditures and implemen-
tation costs are a one-time sunk cost to improve the overall
payments infrastructure of the jurisdiction. This is likely to
bring benefits that need to be quantified separately from
the revenues obtained directly from the provision of fast
payment services. Such benefits may include the following:
Engaging new customer segments
Reducing fraud risk throughout the whole payment
ecosystem
Improving long-term customer relationships
Enabling innovative new product offerings to increase
market share
CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Fast payment implementation is a complex venture, as it
involves multiple stakeholders. Therefore, public authorities
and operators need to be meticulous while making sensitive
decisions. There is no single right way to implement a fast
payment arrangement.
Jurisdictions have adopted different models, includ-
ing different settlement mechanisms, liquidity provisions,
messaging standards, and use cases. These differences are
based on local market conditions, existing legacy systems,
and cost considerations. It is important for all stakeholders to
cooperate to ensure successful implementation. The critical
decisions have to be based on sound metrics and analyses of
key parameters, such as the overall local payment ecosystem
(including telecommunications), participants’ existing inter-
nal systems, funding, and regulatory and legal constraints.
The study methodology was divided into four phases, as
described below and shown in exhibit D1.
Phase 1 involved secondary research to understand the
current state of fast payment arrangements and recent
developments across 10 broad parameters in almost
70 jurisdictions worldwide (including implementations
that are live, under development, and live but not fully
fledged).
In Phase 2, desk research was conducted for 25 juris-
dictions identified for more detailed study, using public-
ly available information. The parameters studied ranged
across regulatory and governance aspects, customer
features, and technical capabilities. The 25 jurisdictions
were selected based on geographical region, income
levels, and the development stage of their fast payment
arrangement.
APPENDIX D: STUDY METHODOLOGY
In Phase 3, the 25 jurisdictions were then further stream-
lined to include only jurisdictions with live fast payment
implementations to obtain the final list of 16 jurisdictions
where a deep-dive analysis was performed. The intent
was to get a diverse mix of regions across various geo-
graphic regions, with adequate coverage across matured/
developed and emerging economies, and jurisdictions
with maximum coverage of use cases/features. The 16
detailed jurisdiction-specific reports were developed
covering such aspects as objectives, system development
process, business and operating model, technical speci-
fications, and governance framework. These deep-dive
reports were prepared based on in-depth secondary and
primary research involving interviews with regulators,
operators, and participants (banks and non-banks).
Finally, in Phase 4, 16 topic-specific notes were devel-
oped covering aspects that are particularly relevant for
fast payments.
86
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 87
PARAMETERS PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3
Jurisdiction
selection
framework
Fast payments developments
across the globe consisting of
Live arrangements
Under development
live-not full-fledged
arrangements
25 jurisdictions were selected
with representation across:
Geographical regions
Developed / developing nations
and mix of jurisdiction economy
size
Income levels
Jurisdictions who were early
adopters of fast payments
and jurisdictions with new
arrangements developed over
the last 2-3 years
For the deep dive study, framework used for
shortlisting the 16 jurisdictions consists of three
filters:
Implementation stage
Jurisdiction economics and regional
distribution
Key features
In this phase only ‘Live Fast Payments
Arrangements’ were considered as greater
information is likely to be available on the
technical features of the payment systems, use
cases, adoption statistics, FPS structure, rollout/
post-rollout actions
1
2
3
Desk research
10Global
16*
25*
30
16
25-
jurisdiction
profiles
FPS global
landscape
Deep dive
assessment
APPROACH
Phase DeliverableSourceJurisdictionsBrief Parameters Brief approach
Broad characteristics/indicators
offast payments were studied to
provide a global overview
25-jurisdiction profiles were
developed including high level
information on technical specs,
participants, governance
arrangements and use
cases/services
In-depth study across
16 jurisdictions
was carried out
Desk research
Desk research and
primary interviews
Desk research and
primary interviews
4 Focus notes
*SCT Inst has been included, which covers multiple jurisdictions across Europe
Brief approach
Toolkit
includes
consolidated
insights from
all phases
1. QR codes
2. APIs
3. Customer authentication
4. Messaging formats
5. Consumer protection
6. Dispute handling, reversal,
chargeback and refunds
7. Fraud risks and AML/CFT
8. Pricing structure
9. Proxy database
10. Access aspects
11. Cross-border aspects
12. Interoperability aspects
13. Oversight aspects
14. Scheme rules
15. Future of fast payments
16. Infrastructure and
ownership aspects
EXHIBIT D1: Study Approach
Jurisdictions, the name of their fast payment arrangement, and the development stage of the same at the time of this study
have been summarized below.
EXHIBIT E1: Complete List of Jurisdictions/Systems Studied—Regional Classification
# REGION JURISDICTION SYSTEM NAME STAGE
1. North America, Central
America, and the
Caribbean
Aruba I-Pago Live
2. Belize APSSS Instant fund
Transfer (IFT)
Not fully fledged
3. Canada Real Time Rail RTR Under development
4. Costa Rica Live
5.
Cura
çao and Sint Maarten
Under development
6. Dominican Republic Instant Payments Not fully fledged
7. El Salvador PayExpedite RTP Under development
8. Mexico SPEI Live
9. Nicaragua CBN PaySett Live
10. United States RTP and FedNow RTP: Live
FedNow: Under development
11. South America Argentina DEBIN Live
12. Brazil SITRAF
PIX
SITRAF: Not fully fledged
PIX: Live
13. Chile TEF Live
14. Colombia Transfiya Live
15. Peru Under development
16. Europe Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
SCT Inst Live
17. Belarus Instant Payment System
(IPS)
Live
18. Czech Republic RTPE Live
19. Denmark RealTime 24/7
P27
RealTime 24/7: Live
P27: Under development
20. Finland Sirto
P27
Sirto: Live
P27: Under development
21. Hungary Instant Payment System Live
22. Iceland Live
APPENDIX E: FULL JURISDICTION LIST
88
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 89
# REGION JURISDICTION SYSTEM NAME STAGE
23. Europe, continued Italy Jiffy Live
24. Latvia Instant Payment Instant Payment: Live
25. The Netherlands iDeal iDeal: Not fully fledged
26. Norway Straksbetalinger Live
27. Portugal MB Way MB Way: Live
28. Poland Express Elixir Live
29. Romania PlatiInstant Live
30. Russia FPS Live
31. Serbia Instant Payment Serbia Live
32. Spain Bizum Bizum: Live
33. Sweden BiR
P27
BiR: Live
P27: Under development
34. Switzerland SIC Not fully fledged
35. Turkey RPS and BKM Express RPS: Not fully fledged
BKM express: Live
36. United Kingdom UK Faster Payment Live
37. Middle East and North
Africa
Bahrain Fawri+ Live
38. Egypt Phone Cash Not fully fledged
39. Jordan JoMoPay Not fully fledged
40. Saudi Arabia Under development
41. United Arab Emirates IPI Live
42. Yemen WeNet Instant Transfer
System
Under development
43. Sub-Saharan Africa Ghana GIP Live
44. Kenya PesaLink Live
45. Nigeria NIP Live
46. Rwanda RIPRS Under development
47. South Africa RTC Live
48. Tanzania TIPS Under development
49. West African Economic and Monetary
Union. Eight member states include Benin,
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau,
Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
BCEAO Digital Financial
Services Interoperability
Project
Under development
EXHIBIT E1, continued
90 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
# REGION JURISDICTION SYSTEM NAME STAGE
50. Asia Azerbaijan Instant Payment System Live
51. Bhutan Bhutan Immediate
Payment System
Live
52. Brunei Payments Hub Under development
53. Cambodia Fast Payment Live
54. China IBPS Live
55. Georgia Under development
56. Hong Kong SAR, China FPS Live
57. Indonesia BI-FAST Under development
58. India IMPS and UPI Live
59. Japan Zengin Live
60. Kazakhstan Sunqar Live
61. Malaysia RPP Live
62. Maldives Unified Payment
Gateway
Under development
63. Nepal ConnectIPS Live
64. Pakistan Raast Live
65. Philippines InstaPay Live
66. Republic of Korea HOFINET Live
6 7. Singapore Fast Live
68. Sri Lanka CEFTS Live
69. Thailand PromptPay Live
70. Uzbekistan Anor Instant Payment
System
Live
71. Vietnam NAPAS Live
72. Oceania Australia NPP Live
74. New Zealand Under development
EXHIBIT E1, continued
This appendix identifies the subset of 25 jurisdictions/sys-
tems that were identified for jurisdiction-profile buildout
via desk research, together with their geographic and cate-
gory-wise distribution (as per the stage of development of
their fast payment arrangement). The parameters that were
studied are also described later in this appendix.
The 25 jurisdictions have representation across:
Geographical regions
Developed/developing nations and a mix of jurisdiction
economy size
APPENDIX F: THE 25 JURISDICTIONS SHORTLISTED FOR A
MORE DETAILED REVIEW
EXHIBIT F1: List of Jurisdictions Shortlisted for Desk Research
# REGION JURISDICTION SYSTEM NAME STAGE
1. North and
Central America
Mexico SPEI Live
2. United States RTP Live
3. FedNow Under development
4. South America Brazil PIX Live
5. Chile TEF Live
6. Europe SEPA SCT Inst Nations (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom)
SCT Inst Live
7. Poland Express Elixir Live
8. Spain Bizum Live
9. Switzerland SIC Live but not fully fledged
10. Turkey RPS Live but not fully fledged
11 . United Kingdom Faster Payments Live
12. Middle East Asia
and North Africa
Bahrain Fawri+ Live
13. Saudi Arabia - Under development
14. Sub-Saharan
Africa
Kenya PesaLink Live
15. Nigeria NIBSS Instant Payment Live but not fully fledged
16. South Africa RTC Live
17. Tanzania Tanzania Instant
Payment System (TIPS)
Under development
Country income levels
Jurisdictions that were early adopters of fast payments
and those with recent implementations (that occurred
over the last two to three years).
For this same subset of 25 jurisdictions, exhibit F2 shows
a distribution based on their geographic location and cat-
egorization based on the stage of development of the fast
payment arrangement. Category 1 denotes “Live,” Category
2 denotes “Under development,” and Category 3 is “Live
but not fully fledged.”
91
92 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
# REGION JURISDICTION SYSTEM NAME STAGE
18. Asia China IBPS Live
19. Hong Kong SAR, China FPS Live
20. India IMPS and UPI Live
21. Japan Zengin Live
22. Malaysia RPP Live
23. Singapore FAST Live
24. Sri Lanka CEFTS Live
25. Thailand PromptPay Live
26. Oceania Australia NPP Live
EXHIBIT F1, continued
EXHIBIT F2: Geographic and Category-wise Distribution of the 25 Shortlisted Jurisdictions
EXHIBIT F3: Key Parameters Studied in the 25 Shortlisted Jurisdictions
3rd
Category
2nd
Category
1st
Category
1
20
3
2
‘Live’ FPS
as per CPMI
definition
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Middle-East
Asia & North
Africa
Oceania
South
America
North
& Central
America
Europe
Distribution of 25 jurisdictions shortlist
Short-list
(25 jurisdictions)
‘Under
development
FPS
‘Live—Not
full-fledged
FPS as per CPMI
2
1
4
2
1
1
8
1
3
1
Asia
Overview
(Implementation
of the FPS stage,
year of
implementation
etc.)
Legal, Regulatory
& Governance
(Ownership,
oversight and
settlement)
Service Providers
(Banks, non-
banks, etc.)
Customer Features
(speed of payment,
hours of operation,
aliases, channels,
etc.)
Technology
capabilities
(Authentication,
messaging
standards, etc.
• GDP
• Income Level
• Population
• Region
1
FPS FEATURES
2
KEY JURISDICTON
STATISTICS
Desk research for these 25 jurisdictions was conducted
using publicly available information on secondary sources.
The parameters studied ranged across regulatory and gover-
nance aspects, customer features, and technical capabilities,
as shown in exhibit F3.
The framework used for further shortlisting the 25-jurisdic-
tion list to the 16 final deep-dive jurisdictions consisted of
three filters. Each filter is detailed below.
FILTER 1: STAGE OF THE FAST PAYMENT
ARRANGEMENT (THAT IS, “LIVE,” “NOT FULLY
FLEDGED,” OR “UNDER DEVELOPMENT”)
In case of jurisdictions with a live arrangement, greater
information is likely to be available on the features of the
payment system, use cases, adoption statistics, technical
architecture, rollout/post-rollout actions (such as pricing
strategy and transaction limits over the years), and so on.
From the previous shortlist, the study identified 20 jurisdic-
tions with live systems:
68
Australia, Bahrain, Chile, China, the
European Union (SCT Inst), Hong Kong SAR, China, India,
Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Singapore,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
FILTER 2: JURISDICTION ECONOMICS AND
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
The objective of this filter was to ensure a balanced mix
of region distribution, gross domestic product, and coun-
try income levels.
69
Exhibit G1 shows the 19 jurisdictions
(excluding Europe’s SCT Inst) mapped by region, country
income level, and gross domestic product. Europe’s SCT Inst
was included in the 16-jurisdiction deep dives due to its
scale, its use case of enabling cross-border transactions, and
that PSPs can choose the CSM of their preference. In total,
seven jurisdictions/systems were selected with this filter, as
per the following.
Australia, Bahrain, and Chile are the only jurisdictions
with live implementations in their regions and were
considered in 16-system list.
While both Mexico and the United States are in North
America, they are at considerably different stages of
APPENDIX G: METHODOLOGY FOR SELECTING THE 16 DEEP DIVES
their fast payment journey (Mexico was introduced in
2004 with several upgrades to date, and the United
States was introduced in 2017) and were hence consid-
ered in the 16-system list.
China and India are larger economies with different in-
come levels and relatively mature fast payment imple-
mentations and were therefore included in the 16-juris-
diction shortlist. Although Japan is also a large economy
with a different income level, it was excluded, as it be-
longs to the same region, and China and India have rel-
atively mature systems.
FILTER 3: KEY FEATURES OF THE FAST
PAYMENT ARRANGEMENT
The remaining 11 jurisdictions were grouped into four clus-
ters (A, B, C, and D in exhibit G1), based on geographic
region and economies/income levels of similar size to ana-
lyze the features of their fast payment arrangements in Fil-
ter 3. The clusters are:
Cluster A: Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom
Cluster B: Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa
Cluster C: China, Hong Kong SAR, China, and Singapore
Cluster D: Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand
The objective of this filter was to select the jurisdictions
with the maximum coverage of use cases/features. Com-
parison of the following features was performed among the
remaining jurisdictions: the diversity of participants (that is,
extension of participation to non-banks), the aliases sup-
ported for conducting transactions, the channels through
which transactions can be performed, the provision of open
APIs, the type of transactions, and use cases supported.
Exhibit G2 shows the detailed list of features used to com-
pare jurisdictions. The comparison was made cluster-wise
to ensure a balanced mix of geographic regions.
Exhibit G3 compares the features of jurisdictions in Clus-
ter A. On this basis, Poland (Express Elixir) and the United
93
94 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
EXHIBIT G1: Jurisdictions with Live Fast Payment Implementations Mapped by Region, Country Income Level, and Gross
Domestic Product
Kingdom (FPS) were selected for the deep dives. Spain was
not included, as Bizum is a fast payment arrangement built
on the SCT Inst scheme, which is already covered in the pre-
vious 25-system shortlist.
Exhibit G4 compared the features of the jurisdictions in
Cluster B. Shortlisted jurisdictions based on the cluster anal-
ysis were Nigeria (NIBSS Instant Payment) and Kenya (PesaL-
ink), as they have better features and higher uptakes.
EXHIBIT G2: Feature List for Comparison of Jurisdictions
71
NO.
PARAMETER FEATURE/OPTIONS
1
Non-banking entities allowed
Yes/no
2
Alias Mobile number
National ID number
Passport number
Name/virtual address
Email ID
Company registration number
E-wallet ID/mobile-money identifier
3
Channels Internet banking
Mobile banking
Branch
Advanced contactless checkouts (QR, NFC, Bluetooth)
Terminals (ATM, point of sale, kiosks)
USSD
4
Open APIs Yes/no
5
Transaction types Individual
Business
Government
6
Use cases Merchant payments
Bulk/batch payments
Cross-border transaction
Request to pay
Schedule future payments
Bill payments
Both jurisdictions in Cluster C (that is, Hong Kong SAR,
China, and Singapore) were included for the deep dives
owing to the multiplicity of features and uses cases they
offer. (See exhibit G5.)
For Cluster D, Malaysia (RPP) and Thailand (PromptPay)
were selected. Since the Asia region is well represented, and
most of the features offered in Sri Lanka are also covered in
other selected systems, Sri Lanka was not included for the
deep dives.
India
Sri Lanka
China
Malaysia
Thailand
Singapore
Hong Kong
SAR, China
Japan
Poland
UK
Spain
Bahrain
Australia
Kenya
Nigeria
South Africa
Mexico
USA
Chile
High
North &
Central
America
Middle East,
Asia, and
North Africa
Sub-Saharan
Africa
South
America
Europe Asia Oceania
Low
Upper
Middle
Total by
region
Total by
income level
Lowe
Middle
2 1 3 1 3 8 1
110
6
3
0
c
d
a
b
JURISDICTION INCOME LEVEL
REGIONS
C
D
A
B
Note: The size of the bubble is a representation of a jurisdiction’s gross domestic product.
70
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 95
# REGION JURISDICTION
YEAR OF
IMPLEMENT-
ATION
NON-
BANKING
ENTITIES
ALLOWED ALIAS CHANNELS
OPEN
APIS
TRANS-
ACTION
TYPES USE CASES
ANY OTHER
SPECIFIC
USE CASE
RANK
BASED ON
FEATURE
COVERAGE
1
Europe
Poland 2012 YES
Payment terminals
for merchant
payments using
Blik code
2 Spain 2016
3 UK 2008 YES YES
EXHIBIT G3: Feature Comparison across Cluster A
# REGION JURISDICTION
YEAR OF
IMPLEMENT-
ATION
NON-
BANKING
ENTITIES
ALLOWED ALIAS CHANNELS
OPEN
APIS
TRANS-
ACTION
TYPES USE CASES
ANY OTHER
SPECIFIC
USE CASE
RANK
BASED ON
FEATURE
COVERAGE
1
Africa
South Africa 2006
Call centre
(channel)
supported
2 Nigeria 2 011 YES
3 Kenya 2017 YES
EXHIBIT G4: Feature Comparison across Cluster B
# REGION JURISDICTION
YEAR OF
IMPLEMENT-
ATION
NON-
BANKING
ENTITIES
ALLOWED ALIAS CHANNELS
OPEN
APIS
TRANS-
ACTION
TYPES USE CASES
ANY OTHER
SPECIFIC
USE CASE
RANK
BASED ON
FEATURE
COVERAGE
1
Asia
Hong Kong
SAR, China
2014 YES YES
Multi-currency
2 Singapore 2015 YES
EXHIBIT G5: Feature Comparison across Cluster C
# REGION JURISDICTION
YEAR OF
IMPLEMENT-
ATION
NON-
BANKING
ENTITIES
ALLOWED ALIAS CHANNELS
OPEN
APIS
TRANS-
ACTION
TYPES USE CASES
ANY OTHER
SPECIFIC
USE CASE
RANK
BASED ON
FEATURE
COVERAGE
1
Asia
Malaysia 2018 YES
2 Sri Lanka 2015 YES
3 Thailand 2017 YES E- Donation
EXHIBIT G6: Feature Comparison across Cluster D
Legend:
Above average (in terms of number
features supported) amongst the
identified 11 jurisdictions
Lowest to Highest relative
ranking within cluster
Legend:
Above average (in terms of number
features supported) amongst the
identified 11 jurisdictions
Lowest to Highest relative
ranking within cluster
Legend:
Above average (in terms of number
features supported) amongst the
identified 11 jurisdictions
Lowest to Highest relative
ranking within cluster
Legend:
Above average (in terms of number
features supported) amongst the
identified 11 jurisdictions
Lowest to Highest relative
ranking within cluster
A
B
C
D
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
96 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
EXHIBIT G7: Final List of 16 Jurisdictions for the Deep Dives
On this basis, the final list of 16 jurisdictions for the deep dives is as follows (mapped in exhibit G7):
1. Australia
2. Bahrain
3. Chile
4. China
5. European Union (SCT Inst)
6. Hong Kong SAR, China
7. India
8. Kenya
9. Malaysia
10. Mexico
11. Nigeria
12. Poland
13. Singapore
14. Thailand
15. United Kingdom
16. United States
UK
Faster
Payments
USA
RTP
Europe/SEPA
Hong Kong SAR, China
FPS
Thailand
PromptPay
Malaysia
RPP
China
IBPS
Bahrain
Fawri+
India
UPI
Nigeria
NIP
Kenya
PesaLink
Singapore
FAST
Australia
NPP
SCT Inst
Poland
Express
Elixir
Mexico
SPEI
Chile
TEF
CONTEXT AND GUIDELINES
Phase 2 of the engagement entails conducting interviews
with subject matter experts across the selected 16 jurisdic-
tions and seeking documentation directly from the regulator
and payment system operators to gather in-depth FPS-re-
lated insights and to develop detailed jurisdiction-specific
reports. A questionnaire was designed for the purpose of
conducting these interviews.
This questionnaire was designed as a reference document
for interviews with the following stakeholders:
Regulators
Payment system operator
Participants in the payment system (including banks,
payment companies, and so on)
The current format of the questionnaire was prepared with
the intent to cover all possible scenarios irrespective of the
FPS maturity in the jurisdiction. The questions are aligned
with the areas included in the terms of reference document
APPENDIX H: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PRIMARY RESEARCH
shared by the World Bank. The questions are overarching
in nature; some are common across the three stakeholders.
The first area in the questionnaire pertains to the typology
and technical specifications of the FPS. It has detailed ques-
tions pertaining to the FPS setup and its features, the alias
and channels supported, the messaging format, and the
business model.
The second section of the questionnaire deals with the
legal, regulatory, and governance aspects of the FPS. It has
detailed questions on the regulatory oversight and gover-
nance of the FPS, the type of participants allowed, access
to APIs, risk-management measures, and infrastructure
security.
The questionnaire was further customized for each indi-
vidual jurisdiction depending upon its setups, including FPS
maturity, features, use cases supported, technical architec-
ture, and ecosystem participants in Phase 2. This ensured
that the interviews conducted in Phase 2 were more tar-
geted and provided valuable insights.
97
98 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
THE QUESTIONNAIRE
The following questionnaire was designed to conduct primary interviews with the relevant stakeholders.
1. TYPOLOGY AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
FPS Setup and Its Features
QUESTION REGULATOR
SYSTEM
OPERATOR PARTICIPANT
What prompted the need to develop an FPS in the jurisdiction?
- Was it regulatory driven?
- Was it digitization of payment?
- Was it market driven?
- Was it part of an upgrade to an existing system?
- Was financial inclusion a driver?
How was this system built? Was this a completely new system, or was it adapted/
upgraded from an earlier system?
Who helped you build the FPS infrastructure? Was an external vendor engaged for
the same? How were the capabilities of the vendor assessed? Were multiple vendors
engaged for various capabilities?
In case of a separate entity: Why did you create the separate entity to operate/clear
the FPS? Do you feel that it led to a better-focused drive to adoption?
OR
Why did you choose to operate the system in-house? Did you consider creating a
separate entity to operate the system?
How has the FPS system evolved over time? What have been the different
technological advancements and upgrades?
How has FPS uptake been since introduction? What are some of the high-level
adoption statistics of the same?
What are the eligibility criteria to participate in the FPS? How do merchants,
consumers, or non-bank PSPs access the service?
What different transaction types and use cases are supported by the FPS?
Transaction types: Use cases:
- Individual (P2P) Merchant payment
- Business (P2B, B2P) Bulk/batch payments
- Government (P2G, G2P, B2G, G2B) Cross-border payments
Schedule future payments
Request to pay
Bill payments
Direct debit
Which use cases have seen most adoption? Which use cases have yet to pick up?
What were the other popular modes of non-cash payment in the jurisdiction before
FPS introduction? How developed was the existing infrastructure for cards, internet,
and mobile payment? What were their volumes of transactions? How did it change
after introduction of the FPS?
What was the level of interoperability between various payment modes? Is your
system interoperable with any of the preexisting modes of payment?
What different overlay services are currently offered to the customers? What has
been the impact of these services on FPS adoption?
Any unique success story of the FPS in the jurisdiction? How has it enabled different
PSPs to innovate and enhance the customer experience?
Do you think that banking and digital penetration had any effect on FPS adoption?
Also, what has been the impact of FPS on financial inclusion and economic
development?
Do any other systems operating in the jurisdiction allow real-time payments? Are
these systems interoperable?
Do you feel that interoperability between the systems would help in driving the real-
time payments? Any future plans to move toward interoperability?
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 99
Aliases and Channels
QUESTION REGULATOR
SYSTEM
OPERATOR PARTICIPANT
Are different aliases supported (such as mobile numbers, email addresses, national
ID numbers, and so on) to improve accessibility for customers?
If not, any plans to do so in future? Are there any difficulties (such as security issues)
involved in extending support for aliases?
What different channels are supported by the FPS? Are payments using NFC and
QR codes supported?
What was the impact on FPS adoption when support for such channels as NFC and
QR codes was extended?
If no channels are supported, do you have plans to extend support for channels
such as NFC and QR codes?
Messaging Format
QUESTION REGULATOR
SYSTEM
OPERATOR PARTICIPANT
What messaging standard is currently followed in the FPS? If not ISO 20022, any
plans to migrate to the same in the near future?
In case a proprietary messaging standard is being used: What unique features are
being employed in the current proprietary messaging format? Does it allow the
outflow of information as in ISO 20022?
Business Model
QUESTION REGULATOR
SYSTEM
OPERATOR PARTICIPANT
What was the estimated budget for the FPS development? What is the initial set-up
cost? Also, please provide any subsequent outlay on maintenance and upgrades.
What is the business model of the FPS operator? How are the revenues utilized? Is it
a nonprofit organization?
What is the pricing scheme for the PSPs (both fixed fee and variable fee)?
What additional cost did the participants have to bear to upgrade or modify their
system to be able to connect to the FPS?
Are any charges levied on the customers? If so, are participants free to determine
the charges?
Is there any upper cap on the charges that can be levied on the customers? How do
participants decide transfer fees for the customers?
99
100 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
2. LEGAL/REGULATORY AND GOVERNANCE ASPECTS
Regulatory Oversight and Governance
QUESTION REGULATOR
SYSTEM
OPERATOR PARTICIPANT
Does a separate statute for payments exist in the jurisdiction? Did it have to undergo
amendments/modifications to implement the FPS in the jurisdiction?
Was the FPS designated a SIPS and regarded as part of critical national infrastructure?
Are there any plans to do the same?
What regulatory oversights does the central bank have on the FPS in the jurisdiction,
whether publicly or privately owned?
What additional regulations did the central bank enforce over and above the ones
governing the existing non-fast payment systems? Why were they required?
Is a separate legal license or authorization required for the operator? How is the
licensing done? What parameters are evaluated?
Did the regulator issue any specific requirement on governance for operators of
payment system? Or was the current governance framework adopted with some
minor modification?
How does the regulator ensure a proper governance structure in the FPS entities?
Does it have an empowered representative on the board of the entity?
How does the regulator ensure the enforcement and adherence to various
regulations and compliances by the FPSs? What internal and external checks are
present for the same?
How does the system operator and participant ensure that their activities comply
with the regulatory requirements? Is there an automated system to red flag
noncompliance, or are regular manual audits conducted for the same?
Are there independent directors on board and other relevant forums in the system
operator or the payment system participants to act as control mechanisms against
any noncompliance?
What kind of documentation/toolkit is in place for smooth onboarding? What is the
typical timeline for integration testing and onboarding? What are some of the best
practices they have adopted?
Participation of Non-Banks to the System
QUESTION REGULATOR
SYSTEM
OPERATOR PARTICIPANT
What additional benefits did the empanelment of non-bank financial companies
bring to the FPS?
Does the regulator or system operator believe that it can widely increase the
coverage of the payment system through non-bank entities? What challenges does
it foresee in empaneling non-bank financial institutions to the FPS?
What challenges did the regulator or the system operator face in ensuring the
same standards of governance and adherence as banks in the non-bank financial
institutions?
How does the regulator or system operator ensure the enforcement and adherence
to various regulations and compliances by the FPSs? What internal and external
checks are present for the same?
What is the onboarding process for non-banking participants to the system? Are
there additional checks and documentations when compared to banks? Why are
they needed?
Do non-banking participants face any challenges in accessing the payment system
facility? Is there an equality with the banks on the same system?
How do the non-banking participants ensure strict compliances with various norms
and regulations regarding payments?
Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems | 101
Third-Party Access (Using Open APIs)
QUESTION REGULATOR
SYSTEM
OPERATOR PARTICIPANT
Was the third-party access of APIs a part of the design of the system? Or was it
based on requests from stakeholders?
Was a feasibility study conducted on the benefits of providing third-party access of
APIs to the entire ecosystem?
What was the impact of third-party access to FPS and did the system see a surge in
transactions after sanctioning access through open APIs?
Is access to APIs open to the wider community, or is it reserved only to select few
organizations?
Are the banks and other financial institutions well equipped to develop APIs and do
they have an agile infrastructure? What is the potential for the use of open-source
technologies to develop interoperable FPS in your jurisdiction?
Do banks currently publish their APIs for other use cases, and, if so, has the
implementation been industry-wide or limited to a select few banks?
How has the experience of opening access to third parties been? Did a large number
of institutions come forward and access the interface?
What kind of adoption of APIs have they seen? What impact has it had on
innovation, customer experience, and usage of FPS?
If third-party access is to be implemented, what additional regulations/checks do
you foresee, and what would the estimated timelines be for the same?
What challenges do participants face in accessing open APIs? Have they really been
able to promote innovation in the payment ecosystem? What additional changes
would you suggest?
Risk Management
QUESTION REGULATOR
SYSTEM
OPERATOR PARTICIPANT
Why did you choose <particular settlement mechanism>? Did you benchmark other
FPS settlement mechanisms before choosing this one?
How does the regulator and system operator minimize liquidity risks of various
participants in the FPS? Are the intermediaries required to deposit some collateral
with the operator of the payment system? How is the collateral value arrived at?
What is the liability model for payment settlements (for example, on banks/balanced),
and what is the governance structure to regulate and oversee participating entities
(for example, NPCI in India, OBIE+FCA in the United Kingdom, and PaymentsNZ in
New Zealand)?
With regard to risk management, what comprehensive risk-management system are
the operators of the FPS required to deploy that effectively controls various credit
and operational risks?
Does the regulator and system operator publish a risk manual with standard
operating procedures for the payment entity and its participants to abide by?
How are the payment intermediaries currently regulated? Do they follow certain
service-level agreements/operational benchmarks? How well connected are they with
banks and customers?
Which dispute-resolution mechanism is deployed? Is there a dedicated portal and
department to handle grievances of all relevant stakeholders—that is, the payment
system operator, participating institutions, and customers?
Is there a governing manual or separate regulations to guide the resolution-providing
authorities? What principles are taken into consideration while evaluating such issues?
What AML/CFT guidelines are stipulated by the regulator? How does the regulator
and system operator ensure that the FPS is not abused for any such criminal
economic activity?
What mechanisms are in place to ensure business continuity in case of unforeseeable
events?
102 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
Data and Cybersecurity
QUESTION REGULATOR
SYSTEM
OPERATOR PARTICIPANT
How do the stakeholders ensure that users’ sensitive data remains completely
secure?
Does the regulator mandate that users’ financial data be stored within its
jurisdiction?
What security requirements are mandated by the regulator to be put in place by
the system operator and the participants? Are specific minimum requirements
prescribed for the application, initiation of transaction, transferring of money, and so
on?
What procedure for sharing customer information with third parties do the system
operator and participants currently follow, and what are the use cases for the same?
How well do customers accept data sharing, and what challenges have you seen/do
you foresee in the domain?
What measures are in place to ensure quick remediation in case of a data security
breach?
Are cybersecurity regulations at par with global standards to ensure secure data
sharing? What controls and checks are in place to ensure a secure data-sharing
mechanism?
What control mechanisms are in place in case of an unfortunate cybersecurity
breach? Is there backup infrastructure to ensure the stability of the system and
continuous operation?
1. Annex G contains the detailed methodology used for the deep dives,
including the criteria for selecting the jurisdictions.
2. Also, note that both Hong Kong SAR, China, and the United Kingdom
use the acronym “FPS” for their fast payment arrangements.
3. Payment card systems also offer real-time availability for authorizing
payments. However, as a general rule, the funds are not transferred
from the payer to the payee in real time.
4. Objectives often include enhancing financial inclusion, promoting
competition, and expanding the use of digital payments, among others.
5. A note published in 2017 by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development highlights the different
inter-relationships between single versus multihoming and
competition; see https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282017%2933/
FINAL&docLanguage=En.
6. As per secondary research done over the course of this study.
7. This figure shows jurisdictions with live implementations in which
fast payments operate 24/7, as well as others in which they do not yet
operate 24/7.
8. https://empower1.fisglobal.com/rs/650-KGE-239/images/Flavors-
of-Fast-Report_2020.pdf?mkt_tok=NjUwLUtHRS0yMzkAAAF7
vrNPXhBylhl__g8mBLlesiELwUpsxSE5CGXUAJ0aCLncHaDBuj5f0y
5PNgs3m78kQZTXdAuLlnoWqTKe0x0rhj4rlUQ4oFFu1bG8YxyPtXcT6IQ;
https://go.aciworldwide.com/rs/030-ROK-804/images/ACI_Prime_
Time_for_Real-Time_Report.pdf. The complete list of jurisdictions is
provided in appendix E.
9. In Mexico, SPEI is used both as an RTGS system and for fast payments
for retail customers. Therefore, its transaction value as a percentage
of gross domestic product is significantly higher than in other
jurisdictions.
10. These can range from liquidity providers to third-party technology
providers, central securities depositories, and so on.
11. Also, note that both Hong Kong SAR, China, and the United Kingdom
use the acronym “FPS” for their fast payment arrangements.
12. Three filters were applied: (1) Implementation Stage; (2) Country
Economics and Regional Distributions; and (3) Key Features. For
example, only “live” fast payment arrangements were considered,
as greater information was available on technical features, use cases,
adoption statistics, and rollout/post-rollout actions. For additional
details on how the selection was made, see annex D.
13. These implementation drivers are based on responses received to
surveys conducted with the 16 jurisdictions that had been chosen for
the deep-dive research.
14. With UPI, a customer is able to initiate a transaction from any UPI app
(irrespective of the bank where the customer holds an account).
15. For further details, see the World Bank’s “Retail Payments Package”,
in particular World Bank (2012), “Developing a Comprehensive
national Retail Payments Strategy”, Washington. Available at: https://
documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/839121469729131991/
pdf/84076-REPLACEMENT-FILE-PUBLIC-Developing-comprehensive-
national-retail-payments-strategy.pdf
16. For further details, see CPMI-IOSCO (2015), “Application of the
Principles for financial market infrastructures to central bank FMIs”,
Basel. Available at: https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d130.htm
17. For further details on the role of governance see the World Bank’s
(2021), Governance of Retail Payment Systems—Keeping Pace with
Changing Markets. Available at: https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/
pdf/10.1596/36210
18. Supervision of privately owned retail payment infrastructures is
delegated to the banking supervisory agency based on article 82 of the
Organic Law of the Central Bank of Chile and articles 12 and 75 of the
General Banking Law.
19. In addition to these models, some other parties are granted “access”
to the system through a third-party account-initiation mode, as in the
case of UPI in India.
20. In 2018, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority established the
restricted authorized deposit-taking institution framework to assist
potential new entrants to the banking industry, particularly small firms
with limited financial resources. This allows eligible entities to seek a
restricted authorized deposit-taking institution license, allowing them
to conduct a limited range of business activities for two years while
they build their capabilities and resources.
21. At the start of SPEI’s operations in 2004, only banks were allowed to
participate in the system. However, given the operative, technological,
and risk-management characteristics of SPEI, Banco de México has
allowed non-bank financial institutions to participate in it since 2006.
22. For example, “system-wide important payment systems” are systems
whose disruption could affect public confidence in payment systems or
the broader financial system. Although a disruption or failure in these
systems may have system-wide implications and may affect many users,
there is negligible risk of systemic impact to financial stability.
23. From this set of analyzed jurisdictions, Japan and South Africa
upgraded their existing systems.
24. In Bahrain, an external consultant was onboarded to evaluate vendor
capability.
25. https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d31.pdf
26. The proprietary format is based on binary messages constructed
with a predefined layout: HEADER + BODY. HEADER includes control
information: destination, message ID, and body size. BODY includes
the binary payload for messages based on data types (char, short,
int, string, and arrays) to transport data. The messages also include
digital signatures for nonrepudiation purposes and encryption for
confidentiality purposes.
27. https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/authentication
28. https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/publications/2021_01_
Technical_Guide_Building_Faster_Better.pdf
29. https://www.jpmorgan.com/europe/merchant-services/insights/PSD2
30. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
QANDA_19_5555
31. Please refer to Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on Strong
Customer Authentication and Common and Secure Communication
under Article 98 of Directive 2015/2366 (PSD2) for additional details
on regulatory technical standards (https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/
documents/files/documents/10180/1761863/314bd4d5-ccad-47f8-
bb11-84933e863944/Final%20draft%20RTS%20on%20SCA%20
and%20CSC%20under%20PSD2%20%28EBA-RTS-2017-02%29.
pdf?retry=1)
32. https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/
documents/10180/1761863/314bd4d5-ccad-47f8-bb11-
84933e863944/Final%20draft%20RTS%20on%20SCA%20and%20
CSC%20under%20PSD2%20%28EBA-RTS-2017-02%29.pdf
33. Transactions through BenefitPay, the national e-wallet payment system,
are processed through multifactor authentication.
34. CNBV has issued guidelines for banks regarding customer-
authentication standards. Banks have to adopt the two-factor
authentication for customer authorization for all services used, including
SPEI. SPEI rules published by Banco de México establish requirements
for institutions other than banks. At the same time, SPEI rules reinforce
the guidelines issued by the CNBV.
ENDNOTES
103
104 | Considerations and Lessons for the Development and Implementation of Fast Payment Systems
35. https://www.gartner.com/en/information-technology/glossary/
application-programming-interface-api
36. https://cgap.apidashboard.io/
37. In India, despite the absence of a standard framework, the Reserve
Bank of India has issued several regulations that have ushered in a wave
of initiatives.
38. ABS-MAS Financial World, Finance-as-a Service: API Playbook.
39. https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/publications/2021_01_
Technical_Guide_Building_Faster_Better.pdf
40. As discussed in the participant onboarding subsection, direct
participants are required to establish this connection and undergo
testing and certifications before going live.
41. Payment system operators typically do not pay any interest on the cash
collateral amounts placed with them; see https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/
mnb-op-124-final.pdf.
42. Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, Fast Payments—
Enhancing the Speed and Availability of Retail Payments (BIS, November
2016) https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d154.pdf.
43. There are some instances where the participant is connected to more
than one CSM.
44. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/intro/news/html/ecb.
mipnews200724.en.html
45. The technical standards include (i) standards used for messaging; (ii)
API standards used for exchanging information and instructions; and
(iii) standards for acceptance infrastructure and for customer payment-
initiation devices, such as QR codes. Messaging standards and APIs
were discussed earlier in this guide in Module B, while QR codes are
covered in Module C.
46. https://usa.visa.com/partner-with-us/payment-technology/visa-b2b-
connect.html
47. https://www.paymentsjournal.com/new-mastercard-launch-allows-fast-
and-secure-cross-border-payments/
48. https://www.pymnts.com/news/cross-border-commerce/cross-border-
payments/2020/western-union-expands-real-time-payouts-to-80-
countries/
49. https://www.abe-eba.eu/media/azure/production/1550/
cryptotechnologies-in-international-payments.pdf; https://www.fsb.
org/wp-content/uploads/P131020-1.pdf
50. In Hong Kong SAR, China (and other jurisdictions), an eDDA (electronic
direct debit authorization) is provided as a value-added service by FPS.
Hong Kong SAR, China, supports two types of eDDA: Standard eDDA,
which is initiated by the payer, and Simplified eDDA, which is initiated
by the payee. In Standard eDDA, the payer initiates an eDDA via mobile
or internet banking. In the case of Simplified eDDA, the payee who has
an SVF account can set up an eDDA as the payee account for debiting
the bank account to replenish the SVF account balance as and when
needed.
51. https://developer.visa.com/images2/products/visa_direct/ads_
technical_specifications_v3.0.pdf
52. https://pay.google.com/about/business/static/data/GPay_RTP_2019.pdf
53. The RBI has notified all payment service operators to shift to one or
more interoperable QR codes. Migration shall be completed by end-
March 2022.
54. https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/FS_Notification.aspx?Id=11987&fn=
9&Mode=0
55. In India, UPI supports NFC, although its adoption has been challenging
due to an infrastructural issue.
56. https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d191.pdf
57. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2018/sep/the-new-
payments-platform-and-fast-settlement-service.html
58. SIPS are considered FMIs. Further, some fast payment arrangements are
considered SIPS.
59. Notice issued under the Payment Services Act of 2019 on regulated
entities’ obligation to report suspicious activities and incidents of
fraud. Applicable to Designated Payment System Operator, Designated
Payment System Settlement Institution, Standard Payment Institution,
Major Payment Institution, and Money-Changing Licensee and not
limited to FAST.
60. https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d178.pdf.
61. https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d146.pdf
62. https://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/news-insights/insight/
programmable-instant-payments-dlt-networks-and-distribution-digital-
money.
63. The People’s Bank of China has already gone live with a pilot of its
Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP) project, while Sweden’s
Riksbank has recently begun the second phase of its e-krona project.
64. Open banking is the secure way to open up the bank systems for
third-party players to leverage the customer-consented financial data
to build applications and innovative financial services that can give
customers more control over their information, leading to more choice
in their banking, resulting in added confidence in the use of their
data and eventually helping them get a much better deal for their
money.
65. The India Stack is in essence the combining of NPCI’s projects for
digital payments and Aadhaars identity and authentication prowess
via APIs.
66. While these differentiators are common to FPS, they do not appear in
all FPS.
67. As open banking continues to revolutionize the payments landscape,
it is important to decide which parties have permission to access
customer data. Customers should give consent to access their data and
for certain specific purposes only.
68. Turkey’s RPS system (which is a not fully fledged fast payment
arrangement) and the United States’s FedNow system (which is under
development) were considered in the 25-jurisdiction shortlist but
were not considered for the next filters even if the corresponding
jurisdictions already have other live fast payment arrangements in
place.
69. For country income levels, the World Bank’s country income
classification and country listing was used.
70. The chart is for representation purpose only and is indicative.
71. Relative comparison based on secondary research and publicly available
information, for the purpose of shortlisting 16 counties. Scores were
produced by dividing the available feature count by the maximum
number identified. For ranking by computer, a weighting of 1 was
given to all parameters except “Non-banking entities allowed” and
“Open APIs” (which were given a ranking of 0.5).