the yale law journal forum October ,
54
remaining circuits have older precedents holding that Title VII does not bar dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation,
34
and—in the case of three circuits
35
—
have recently armed such precedents. As for gender identity, one circuit has
held that Title VII prohibits discrimination on that basis.
36
Three others have
signaled their agreement with this approach in non-Title VII cases, despite older
precedents holding that Title VII does not prevent discrimination on gender-
identity grounds.
37
In contrast, two circuits have le their old precedents largely
untouched, neither relying on nor rearming them in precedential decisions
within the last decade.
38
The remaining circuits have yet to address the issue.
and arguing that Title VII, read in light of its ordinary meaning and purpose, covers discrim-
ination based on sexual orientation and gender identity).
34. See, e.g., Kay v. Indep. Blue Cross, Fed. App’x , (d Cir. ) (relying on Bibby v.
Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., F.d , (d Cir. )); Medina v. Income Support
Div., F.d , (th Cir. ); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., F.d ,
(th Cir. ) (en banc), a’g DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., F.d (th Cir. );
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., F.d , (th Cir. ); Williamson v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, F.d , (th Cir. ) (per curiam).
35. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, Fed. App’x , - (th Cir. ) (per
curiam) (arming the dismissal of a Title VII sexual-orientation claim and reiterating that
the court could not hold otherwise in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court or en banc
Eleventh Circuit decision to the contrary); Wittmer v. Phillips Co., F.d , (th
Cir. ) (noting that Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., F.d (th Cir. ) (per curiam)
remains binding precedent); Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., F.d , (th Cir. )
(arming Blum, F.d ); Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n, Fed. App’x , (th
Cir. ) (relying on Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., F.d , (th Cir. )); see also
Tumminello v. Father Ryan High Sch., Inc., Fed. App’x , (th Cir. ) (relying
on Vickers to reject a Title IX sexual-orientation claim).
36. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., F.d , , (th Cir. ).
37. See Glenn v. Brumby, F.d , - (th Cir. ) (holding that discrimination based
on gender identity violates the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition on sex discrimination).
Compare Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. Bd. of Educ., F.d , -
(th Cir. ) (looking to the Title VII context to decide that a Title IX gender-identity claim
was likely to succeed), and Schwenk v. Hartford, F.d , - (th Cir. ) (stat-
ing, in deciding a Gender Motivated Violence Act claim, that the Holloway v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., F.d (th Cir. ) approach to Title VII was “overruled by the logic and
language” of Supreme Court decisions holding that Title VII prohibited discrimination based
on stereotypes about how people of a certain sex should behave), with Ulane v. E. Airlines,
Inc., F.d , (th Cir. ) (holding that Title VII does not protect against
transgender discrimination), and Holloway, F.d at - (same).
38. See Larson v. United Air Lines, F. App’x. , n. (th Cir. ) (citing Etsitty v.
Utah Transit Auth., F.d , (th Cir. )); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and
Sons, Inc., F.d , (th Cir. ) (per curiam) (citing Sommers v. Budget Mktg.,
Inc., F.d , (th Cir. )); see also Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., F.d
, - (d Cir. ), cert. denied, S. Ct. () (implying in dicta on a Title IX
claim that Title VII’s definition of sex does not include gender identity).