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OPCW

Technical Secretariat

S/1319/2015

29 October 2015

Original: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

REPORT OF THE OPCW FACT-FINDING MISSION IN SYRIA REGARDING

ALLEGED INCIDENTS IN THE IDLIB GOVERNORATE OF THE SYRIAN ARAB

REPUBLIC BETWEEN 16 MARCH AND 20 MAY 2015

1. On 1 May 2015, the Director-General mandated the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission

(FFM) in Syria to conduct an investigation into incidents of the alleged use of toxic

chemicals, particularly chlorine, as a weapon in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian

Arab Republic from 16 March 2015 onwards, as reported in the media.

2. The report of the FFM is hereby circulated to the States Parties (Annex 2). It provides

a detailed account of the work undertaken by the FFM and the process leading to the

findings presented therein. The FFM has presented its conclusions that several

incidents that occurred in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian Arab Republic between

16 March 2015 and 20 May 2015 likely involved the use of one or more toxic

chemicals—probably containing the element chlorine—as a weapon.

3. The work of the FFM has remained consistent with its mandate, which did not include

the question of attributing responsibility for the alleged use.

Annexes:

Annex 1: Cover Note by the Head of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria

Annex 2: Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding Alleged

Incidents in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian Arab Republic between

16 March and 20 May 2015

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Annex 1

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Annex 1

COVER NOTE BY THE HEAD

OF THE OPCW FACT-FINDING MISSION IN SYRIA

20 October 2015

Director-General,

In accordance with the mandate of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) (mission code

FFM/005/15, dated 1 May 2015), I submit herewith the report of the findings of the FFM.

Leonard Phillips

Head of the FFM-Alpha

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Annex 2

REPORT OF THE OPCW FACT-FINDING MISSION IN SYRIA

REGARDING ALLEGED INCIDENTS IN THE IDLIB GOVERNORATE

OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

BETWEEN 16 MARCH AND 20 MAY 2015

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. SUMMARY ................................................................................................................. 6

2. METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................... 7

METHODOLOGY FOR THE ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS OF

EVIDENCE ................................................................................................................. 7

ACCESS TO RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS.......................................... 8

SELECTION OF INTERVIEWEES ............................................................................. 9

INTERVIEW PROCESS ............................................................................................. 10

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY ................................................................. 11

SAMPLING AND ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES .................................................. 12

BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES ......................................................................................... 14

ANALYSIS OF DELIVERY AND DISPERSION MECHANISM(S) AND

IMPACT EVENTS ...................................................................................................... 14

PERSONNEL SELECTION, SKILL SETS, AND TRAINING ........................... 15

CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND HANDLING 16

DEPLOYMENT DETAILS AND CHRONOLOGY ............................................. 17

3. INCIDENT SUMMARIES AND ANALYSIS ........................................................ 18

INCIDENT SUMMARIES ....................................................................................... 18

QMENAS ..................................................................................................................... 21

NARRATIVES ............................................................................................................ 22

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 23

SARMIN ...................................................................................................................... 26

NARRATIVES ............................................................................................................ 28

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 31

BINNISH ..................................................................................................................... 51

NARRATIVE .............................................................................................................. 52

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 52

IDLIB CITY ................................................................................................................. 56

NARRATIVE .............................................................................................................. 58

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 59

NARRATIVE .............................................................................................................. 62

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 63

SARAQIB .................................................................................................................... 64

NARRA........................................................................................................................ 65

NARRATIVE .............................................................................................................. 65

KURIN ......................................................................................................................... 66

NARRATIVE .............................................................................................................. 67

MUNITIONS ............................................................................................................. 67

OVERALL ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION COLLECTED ................... 71

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INCIDENTS ....................................... 71

MEDICAL SIGNS, SYMPTOMS, AND TREATMENT ........................................... 73

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EVALUATION OF SAMPLES .................................................................................. 75

CHEMICAL ANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE REMNANTS OF THE

ALLEGED MUNITION .............................................................................................. 79

CHEMICAL ANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES .... 80

REVIEW OF INFORMATION ON THE MUNITIONS ............................................ 81

4. WITNESSES IDENTIFIED BY THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC .................. 88

KAFR ZITA, SPRING OR SUMMER 2014 ............................................................... 91

IDLIB CITY, 28 MARCH 2015 .................................................................................. 91

IDLIB CITY, AUGUST 2014 ..................................................................................... 92

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................. 93

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1. SUMMARY

1. Open-source media were examined and cross-referenced with other sources of

information, including that obtained from non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

This provided a credible basis for investigation, which resulted in a Fact-Finding

Mission (FFM) being mandated (Appendix 1) to gather facts regarding incidents of

alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian

Arab Republic from 16 March 2015 onwards.

2. The FFM was led by and predominantly comprised inspectors, with support from

various other divisions and branches within the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the

Secretariat”). Interpreters were embedded in the team and were critical to the

effective functioning of the mission. Furthermore, medical expertise was provided

through the secondment of an external medical doctor to the team (Appendix 2).

3. The conclusions were derived from interviews and supplementary material submitted

during the interview process. Additional input included media content and samples,

which were used to corroborate each other as well as the information given in the

interviews.

4. The inability of the team to, inter alia, visit the location shortly after the incident,

review original records in situ, take its own samples, and totally control the selection

of interviewees detracts from the strength of the conclusions that can be made by the

FFM. However, sufficient facts were collected to conclude that incidents in the

Syrian Arab Republic likely involved the use of one or more toxic

chemicals— probably containing the element chlorine—as a weapon.

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2. METHODOLOGY

Methodological considerations

2.1 The three main driving principles in development of the team’s fact- and

data-gathering methodology were to ensure that:

(a) a validated methodology is used for the acquisition and analysis of evidence to

the maximum extent possible under the conditions of the mission;

(b) the personnel conducting the investigation have the appropriate skill sets and

training; and

evidence.

METHODOLOGY FOR THE ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

2.2 In conducting its work, the FFM complied with the current OPCW guidelines and

procedures for the conduct of an investigation of alleged use (IAU) of chemical

weapons (see Appendix 4).

2.3 The FFM also adhered to the most stringent protocols available, using both objective

criteria and standard questionnaires for such an investigation, as set out in the relevant

quality measurement system documents (QDOCs). As these questionnaires were

specifically designed for IAUs, occasionally slight modifications were required.

Authority for such flexibility to make modifications is expressly provided for in the

OPCW procedures. Additionally, any modifications were minor and were carried out

in consultation with the Office of the Legal Adviser and the Office of the

Director-General.

2.4 The major challenges of the investigation centred predominantly on the open nature of

the allegations in technical, geographical and chronological terms, and on evidential

sources in terms of relevance, validity, and authenticity.

2.5 The prioritisation of evidence was based on relevance in accordance with the

guidance provided in the OPCW procedures, and re-evaluated according to the degree

of separation in the chain of custody between the source and receipt by the team.

Types of evidence were then defined as primary, secondary, or tertiary, in descending

order of value.

2.6 The most relevant methods for collecting and evaluating the credibility of information

included the following, inter alia: research into the incidents and existing reports; the

assessment and corroboration of background information; the conduct of interviews

with relevant witnesses, responders, medical treatment providers, and alleged victims;

the review of documentation and records provided by interviewees; the assessment of

the symptoms of victims as reported by interviewees; the receipt of environmental

samples for subsequent analysis; and the documentation and analysis of the alleged

subcomponents of munitions received by the team.

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2.7 In accordance with the OPCW procedures, the FFM considered the following:

first-hand testimony from interviews as primary evidence; documentation,

photographs, and video and audio recordings presented by the interviewees as

secondary evidence; and samples provided by the interviewees, in addition to

open-source information, as supporting information. The ascribed values take into

consideration the consistent corroboration between interviewee testimony,

open-source research, documents and other records as provided by interviewees, and

the characteristics of the samples provided. No metadata forensic analysis was carried

out on the electronic records provided by the witnesses.

2.8 During the preparatory phase, the team engaged in extensive open-source research

concerning the allegations (see Appendix 5). The majority of sources included news

media, blogs, and websites of various NGOs, including civil defence units. While

there were many different alleged incidents indicated by these sources, there was a

concentration of events from mid- to late March 2015 in the area to the east of Idlib

City, particularly in the villages of Sarmin, Qmenas, Binnish, and Al-Nerab, as well

as in Idlib City itself. For this reason, the team focused on this area in both its

ongoing open-source preparations and in identifying suitable organisations and bodies

with which to work.

2.9 During consultations in March and May, and later again in July 2015 (letters

L/ODG/1972239/15 dated 7 April 2015 and L/ODG/197860/15 dated 13 May 2015),

the Secretariat also requested that the Syrian Arab Republic provide any information

it might have that could be relevant to the investigation. Representatives of the Syrian

Arab Republic indicated during the first two meetings that, at that time, they were not

in a position to be able to provide significant evidence regarding the allegations, but

that they categorically refuted them. However, during the July consultations, the

representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic indicated that a number of displaced

individuals from the area were available to be interviewed and that the representatives

would facilitate the interviews in Damascus. The Syrian Arab Republic forwarded

Note Verbale 56 containing Letter No. 158 (classified OPCW Protected) to the

Secretariat on 27 July 2015 with more information. It was decided within the

Secretariat that the testimonies of these individuals would be taken by the FFM-Bravo

team, a concurrent FFM team already deploying to Damascus to investigate separate

incidents, and whose mandate would be amended to reflect this (NV/ODG/199375/15,

dated 30 July 2015).

Access to relevant geographic locations

2.10 In the conduct of an investigation, complete, direct, and immediate access to the scene

of alleged events provides the greatest opportunity to collect higher value evidence.

Taking into account various constraints, such as the available time, geographical

distribution, and security concerns, the FFM considered three main factors in deciding

whether to conduct on-site visits, including interviews:

(a) the scientific and probative value of an on-site visit;

(b) the risk assessment of conducting such visits in the midst of the ongoing

armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic; and

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confrontation lines or national borders and meet the FFM team.

2.11 In the best case during an investigation, potential interviewees would be identified by

one of two means: 1) through the investigation team canvassing the area of the alleged

incident to identify witnesses; and 2) through the identification of potential

interviewees as possible leads by another source deemed reliable by virtue of

proximity or involvement.

2.12 Due to security concerns in the region of interest and the time frame of events, and

considering the very fluid circumstances of the ongoing conflict, including

movements of people out of areas of interest, it was determined that, despite the

potential gains in terms of primary evidence (although possibly somewhat reduced

due to the passage of time), the risk for the team to visit these areas was prohibitive.

Therefore, the team could not directly observe, assess, and record locations of alleged

incidents, could not canvass directly for witnesses and affected persons, and could not

directly collect samples, records, and other evidence from their sources.

2.13 It should also be noted that such canvassing in the desired location might enable the

identification of:

(a) a larger proportion of people willing to be interviewed, as travel would not be

required, resulting in a greater selection pool for the team;

(b) people from unaffected parts of the village who may not have been aware of

incidents at the time, thus lending credibility or otherwise to interviewees,

given their location; and

otherwise the input from interviewees.

2.14 In this context, the ability to verify the sequence of incidents through interviews, to

access evidence, and to verify its chain of custody became primary considerations in

the fact-finding process. To this end, the FFM conducted off-site interviews with

relevant witnesses and affected persons, and performed the off-site receipt of samples,

records and documentation, as collected by others. Therefore, within the limits of

persons potentially available to the team, careful consideration was given to the

process of identifying potential interviewees, arranging secure access to the

interviewees, and maximising the value of output from the interviews, as well as for

the treatment of evidence, once received.

Selection of interviewees

2.15 Extensive discussions took place between elements of the Secretariat and various

civilian entities from the Idlib Governorate, including NGOs and civil defence

representatives, as well as with representatives of a neighbouring State Party

(hereinafter referred to as “Country X”), which hosted and provided logistical support

to the field activities of the team. The ultimate purpose was to establish an agreement

on working practices, coordinate logistics and movements, and identify interviewees

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and arrange for their authorisation to visit Country X for interviews.

These discussions were complemented by pre-deployment visits to Country X.

2.16 While there were several different NGOs with access to potential interviewees, only

one, the Chemical Violations Documentation Center of Syria (CVDCS

), appeared to

have access to the means of arranging their transport from the Idlib Governorate and

their accommodation in Country X. Through this interaction, the team received a list

from the CVDCS of approximately 150 individuals who may have had information

about the alleged incidents to the east of Idlib City in mid- to late March. CVDCS

identified 50 such individuals who would be willing to be interviewed in relation to

the incidents. From these, the team selected 30 for interviews, after giving

consideration to the factors of age, gender, relation to the incident (casualty,

eyewitness, first responder, nurse, and treating physician), number of incidents, and

geographical location, while giving emphasis to the priority indicated in

QDOC/INS/WI/IAU05.

Interview process

2.17 In order to optimise the output from the interviews, a suitable location for the safe,

accessible, and comfortable conduct of interviews was chosen in conjunction with

officials from Country X. This neutral location was surveyed and prepared for

facilitation of the interviews, including facilities for rest and hospitality, with separate

rooms for private interviews.

2.18 Interviewees were transported to the interview site in subgroups of approximately

four on a daily basis. Upon arrival, the interviewees were greeted by the field team

and given a thorough explanation of the team’s mandate, background and process,

with interpretation into Arabic. The discussions included, among other things,

confidentiality aspects and consent. Efforts were made by the team to make this

process as relaxed and informal as possible.

2.19 The interview methods were based on the free recall technique, tailored with

follow-on questions relevant to this investigation and adapted from the standard

operating procedures (see Appendix 4), based both on the information obtained from

preparatory research and on the interviews themselves.

2.20 The FFM was divided into two interview teams that conducted concurrent interviews

in two separate rooms (except for the last group of interviewees, for which the team

was divided into three interview teams in three separate rooms). Each interview

sub-team was comprised of cross-functional skill sets (see paragraph 2.45) in order to

maximise the extraction of information from multiple perspectives.

2.21 At the beginning of each individual interview, all interviewees were given a review of

the procedure. Once the process was mutually agreed between the interview team and

each interviewee, the recording devices were switched on. Both audio-visual and

audio-only recording were used. A consent form for the respective interview was

prepared using the personal details of the interviewees and their identification papers.

An NGO supporting the FFM by providing access to documents, samples, and witnesses.

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This was followed by the signing of the consent forms. Many interviewees expressed

concern that their personal details coupled with the information they were giving

would be disseminated outside of the OPCW without their knowledge, with the

potential impact this would have on their security. All interviewees were assured that

they would remain anonymous.

2.22 The initial portion of the recorded interview followed a standard procedure of an

introduction of all present in the room, an explanation of the aims of the interview,

and confirmation of consent. Subsequently, the interviewees delivered their

statements on the incident(s). With a view to obtaining a full account of what was

witnessed and experienced by the interviewees, follow-up questions were posed by

the interview team, including a review of regional maps for identification of key

locations, when possible, and Internet searches. All review processes on the computer

were video recorded. Furthermore, any additional evidence provided by the

interviewees in the form of documents, photographs, and videos was reviewed.

The testimonies and evidence were secured.

2.23 In conducting the interviews, full consideration was given to the privacy and

protection of participants. All information was kept confidential and the identity of

victims and witnesses protected at all times. An identity number was assigned to each

interviewee and only this number was used for the processing of data. The master list

with the names of the witnesses was kept secure with the FFM. Throughout its work,

the FFM made all efforts to respect cultural and religious values and norms, national

customs, and the personal pressures and traumas associated with exposure to conflict.

2.24 At the end of each day, the team held a debriefing session and shared its findings.

This was followed by the securing of all data and documents collected that day.

2.25 The same procedures were used by the FFM-Bravo team in the conduct of interviews

in Damascus, with two similarly structured interview teams working simultaneously.

Epidemiological methodology

2.26 Epidemiological determination of cause and effect was established according to the

following criteria:

(a) there must be a biologically plausible link between the exposure and the

outcome;

(b) there must be a temporal relationship between the exposure and the outcome;

and

2.27 An epidemiological investigation should under best circumstances include a review of

all documentation related to an alleged incident, an epidemiological description of the

incident, interviews with presenting witnesses, health care workers and first

responders, first-hand interviews with casualties, and on-site assessments of

symptoms and signs, including assessments of the clinical severity of their

syndromes. Further information regarding the treatment and outcomes of persons

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exposed should be retrieved from medical files relating to the time of incident and

further interviews with treating clinicians. The epidemiological investigation should

yield information about the scale of each event and provide contextual and

geographical information that should subsequently be cross-checked and corroborated

by the environmental sampling teams.

2.28 However, as mentioned previously, the FFM was not able to physically visit the

locations of the alleged incidents, and therefore did not have the opportunity to:

(a) assess the geography of the locations of the alleged incidents;

(b) visit the field hospitals where the casualties were treated and make

assessments of the available facilities;

records, radiographs, laboratory reports, etc.; and

(d) conduct the on-site collection of testimonies and clinical examinations and, as

appropriate, the collection of biomedical samples.

2.29 The FFM could not rely on clinical examinations, as the medical symptoms caused in

those exposed to the toxic substances had been resolved either through treatment or

otherwise resolved over the intervening period.

2.30 The epidemiological investigation was therefore focused on collecting the testimonies

of the interviewees (witnesses, persons exposed, and those providing medical care),

together with collecting and examining relevant documentary evidence that they

might offer.

Sampling and analytical procedures

2.31 Under optimal circumstances, samples from an incident would be collected by the

investigating team immediately after the incident, using approved procedures and

equipment, including full documentation of the chain of custody of the samples.

As noted above, the team was constrained due to the inability to directly access the

sites of the alleged incidents and the amount of time that had passed between the

alleged incidents and receipt of samples by the team (approximately 3 to 10 weeks).

As a result, the team was unable to:

(a) assess the geography and conditions of the locations of the alleged incidents;

(b) directly select sampling points and items;

(d) implement a verifiable cradle-to-grave chain of custody of samples.

2.32 Given the elapsed time since the alleged events and the nature of chlorine, as well as

the unknown nature of other possible innumerable toxic chemicals (such as volatility,

vapour density, prevalence of naturally occurring markers, or degradation products

and rates, etc.), any selection of samples from those offered to the team and the

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subsequent analyses of such samples required careful consideration. With such a

broad range of unknowns, the team considered and accepted a broad array of sample

types, to be subjected to an equally broad array of analyses.

2.33 The FFM used an OPCW designated laboratory for the analysis of the samples

received. Designated laboratories are accredited by the OPCW for the analysis of

authentic samples in accordance with the relevant decisions taken by the States Parties

to the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”).

2.34 The OPCW designated laboratories must meet the following criteria:

(a) they have established an internationally recognised quality assurance system

in accordance with relevant standards (ISO/IEC

17025:2005 or equivalent);

(b) they have obtained accreditation by an internationally recognised accreditation

body for the analysis of chemical-warfare agents and related compounds in

various types of samples; and

programme.

2.35 The OPCW proficiency tests are based on qualitative analysis of test samples with

unknown sample composition to determine the presence of any number of possible

chemicals relevant to the Convention.

2.36 The significant features of the test demonstrate it to be one of the most challenging

proficiency tests, requiring highly competent analytical skills and stringent quality

control. Among these features, the test:

(a) covers a diverse nature of chemicals

(b) involves blind testing for an almost infinite number of chemicals in complex

matrices;

(d) requires detailed reporting of results;

(e) allows for only a short timeline;

(f) involves a zero tolerance for false positives; and

(g) involves a performance rating.

2.37 The methods used by the designated laboratory for the analysis of the environmental

samples handed over to the FFM are validated during OPCW proficiency testing, and

in the accreditation of the laboratory as described above. The selected laboratory

ISO/IEC = of the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical

Commission.

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followed its standard operating procedures for sample preparation (extraction,

derivatisation, concentration, etc.), followed by analysis using gas

chromatography-electron impact mass spectrometry/dual flame photometry detection

(GC-EI-MS/dFPD), liquid chromatography-high-resolution mass spectrometry

(LC-HRMS) and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy for the

identification of organic compounds.

2.38 Inorganic species were analysed using inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry

(ICP-MS), inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectrometry (ICP-OES), ion

chromatography (IC) and X-ray fluorescence (XRF, qualitative results). Fourier

transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) and differential scanning calorimetry (DSC)

were used for material testing.

Biomedical samples

2.39 The methods used by laboratories for the analysis of the biomedical samples received

by the FFM are currently being evaluated through biomedical testing exercises for the

analysis of such samples.

2.40 For the analysis of biomedical samples, the FFM intended to use laboratories involved

in the OPCW biomedical testing exercises. However, due to the low concentration of

analytes, analysis would need to be targeted to the expected chemical and/or its

metabolites. Targeted analysis is normally based on observed symptoms in patients,

bearing in mind that symptoms can be unspecific.

2.41 In this case, chlorine would not have yielded any relevant metabolites, given the lack

of specific biomarkers. Considering the large number of other potential chemicals,

based on the signs and symptoms, additional information would be needed to analyse

biomedical samples.

Analysis of delivery and dispersion mechanism(s) and impact events

2.42 As with other evidence, visits to the scene of alleged incidents and collection of

evidence at the scene (in this case remnants of munitions) would have provided the

most valuable input, particularly if this collection could have been done very close to

the time of the alleged incident. As this was not possible, the team based its

assessment on open-source information, predominantly from the Internet; testimony

given during interviews; videos, pictures, and documents submitted by interviewees;

and samples of munition remnants, indicated by interviewees as relating to specific

incidents.

2.43 Further means of validation would ideally be provided by comparing observations

from interviewees to the expected behaviour of a known device or theoretical design.

Given the uncertainty around the unknown potential chemical and how industrial

chemicals in particular might behave under unknown energetic and mechanical

dispersion conditions, it would not be possible to compare the theoretical dispersion

of chemicals and fragments to that described by interviewees and shown in

photographs and videos.

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2.44 The team carried out some basic plume modelling of potential industrial chemicals.

Given the same uncertainties described above and the inherent inaccuracies of plume

modelling, this is of very limited value to the process.

PERSONNEL SELECTION, SKILL SETS, AND TRAINING

2.45 Team members were selected based on their specific skill sets across a broad range of

mission requirements. The skill sets included knowledge and expertise in the

following fields:

(a) chemical weapons;

(b) munitions;

(d) medical/health, including epidemiology and first response;

(e) industrial chemicals and technology;

(f) interview and negotiation;

(g) contingency operations experience, including previous experience with

fact-finding missions and other missions to the Syrian Arab Republic;

(h) operations control;

(i) communications;

(j) logistics; and

(k) security.

2.46 Prior to deployment, staff received training (including refresher training), which was

documented in the various subtopics essential for the performance of safe, effective,

and efficient inspections, including:

(a) interviewing and investigative techniques/considerations;

(b) evidence collection and handling;

(d) confidentiality procedures;

(e) operational security; and

(f) crisis management.

2.47 The training included lectures, field training, table-top exercises, activity rehearsals,

and practice. Particular emphasis in training and preparation was placed on

interviewing and evidence handling. Much training, particularly in the latter two

areas and field security, was provided by experts from a number of States Parties.

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Regular security briefings were also given. Further information is included in

Appendix 3.

2.48 Equipment needs were identified and equipment was sourced while movements and

logistics were arranged. New equipment was procured and team proficiency

established. Expert advice and consultation was also coordinated with resources from

the Secretariat, particularly with regard to health and safety, security matters, and the

legal aspects of the process.

2.49 The above preparations ensured that sample receipt, interviews, and all other evidence

collection were performed by fully trained and qualified inspectors.

CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND HANDLING

2.50 This FFM collected the evidence in the form of witness interviews/statements (taken

as audio and/or video recordings) and documents/photos/videos handed over by

witnesses. The team additionally received environmental samples and fragments of

alleged munitions collected by witnesses and/or representatives of the CVDCS.

2.51 The following procedures, aimed in particular at ensuring the chain of custody from

moment of receipt, were applied during the mission:

(a) All witness statements/interviews were video and/or audio recorded and the

recordings were documented as evidence.

(b) All electronic files or paper documents handed over by interviewees were

registered in the evidence logbook.

(USB) bridge, and secure digital (SD) ultra-small flash memory cards were

locked prior to viewing in order to not alter the metadata of the files.

(d) Files on original electronic storage devices were copied to provide best

evidence, and working copies were made so as to not compromise original

information during data handling.

(e) The receipt, packaging, and sealing of the provided samples were supported

by photographs and appropriate paper documentation.

(f) The received samples were in the possession of at least one team member and

under OPCW seal from the time of receipt until arrival at the FFM on-site

office.

(g) At the FFM on-site office, the samples were fully documented, packaged,

sealed and packed appropriately for safe transport.

(h) The integrity of the samples was ensured through their physical possession by

an FFM member and/or through tamper-proof seals.

(i) All seals and accompanying documentation were confirmed correct/intact

prior to the issuance of handover/takeover receipts.

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2.52 Some samples were accompanied by partial documentation of the chain of custody

prior to delivery to the FFM. Although this documentation provided some degree of

confidence, the entire chain of custody could not be verified, thus the possibility of

cross-contamination could not be ruled out. Therefore, although such samples would

be considered as primary evidence under optimal circumstances, given the constraints

as described, the FFM regarded the samples as tertiary evidence. As such, the results

from such analyses were treated more as supporting information than of significant

evidential value. Therefore, it was decided that the splitting of samples for analysis at

a second laboratory did not warrant the efforts, including cost, and the impact on the

designated laboratory and on OPCW staff.

2.53 However, the FFM followed procedures to ensure a strict chain of custody from the

time of receipt through delivery to the OPCW Laboratory in Rijswijk, the

Netherlands, by the procedures described earlier. Additionally, similar stringent

procedures were applied when transferring the samples to a selected designated

laboratory where activities were conducted using standardised procedures (including

quality assurance and quality control checks) for receiving, storing, preparing and

analysing samples. The results were then communicated to the FFM team for review.

Each transfer of material was accompanied by documentation of the transfer.

DEPLOYMENT DETAILS AND CHRONOLOGY

2.54 From 1 to 4 May 2015, a single interview team deployed and conducted one interview

with a medical professional who had reported managing casualties of alleged

chemical attacks in the Idlib Governorate on multiple occasions. The team was

composed of a mission leader, interview leader, two other interviewers, and an

interpreter. The composition of the team was designed to incorporate a broad range

of expertise and specialist fields, including munitions, medical, chemical technology,

and language.

2.55 A larger team deployed from 19 May to 6 June 2015 to conduct the remainder of the

planned interviews, and to collect samples for analysis. The team consisted of

interview teams, plus command post elements to support critical operational needs

such as logistics, movements, communications, security, confidentiality, evidence

collection and handling, and command. During this deployment, the team conducted

interviews, collected documents, images and videos, as well as identified and

collected samples for potential analysis.

2.56 Concurrent with the team’s activities, the CVDCS provided accommodation for the

interviewees as well as transport to and from the border and between their place of

accommodation and the interview location. The schedule was planned such that the

interviewees would arrive in three different batches. The pattern for each batch was

as follows:

(a) travel from current home location to border;

(b) cross the border;

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(d) rest period between the journey and the start of the interview process;

(e) interviews over several days; and

(f) return and arrival of next batch.

2.57 The original plan was that the three batches would include 11, 9 and 10 interviewees

respectively. However, the first batch additionally included the doctor who was

originally interviewed from 1 to 4 May. He passed on additional data, including

photographs and video footage, but was not re-interviewed. Furthermore, the CVDCS

encountered funding issues which resulted in the last batch being reduced from 10 to

3 interviewees. In consultation with the CVDCS, the team selected interviewees

based on anticipated breadth of knowledge of incidents, coupled with their status in

the communities and the potential influence for future continuation of FFM activities.

2.58 A final deployment took place from 21 to 24 July 2015, when a small team met on the

border with Syrian nationals who provided additional samples for potential analysis.

2.59 In addition to the above, the FFM-Bravo team, while deployed to Damascus to

conduct a separate mission, conducted 20 interviews with 18 persons presented by the

Syrian Arab Republic as having testimony relevant to this report. These interviews

were conducted from 4 to 7 August 2015 and are discussed in Section 4.

2.60 A breakdown of timelines is provided in Appendix 3.

3. INCIDENT SUMMARIES AND ANALYSIS

INCIDENT SUMMARIES

3.1 The following sections outline events that occurred in a particular area. The

narratives in the following sections given for each incident are derived from

interviews. Unless otherwise stated, all weather conditions indicated are taken from

http://www.wunderground.com.

3.2 There are many references to the Syrian Civil Defense (SCD) in the narratives.

The SCD’s website (http://syriacivildefense.org/) states as follows: “We, the Syrian

Civil Defense teams and team members, act neutrally, impartially and are

humanitarians. We do not to pledge allegiance to any political party or group. We

serve all the people of Syria – we are from the people and we for the people … Our

mission is to save the greatest number of lives in the shortest possible time and to

minimise further injury to people and damage to property.” Many of the first

responders claimed to be members of the SCD and tend to respond to incidents as a

function of that membership. Some interviewees presented documentation to confirm

their membership in the SCD.

3.3 Paragraphs 3.4 to 3.130 below refer to alleged incidents in Qmenas, Sarmin, Binnish,

Idlib City, Al-Nerab, Saraqib, and Kurin. Figures 1 to 4 below show the relative

geographic locations of Qmenas, located 6 km south-east of Idlib City; Sarmin,

located 5 km north-east of Qmenas; Al-Nerab, located 3 km south of Sarmin; Binnish,

located 6 km in a northerly direction from Sarmin; Saraqib, located 17 km

east-south-east from Idlib City; and Kurin, 10 km south-west of Idlib City.

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FIGURE 1: IDLIB CITY AND THE AREA TO THE EAST

FIGURE 2: BINNISH AND THE AREA TO THE NORTH

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FIGURE 3: THE AREA TO THE SOUTH OF IDLIB CITY

FIGURE 4: IDLIB CITY AND SARAQIB

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Qmenas

3.4 Qmenas is a village in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian Arab Republic.

3.5 Between 3 May and 5 June 2015, the FFM interviewed 17 individuals including

treating physicians, nurses, first responders, casualties, and witnesses who provided

accounts and information regarding the alleged incident of 16 March 2015.

TABLE 1: INFORMATION ON REPORTED INCIDENTS IN QMENAS

Date Approximate time Weather conditions

16 March 2015 20:30 – 21:00 Temperatures around 14°C with 48% to

51% humidity. The wind direction was

SW WSW at 3 to 4 metres per second

(m/s).

3.6 Figure 5 below shows the approximate alleged impact points of the devices, as

derived from interviewees.

FIGURE 5: QMENAS AND THE SURROUNDING AREA

Impact point, 16 March 2015, Qmenas

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Narratives

3.7 Qmenas was not under the control of the Government in March 2015 and the front

line was at around 2 km from the village outskirts. Prior to conflict in this area, the

population of the village was approximately 2,000 people.

3.8 Interviewees claimed that on the night of 16 March 2015 between 20:00 and 21:00,

a helicopter had been passing above Qmenas. The helicopter was flying east out of

Qmenas and dropped two items in and very close to the edge of a military zone.

3.9 According to one of the witnesses interviewed by the FFM team, both items (“barrel

bombs”) hit the ground inside the military zone; one of the items was very close to a

residential area. The witnesses from Qmenas described the sound of the explosion as

muted compared to the sound of conventional weapons. It was assumed by witnesses

that the bomb failed to explode. A few minutes later, the occupants of the houses

situated in the eastern and north-eastern part of the village, relatively close to the

impact point, smelled an odour similar to chlorine-based household cleaning agents,

but much more intense. Some witnesses mentioned specific brand names of cleaning

agents and some specifically mentioned chlorine, which may be the chemical chlorine

or may be the trade name of a chlorine-based household cleaning agent. The residents

of the area who were exposed to the alleged gas began tearing and coughing and had

difficulty breathing. Shortly thereafter, as there was no mobile telephone coverage in

this village at the time, the population was informed through other early-warning

methods, including the use of hand-held radios and the loudspeakers on the mosques’

minarets. The announcements, for example, stated “careful a chemical attack on

Qmenas”. The witnesses described a scene of panic in the village after the

announcement of the message.

3.10 Approximately 60 exposed persons were transported by volunteers, who used their

personal cars or vans, from Qmenas to the Sarmin field hospital. Two ambulances

were sent from the Saraqib SCD unit to Qmenas, but they reached the village after the

evacuation of exposed persons was complete.

3.11 All persons transferred from Qmenas to Sarmin field hospital as exposed cases were

decontaminated by flushing with water near the entrance of the hospital. One of the

treating physicians was in charge of prioritising the cases (triage) and sending them to

the appropriate channel for treatment.

3.12 From the 60 or so individuals who arrived from Qmenas to the Sarmin field hospital

on 16 March 2015, 40 cases had clinical signs of anxiety, six cases were considered as

secondary exposure (one treating physician and five first responders), and 14 patients

were considered as directly exposed.

3.13 The roughly 60 individuals who were transported to the Sarmin field hospital were all

civilians. The FFM team asked if any military personnel had also been treated. One

interviewee confirmed that some, without giving a number, had been exposed to the

alleged chemical(s). He also indicated that those cases had been treated in their

military unit.

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3.14 Most of the witnesses from Qmenas who were interviewed by the FFM team and had

visited the alleged incident location reported seeing one item only; two witnesses

confirmed seeing a second item, from a distance due to the restriction of access

(military area). Witnesses described seeing:

(a) a metallic cylinder or barrel/drum;

(b) a number of exploded refrigerant gas cylinders, the inner side of which were

yellowish and the outer side of which were green;

(d) plastic bottles.

Epidemiological analysis

3.15 Between 3 May and 5 June 2015, the FFM interviewed and collected the testimonies

of 17 individuals including treating physicians, nurses, first responders, casualties,

and witnesses, including 12 who provided epidemiological evidence. The details of

those 12 interviewees are given in table below:

TABLE 2: RELATION TO THE INCIDENT IN QMENAS AND GENDER

DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES

Interviewee Male Female

Treating physicians 2 2

Nurses 1 1

First responders 2 2

Exposed persons 3 2 1

Witnesses 4 4

Total 12 11 1

FIGURE 6: DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES IN RELATION TO THE

INCIDENT IN QMENAS

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3.16 The village of Qmenas has no field hospital; for emergencies the population uses the

nearest hospital, which is located in Sarmin. Qmenas was allegedly attacked with a

suspected chemical or chemicals on 16 March 2015. The individuals who were

interviewed described this attack as indicated above.

3.17 The Sarmin field hospital received approximately 60 patients on 16 March 2015.

The decontamination of patients was performed in all cases, including washing of the

exposed area of skin. This decontamination was performed outside of the emergency

room. The clinical examination, signs, and symptoms, as observed by the treating

physician included coughing, difficulty of breathing, and tearing.

TABLE 3: SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS IN QMENAS, 16 MARCH 2015

Symptom Number of cases (approximately)

Coughing 20

Difficulty of breathing 20

Tearing 5

Feeling of panic 40

Total cases 60

FIGURE 7: SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS IN QMENAS, 16 MARCH 2015

3.18 Forty patients were considered as mild cases and 20 as moderate. None of the

affected individuals in the described attack had any signs of physical trauma on their

bodies, but only suffered from the effects of the suspected toxic chemical(s).

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FIGURE 8: SEVERITY OF CASES IN QMENAS, 16 MARCH 2015

3.19 The mild cases responded well to the administration of oxygen. Those with moderate

symptoms also benefitted from nebulisation with the bronchodilator salbutamol and

the intravenous steroids hydrocortisone or dexamethasone. No severe cases were

reported.

3.20 No laboratory examinations and no X-rays needed to be requested for these cases.

All of these individuals were discharged from the hospital after a maximum of one

hour.

TABLE 4: TREATMENT OF CASES IN QMENAS, 16 MARCH 2015

Decontamination 60

Oxygen 60

Bronchodilator nebuliser 20

Inhaler steroids 0

Intravenous steroids 20

Lidocaine nebuliser 0

Lab analysis 0

X-ray 0

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FIGURE 9: TREATMENT OF CASES IN QMENAS, 16 MARCH 2015

3.21 The hospital staff registered the names of patients. The FFM requested copies of the

patient registration book and medical files, but was not provided with these

documents.

Biomedical samples

3.22 No biomedical samples were taken from the patients involved in the alleged incident

in Qmenas on 16 March 2015, neither by the FFM team nor by the medical staff at the

Sarmin field hospital.

Environmental samples

3.23 No environmental sample was collected or received by the FFM team related to the

alleged incident in Qmenas on 16 March 2015.

Sarmin

3.24 The village of Sarmin is one of the villages of the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian

Arab Republic.

3.25 Between 3 May and 5 June 2015 the FFM team interviewed 21 individuals who

provided accounts and information regarding incidents of alleged use of toxic

chemicals as a weapon in and close to this village on 16 March, 23 March, and

26 March 2015, and 16 May 2015. The interviewees were treating physicians, nurses,

first responders, casualties, and witnesses.

3.26 The description of all of the allegations was similar and indicated that the incident

happened during the night. Although the people said they were unable to see the

helicopters, they heard the sound. The witnesses described the sound of impact as

muted compared to the explosive sound previously encountered with the impact of

explosive devices and weapons. In the first incidents, it was commonly assumed that

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the bomb had failed to explode. This was followed minutes later by warnings on

hand-held radios about impact points and the release of chemicals. Some people who

lived close to the impact points and who were exposed described smelling the typical

odour of chlorine immediately after the impact and tried to escape. They described

the smell as irritating, similar to chlorine used as a household cleaning agent but much

more intense. The interviewees informed the FFM team that over a period of time

since the beginning of the crisis they had been educated by local emergency response

committees on what to do in case of an attack involving toxic chemicals. People were

advised to escape upwind of the point of impact and to higher elevations.

TABLE 5: CHRONOLOGY AND ASSOCIATED WEATHER CONDITIONS

IN RELATION TO INCIDENTS IN SARMIN

Incident Date

Approximate

time

Weather conditions

First 16 March 2015 22:30 – 23:00

Stable temperatures at 14 to 15°C

between 19:00 and midnight, with

48% to 51% humidity. The wind

direction was SW WSW at 3 to 4

m/s

Second 16 March 2015 22:30 – 23:00

Third 23 March 2015 01:00 – 03:00

Stable temperatures at 10°C

between midnight and 7:00, with

62% to 67% humidity. The wind

direction was variable,

predominantly W to WNW at 6 to 7

m/s

Fourth 26 March 2015 22:00 – 23:00

Temperature was dropping down

from 16 to 12°C between 19:00 and

midnight with increasing humidity

from 68% to 94% for the same

period of time. The wind direction

was variable, predominantly NE at

1 to 3 m/s

Fifth 16 May 2015 03:00 – 04:00

The temperature was stable at 18°C

from midnight to 6:00. The wind

direction was variable, with no

fixed direction and the velocity was

wavering between 2 and 6 m/s

3.27 Figure 10 below shows the approximate impact points of the devices, as derived from

interviewees.

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FIGURE 10: ALLEGED APPROXIMATE IMPACT POINTS IN SARMIN

Narratives

3.28 In March 2015, the village was under the control of opposition groups. The normal

population was estimated to be around 20,000 and less than 5,000 at the time of the

incident.

16 March 2015

3.29 Interviewees claimed that on the night of 16 March 2015 between 22:30 and 23:00

a helicopter was heard passing above Sarmin, flying from west-south-west to

east-north-east, and that helicopter dropped the first item. A few minutes later the

same helicopter dropped a second item nearby in the same eastern neighbourhood of

Sarmin.

3.30 The interviewees affirmed that they had heard the sound of the falling items from the

helicopter “sound similar to a diving fighter jet” followed by a soft explosion, “not a

strong explosion sound”. Initially, they had assumed that the item failed to explode.

A few minutes later, a message was conveyed to the residents of Sarmin that they

 Impact point, 23 March 2015, Sarmin

 Impact point, 26 March 2015, Sarmin

Impact point, 16 March 2015, Sarmin 

Impact point, 16 March 2015, Sarmin

pact point, 16 May 2015, Sarmin

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were chemical items. The message had been broadcast through the local walkie-talkie

network and the loudspeakers on the minarets of the mosques.

3.31 Some interviewees who lived close to the impact points and who were exposed

described smelling the typical odour of chlorine immediately after the explosion of

the first item.

3.32 A number of SCD members responded to the request for help from the population on

the basis of receiving information through the local communication system, and also

responded to incidents on their own initiative as part of their voluntary role. The SCD

members interviewed by the FFM team indicated that an odour similar to chorine

could be smelled a hundred metres away from the impact point.

3.33 Alleged casualties were evacuated to two hospitals, the Sarmin field hospital and the

Saraqib field hospital. Testimonies of the treating physicians indicated that a total of

42 patients were received in both field hospitals as directly exposed individuals.

These 42 cases were classified as moderate to severe. Sarmin field hospital treated 31

patients and 11 were received at the Saraqib field hospital. Among the 31 patients

treated at the Sarmin field hospital on the night of 16 March 2015, 14 patients had

been received from Qmenas. These 14 patients were those previously indicated as

having been directly exposed in the alleged incident that occurred in Qmenas on the

same evening (see paragraphs 3.8 and 3.9), approximately two hours before the

incident in Sarmin. One of the treating physicians claimed that the hospital had also

treated some 20 SCD members who had suffered secondary exposure and mild

symptoms.

3.34 The total number of fatalities related to these incidents in Sarmin was six people, all

of them members of one family (mother, father, their three children, and the

children’s grandmother). Three of those six had reached the hospital alive: the

mother, the father, and the oldest child. The remaining three family members (the

grandmother and the two daughters) were dead when they arrived at the field hospital

in Sarmin.

3.35 According to the interviewees’ statements, the six family members lived in the same

house at the time of the incident. The house had two separate levels underground and

had a rectangular vertical ventilation shaft with an approximate dimension of 3 m x

1.5 m. The ventilation shaft was open at ground level and descended through the two

floors, allowing the ventilation of the two underground floors. The interviewees

described that the chemical item fell through the ventilation shaft and exploded inside

the house. It was not totally clear where it had exploded, whether towards the top of

the shaft, the bottom, or in between. However, it was estimated to have exploded in

the second underground level (-2) where the family had been taking refuge.

Furthermore, at some point during the incident, there was an impact with a water tank.

The father, the mother, and the oldest (male) child managed to escape to the open air,

and were transported by the SCD to the hospital where they were decontaminated

with water and then received medical attention. The father informed the SCD

rescuers that the two daughters and grandmother were trapped in the second

underground level. The rescuers managed to extract the grandmother and the two

daughters 30 minutes later and also transferred them to the hospital. Delays in the

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rescue were caused by the inability to access the basement due to the strong pungent

chemical smell. The interviewees confirmed that the grandmother and the two

daughters were dead on arrival at the hospital. The FFM team tried to clarify if those

three casualties were alive during the transport phase, or whether they had died at the

house. It was impossible to further clarify this issue.

3.36 Witnesses and first responders who were interviewed by the FFM team and had

visited the family house after the alleged incident reported observing the following:

(a) a strong smell of chlorine;

(b) a metallic cylinder with an approximate diameter of 1 m to 1.5 m; they

described it as “double the size of an oil barrel”;

(d) the presence of a red/purple liquid on the floor and part of the walls.

23 March 2015

3.37 Interviewees claimed that on 23 March 2015, during the early morning hours between

1:00 and 3:00, a helicopter had been heard passing above Sarmin and that the

helicopter dropped one item. The interviewees stated that they heard a whistling

sound coming from the falling item, followed by a weak explosion sound.

3.38 A few minutes later, a man conveyed a message, through the local walkie-talkies, that

“he has smelled toxic substances in the air” in the south-west of Sarmin. Based on

that message, the local emergency system broadcasted an order of evacuation to the

residents of that part of the village. Some witness affirmed that they smelled chlorine

3 to 4 km away in Al-Nerab (to the south) and in part of the Qmenas neighbourhood.

3.39 The medical specialist interviewed by the FFM team affirmed that the number of

exposed persons was five, all suffering from mild symptoms.

3.40 Witnesses interviewed by the FFM team and who had visited the location of the

alleged impact site reported observing the following:

(a) a metallic cylinder;

(b) a number of exploded green refrigerant gas cylinders;

(d) soil that had changed colour to reddish pink; and

(e) leaves on the trees that had turned yellow.

26 March 2015

3.41 Interviewees claimed that on 26 March 2015 in the early morning hours between 1:45

and 2:30, a helicopter was heard passing above Sarmin after broadcasts on radios

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warned of the helicopter passing over Qmenas eastward towards Sarmin. The

helicopter dropped one item. A few minutes later, a man radioed a message of a

“strong smell at 50 m from the market” in Sarmin.

3.42 The alleged item fell into an uninhabited house at approximately 100 m west of one of

the main streets of Sarmin, “Market Street”.

3.43 The medical specialist interviewed by the FFM team affirmed that the number of

exposed persons was six, all suffering from mild symptoms.

16 May 2015

3.44 Interviewees claimed that in the early morning hours of 16 May 2015 around 2:00, a

helicopter was heard passing above Sarmin. The helicopter dropped one item which

fell into the entrance of a residence set in an underground cave.

3.45 The medical specialist interviewed by the FFM team mentioned four exposed persons

(one male, one female, and two children), three of whom had mild symptoms, and one

(the male) whose case was considered as moderate.

3.46 Witnesses who were interviewed by the FFM team and had visited the alleged

incident location reported observing the following:

(a) the metallic outer casing of a cylinder; and

(b) changed colour on the walls, described as the “walls looked burned”.

Epidemiological analysis

3.47 Sarmin has one field hospital, which is located in one of the buildings in the city and

is intended specifically for the medical needs of this village, including the treatment

of traumatic war injuries. There is also one private clinic and one primary health

centre, the latter being dedicated exclusively for vaccinations. The field hospital is

staffed by two doctors specialising in the fields of radiology and psychiatry, in

addition to a resident specialising in pneumology. The medical doctor of the private

clinic, who is an anaesthetist, supports the team if needed (as was the case for the

several incidents), as well as 25 other staff from the field hospital, most of them field-

trained nurses.

3.48 The hospital staff members do not have formal training in the management of injuries

resulting from chemical incidents. The structure of the hospital has been augmented

continuously since its establishment. The resources available at the hospital include a

radiology department, one operation theatre, an emergency room with a total of eight

inpatient beds, and some oxygen cylinders and nebulisers. All individuals who present

to this field hospital for routine illnesses and war injuries are registered, and all

medical records are maintained.

3.49 It was reported that Sarmin was attacked with suspected toxic chemicals on several

occasions.

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3.50 The FFM interviewed and collected the testimonies of 21 individuals including

treating physicians, nurses, first responders, exposed persons, and witnesses who

provided accounts and information regarding incidents of alleged use of toxic

chemicals as a weapon. Of these 21 individuals, 20 provided epidemiological

evidence. The details of these interviewees are given in Table 6 below.

TABLE 6: RELATION TO THE INCIDENT IN SARMIN AND GENDER

DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES

Interviewee Male Female

Treating physicians 3 3

Nurses 1 1

First responders 3 3

Paramedics 2 2

Casualty 6 5 1

Witnesses 5 5

Total 20 19 1

FIGURE 11: DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES IN RELATION TO THE

INCIDENT IN SARMIN, 16 MARCH 2015

TABLE 7: CHRONOLOGY OF INCIDENTS IN SARMIN

Incident Date Approximate time No. of patients Deaths

First 16 March 22:30 – 23:00 26 0

Second 16 March 22:30 – 23:00 6 6

Third 23 March Late at night 5 0

Fourth 26 March 22:00 – 23:00 6 0

Fifth 16 May 15:30 – 16:00 4 0

3.51 Witnesses who were close to the impact points and who were exposed described

smelling the typical odour of chlorine immediately after the impact and tried to

escape. They described the smell as irritating, similar to chlorine used as a household

cleaning agent but much more intense.

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3.52 This odour immediately induced coughing and a feeling of suffocation among all who

were exposed. Some of the first responders who managed the exposed persons were

also cross-contaminated from the casualties and suffered symptoms of exposure.

3.53 The FFM was informed that after the chemical incidents were reported, ambulances

attached to Sarmin field hospital were dispatched to rescue those who had been

exposed.

3.54 Simultaneously, volunteers from the neighbourhood used their private vehicles to

evacuate people to the Sarmin field hospital. During the incidents of 16 March 2015,

because of the load and the previous incident in Qmenas village, some of the patients

were evacuated to both the Sarmin and Saraqib field hospitals.

3.55 From the testimonies collected, the FFM found that the predominant symptoms

among those who were exposed were coughing and shortness of breath. Only a few

of the exposed persons reported a burning sensation on exposed skin and a mild

burning sensation/tearing of the eyes.

3.56 The clinical examination, signs, and symptoms as observed included coughing,

difficulty breathing, and tearing.

TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF THE SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS REPORTED BY

THE TREATING PHYSICIANS

Symptom 16 March 16 March 23 March 26 March 16 May

Sarmin Saraqib

Coughing 29 11 2 5 6 4

Difficulty

breathing

29 11 2 5 6 4

Tearing, burning

sensation in eyes

5 0 0 0 0 1

Nausea/vomiting 3 0 0 0 0 0

Disorientation 0 0 3 0 0 0

Loss of

consciousness

0 0 3 0 0 0

Burning sensation

on exposed

skin/nose

3 0 0 0 0 0

Frothy secretions

from mouth

0 0 1 0 0 0

Feeling of panic 20 0 0 0 0 0

Headache 2 0 0 0 0 0

Physical injuries 0 0 0 0 0 0

Death 0 0

0 0 0

Total cases 29 11 6 5 6 4

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FIGURE 12: SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS RELATING TO THE FIRST INCIDENT

IN SARMIN, 16 MARCH 2015

Coughing

Difficulty breathing

Tearing, burning sensation in eyes

Nausea/vomiting

Disorientation

Loss of consciousness

Burning sensation on exposed

skin/nose

Frothy secretions from mouth

Feeling of panic

Headache

Physical injuries

3.57 On arrival at both hospitals, most patients were decontaminated by washing the

exposed area(s) of skin with water. Some interviewees reported a chlorine-like odour

emanating from the casualties as well as a red/pink colouration of the rinse water.

3.58 One of the treating physicians informed the FFM that a large number of individuals

who sought medical aid had no adverse clinical signs other than anxiety. Because

they were in a state of panic, the first aid provided was mostly decontamination,

moving to fresh air, oxygen therapy, and giving reassurance. The treatment provided

to those who were exhibiting clinical signs included the administration of oxygen,

nebulisation with the bronchodilator salbutamol, and the intravenous steroids

hydrocortisone and dexamethasone, along with intravenous fluids. The treatment

provided was effective and the patients’ medical status improved quickly.

3.59 The FFM was informed that the ambulance drivers and first responders who had

participated in the rescue and evacuation of people to the hospital were also affected,

some of them requiring the administration of oxygen.

3.60 Twenty patients were considered as mild cases, four as moderate, three as severe, and

three arrived to the hospital dead. None of the affected individuals in the described

attack had any signs of physical trauma on their bodies, but only suffered from the

effects of the suspected toxic chemical.

3.61 The mild cases responded well to the administration of oxygen. Those with moderate

symptoms also benefitted from nebulisation with the bronchodilator salbutamol and

the intravenous steroids hydrocortisone or dexamethasone. For the severe cases,

because the initial response to treatment was poor, treating physicians attempted

intubation.

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3.62 Neither a lab exam nor an X-ray was requested by the treating physicians for any of

the cases.

3.63 In total, six severe cases did not survive the exposure. All of the other cases were

discharged from the hospital after a maximum of three hours.

TABLE 9: TABLE OF TREATMENT OF CASUALTIES IN SARMIN,

16 MARCH 2015

Decontamination 29 + 11

Oxygen 29 + 11

Bronchodilator nebuliser 10

Inhaler steroids 10

Intravenous steroids 10

Lidocaine nebuliser 0

Lab analysis 0

X-ray 0

FIGURE 13: MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN SARMIN, 16 MARCH 2015

10 10

Decontamination

Oxygen

Bronchodilator nebuliser

Inhaler steroids

Intravenous steroids

Lidocaine nebuliser

Lab analysis

X-ray

3.64 The hospital staff registered the names of the patients. The FFM requested copies of

the patient registration book or medical files, but was not provided with them.

3.65 However, a number of videos of incidents recorded on different dates by the

interviewees themselves were provided to the FFM. These videos show people

suffering, and being decontaminated and treated. The interviewed treating physicians

and other interviewees can be seen in these videos.

3.66 The FFM teams asked the interviewees who had been exposed about their current

medical status. None of the interviewees had any remaining symptoms from the time

of exposure, and all were in good physical health at the time of the interviews.

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 36

Biomedical samples

3.67 For all of the alleged incidents that occurred in Sarmin as reported above, only two

biomedical samples were taken on 16 March 2015.

3.68 One health worker, who was in Sarmin hospital on 16 March 2015, informed the FFM

team that biomedical samples had been taken from the victims by a treating physician.

The samples were blood and hair taken from one of the dead casualties, and were

sent elsewhere for analysis. The FFM team was given access neither to the analysis

results nor to the samples to conduct their own analysis.

Environmental samples

3.69 Samples, which included environmental samples and remnants of devices, were

received by the FFM team on two different dates. The first group of samples was

received by the team on 22 May 2015; the second group on 23 July 2015. According

to the interviewees’ statements, the samples were originally collected by the

interviewees and were held in a different location within Sarmin.

3.70 Some samples were accompanied by partial documentation of the chain of custody

prior to delivery to the FFM. Although this documentation provided some degree of

confidence-building, the entire chain of custody could not be verified and, therefore,

the possibility of cross-contamination could not be ruled out. Accordingly, as already

explained in Section 2 above, the FFM regarded the samples as tertiary evidence.

3.71 A total of 17 samples were delivered to the FFM team. Six samples (05SDS, 07SDS,

08SDS, 09SDS, 11SDS, and 12SDS) were collected by the witnesses in relation to

different alleged incidents. Eleven samples (13SDS, 14SDS, 15SDS, 16SDS, 17SDS,

18SDS, 19SDS, 20SLS, 21SDS, 22SDS, and 23SDS) were collected from the house

of the deceased victims of the alleged incident of 16 March 2015.

3.72 Sample 24SLS was actually two subsamples of soil from Sarmin. The FFM team

requested that these be taken one day prior the delivery date and that they should be

collected at a distance of 100 m and 200 m, respectively, from the impact point of the

first incident of 16 March 2015. Those two samples were a background reference for

the team.

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 37

TABLE 10: ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES ANALYSIS RESULTS

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

22/05/2015

20150522102805

05SDS

Empty HCFC container

Extraction of 1.4 g of debris

from outside surface of

container with 2 mL

dichloromethane-d2

GC-EI-MS/dFPD - High conc. of Trinitrotoluene (TNT)

- Oxidation products of butylated

hydroxytoluene (BHT)

- Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs)

Extraction of inside surface of

container with 10 mL n-hexane

GC-EI-MS/dFPD - Trinitrotoluene (TNT)

- Oxidation products of butylated

hydroxytoluene (BHT)

- Polychlorinated aromatic hydrocarbons

(PCAHs)

Extraction of inside surface of

container with 10 mL deuterium

oxide

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- Fe [mg/L extract]: 1260 (ICP-OES)

- Zn [mg/L extract]: 380 (ICP-OES)

- K [mg/L extract]: 60 (ICP-MS)

- Mn [mg/L extract]: 50 (ICP-MS)

- Bromide [mg/L extract]: 3 (IC)

- Chloride [mg/L extract]: 3700 (IC)

Extraction of 160 mg of debris

from outside surface of

container with 20 mL water

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- K [mg/kg debris]: 14200 (ICP-MS)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 2 (ICP-MS)

- Bromide [mg/kg debris]: 40 (IC)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 25100 (IC)

22/05/2015

20150522102807

07SDS

Black brown plastic

container

Cutting piece of plastic

container and cleaning of

surface

FTIR spectroscopy and

Differential Scanning

Calorimetry (DSC)

Polymer identified as PET (Polyethylene

terephthalate)

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 38

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

22/05/2015

20150522102808

08SDS

Ruptured HCFC + plastic

containers

None XRF spectroscopy on

outside surface of CFC

container

- K [%]: 0.3

- Mn [%]: 1.3

- Cl [%]: 1.0

None XRF spectroscopy on

inside surface of

HCFC container

- K [%]: 0.2

- Mn [%]: 0.9

- Cl [%]: 1.0

Sanding off debris on the metal

surface of HCFC container

XRF spectroscopy on

cleaned metal surface

- Fe [%]: > 99

Extraction of 100 mg debris

from outside surface of HCFC

container with 2 mL

dichloromethane-d2

GC-EI-MS/dFPD - High conc. of Trinitrotoluene (TNT)

- Oxidation products of butylated

hydroxytoluene (BHT)

- PAHs

- PCAHs

Extraction of 100 mg debris

from inside surface of HCFC

container with 2 mL

dichloromethane-d2

GC-EI-MS/dFPD - Trinitrotoluene (TNT)

- Oxidation products of butylated

hydroxytoluene (BHT)

- PAHs

- PCAHs

Extraction of 100 mg debris

from rust-coloured area on

outside surface of HCFC

container with 20 mL water

ICP-MS

- K [mg/kg debris]: 2600 (ICP-MS)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: <10 (ICP-MS)

- Bromide [mg/kg debris]: 500 (IC)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 55000 (IC)

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 39

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

Extraction of 100 mg debris

from inside surface (area 1) of

HCFC container with 20 mL

water

ICP-MS

- K [mg/kg debris]: 4200 (ICP-MS)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 140 (ICP-MS)

- Bromide [mg/kg debris]: 20 (IC)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 8800 (IC)

Extraction of 100mg debris from

inside surface (area 2) of HCFC

container with 20 mL water

ICP-MS

- K [mg/kg debris]: 3200 (ICP-MS)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 170 (ICP-MS)

- Bromide [mg/kg debris]: 20 (IC)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 9700 (IC)

Extraction of 70 mg debris from

area around hole on top of

outside surface of HCFC

container with 20mL water

ICP-MS

- K [mg/kg debris]: 1400 (ICP-MS)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: <10 (ICP-MS)

- Bromide [mg/kg debris]: <10 (IC)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 3300 (IC)

22/05/2015

20150522102809

09SDS

Clothes from a victim

22/05/2015

20150522102811

Ruptured HCFC container None XRF spectroscopy on

outside surface

- K [%]: 0.3

- Mn [%]: 2.9

- Cl [%]: 7.8

The victim was not severely exposed to the chemical; therefore the laboratory was tasked with preserving this sample for a specific tracer if the

environmental samples results did not offer any specific chemical or degradation product.

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 40

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

11SDS - Ti [%]: 3.0

None XRF spectroscopy on

inside surface

- K [%]: 0.4

- Mn [%]: 0.6

- Cl [%]: 0.2

Sanding off debris on the metal

surface

XRF spectroscopy on

cleaned metal surface

- Fe [%]: > 99

22/05/2015

20150522102812

12SDS

Ruptured HCFC + plastic

containers

None XRF spectroscopy on

outside surface of

HCFC container

- K [%]: 1.4

- Mn [%]: 2.8

- Cl [%]: 4.6

None XRF spectroscopy on

inside surface of

HCFC container

- K [%]: 1.8

- Mn [%]: 1.4

- Cl [%]: 4.4

Sanding off debris on the metal

surface of HCFC container

XRF spectroscopy on

cleaned metal surface

- Fe [%]: > 99

Extraction of 200 mg of debris

from plastic container with 2 mL

dichloro-methane-d2

GC-EI-MS/dFPD - High conc. of Trinitrotoluene (TNT)

- Oxidation products of butylated

hydroxytoluene (BHT)

- PAHs

Extraction of 200 mg of debris

from HCFC container with 2 mL

dichloro-methane-d2

GC-EI-MS/dFPD - High conc. of Trinitrotoluene (TNT)

- Oxidation products of butylated

hydroxytoluene (BHT)

- PAHs

- PCAHs

23/07/2015

20150723100801

13SDS

Key None

XRF spectroscopy on

surface

- K [mg/kg]: < LOD

- Mn [mg/kg]: 3500

Extraction of 17.2 mg of

corrosion debris from key with

2mL dichloromethane-d2.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

- Oxidation products of BHT

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 41

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

Extraction of 18.9 mg of

corrosion debris from key with 3

mL deuterium oxide. Dilution of

1 mL of extract with 20 mL

water.

Re-extraction of debris with 3

mL 10% hydrochloric acid.

Dilution of 1 mL of extract with

20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 2000 (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 350 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 25 (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 1700 (IC)

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 180000 (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 200 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 1100 (MS)

Teaspoon

XRF spectroscopy on surface XRF spectroscopy on

surface

- K [mg/kg]: < LOD

- Mn [mg/kg]: 2’500

Extraction of 8.7 mg of

corrosion debris from teaspoon

with 2 mL dichloromethane-d2.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

- Oxidation products of BHT

Extraction of 7.5 mg of

corrosion debris from teaspoon

with 3 mL deuterium oxide.

Dilution of 1mL of extract with

20 mL water.

Re-extraction of debris with

3 mL 10% hydrochloric acid.

Dilution of 1mL of extract with

20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 1500 (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 2500 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 300 (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 6000 (IC)

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 9000 (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 1000 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 400 (MS)

23/07/2015

20150723100802

14SDS

Metal Rod from level float

of water tank

None XRF spectroscopy on

surface

- K [mg/kg]: < LOD

- Mn [mg/kg]: 3000

- S [mg/kg]: 75000

Extraction of 98.7 mg of

corrosion debris from metal rod

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 42

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

of level float with 2 mL

dichloromethane-d2.

Extraction of 99.7 mg of

corrosion debris from metal rod

of level float with 3 mL

deuterium oxide. Dilution of

1 mL of extract with 20 mL

water.

Re-extraction of debris with 3

mL 10% hydrochloric acid.

Dilution of 1 mL of extract with

20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 800 (IC)

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 50000 (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 400 (MS)

Floater from level float of

water tank

None XRF spectroscopy on

surface

- K [mg/kg]: < LOD

- Mn [mg/kg]: 16’000

Rinsing of floater with 5 mL

acetonitrile-d3.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

- Diazinon

- Oxidation products of BHT

- PAHs

23/07/2015

20150723100803

Electrical light bulb

None XRF spectroscopy on

surface

- K [mg/kg]: < LOD

- Mn [mg/kg]: 20000

Extraction of 11.3 mg of debris GC-EI-MS/dFPD - TNT

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 43

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

15SDS

from light bulb (luminous

element and thread) with 2 mL

dichloromethane-d2.

GC-AED - Oxidation products of BHT

Extraction of 8.7 mg of debris

from light bulb with 3 mL

deuterium oxide. Dilution of

1 mL of extract with 20 mL

water.

Re-extraction of debris with

3mL 10% hydrochloric acid.

Dilution of 1 mL of extract with

20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 33000 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 37000 (IC)

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 7500 (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 13000 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 32000 (MS)

23/07/2015

20150723100804

16SDS

Two pieces of

construction material

(piece #2 with dark

coloured debris on surface

used for analysis)

None XRF spectroscopy on

surface (piece 1)

- K [mg/kg]: 1200

- Mn [mg/kg]: 11000

XRF spectroscopy on

surface (piece 2)

- K [mg/kg]: 6200

- Mn [mg/kg]: 36000

Extraction of 45.7 mg of debris

from dark coloured surface with

2 mL dichloromethane-d2.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

Extraction of 51.2mg of debris

from dark coloured surface with

3mL deuterium oxide. Dilution

of 1mL of extract with 20mL

water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 33000 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 37’000 (IC)

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 7500 (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 13000 (OES)

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 44

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

Re-extraction of debris with

3 mL 10% hydrochloric acid.

Dilution of 1mL of extract with

20 mL water.

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 32000 (MS)

23/07/2015

20150723100805

17SDS

Part of an exploded HCFC

gas cylinder

None XRF spectroscopy on

inside surface of

HCFC container

(different spots)

- K [mg/kg]: < LOD

- Mn [mg/kg]: 2000-6000

Extraction of 55.7 mg of

corrosion debris from inside

surface of HCFC container with

2 mL dichloromethane-d2

(spot #1).

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

Extraction of 46.1 mg of

corrosion debris from inside

surface of HCFC container with

2 mL dichloromethane-d2

(spot #2).

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

Extraction of 99.0 mg of

corrosion debris from inside

surface of HCFC container with

2 mL dichloromethane-d2

(spot #3).

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

Extraction of 50.2 mg of

corrosion debris from inside

surface of HCFC container with

3 mL deuterium oxide (spot #1).

Dilution of 1 mL of extract with

20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 150 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 1200 (IC)

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 60000 (OES)

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 45

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

Re-extraction of debris with

3 mL 10% hydrochloric acid.

Dilution of 1mL of extract with

20 mL water.

- K [mg/kg debris]: 150 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 300 (MS)

Extraction of 48.8 mg of

corrosion debris from inside

surface of HCFC container with

3 mL deuterium oxide (spot #2).

Dilution of 1 mL of extract with

20 mL water.

Re-extraction of debris with

3 mL 10% hydrochloric acid.

Dilution of 1mL of extract with

20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 200 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 400 (IC)

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 120000 (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 100 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 300 (MS)

Extraction of 99.0 mg of

corrosion debris from inside

surface of HCFC container with

3mL deuterium oxide (spot #3).

Dilution of 1 mL of extract with

20 mL water.

Re-extraction of debris with

3 mL 10% hydrochloric acid.

Dilution of 1mL of extract with

20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 700 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 1400 (IC)

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 7000 (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 1000 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 1’100 (MS)

23/07/2015

Part of an exploded HCFC

gas cylinder

None XRF spectroscopy on

outside surface of

- K [mg/kg]: < LOD

- Mn [mg/kg]: 40’000

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 46

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

20150723100806

18SDS

HCFC container

Extraction of 100.1 mg of

corrosion debris from out-side

surface of HCFC container with

2 mL dichloro-methane-d2.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

Extraction of 100.6 mg of

corrosion debris from out-side

surface of HCFC container with

3mL deuterium oxide. Dilution

of 1mL of extract with 20 mL

water.

Re-extraction of debris with

3 mL 10% hydrochloric acid.

Dilution of 1mL of extract with

20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 400 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 300 (IC)

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 60000 (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 1400 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 8500 (MS)

None XRF spectroscopy on

inside surface of

HCFC container

- K [mg/kg]: < LOD

- Mn [mg/kg]: 2500

Extraction of 96.5 mg of

corrosion debris from inside

surface of HCFC container with

2 mL dichloromethane-d2.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

- Oxidation products of BHT

- PAHs

Extraction of 81.9 mg of

corrosion debris from inside

surface of HCFC container with

3 mL deuterium oxide. Dilution

of 1 mL of extract with 20 mL

water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: < LOD (OES)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 600 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 40 (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 1500 (IC)

- Fe [mg/kg debris]: 90000 (OES)

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 47

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

Re-extraction of debris with

3 mL 10% hydrochloric acid.

Dilution of 1mL of extract with

20 mL water.

- K [mg/kg debris]: 500 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 4000 (MS)

23/07/2015

20150723100807

19SDS

One piece of wood (dark

coloured debris on surface

used for analysis)

None XRF spectroscopy on

surface

- K [mg/kg]: 32000

- Mn [mg/kg]: 11000

Extraction of 21.2 mg of debris

from wood piece with 2 mL

dichloromethane-d2.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

- Diazinon

- Oxidation products of BHT

Extraction of 21.2 mg of debris

from wood piece with 3 mL

deuterium oxide. Dilution of

1mL of extract with 20mL

water.

Re-extraction of debris with

3 mL 10% hydrochloric acid.

Dilution of 1mL of extract with

20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- K [mg/kg debris]: 5000 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 250 (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 4600 (IC)

- K [mg/kg debris]: 3000 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg debris]: 30000 (MS)

23/07/2015

20150723100808

20SLS

Soil sample (sand and

stones)

Transfer of sample in XRF cup. XRF spectroscopy on

soil surface

- K [mg/kg]: 50000

- Mn [mg/kg]: 60000

(stoichiometric ratio K / Mn ~1:1)

Extraction of 5 g soil with 5 mL

dichloromethane-d2.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

- TNT

- Oxidation products of BHT

- PAHs

- PCAHs

Extraction of 5 g soil with 5 mL

deuterium oxide. Dilution of

1mL of extract with 20 mL

water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- K [mg/kg]: 14000 (OES, 1:100)

- Mn [mg/kg]: 25 (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg]: 21000 (IC)

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 48

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

Re-dilution of 0.1 mL of extract

with 10 mL water for ICP-OES

analysis.

23/07/2015

20150723100809

21SDS

Pieces of wood

(+plastic container)

None XRF spectroscopy on

surface

(container)

- K [mg/kg]: 18000

- Mn [mg/kg]: 24000

(stoichiometric ratio K / Mn ~1:1)

XRF spectroscopy on

surface

(wood pieces)

- K [mg/kg]: 28000

- Mn [mg/kg]: 18000

Extraction of 2.0 g of splinters

of wood with 5 mL

dichloromethane-d2.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

- -Pinene and bornyl chloride (bornyl

chloride is a reaction product of -pinene

with chlorinating agents)

- TNT

- PCAHs

Extraction of 2.0 g of splinters

of wood with 5 mL deuterium

oxide. Dilution of 1 mL of

extract with 20 mL water.

Re-extraction of splinters of

wood with 5 mL 10%

hydrochloric acid. Dilution of

1 mL of extract with 20 mL

water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- K [mg/kg]: 1000 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg]: 8000 (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg]: 33000 (IC)

- K [mg/kg]: 4500 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg]: 7000 (MS)

23/07/2015

20150723100810

22SDS

Plastic containers

None XRF spectroscopy on

surface

- K [mg/kg]: 70000

- Mn [mg/kg]: 90000

(stoichiometric ratio K / Mn ~1:1)

Cutting piece of plastic

container and cleaning of

FTIR spectroscopy - Polymer identified as PET

(polyethylene terephthalate)

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 49

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

surface.

Cutting piece (280 mg) of plastic

container and extraction with

2 mL dichloromethane-d2.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

- TNT

- Oxidation products of BHT

- PAHs

- PCAHs

Cutting piece (280 mg) of plastic

container and extraction with

3 mL deuterium oxide. Dilution

of 1 mL of extract with 20 mL

water.

Re-extraction of container piece

with 3 mL 10% hydrochloric

acid. Dilution of 1 mL of extract

with 20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- K [mg/kg]: 4500 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg]: < LOD (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg debris]: 3500 (IC)

- K [mg/kg]: 1600 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg]: 3700 (MS)

23/07/2015

20150723100811

23SDS

Jacket of a victim

None XRF spectroscopy on

sleeve surface

- K [mg/kg]: 11000

- Mn [mg/kg]: 5000

Cutting piece of jacket (950 mg)

and extraction with 5 mL

acetonitrile-d3.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

- PAHs

Cutting piece of jacket (920 mg)

and extraction with 3 mL

deuterium oxide. Dilution of

1 mL of extract with 20 mL

water.

Re-extraction of jacket piece

with 3 mL 10% hydro-chloric

acid. Dilution of 1 mL of extract

with 20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

- K [mg/kg]: 4000 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg]: 1200 (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg]: 13000 (IC)

- K [mg/kg]: 2100 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg]: 2300 (MS)

S/1319/2015

Annex 2

page 50

Date of receipt;

OPCW evidence

reference

number; and

sample code

Sample description Sample preparation Technique Result

23/07/2015

20150723100812

24SLS

2 Soil samples taken from

Sarmin as background

sample (blank sample)

from two locations

(Location 1 and

location 2)

Transfer of sample in XRF cup. XRF spectroscopy on

soil surface (location

- K [mg/kg]: 15000

- Mn [mg/kg]: 350

XRF spectroscopy on

soil surface (location

- K [mg/kg]: 9000

- Mn [mg/kg]: 350

Extraction of 5 g soil with 5 mL

dichloromethane-d2.

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

(location 1)

- PAHs

GC-EI-MS/dFPD

GC-AED

(location 2)

- Oxidation products of BHT

- PAHs

Extraction of 5 g soil with 5mL

to 7 ml deuterium oxide.

Dilution of 1 mL of extract with

20 mL water.

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

(location 1)

- K [mg/kg]: 500 (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg]: < LOD (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg]: 300 (IC)

ICP-MS

ICP-OES

(location 2)

- K [mg/kg]: < LOD (OES)

- Mn [mg/kg]: < LOD (MS)

- Chloride [mg/kg]: 30 (IC)

BHT: Butylated hydroxytoluene, HCFC: hydrochlorofluorocarbon, Cl: Chloride, Fe: Iron, FTIR: Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy, GC-EI-

MS/dFPD: Gas Chromatography – Mass Spectrometry / dual Flame Photometry Detection, IC: Ion Chromatography, ICP-MS: Inductively Coupled

Plasma Mass Spectrometry, ICP-OES: Inductively Coupled Plasma Optical Emission Spectrometry, K: Potassium, LOD: Limit of Detection, Mn:

Manganese, NMR: Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy, PAHs: Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, PCAHs: Polychlorinated aromatic

hydrocarbons, PET: Polyethylene terephthalate, S: Sulfur, TNT: Trinitrotoluene, XRF: X-ray Fluorescence.

** All photographs from samples received on 23/07/2015, courtesy of Spiez Laboratories**

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Binnish

3.73 Binnish is a small city in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Other villages close to Binnish include Al-Fu’ah village at 2 km NWN and

Taoum village at 4 km ENE.

3.74 The FFM interviewed and collected the testimony of a treating physician

about the alleged incident of 23 March 2015.

TABLE 11: INFORMATION ON THE ALLEGED INCIDENT IN

BINNISH

Date Approximate time Weather conditions

23 March 2015 19:00 – 20:00 Stable temperatures around

14°C between 19:00 and

midnight, with 55% to 72%

humidity. The wind direction

was variable at 1 to 5 m/s.

3.75 Figure 14 below shows the approximate alleged impact point of the device, as

derived from the interviewee.

FIGURE 14: APPROXIMATE ALLEGED IMPACT POINT OF THE

DEVICE

Impact point, 23 March 2015, Binnish 

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Narrative

3.76 The FFM team interviewed only one person from Binnish, who was a treating

physician at the time of the alleged incident.

3.77 At the time of the incident, the city was not under the control of the

government. The interviewee reported frequent airborne, artillery, and mortar

attacks. A large number of families were displaced from the village and were

located elsewhere. The population of the city before the crisis was

approximately 40,000. By March 2015, the population was reduced to around

5,000 due to its close proximity to the front line 7 km to the west of the city.

3.78 On 23 March 2015 at around 19:00, one item was dropped on the city in the

south-eastern area of the village in agricultural land. The physician was in the

field hospital; he did not hear any explosion and was informed of the incident

through the local early-warning methods, including the use of hand-held

radios. There was no mobile telephone coverage in this village at the time of

the incident.

3.79 Binnish field hospital registered 21 patients related to the incident on

23 March. Out of these 21, 10 were mild cases, 10 were moderate cases, and

one was identified as a severe case. No deaths were reported to the FFM team.

3.80 The decontamination of patients, including washing of the exposed area of

skin, was done for all cases. This decontamination was conducted using water

outside the hospital, five to 10 m from the emergency room. The physician

did not smell chlorine odour emanating from the clothing but was informed of

the smell by the patients.

3.81 Twenty-four hours later, the interviewee visited the place where the item

allegedly hit the ground. He did not see any remnants of the item and

reported: “I saw that there was a wheat field and the wheat turned yellow on

an area of about 50 metres, all yellow. The yellow colour was clearly visible”.

Epidemiological analysis

3.82 Binnish has one field hospital, which is in one of the buildings in the village

and is intended specifically for the medical needs of this village, including the

treatment of traumatic war injuries. There are also four private clinics (none

of them are known to have received cases from the alleged chemical

incidents). The hospital has a staff of eight doctors specialised in the fields of

general surgery, urology, orthopaedics, internal medicine, dermatology, and

gynaecology, as well as 15 other staff including seven certified nurses and

eight field-trained nurses. The hospital staff members do not have formal

training in the management of injuries resulting from chemical incidents.

Furthermore, the structure of the hospital has been augmented continuously

since its establishment. The resources available at the hospital include a

laboratory, radiology department, pharmacy, two operating theatres, a delivery

room, emergency room with a total of eight in-patient beds, four oxygen

cylinders, and eight nebulisers. All individuals who present to this field

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hospital for routine illness, diseases, and war injuries are registered, and all

medical records are maintained.

3.83 The field hospital received all of the approximately 21 patients from the

alleged chemical incident. The physician informed the FFM that the hospital

staff were able to register most, but not all, of the names. A copy of a list of

patients with the stamp of the hospital (but not the patient registration book,

and no medical files) was provided showing the name, age, and gender. The

age distribution of the 21 patients recorded as having been treated at the field

hospital is provided in the table below:

TABLE 12: PATIENT DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO AGE

GROUP

Age group Total Males Females

0 to 5 years 3 2 1

6 to10 years 0 0 0

11 to 15 years 2 1 1

16 to 20 years 6 4 2

21 to 30 years 5 3 2

31 to 40 years 2 2

41 to 50 years 2 1 1

51 to 60 years 1 1

Total 21 11 10

FIGURE 15: DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY GENDER

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FIGURE 16: DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY AGE

3.84 The clinical examination demonstrated that most of the cases presented with

the following symptoms: coughing, difficulty breathing, and drowsiness.

Some of the signs were due to anxiety and psychosomatic stress. The

dyspnoea in the moderate cases was grade 1. The physician classified the

dyspnoea in four grades:

(a) Grade 1: provoked by severe exercise;

(b) Grade 2: provoked by moderate exercise;

(d) Grade 4: at rest.

3.85 The one severe case presented with severe anxiety, severe coughing and

resistance, difficulty breathing, shortness of breath, severe wheezing, mild eye

irritation. The spread of symptoms is indicated in the table below.

TABLE 13: SYMPTOMS RELATING TO THE INCIDENT IN

BINNISH

Symptom Binnish

Coughing 10

Difficulty breathing 10

Tearing, burning sensation in eyes 1

Nausea/vomiting 0

Loss of consciousness 0

Burning sensation on exposed skin/nose 0

Feeling of panic 21

Physical injuries 0

Death 0

Total 21

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FIGURE 17: SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS RELATING TO THE

INCIDENT IN BINNISH

3.86 No cutaneous or severe ophthalmologic signs or hypoxemia were reported.

All of these individuals responded well to the administration of oxygen

(five litres per minute) and nebulisation with the bronchodilator salbutamol.

Those with moderate symptoms also benefitted from inhaler steroids or

intravenous steroids, hydrocortisone, or dexamethasone.

3.87 The severe case was managed with oxygen (seven litres per minute)

nebulisation with the bronchodilator salbutamol, inhaler steroids, and

lidocaine nebuliser for the cough.

3.88 Neither a laboratory exam nor an X-ray was requested by the treating

physicians for any of the cases as all of these individuals were discharged

from the hospital after three hours. None of the individuals affected in the

incident had any signs of physical trauma on their bodies, but only suffered

from the effects of a toxic chemical. The physician presented these cases as

possibly to be due to chlorine but not confirmed as such.

TABLE 14: TREATMENT OF CASUALTIES IN BINNISH

Decontamination 21

Oxygen 21

Bronchodilator nebuliser 21

Inhaler steroids 10

Intravenous steroids 10

Lidocaine nebuliser 1

Laboratory analysis 0

X-ray 0

000

Coughing

Difficulty breathing

Tearing, burning sensation in

eyes

Nausea/vomiting

Loss of consciousness

Burning sensation on exposed

skin/nose

Feeling of panic

Physical injuries

Death

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FIGURE 18: MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN BINNISH

Biomedical samples

3.89 No biomedical samples were taken from the patients, neither by the FFM team

nor by the medical staff at the Binnish field hospital.

Environmental samples

3.90 No environmental samples were collected or received by the FFM team.

Idlib City

3.91 Idlib City is the principal city of the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian Arab

Republic.

3.92 Between 3 May and 5 June, the FFM team interviewed six individuals in the

context of incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Idlib

City. The interviewees were treating physicians, nurses, and first responders.

Three incidents had been reported by the interviewees to the FFM team. The

first incident happened on 31 March, the second was on 16 April 2015, and the

third was on 20 May 2015. Out of the three reported incidents, the

interviewees recalled more information in relation to the first incident. The

information about the second and the third incident was limited to the date of

the event, the location, and number of cases.

Decontamination

Oxygen

Bronchodilator nebuliser

Inhaler steroids

Intravenous steroids

Lidocaine nebuliser

Lab analysis

X-ray

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TABLE 15: CHRONOLOGY OF INCIDENTS IN IDLIB CITY

Incident Date Approximate Time Weather Conditions

First 31 March 2015

11:00 – 12:00 and

13:00 – 14:00

The temperature was

18°C to 20°C, humidity

60% and the wind

velocity 10 to 12 m/s

mainly SSW.

Second 16 April 2015 00:30 – 01:00

The temperature was

around 16°C; wind

direction was variable at

1 to 2 m/s and humidity

of 50%.

Third 20 May 2015 03:00 – 04:00

In the early morning of

20 May 2015, the

temperature was stable

around 20°C and the

humidity was 50%. The

wind direction was

variable, mainly NW with

a velocity of 2 m/s.

3.93 The figure below shows the approximate alleged impact points of the devices,

as derived from the interviewees.

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FIGURE 19: APPROXIMATE ALLEGED IMPACT POINTS IN IDLIB

CITY

Narrative

3.94 On the days of the incidents the city was not under the control of the

government.

31 March 2015

3.95 On 31 March 2015 at around noon, a helicopter was heard passing above Idlib

and was seen to have dropped one item. One eyewitness started to video

record after detonation of the munition and provided the recording to the FFM

team. The video showed a drifting yellow-green cloud. A few minutes later, a

message was broadcast that the helicopter had dropped a chlorine item close

by the governorate administrative building (HQ). One hour later, a second

alleged item was dropped on “Al-Mahreb roundabout” close by the museum.

3.96 Interviewees, in particular the first responders, described smelling the typical

odour of chlorine as they approached the impact point.

3.97 On the same day two to three hours before the first incident, the national hospital

in Idlib had been attacked. Therefore, people who had indications of exposure

were transported to either Sarmin field hospital or Binnish field hospital for

treatment and care. Sarmin field hospital registered six patients and Binnish field

hospital registered 32 patients. All patients were considered by the medical

specialists

to be mild cases.

Impact point, 20 May 2015, Idlib City

Impact point, 31 March 2015, Idlib City

Impact point, 16 April 2015, Idlib City

Impact point, 31 March 2015, Idlib City

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16 April 2015

3.98 Interviewees claimed that, on 16 April 2015 at around midnight, one item was

dropped in Idlib City. The first responders interviewed reported smelling the

typical odour of chlorine as they approached the impact point. Approximately

20 people had signs of exposure and were transported to either Sarmin field

hospital or Binnish field hospital for treatment and care.

20 May 2015

3.99 The FFM team was not able to obtain any significant information, other than

the approximate time and location for this incident.

Epidemiological analysis

3.100 The FFM team interviewed and collected the testimonies of six individuals in

the context of the investigation of incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals

as a weapon. The interviewees were treating physicians, nurses, and first

responders. The results presented below are mainly related to the incident of

31 March 2015.

TABLE 16: RELATION TO THE INCIDENTS IN IDLIB CITY AND

GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES

Interviewee Male Female

Treating physicians 3 3 0

Nurses 1 1 0

First responders 2 2 0

Casualties 0 0 0

Witnesses 0 0 0

Total

6 6 0

FIGURE 20: DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES IN RELATION

TO THE INCIDENTS IN IDLIB CITY

3.101 Idlib City had no functional hospitals at that time. Therefore, for emergencies

the population used the nearest hospitals such as those in Sarmin and Binnish.

The patients were transported by volunteers in their personal cars or vans.

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Sarmin field hospital received approximately six patients and Binnish field

hospital received 32 patients. All patients were decontaminated, which

included washing the exposed area of skin with water. This decontamination

was conducted outside the emergency room. Upon clinical examination, the

signs and symptoms observed included coughing, difficulty breathing, and

tearing.

TABLE 17: SYMPTOMS OF CASES IN IDLIB CITY

Symptom

Coughing 38

Difficulty breathing 38

Total cases 38

3.102 All patients were considered to be mild cases. None of the affected

individuals in the attack had any signs of physical trauma on their bodies, but

only suffered from the effects of the suspected toxic chemical. All cases

responded well to the administration of oxygen. No moderate or severe cases

were reported. Neither a laboratory exam nor an X-ray was requested by the

treating physicians for the cases. The patients were discharged after a

maximum of one hour.

TABLE 18: TREATMENT OF CASES IN IDLIB CITY

Decontamination 38

Oxygen 38

Bronchodilator nebuliser 0

Inhaler steroids 0

Intravenous steroids 0

Lidocaine nebuliser 0

Laboratory analysis 0

X-ray 0

3.103 Even though the hospital staff were able to register the names of the patients in

both hospitals, no copy of the patient registration book or medical files was

provided to the FFM, although these were requested. The FFM received a

copy of a list of patients with the stamp of Binnish hospital showing the name,

age and gender. The age distribution of the 32 patients treated at the Binnish

field hospital is provided in table below.

TABLE 19: PATIENT DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO AGE

GROUP, IDLIB CITY

Age group Total Males Females

0 to 5 years 0 0 0

6 to10 years 0 0 0

11 to 15 years 2 2 0

16 to 20 years 12 12 0

21 to 30 years 13 13 0

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Age group Total Males Females

31 to 40 years 4 4 0

41 to 50 years 1 1 0

51 to 60 years 0 0 0

Total 32 32 0

FIGURE 21: DISTRIBUTION OF CASES IN IDLIB CITY BY AGE

11 to 15 years

16 to 20 years

21 to 30 years

31 to 40 years

41 to 50 years

Al-Nerab

3.104 Al-Nerab is a village in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian Arab Republic.

3.105 The FFM interviewed eight individuals in relation to alleged incidents in

Al-Nerab; six of the interviewees were first responders, one of whom claimed

that he had been exposed and two of whom visited the impact point few days

after the incidents. The six interviewees who participated in the rescue

operation were first responders from Sarmin, located in Sarmin at the time of

the incidents. As the information provided to the FFM team was not from

direct witnesses, the team was not able to build the sequence of events from

the moment of the incidents until the beginning of the rescue operation.

3.106 Three dates of three incidents had been mentioned to the FFM, namely,

27 April 2015, 1 May 2015, and 2 May 2015.

TABLE 20: CHRONOLOGY AND ASSOCIATED WEATHER

CONDITIONS IN RELATION TO THE INCIDENTS IN

AL-NERAB

Date Approximate time Weather conditions

27 April 2015

Morning (no accurate

indication of time)

Temperatures were rising from

12°C to 21°C; humidity was

dropping from 98% to 48%. The

wind direction was variable at 2

to 7 m/s.

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Date Approximate time Weather conditions

1 May 2015

Evening before

midnight (no accurate

indication of time)

Temperature was around 18°C

with 64% to 77% humidity. The

wind direction was changing

between WSW and SSW at 8 to

3 m/s.

2 May 2015 Around 04:30

The temperature was around

15°C; humidity was 80%. In the

early morning, the wind direction

was SW with a velocity of 4 m/s.

3.107 The figure below shows the approximate alleged impact points of the devices,

as derived from the interviewees.

FIGURE 22: ALLEGED IMPACT POINTS IN AL-NERAB

Narrative

3.108 Al-Nerab was not under the control of the government in April and May 2015.

3.109 Although there were no direct witnesses to the actual events among the

interviewees, the FFM team was able to collect information from the first

responders regarding some of the casualties, including two fatalities from the

Impact point, 27 April 2015, Al-Nerab

Impact point, 02 May 2015, Al-Nerab

Impact point, 01 May 2015, Al-Nerab 

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alleged incident of 2 May. One responder who visited the 2 May site after

transporting victims to the Sarmin field hospital, and two witnesses who

visited the impact point a few days later, had given information about the

munition, which reportedly impacted in front of the residence of the two

casualties who died. These interviewees described barrel fragments,

light-green-coloured refrigerant cylinders, and plastic bottles among the

remnants, as well as a strong smell of chlorine, discolouration of nearby

vegetation, and burn marks on the outside wall of the house.

3.110 The alleged incidents of 27 April and 1 May were also reported to have

occurred in residential neighbourhoods. Responders similarly reported

smelling a strong odour of chlorine and seeing remnants similar to those

described above. One witness reported that he poured water over one of the

plastic bottle remnants and that the water turned red.

Epidemiological analysis

3.111 Between 23 May and 5 June 2015, the FFM interviewed eight individuals; six

of the interviewees were first responders, one of whom claimed that he was

exposed, and two interviewees had visited the impact point a few days after

the incidents. As the individuals who were interviewed were in fact in Sarmin

during the attack, the information received about the incident was not first

hand.

3.112 The details of these interviewees are given in the table below.

TABLE 21: RELATION TO THE INCIDENT IN AL-NERAB AND

GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES

Interviewee Male Female

First responders 5 5 0

Exposed person 1 1 0

Witnesses 2 2

Total 8 8 0

FIGURE 23: DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES IN RELATION

TO THE INCIDENT IN AL-NERAB

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3.113 The information reported 12 casualties resulting from all three alleged

incidents, including two cases of death: a father and his baby from the incident

on 2 May 2015. It was reported that the baby was found dead at the scene,

and the father died a few days later in a hospital near the border. The signs

observed by the first responder included coughing, difficulty breathing, and

tearing.

Biomedical samples

3.114 For all alleged incidents in Al-Nerab reported above, only two biomedical

samples had been taken. The samples were blood and hair taken from the

dead baby.

3.115 The FFM team received the sample (blood and hair) from the CVDCS on

22 May 2015. The quantity of blood and hair was not enough to perform a

screening analysis; therefore, the laboratory was tasked with screening the

environmental samples first and preserving the biomedical sample for a

specific tracer in the light of the results. The environmental sample analysis

result did not offer any lead with respect to an organic or/and inorganic tracer

or their metabolites that could be specific and not naturally occurring in the

human body. Therefore, no analysis was conducted on these two samples.

Environmental samples

3.116 No environmental samples were collected or received by the FFM team

related to the alleged incidents in Al-Nerab.

Saraqib

3.117 Saraqib is a city in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian Arab Republic.

3.118 Between 23 May and 5 June 2015, the FFM interviewed six individuals who

provided information in relation to the alleged incidents in Saraqib, five of

whom were first responders and one an eyewitness (local media) with respect

to the alleged munition remnants; all were male.

3.119 Figure 24 below indicates the approximate alleged impact points of the

devices, as derived from the interviewees.

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FIGURE 24: IMPACT POINT OF ALLEGED INCIDENT IN SARAQIB

TABLE 22: DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT IN SARAQIB

Narrative

3.120 Saraqib was not under the control of the government in May 2015.

3.121 The alleged incident in Saraqib with suspected toxic chemicals was on

2 May 2015. The individuals who were interviewed by the FFM team were in

fact in Sarmin during the incident. The interviewees reported to the FFM team

an approximate number of 70 chemical casualties. The signs observed by the

first responder during the rescue operation were coughing, difficulty

breathing, and tearing.

Date Approximate time Weather conditions

2 May 2015 Around 4:30

In the early morning of 2 May 2015, the

temperature in Saraqib was around 15°C,

humidity was 80%, and the wind

direction was south-west with a velocity

of 4 m/s.

Impact point, 2 May 2015, Saraqib

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3.122 The information received about the incident was not first hand and the FFM

team could not cross-check this information from different sources such as

medical professionals, victims, casualties and direct witnesses.

3.123 One interviewee visited the scene approximately 20 minutes after the incident.

He reported a strong chemical smell, barrel remnants, refrigerant cylinders,

plastic bottles, and some chemical burning and discolouration of vegetation.

Biomedical samples

3.124 No biomedical samples were taken from the patients in relation to the alleged

incident in Saraqib on 2 May 2015.

Environmental samples

3.125 No environmental samples were collected or received in relation to the alleged

incident in Saraqib on 2 May 2015.

Kurin

3.126 Kurin is a village in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian Arab Republic.

3.127 Only one interviewee made reference to an incident in Kurin; the interviewee

could not recall the date of the incident, but was able to give information about

the incident location.

3.128 Figure 25 below indicates the alleged approximate impact points of the

devices, as derived from the interviewees.

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FIGURE 25: APPROXIMATE ALLEGED IMPACT POINT OF

DEVICE IN KURIN

Narrative

3.129 The interviewee claimed that in mid-April 2015 in the evening between 18:30

and 20:00, shortly after sunset, he was with five friends riding in a pick-up

truck close to Kurin. He heard a helicopter in the air, so the six of them took

cover. A moment later they heard the sound of something falling through the

air, followed by a light explosion. A few minutes later they continued moving

in the pick-up. As soon as they arrived in an area in Kurin, they smelled

“[c]hlorine. It was clear from its taste it was chlorine. It stuck to our mouths.”

They left the village quickly and washed their faces and mouths with water.

3.130 The FFM team could not cross check this information from other sources.

MUNITIONS

3.131 The FFM team collected information regarding the alleged chemical item or

munition during the interviews. The interviewees referred to the alleged

items/munitions as “barrel bombs”. Several of the interviewees described the

remnant of the munition and some of them also provided pictures. The FFM

team also received parts of the munitions as samples. Additionally, the team

also found many pictures of alleged items/munitions in open sources, which

bore resemblance to descriptions provided by interviewees.

3.132 Initially, the team studied the media footprints where the improvised chemical

munitions were reportedly used. As interviews progressed, more information

Impact point, mid-April 2015, Kurin

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was obtained from a number of persons who were interviewed in their

different capacities as victims, witnesses, first responders, and medical

personnel. Their testimonies were correlated with the various types of

evidences provided to the team by the interviewees, with the social media

videos and pictures, with the samples handed over to the team and with the

information collected from various other open sources.

3.133 Based on the information collected by the FFM team, samples, pictures, and

descriptions of the items by the witnesses, the following are key common

features:

(a) an outer shell (barrel) designed to contain a number of metallic and

plastic cylinders;

(b) a number of metallic cylinders of various shapes and sizes that could

be filled with chemical compounds;

(d) detonation cord or an explosive mixture;

(e) ordinary time fuse; and

(f) multiple and various connectors that hold the components together.

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FIGURE 26: ALLEGED REMNANTS OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS, DERIVED FROM DIFFERENT

SOURCES

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3.134 From the 24 interviewees, 16 interviewees offered relevant data regarding the

remnants of improvised chemical bombs allegedly used during the

investigated incidents. Figure 27 below shows the distribution of interviewees

with respect to the different incidents.

FIGURE 27: DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES WITH RESPECT

TO THE ALLEGED INCIDENTS

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OVERALL ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION COLLECTED

Epidemiological analysis of the incidents

3.135 For logistical and security considerations, the interviewees were transported to

the interview location in Country X in three groups:

(a) The first group totalled 11 interviewees, all of whom were interviewed.

(b) The second group totalled nine interviewees, all of whom were

interviewed.

interviewed (30%).

3.136 Seven interviewees from the original selection were unable to join the group.

TABLE 23: DISTRIBUTION OF THE INTERVIEWEES BY AGE

AND GENDER

Age group Male Female Total

20 years 2 2

21 to 30 years 11 1 12

31 to 40 years 6 6

41 to 50 years 2 1 3

51 to 60 years 1 1

Total 22 2 24

FIGURE 28: DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES BY AGE

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FIGURE 29: DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES BY GENDER

TABLE 24: DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES IN RELATION

TO THE INCIDENTS

Relation to the incident Number

Treating physician 4

Nurse 2

Paramedic 2

Civil defence 3

Patient 7

Eyewitness 6

Total 24

FIGURE 30: DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES IN RELATION

TO THE INCIDENTS

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3.137 In carrying out the analysis, the team noted the following in particular:

(a) The FFM compiled data that emerged from the testimonies of

interviewees.

(b) The relation of the interviewees to the incidents was frequently

interchangeable; some first responders and medical personnel were

considered as having been exposed and some of the interviewees were

present at more than one incident.

the course of one or more of the alleged incidents. Eighteen of these

described smelling the distinctive odour of a chlorine-like substance,

similar to cleaning products but much stronger; three described a

strong and repulsive odour.

(d) All medical staff, from ambulance drivers to treating physicians,

mentioned a large number of patients documented in different hospitals

at which they sought medical aid.

(e) When transporting patients or providing aid to them, some of the

medical staff and first responders suffered from some symptoms of

exposure.

(f) A few were affected by the intense smell of chlorine emanating from

the clothes of people who were exposed during an incident. It should

be noted that patients were decontaminated with water or soap and

water before being brought inside the hospital.

Medical signs, symptoms, and treatment

3.138 The symptoms of exposure, the signs observed by the treating physicians, and

the treatment that was provided to patients, in addition to the symptoms based

on interviewees’ testimonies, are discussed below.

3.139 All interviewees who declared having been exposed to toxic chemicals are

reported here. These include the seven patients and five first responders /

nurses exposed (a total of 12 individuals exposed).

3.140 Some symptoms are grouped together. The range experienced by the patients

as a result of suspected exposure to toxic chemicals included coughing,

shortness of breath, tearing and burning sensation in the eyes, burning

sensation on exposed skin, nausea/vomiting, disorientation, and loss of

consciousness.

3.141 The clinical examination reported by the treating physician included coughing,

difficulty breathing, and tearing.

3.142 The severity of symptoms varied and depended on the duration of exposure

and the age of the patient.

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TABLE 25: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE REPORTED

SYMPTOMS BY THE CASUALTIES WHO PROVIDED

THEIR TESTIMONY

Symptom Frequency of Occurrence

Coughing 12

Shortness of breath/difficulty breathing 12

Tearing, burning sensation in eyes 8

Burning sensation on exposed skin 3

Nausea/vomiting 3

Disorientation 1

Loss of consciousness 1

Physical injuries 0

Total 12

FIGURE 31: FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF SIGNS AND

SYMPTOMS

12 12

Coughing

Shortness of breath/difficulty breathing

Tearing, burning sensation in eyes

Burning sensation on exposed skin

Nausea/vomiting

Disorientation

Loss of consciousness

Physical injuries

3.143 Cumulatively, 12 of 12 experienced coughing, 12 of 12 had shortness of

breath, 8 of 12 experienced burning in the eyes and tearing, 3 of 12

experienced a burning sensation on exposed skin, 1 of 12 had nausea or

vomiting, and 1 of 12 lost consciousness.

3.144 There is no discordance between the two sources of information because for

the patients the main symptoms were difficulty breathing and severe coughing.

The other symptoms were reported as secondary, mild symptoms, but

nonetheless are recorded in this document.

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3.145 The respiratory symptoms among patients appeared almost immediately after

exposure to the suspected toxic chemicals and persisted for a few hours or, in

some cases, for a few days. The cough was non-productive in the majority of

cases, which is a result of irritation of the upper respiratory tract and the

constitution of bronchospasm. No cases of productive cough or haemoptysis

were observed.

3.146 As reported by the treating physicians, a large number of patients presented in

a state of panic. This could be attributed to the psychological effects of living

in a conflict area.

3.147 The treatment provided included oxygen therapy, application of intravenous

fluids, and steroid therapy.

3.148 The mainstay of treatment provided was oxygen, which provided relief to

patients within minutes. Oxygen relieves hypoxia in exposed patients and

calms those who are in state of panic, thus bringing immediate relief.

3.149 The use of bronchodilators relaxes constricted airways, thus improving

oxygenation and relieving symptoms. The efficacy of steroids is not proven.

3.150 The use of intravenous fluids is of more value in providing quick access to the

peripheral vessels for intravenous drug administration. Moreover, in cases of

pulmonary oedema, administration of fluids has to be carefully justified and

weighed.

3.151 The outcome of exposure was fatal in six cases in Sarmin and two in

Al-Nerab. In the alleged incident in Sarmin, three died immediately and three

later on the same night in Sarmin hospital. All these individuals were from the

same family and very close to the impact site. In the Al-Nerab incident, one

died at the scene of impact and the other three days later.

3.152 The hospitals at all locations in question are equipped with minimal medical

equipment, thus the treating physicians did not take any blood tests, perform

radiographs, etc.

Evaluation of Samples

3.153 None of the samples were collected by the FFM team. A total of 24 samples

were handed over to the FFM team by the CVDCS. The samples were

received by the FFM team on two different dates; the first set of samples was

received by the team on 22 May 2015 and the second set of samples was

received on 23 July 2015. According to interviewees’ statements, the samples

were originally collected by the interviewees and were held in a separate

location within Sarmin, then handed over to the CVDCS.

3.154 The OPCW FFM team ensured the chain of custody of these samples from the

moment of receipt by following the procedure described in the methodology

section (Section 2) of the current report. The described procedure was applied

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for all samples starting from the moment of receipt to the handover of these

samples to the OPCW designated laboratory.

3.155 Some of the received samples were accompanied by partial documentation of

the chain of custody prior to delivery to the FFM. Although this

documentation provided some degree of confidence, the entire chain of

custody could not be verified, thus the possibility of cross-contamination

could not be ruled out. Therefore, although such samples would be considered

as primary evidence under optimal circumstances, given the constraints as

described, the FFM regarded the samples as tertiary evidence. As such, the

results from such analyses were treated more as supporting information than

as having significant evidential value. Therefore, it was decided that the

splitting of samples for analysis at a second laboratory did not warrant the

efforts, including cost, and impact on the designated laboratory as well as on

OPCW staff.

TABLE 26: LIST OF SAMPLES

Date

OPCW evidence

reference

number

OPCW

sample

code

Sample description Location

22/05/2015 20150522102801 01SLS

Soil sample collected

from the impact point

of a barrel bomb

Kafr Zita

22/05/2015 20150522102802 02SLS

Soil sample collected

from the impact point

of a barrel bomb,

the

soil was coloured

purple after the

attack,

48 hours later

the colour had

returned to normal

Kafr Zita

22/05/2015 20150522102803 03AQS

Purple aqueous

solution

Kafr Zita

22/05/2015 20150522102804 04SDS

Empty HCFC

container

Kafr Zita

22/05/2015 20150522102805 05SDS

Empty HCFC

container

Sarmin

22/05/2015 20150522102806 06SDS

Black/brown plastic

container + dark red

powder

Kafr Zita

22/05/2015 20150522102807 07SDS

Black/brown plastic

container

Sarmin

Terminology is as provided by interviewees.

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Date

OPCW evidence

reference

number

OPCW

sample

code

Sample description Location

22/05/2015 20150522102808 08SDS

Ruptured HCFC

container

Sarmin

22/05/2015 20150522102809 09SDS Clothes from a victim Sarmin

22/05/2015 20150522102810 N/A

Blood and hair

sample

Al-Nerab

22/05/2015 20150522102811 11SDS

Ruptured HCFC

container

Sarmin

22/05/2015 20150522102812 12SDS

Ruptured HCFC

container

Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100801 13SDS

One key and one

teaspoon

Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100802 14SDS

Level float for water

tank

Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100803 15SDS Electrical light bulb Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100804 16SDS

Two pieces of

construction material

Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100805 17SDS

Part of an exploded

HCFC gas cylinder

Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100806 18SDS

Part of an exploded

HCFC gas cylinder

Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100807 19SDS Piece of wood Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100808 20SLS

Soil sample (sand and

stones)

Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100809 21SDS

Pieces of wood (and

plastic container)

Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100810 22SDS Plastic containers Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100811 23SDS Jacket of a victim Sarmin

23/07/2015 20150723100812 24SLS

Two soil samples

(sand and stones)

Taken from two

locations in Sarmin as

background samples

(blank samples)

Sarmin

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3.156 After receiving the samples and the documentation, it became apparent that

five samples had been collected in Kafr Zita which is a city within the Hama

Governorate in the Syrian Arab Republic. As the current mandate is restricted

to the Idlib Governorate in the Syrian Arab Republic, in this report the team

will not include the analysis results of the following samples; 01SLS, 02SLS,

03AQS, 04SDS, and 06SDS. The FFM team will retain the analysis results

within the Secretariat, pending potential investigation of incidents outside this

mandate.

3.157 Considering the uncertainty around the potential chemical allegedly used and

how it might behave under unknown energetic conditions, and an

indeterminate period of time in uncontrolled environment, the FFM team

requested from the OPCW designated laboratory a large screening of organic

and inorganic chemical compounds and / or elements, not limited to scheduled

chemicals.

3.158 In this report, the results of 19 samples were considered:

(a) eleven samples (13SDS, 14SDS, 15SDS, 16SDS, 17SDS, 18SDS,

19SDS, 20SLS, 21SDS, 22SDS, and 23SDS) related to samples

collected from the house of the six dead victims of the alleged incident

of 16 March 2015 in Sarmin;

(b) six samples (05SDS, 07SDS, 08SDS, 09SDS, 11SDS and 12SDS)

related to different undefined alleged incidents in Sarmin other than

above-mentioned incident;

alleged incident of Al-Nerab on 2 May 2015; and

(d) one background soil sample from Sarmin (consisting of two

subsamples from slightly different locations).

3.159 The 19 samples mentioned above may be categorised as follows:

(a) remnants of the alleged item or munition:

(i) metallic remnant: 05SDS, 08SDS, 11SDS, 12SDS, 17SDS and

18SDS; and

(ii) plastic remnant: 07SDS and 22SDS;

(b) environmental samples:

(i) soil, stones and construction materials: 13SDS, 14SDS, 15SDS,

16SDS, 19SDS, 20SDS, 21SDS and 24SLS; and

(ii) textiles and leather products: 07SDS and 23SDS; and

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20150522102810.

Chemical analysis results of the remnants of the alleged munition

Metallic material:

3.160 All the metallic parts of the remnants of the alleged munition received by the

FFM team consisted of a part or whole metallic cylinder. The cylinder bore the

markings for the refrigerant R22, a hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) and

liquefied gas, and was comparable to those commercially available.

3.161 A screening of the residual organic compound was performed by the OPCW

designated laboratory. The analysis was conducted on the external and the

inner side of the exploded or ruptured R22 cylinder for the following samples:

05SDS, 08SDS, 12SDS, 17SDS, and 18SDS. No organic compounds were

reported for the sample 17SDS. However, different concentrations of

trinitrotoluene (TNT) on the rest of samples clearly indicate the contamination

and /or the exposure of those samples to high-explosive materials.

3.162 In addition to the explosives footprint on those samples, different

concentrations of polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) were found in the

samples. Moreover, polychlorinated hydrocarbons (PCAHs,

hexachlorobenzene, octachloronaphthalene, and others) were detected in some

of those samples. It is possible that these chemicals were formed during the

combustion of organic material in presence of chlorine-containing chemicals.

3.163 The screening for inorganic compounds (including elements) reveals that

potassium and/or manganese were identified in all samples at different

concentrations and that the concentration of chloride was significantly higher

than normal in samples 05SDS, 08SDS, 17SDS, and 18SDS.

3.164 The concentration of chloride in the debris from the inside surface of the R22

container 18SDS (aliquot 18SDS-E2SI) was five times higher compared to the

outside surface (aliquot 18SDS-E2SO).

Plastic material:

3.165 The plastic material was identified as polyethylene terephthalate. The organic

compounds identified were the same as on the metallic remnants of the

munition.

3.166 Potassium and manganese were detected in both samples analysed in high

concentration; 1:1 stoichiometric ratios of potassium and manganese were

observed.

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Chemical analysis results of the environmental samples

The screening for organic compounds shows the following:

3.167 Differing concentrations of TNT were found in the environmental samples.

Also, different concentrations of polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) were

detected. In addition, PCAHs (hexachlorobenzene, octachloronaphthalene, and

others) were detected in some samples. It is possible these chemicals were

formed during the combustion of organic chemicals in the presence of

chlorine-containing chemicals. Also, different plasticisers and oxidation

products of the antioxidant butylated hydroxytoluene (BHT) were identified.

3.168 Bornyl chloride was identified in wood sample 21SDS. According to the

literature,

bornyl chloride is a reaction product of hydrogen chloride with the

terpene-based wood ingredient -pinene. In order to show that bornyl chloride

is not naturally occurring, wood chips from a fir tree were extracted with

n-hexane. After analysis with GC-MS and GC-AED, -pinene but no bornyl

chloride was detected. In a further experiment, some fir tree chips were

exposed to (a) hydrogen chloride gas (HCl) and (b) chlorine gas (Cl

). After

extraction with n-hexane and analysis, significant amounts of bornyl chloride

were present in both extracts from experiments (a) and (b).

3.169 Consequently, the detected bornyl chloride in wood sample 21SDS is most

likely not of natural origin.

The screening for inorganics

3.170 Different concentrations of potassium and/or manganese (potassium

permanganate (KMnO

, manganese oxide (MnO

)) were identified in all

samples. High concentrations of manganese were found in the dark coloured

debris on the electrical light bulb 15SDS, on the construction material piece

16SDS, and on the wood piece 19SDS. Using XRF analysis, almost

stoichiometric 1:1 ratios of potassium and manganese were found in the soil

sample 20SLS and the plastic containers 21SDS and 22SDS. This is

consistent with derivation from potassium permanganate (KMnO

3.171 High concentrations of chloride were identified in all samples. The

concentration of chloride in the extract of the soil sample 20SLS (aliquot

20SLS-E2) was between 70 and 700 times higher than the two soil samples

24SLS (aliquots 24SLS-E2A / 24SLS-E2B). Considering that sample 24SLS

is a background soil sample and it was taken more than three months after the

incident in Sarmin, there is strong evidence that sample 20SLS was exposed to

or contaminated by chloride.

Information supplied by the designated laboratory.

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Biomedical samples

3.172 The biomedical samples received by the FFM team were approximately 1 to

1.5 ml of blood taken from the dead child in the Al-Nerab incident and a hair

sample taken from the same victim after decontamination. The quantity of

samples was not enough to perform a screening analysis; therefore, the

laboratory was tasked with screening the environmental samples first and

preserving the biomedical sample for specific tracer(s) in light of the results

for the environmental samples.

3.173 The environmental sample analysis result did not offer any lead with respect to

an organic and/or inorganic tracer or their metabolites that could be specific

and not occurring naturally in the human body. Therefore, no analysis was

conducted on these two samples.

Review of information on the munitions

3.174 Multiple open sources, videos, and media reports indicate that in the conflict,

conventional weapons have been supplemented with improvised weapons

derived from low cost containers filled with explosive, fuel, irregular shaped

steel fragments that have been referred to as “barrel bombs”. More recently,

reports have referred to barrel bombs containing chemicals.

3.175 The interest of the investigation team was focused on those improvised

ordnance that produced casualties by intoxication with an unknown chemical

that were allegedly used in Idlib region in the Syrian Arab Republic between

March and May 2015.

3.176 The testimonies of interviewees were correlated with the various types of

evidence provided to the team by the interviewees, with social media videos

and pictures, with the samples handed over to the team, and with the

information collected from various other open sources. Based on these inputs,

the following components have been determined:

(a) an outer shell (barrel) designed to hold inside a various number of

components including chemical cylinders;

(b) a number of cylinders potentially of various shapes and sizes filled

with chemical compounds (which are most probably gases or liquids);

(d) detonation cord or an explosive mixture designed to rupture the gas

cylinders and the plastic bottles;

(e) an ordinary time fuse consisting of a blasting cap and a time-calculated

fuse wick (fuse cord); and

(f) multiple and various connectors that hold the components together.

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3.177 By piecing together these inputs, the modus operandi is that the barrel bomb

releases the toxic chemical compound(s) by using the detonation cord or an

explosive mixture to rupture the gas cylinders filled with toxic chemical, the

plastic bottles, and the outer shell. Improvised chemical barrel-bomb designs

that are observed through social media demonstrate that there is an evolution

of their manufacture, likely driven by trial and error. Open sources indicate

three generic constructions of the chemical barrel bomb. However, based on

all the inputs related to the mandate, only one type appears to have been used

in the Idlib region between March and May 2015.

3.178 Figure 32 below depicts this generic construction.

3.179 Figure 33 shows some of the evidence received by the team which helped

build the picture of the munition indicated in Figure 32.

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FIGURE 32: DEPICTION OF AN IMPROVISED CHEMICAL

MUNITION, ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN USED

IN THE IDLIB GOVERNORATE BETWEEN

MARCH AND MAY 2015

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FIGURE 33: EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION RECEIVED BY THE FFM TO ENABLE DEPICTION OF THE DEVICE

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3.180 The remnants of the chemical improvised explosive devices show the

characteristics and design of air bombs. Almost all of the remaining outer

shells have three big metallic stabilising fins welded on the back. In more

conventional weaponry, the role of the fins is to stabilise the entire ensemble

during its flight/dive from the launching moment until it reaches the target by

keeping the bomb nose-down during its descent. The process of stabilisation is

necessary for improving the accuracy of the targeting process and to decrease

the rate of fail. Without stabilising fins, bombs would tumble through the air

and thus increase the probability of the fuse not hitting the ground and thus

decrease the likelihood of detonation. Typically, conventional bombs are

designed with at least four stabilising fins. The improvised ones, however,

appeared to have only three.

3.181 Figure 34 below is from an open source and depicts the different appearances

of improvised bombs versus more conventional types, particularly with respect

to the number of fins. These are merely used to indicate these differences, with

no implication of their being at all chemical in nature.

FIGURE 34: CONVENTIONAL (LEFT) AND IMPROVISED AIR BOMBS

(RIGHT) FINS DESIGN

3.182 It is hypothesised that the rationale behind three stabilising fins and no more

could derive from practicality of deployment, as follows. For easier transport,

the improvised chemical air bombs were designed with a transport train

comprising two wheels in the front and one on the back of the bomb. These

wheels would facilitate the conveyance of an improvised device in

transportation that may not be designed for such purposes. The three stabilising

fins provide a relatively low-cost technical solution that facilitates both the use

of the wheels and provides stabilisation. Furthermore, some of the social media

sources show improvised bombs loaded into a helicopter. The internal design

of helicopter and the launching procedures shown on social media create

practical difficulties in handling a bomb designed with four fins. See Figure 35

below.

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FIGURE 35: PICTURE FROM SOCIAL MEDIA SHOWING TWO

IMPROVISED BOMBS FITTED INTO A HELICOPTER

3.183 Further evidence of the improvised bombs being dropped from a height is the

deformation of the outer shell. In almost all cases that the team studied, the

impact damage can be seen in the front part of the bomb or on the side. The

deformation indicates that the device was launched from a height and the

impact was frontal (when stabilised by fins) or on the side (without

stabilisation). Both cases suggest that the object followed a free-fall trajectory.

3.184 In no cases did remnants suggest the presence of the following:

(a) an engine, as in the case of a land-launched projectile; or

(b) an energetic component that would usually be used to transport the

projectile from the launching system to the target.

3.185 Furthermore, it is estimated that the size of the improvised chemical bomb

would be too great to be launched from a terrestrial artillery type of weapon.

3.186 A comparison of aerial and terrestrial projectiles and rockets can be seen in

Figure 36 below.

FIGURE 36: PICTURES FROM MEDIA SHOWING THE DEFORMATION

AND REMNANTS OF AIR BOMBS AND ROCKETS

Media: Air Bomb Deformation Image by Interviewee

1011: Qmenas 16 March

2015

Media: Barrel Bomb

Projectile in Launching

Position

Media: Barrel Bomb

Projectile

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3.187 The impact point (the crater) and the fact that the outer shell and internal

components can be clearly visible (large pieces of remnants) confirm that

impacts of the improvised air bombs in the alleged incidents did not involve a

large amount of high explosive. If so filled, the bomb would have fragmented

all the bomb components into very small pieces. That is not the case in the

incidents assessed, where the most of the bomb components were found in

large pieces. Similarly, the crater produced by a high-explosive bomb would

have been bigger in diameter and deeper. For comparison, see Figure 37

below.

FIGURE 37: PICTURES FROM OPEN-SOURCE MEDIA (LEFT) AND

PROVIDED BY AN INTERVIEWEE (RIGHT) SHOWING

THE CRATER FORMED FOLLOWING THE DETONATION

OF A HIGH EXPLOSIVE IMPROVISED BOMB AND AN

IMPROVISED CHEMICAL BOMB

Media: Barrel Bomb High Explosive Crater Image by Interviewee 1011: Qmenas, 16 March 2015

3.188 In principle, a bomb designed to be used as chemical bomb is designed such

that the explosive train should only crack the walls of containers containing

toxic chemicals. A greater quantity of explosive would destroy the toxic

chemical by burning it. In addition, the use of a greater quantity of explosive to

spread the toxic chemicals would decrease the concentration on the targeted

area and potentially render the effects harmless.

3.189 In addition to the indications of these being chemical devices, there is also

evidence indicating that they are a binary type, where two chemicals react to

produce what would be a more effective chemical weapon. Within the outer

container (“barrel”), there are two different smaller types of container, one

being designed to hold a liquefied gas (R22), the other being a plastic bottle,

typical of the type that would hold drinks. The presence of a detonation cord

wrapped around these two smaller containers would rupture the containers,

allowing the mixing and subsequent reaction of the different chemical

components.

3.190 In almost all of the cases there is a visible metallic brim and two large bolts on

the rear side of the outer shell, suggesting an improvised device designed to

hold in place the inner containers during both transport and deployment. In

case of a binary chemical bomb, without this system, on impact, the inner

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containers loaded inside the barrel bomb would be thrown outside due to

inertial forces before the chemicals could be released, enabling them to mix and

react. In the case of an improvised bomb filled with containers containing one

single toxic chemical, on impact the barrels will be pushed outside and spread

around the target, without the need to contain them in order to facilitate a

reaction.

4. WITNESSES IDENTIFIED BY THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

4.1 During meetings held from 21 to 23 March 2015, representatives from the

Secretariat requested that the Syrian Government share any information

possible within its purview related to the recent alleged incidents in the Idlib

Governorate. In letters dated 7 April and 13 May 2015, the Director-General

reiterated these requests. During meetings that took place from 12 to

15 July 2015, the Syrian authorities stated that some persons who had been

displaced from northern regions of the Syrian Arab Republic were willing and

available to be interviewed, and that the Syrian Government could facilitate the

interviews. On 31 July 2015, the FFM-Bravo mandate was amended

accordingly, and the said interviews were conducted from 4 to 7 August 2015.

Twenty interviews were conducted with 18 interviewees.

4.2 The overall details of the interviewees are provided below.

FIGURE 38: AGE OF INTERVIEWEES (FFM-BRAVO, AUGUST 2015)

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FIGURE 39: GENDER OF INTERVIEWEES (FFM-BRAVO,

AUGUST 2015

FIGURE 40: RESIDENCE AREA OF INTERVIEWEES (FFM-BRAVO,

AUGUST 2015)

4.3 The overall summary of the relevant information is as follows.

4.4 Seventy-eight percent (14 of 18) of the interviewees reported having no

awareness of any incident related to the suspected use of toxic chemicals as a

weapon having occurred in their area of residence.

4.5 Twenty-two percent (4 interviewees) informed the FFM about suspected cases

of chemical incidents. All reported cases of difficulty of breathing, coughing,

and ophthalmic signs. However, one was geographically and chronologically

outside the scope of the FFM mandate (Hama Governorate in 2014), two were

chronologically outside the scope of the mandate (referring to incidents in

2014), and one, based on the interviewee’s testimony, was deemed unlikely to

be the result of the use of toxic chemicals as a weapon.

4.6 As mentioned, one of the interviewees was from the Hama Governorate and

was not in the Idlib Governorate during the period in question. Therefore, the

testimony of this interviewee was deemed to be irrelevant to this particular

investigation. The statement of this interviewee indicated their having

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witnessed an incident in Kafr Zita (Hama Governorate) in March or April 2014

or at the end of summer 2014, as described below.

4.7 Six more interviewees were from Al-Tamanah, Idlib Governorate. This

location is approximately 55 km south of the area described where the alleged

incidents were reported to have taken place by witnesses heard during the

interviews conducted by FFM-Alpha in May and June 2015. Therefore, their

testimony had little impact on the investigation of those particular incidents, as

none of the six interviewed by FFM-Bravo in August 2015 were in that locale

at the time. There were, however, alleged incidents in their area (Al-Tamanah)

in April and May 2014, and in April and June 2015, which were reported in

open sources. The alleged incidents in 2014 are outside the current mandate.

Nonetheless, the six interviewees who volunteered information on the subject

reported no knowledge of any chemical incidents. One reported having

received warnings to evacuate due to impending chemical attack around April

or May of 2014, but after returning home the next day, observed no evidence of

a chemical attack.

4.8 The alleged incidents of April and June 2015 in Al-Tamanah, however, are

within the mandate. None of these interviewees reported any information

related to these alleged incidents, and none of those interviewed by FFM-Alpha

were within 50 km of Al-Tamanah at that time. The team therefore has

insufficient information to make an assessment of these alleged incidents.

4.9 Two of the interviewees were from the village of Jesr Al-Chughur. This

location is approximately 40 km southwest of Idlib City, within the Idlib

Governorate. They reported no knowledge of any of the alleged incidents

described in the interviews conducted by FFM-Alpha in May and June 2015.

Similarly, they did not offer any information with regard to potential incidents

in Jesr Al-Chughur, alleged in open sources to have occurred in May 2015.

Furthermore, none of those interviewed by FFM-Alpha were within 40 km of

Jesr Al-Chughur at that time. The team therefore has insufficient information

to make an assessment of the alleged incidents in Jesr Al-Chughur.

4.10 The 11 remaining interviewees came from areas that were between

approximately 4.5 and 7 km from the areas of the nearest impacts reported

during the interviews conducted by FFM-Alpha in May and June 2015. As

such, their testimony was deemed potentially relevant to those incidents under

the FFM-Alpha mandate and was further analysed. Out of these 11

interviewees:

(a) Eight (73%) reported no knowledge of any incident involving

chemicals. However, one of these eight reported having received

warnings to evacuate due to impending chemical attack around April of

2015, but after returning home three days later, observed no evidence of

a chemical attack.

(b) One (9%) reported a suspected incident in Idlib City at approximately

12:00 on 28 March 2015, as described below. The incident was

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determined by the team to be not likely involving the use of toxic

chemicals as a weapon.

as a weapon in Idlib in 2014, as described below. According to their

testimony, these same two vacated Idlib City after 16 March 2015 and

prior to the reported dates of the alleged incidents in Idlib City, so were

not in the area at the time. The departure of these two interviewees

reduces to nine the number of potential witnesses in the area of the

reported incidents during the time period of concern.

4.11 The narratives given for each incident in the following paragraphs is derived

from interviews.

Kafr Zita, spring or summer 2014

4.12 Armed men fired a mortar canon as a helicopter passed overhead. Shortly

afterward, the interviewee and her family saw yellow and white smoke,

experienced difficulty breathing, and smelled a bad odour that they had not

experienced before. At hospital, they saw one casualty, a three-year-old girl

exhibiting laboured breathing, secretions, and cyanosis. The interviewee

described witnessing approximately one month later men in civilian clothes and

full-face respirators releasing gas from cylinders shortly after hearing an

announcement from a mosque minaret that a chemical attack was impending.

Further, the interviewee describes being taken to a base and witnessing men

filling cylinders with white powder. All of these incidents are outside the scope

of the mandate, however.

Idlib City, 28 March 2015

4.13 The interviewee reported an attack involving a nearby explosion in their

neighbourhood (Al-Thawra neighbourhood of Idlib City), estimated to be

approximately 30 m from their home. The explosion reportedly resulted in

structural damage and broken windows in all the buildings throughout the

neighbourhood, and generated a large volume of red dust and an unpleasant

odour. Immediately following exposure to the dust, the witness and their

family members experienced choking, coughing, eye irritation, and dizziness.

The witness was unable to associate the odour with any familiar odour. Further

questioning indicated the colour of the dust to be closer to light orange and

possibly similar to the local soil. Later during the interview, the witness

indicated that they witnessed no incidents related to chemical attacks, but had

observed reportedly strange behaviour from some neighbours on the day of the

described incident, in the form of gathering for discussions. Further

information that was given of a pre-existing prevalence of medical conditions

within the family, including asthma among others, could indicate that the

described symptoms were the result of a combination of the pre-existing

medical conditions being affected by a high volume of dust and psychological

trauma.

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Idlib City, August 2014

4.14 Two interviewees reported that a projectile exploded in the Al-Amaliyeh

neighbourhood of Idlib City, approximately 10 m outside the bedroom of the

eldest daughter, who was most affected. Both interviewees described a

powerful explosion that shook the house, followed by a bad odour which they

could not associate with a familiar odour. They described symptoms of the

eldest daughter including coughing, a feeling of suffocating, tearing and

irritation of eyes, runny nose, drooling, and unconsciousness. She was treated

by her parents (both medical/emergency response professionals) with

resuscitation and a bronchodilator. Two other family members experienced

moderate coughing and throat irritation. Three other family members present

did not experience symptoms. Another daughter was wounded by shrapnel.

The residence incurred significant physical damage.

4.15 The testimony indicates the possibility of a chemical incident. However, the

incident described occurred between 8 and 20 August 2014, which is outside

the scope of the mandate.

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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Much of the methodology section describes the manner in which the

investigation would have been carried out, had there been ideal circumstances

in which to do so. The inability of the team to visit the scene due to significant

security issues, however, created several deviations from the ideal. Thus, the

team could neither identify their own witnesses nor take their own samples.

Furthermore, the supportive value of correlating physical reality, such as visible

infrastructure, original records, and impact sites with information supplied by

interviewees was also not possible. The team therefore had to rely on

open-source information, interviewees identified and supplied by other entities,

samples (lacking full certainty of chain of custody) as made available by the

interviewees, and limited medical records.

5.2 It was in this context that the team had to glean the most benefit from available

sources and make an assessment of credibility.

5.3 Open-source media are by their very nature prone to the influences and

motivations of their authors, owners, and sponsors. While it is recognised that

some media sources may be more reliable than others, it can also not be

discounted that their source of information may have their own motivation.

Furthermore, it was not possible to ascertain how many separate independent

sources there may have been for the numerous similar stories in the media.

What was clear, however, was that from social media such as Twitter,

Facebook, and YouTube through to major international news media, there were

strong indications of events occurring in the Idlib Governorate that involved the

use of chemicals as a weapon.

5.4 In the preparatory phase, through contact with various NGOs, the FFM was

able to discuss events with individuals who not only had second-hand

knowledge of events, but also some who claimed first-hand experience. While

there was not the opportunity to interview these at the time, this lent sufficient

credibility to media reports to warrant additional investigation by the FFM.

5.5 The team explored a variety of means by which additional information and

evidence could be obtained. Due to the complexity of the situation in the Idlib

Governorate it was not possible to engender an environment that would be

permissive enough to allow even a small team to visit any of the locations.

Further liaison with NGOs revealed that only one had the capability to facilitate

the transportation of interviewees and samples to a mutually convenient

location.

5.6 The interview process used free recall. Amongst the advantages of this process

is that information has to come from the interviewees themselves. This is

followed by questioning and focusing on layers of specific details, including

context. It then becomes significantly more difficult for individuals to give a

coached story, without evidence of coaching being very apparent. From a

collective point of view, versions of the same events from different

interviewees can be cross-checked against each other for broad consistency. It

is worth recognising that recall of an event from different interviewees will

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naturally contain variations and discrepancies, particularly given the time lag,

unless the interviewees are coached to give an identical version of events. The

FFM team has then to make that assessment as to whether these discrepancies

amount to individually fabricated versions of events or are typical of the

failings of human recall. Both interview teams included personnel with

significant previous interview experience. Furthermore, the interview teams

with a cross-functional skill set enabled a deeper assessment of information.

Details could therefore be assessed by team members with expertise in

particular areas and discussed together. Regular breaks in the interview process

facilitated these discussions and enabled a targeted approach in the continuation

of the interview.

5.7 The fact that testimony included that given by medical staff, who were located

remotely from the incidents, placed a good degree of credibility on the medical

signs and symptoms reported both by casualties and first responders. Such

testimony could not determine which chemical may have been responsible.

However, the signs and symptoms are consistent with the effects caused by

chemicals, in addition to other potential causes, which primarily irritate tissue

such as eyes, nose, throat, and lungs.

5.8 It can therefore be concluded that the evidence received throughout the

interview process gave the team a reasonable degree of confidence that a

chemical had affected people in various locations in the Idlib Governorate.

5.9 Interviewees confirmed the availability of samples and the CVDCS confirmed

their receipt from the interviewees. The remnants of the alleged munitions are

consistent with those shown in open-source media, depicted in electronic media

received independently from NGOs, as well as the interviewees themselves.

5.10 The results from chemical analysis indicate the presence of:

(a) chemicals, expected to be present due to the constituents of the

containers, for example iron (from the refrigerant container) and PET

(polyethylene terephthalate, from the plastic containers);

(b) chemicals related to the presence of explosives; and

explained by their addition to the explosive device/explosive remnants.

5.11 The elements / chemical ions identified in category (c) above are manganese,

potassium, chloride, and bromide.

5.12 The ratio of potassium to manganese, coupled to the purple-red colour referred

to in open-source media and interviews, as well as visible in photographs and

videos, is consistent with the presence of potassium permanganate, which is an

oxidising agent.

5.13 In the raw material for the production of chlorine, bromide is an expected

contaminant which is not always removed in the production process. This

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bromine/bromide is often present in downstream products and therefore could

be expected to be present, at significantly lower concentrations, whenever

chlorine/chloride is detected. It is therefore reasonable to assume that if

chloride is detected as being present, the presence of bromide may be linked to

the chloride rather than other sources.

5.14 The volatility and reactivity of molecular chlorine (Cl

) are such that unless the

appropriate sampling and analytical equipment were used at the time of an

incident, detection of Cl

is not possible some time later. The analyses of some

of the samples indicated the presence of chloride at levels considerably higher

than should be normally expected in such samples, unless added through the

incorporation of a chlorine-containing chemical to the original material, or by

contamination after the incident.

5.15 The container for R22 is designed such that its pressure rating and materials of

construction are fit for purpose. The vapour pressure of R22 is similar enough

to that of certain other industrial chemicals, inter alia chlorine, anhydrous

hydrogen chloride, and anhydrous ammonia, such that the refilling of R22

containers with other chemicals for use in an improvised bomb would be

feasible, recognising that such use would not need to meet the same stringent

requirements for commercial use of these containers.

5.16 Taken purely at face value, the samples and their analysis indicate the presence

of potassium permanganate and a chlorine/chloride-containing chemical.

Unfortunately, the chain of custody for the samples reduced the value of

samples as strong stand-alone evidence. The results therefore need to be seen

in light of supporting other evidence, in particular supporting the testimony of

interviewees.

5.17 Given the oxidising nature of potassium permanganate, it is conceivable that it

might be used to oxidise a chlorine containing compound, resulting in the

production of Cl

, thus giving rise to the ‘bleach like’ smell described by

interviewees.

5.18 The description of the alleged chemical weapon and its deployment derives

from several inputs, as previously described. The features of the improvised

chemical bomb are consistent with its being designed for deployment from a

height. As most incidents happened during darkness, it is not surprising that no

interviewees claimed to have seen the means of deployment. The deformation

of the remnants is consistent with mechanical impact and explosive rupture,

rather than explosion causing deflagration. Witnesses also reported a lesser

explosive sound than for other more conventional types of bombs. Moreover,

casualties’ signs and symptoms do not include physical injuries that would be

expected from the deployment of an explosive device. The craters which have

been claimed to have been caused by the device are also consistent with its

being dropped from a height with lesser explosive power. It is therefore

reasonable to assume that the devices were not designed to cause mechanical

injury through explosive force but rather to rupture and release their contents.

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5.19 In itself, no one source of information or evidence would lend particularly

strong weighting as to whether there was an event that had used a toxic

chemical as a weapon. However, taken in their entirety, sufficient facts were

collected to conclude that incidents in the Syrian Arab Republic likely involved

the use of a toxic chemical as a weapon. There is insufficient evidence to come

to any firm conclusions as to the identification of the chemical, although there

are factors indicating that the chemical probably contained the element

chlorine.

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Appendix 1

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Appendix 1

MANDATE OF THE OPCW FACT-FINDING MISSION

The following is a declassified version of the FFM team’s mandate:

To: Phillips, Leonard Arthur, OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) Team

Leader

From: The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons

Subject: Mandate for investigation of incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals,

particularly chlorine, as a weapon in Idlib Governorate, the Syrian Arab

Republic from 16 March 2015 onwards as reported in the media and

determined by the Director-General to provide a credible basis for

investigation.

In accordance with preambular paragraph 8 and operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of

OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015 and

other relevant decisions of the Executive Council and in line with my authority to

seek to uphold at all times the object and purpose of the Convention as reinforced

by the United Nations Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013) and 2209 (2015), as

applicable to the investigation referred to in the subject, I hereby mandate and

instruct an inspection team under your leadership to conduct an investigation of

incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals, particularly chlorine, as a weapon, in

accordance with the modalities specified below:

1. FFM activities to be conducted in: Country X and any other relevant locations,

2. Site for the FFM: Country X and, any other relevant locations, if deemed

necessary by the Director-General.

3. Names of inspectors assigned to your team:

See Appendix 2 (names redacted)

4. The inspection equipment which the inspection team has been authorised to

carry will be selected from the list of approved equipment (Ref. C-1/DEC.71).

Any additional equipment which might be necessary will be notified in

advance to the State Party.

5. The deployment and all movements of the FFM team while in-country will be

fully coordinated with all relevant authorities. No deployment or movement

shall take place without all necessary authorizations. No such authorization

shall be provided unless all suitable conditions, in particular a safe and

enabling environment exist for the OPCW team, including no crossing of

confrontation lines. The FFM team shall ensure that their whereabouts will be

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known at all times by designated personnel from the Operations Planning

Branch.

6. FFM aims:

6.1 Gather facts regarding the incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals,

particularly chlorine, as a weapon, in Idlib Governorate, the Syrian Arab

Republic, from 16 March 2015 onwards as reported in the media and

determined by the Director-General to provide a credible basis for

investigation, mindful that the task of the FFM does not include the question

of attributing responsibility for the alleged use; and

6.2 Report to the Director-General upon conclusion of FFM activities.

7. Operational instructions:

7.1 Review and analyse all available information pertaining to reported incidents

of alleged use of toxic chemicals, particularly chlorine, as a weapon;

7.2 Collect testimonies from persons alleged to have been affected by the use of

toxic chemicals, particularly chlorine, as a weapon, including those who

underwent treatment, eye witnesses of the alleged use of toxic chemicals,

particularly chlorine, medical personnel and other persons who have been

treated or come into contact with persons who may have been affected by the

alleged use of toxic chemicals, particularly chlorine;

7.3 Where possible, and deemed necessary, carry out medical examinations,

including autopsies, and collect biomedical samples of those alleged to have

been affected;

7.4 If possible, visit the hospitals and other locations as deemed relevant to the

conduct its investigations;

7.5 Examine and, if possible, collect copies of, the hospital records including

patient registers, treatment records, and any other relevant records, as deemed

necessary;

7.6 Examine, and, if possible, collect copies of any other documentation and

records deemed necessary;

7.7 Take photographs and examine, and if possible collect copies of video and

telephone records;

7.8 If possible, and deemed necessary, physically examine and take samples from

remnants of cylinders, containers, etc., alleged to have been used during the

incidents under investigation;

7.9 If possible, and deemed necessary, collect environmental samples at or from

the alleged points of incidents and surrounding areas;

7.10 Cooperate fully with the relevant authorities with regard to all aspects of the

Mission; and

7.11 All activities of the FFM will be undertaken in accordance with the relevant

Secretariat procedures relating to the conduct of inspections during

contingency operations, as applicable.

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Appendix 2

FFM TEAM MEMBERS

Name Role(s) Speciality

Inspector 0 Team Leader

Chemical production

technologist (CPT)

Inspector 1

Deputy Team Leader. Interview team 1

support and continuity. Interview team 3

point of contact. Sample handling.

Analytical chemist (AC)

Inspector 2 Interview team 1 point of contact. CPT

Inspector 3 Interview team 1

Health and safety

specialist (HSS)

Inspector 4 Interview team 1. Security liaison.

Chemical weapons/

munitions specialist

(CWMS)

Inspector 5

Interview team 2 point of contract.

Logistics, security liaison, training

coordinator.

CWMS

Inspector 6 Interview team 2 CPT

Inspector 7 Interview team 2. Logistics HSS

Inspector 8

Interview team 2 support and continuity.

Interview team 3.

Medical doctor

Inspector 9

Logistics, communications, command post

support. Replacement on Interview team

CWMS

Inspector 10 Evidence handling, sample handling. AC

Inspector 11 Evidence handling, command post support CPT

Inspector 12 Security liaison, command post. CWMS

Inspector 13

Based at OPCW Headquarters (HQ),

general support function.

CPT

Interpreter 1 Interpretation Interpreter

Interpreter 2 Interpretation Interpreter

Mission Planner 1

HQ-based operational and planning

support

Mission planning

coordinator (MPC)

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Appendix 3

page 100

Appendix 3

TIMELINES

Dates (all 2015) Activity Location

23 March to 2 April

Team forming and building. Gathering

information about the chemical incidents from

open sources.

Headquarters

(HQ)

3 April First meeting with the CVDCS. The Hague

7 to 8 April

Training session on interview techniques

provided by the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland.

9 April

In house training session on how to deal with

traumatised interviewees provided by the

Health and Safety Branch (HSB).

10 to 13 April

First coordination meetings in Country X.

Points of contact established with relevant

authorities in Country X and several NGOs.

Country X

13 to 14 April

Training session on interview techniques

provided by the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland

16 April

In-house training session on how to deal with

traumatised interviewees provided by HSB.

17 April

Second meeting with the CVDCS. Request

made for the names of injured persons, doctors,

first responders, and witnesses willing to speak

to the OPCW.

Brussels

19 to 24 April

Safe and Secure Approaches in Field

Environments (SSAFE) training

Germany

20 April

Evidence management training provided by the

Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI).

29 and 30 April

Team received the list of names from the

CVDCS.

Selection of potential interviewees and

communication to the CVDCS.

1 to 4 May First interview Country X

4 May

The list of interviewees’ names handed over to

the authorities of Country X.

4 to 8 May

In-house practical training on interview

techniques

10 to 13 May

Second coordination meeting with the

authorities of Country X.

Country X

14 May

The deployment plan given to relevant

authorities and NGOs.

19 to 21 May

Main deployment. Set up of interview location

and team office.

Country X

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Dates (all 2015) Activity Location

22 May

Receipt of samples. Arrival of first batch of

interviewees.

Country X

23 May to 5 June Interviews Country X

5 to 6 June Equipment packing and return to HQ Country X

7 to 14 June

Rest and recuperation. Administrative tasks,

equipment return, evidence collation.

15 June to date

Team size reduction, interview transcription,

evidence review, report writing.

21 to 24 July Collection of second set of samples Country X

4 to 7 August Interviews carried out by Bravo

Syrian Arab

Republic

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Appendix 4

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Appendix 4

REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION

1. QDOC/INS/SOP/IAU01 Standard Operating Procedure for Evidence

Collection, Documentation, Chain-of-Custody and

Preservation During an Investigation of Alleged Use

of Chemical Weapons

2. QDOC/INS/WI/IAU05 Work Instruction for Conducting Interviews During

an Investigation of Alleged Use

QDOC/INS/SOP/IAU02

Standard Operating Procedure Investigation of

Alleged Use (IAU) Operations

4. QDOC/INS/WI/IAU01 Work Instruction for Command Post Operations

During an Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical

Weapons

5. QDOC/INS/SOP/GG011 Standard Operating Procedure for Managing

Inspection Laptops and Other Confidentiality

Support Materials

6. QDOC/LAB/SOP/OSA2 Standard Operating Procedure for Off-Site Analysis

of Authentic Samples

7. QDOC/LAB/WI/CS01 Work Instruction for Handling of Authentic Samples

from Inspection Sites and Packing Off-Site Samples

at the OPCW Laboratory

8. QDOC/LAB/WI/CS03 Work Instruction for Documentation, Chain of

Custody and Confidentiality for Handling Off-Site

Samples at the OPCW Laboratory

9. QDOC/LAB/WI/OSA3 Work Instruction for Chain of Custody and

Documentation for OPCW Samples On-Site

10. QDOC/LAB/WI/OSA4 Work Instruction for Packing of Off-Site Samples

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Appendix 5

OPEN-SOURCE REFERENCES AND INFORMATION

Date of

Incident

Location Source/link(s)

16/03/2015 Qmenas https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use_of_chemical_weapons_in_the_Syrian_civil_war

16/03/2015

Qmenas

and

Sarmin –

20:45

https://youtu.be/f6qBHWgPf7Q, https://youtu.be/ZgWP_QprOP4, https://youtu.be/XAORzTza7rg, https://youtu.be/nQg1B0k5Zkk,

https://youtu.be/JUSH7rHBQsc, https://youtu.be/yzGcHdR2AVs, https://youtu.be/j96W2l_oqgo, https://youtu.be/W8eZkU6jnTE,

https://youtu.be/FAhzdWWKbHA, https://youtu.be/Zj2fgROPFJA, https://youtu.be/2m17JnGFYdc, https://youtu.be/6bTrpHYMEDY,

https://youtu.be/ujb9ROoQaZY, https://youtu.be/ovPKtOjOx7g, https://youtu.be/Gx2h3_jXGzc, https://youtu.be/MmNBLUtP3hw,

https://youtu.be/Vc9cuH1icHo, https://youtu.be/SMVkFIlY5II, https://youtu.be/oZoAwJUyqTY, https://youtu.be/gPa_6CoYD_o,

https://youtu.be/ja_Osq_RTqU, https://youtu.be/JIlBRb2aFzo, https://youtu.be/4Kg4qSo40S0, https://youtu.be/m_zeRoX_L7s,

https://youtu.be/21K2g_LkSts, https://youtu.be/qnp00TocRSY, https://youtu.be/nvwonr_QqGo, https://youtu.be/N84aC1z0bjw,

https://youtu.be/k7TwicGkTdo, https://youtu.be/J6c6A1Qnbbw, https://twitter.com/ughxughx111/status/577548098806915072,

https://twitter.com/sweet_hart1165/status/577549747143196672,

https://twitter.com/aboyosha3homs/status/577550356374159360, https://twitter.com/anastracey/status/577552436975501312,

https://twitter.com/omar_3lwan/status/577552527912267776, https://twitter.com/hassanalhesen/status/577553118914863104,

https://twitter.com/SarmeenCoordina/status/577556117657661440,

https://twitter.com/anasanas84/status/577556934624210944, https://twitter.com/news76696251/status/577604460974907392

16/03/2015

Qmenas

and

Sarmin –

22:15