Libya
Dr. Simon Adams
and the
Responsibility
to Protect
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Occasional Paper Series
No. 3, October 2012
e Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect was established
in February 2008 as a catalyst to promote and apply the norm of the
“Responsibility to Protect” populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. rough its programs,
events and publications, the Global Centre for the Responsibility
to Protect is a resource and a forum for governments, international
institutions and non-governmental organizations on prevention and
early action to halt mass atrocities.
Cover Photo:
A family walks during a visit to Tripoli Street, the center of ghting between forces
loyal to Libyan leader Muammar Qadda and rebels in downtown Misrata, Libya.
Associated Press Images.
e views expressed in the Occasional Paper are those of the author andare not
necessarily held by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.
© Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2012.
All Rights Reserved
CONTENTS
3 Executive Summary
5 The Arab Spring and Libya
6 The UN Security Council Responds
7 Qaddafi’s Libya
8 “No Fly Zone,” the AU “Road Map” and NATO
10 Mass Atrocity Crimes
11 Humanitarian Intervention versus R2P
12 R2P and Regime Change
14 Backlash
17 Conclusion
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES |
LIBYA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Executive Summary
For those concerned with the international community’s Responsibility
to Protect (R2P), the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security
Council Resolution 1973, which authorized a military intervention in
Libya, has caused much controversy and dissension.
From the start of Muammar al-Qadda’s violent crackdown against
protesters in February 2011, R2P informed the Security Council’s response.
Adopted at the UN World Summit in 2005 and intended as an antidote to
the inaction that had plagued the UN during the genocides in Cambodia,
Rwanda and Srebrenica, R2P represents a solemn commitment by the
international community to never again be passive spectators to genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. While R2P
played some role in preventing an escalation of deadly ethnic conict in
Kenya during 2007, it had never been utilized to mobilize the Security
Council to take coercive action against a UN member state before.
It is for this reason that Resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011, which
framed the Security Council’s response in terms of R2P, was hailed as a
groundbreaking diplomatic moment. Similarly, Resolution 1973, which
followed on 17 March, was initially seen as a timely and proportional
intervention to ensure the protection of civilians at grave risk of mass
atrocities. It was a regrettable, but necessary measure of last resort.
However, over the course of the following months the debate regarding the
meaning of the resolutions and their implementation became increasingly
bitter. Some argued that the Libyan intervention had been hijacked by
partisans of “regime change.” e alternative view was that “all necessary
measures” were being used by the NATO-led alliance to prevent atrocities
and protect civilians – nothing more and certainly nothing less. Questions
of proportionality and motivation began to undermine the unanimity
that initially existed.
e fall of Qadda’s government in August 2011, the internecine conicts
between rebel militias and the challenges of rebuilding from the ruins of
civil war mean that Libya continues to be a talisman for debates over R2P.
Moreover, the Security Council’s inability to take comprehensive action
with regard to mass atrocities in nearby Syria has widened the divide
between supporters and critics of the implementation of R2P in Libya.
is occasional paper from the Global Centre for the Responsibility
to Protect analyzes the debates that have shaped interpretations of the
intervention in Libya and argues that R2P played a crucial role in stopping
mass atrocities and saving lives.
3
| GLOBAL CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
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A L G E R I A
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TUNISIA
NIGER
CHAD
The boundaries and names shown and the designations
used on this map do not imply official endorsement or
acceptance by the United Nations.
Map No. 3787 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS
February 2012
Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section
0 100 200 300 km
0
100 200 mi
LIBYA
6
7 8 9
National capital
Provincial capital
Town
Major airport
International boundary
Provincial boundary
Expressway
Main road
Secondary road
LIBYA
5
4
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1
1 AN NUQĀT AL KHAMS
2 AZ ZĀWIYAH (AZZĀWIYA)
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A L G E R I A
E G Y P T
TUNISIA
NIGER
CHAD
The boundaries and names shown and the designations
used on this map do not imply official endorsement or
acceptance by the United Nations.
Map No. 3787 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS
February 2012
Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section
0 100 200 300 km
0
100 200 mi
LIBYA
6
7 8 9
National capital
Provincial capital
Town
Major airport
International boundary
Provincial boundary
Expressway
Main road
Secondary road
LIBYA
5
4
3
2
1
1 AN NUQĀT AL KHAMS
2 AZ ZĀWIYAH (AZZĀWIYA)
3 AL JIFARAH
4 TARĀBULUS (TRIPOLI)
5 AL MARQAB
6 BENGHAZI
7 AL MARJ
8 AL JABAL AL AKHDAR
9 DARNAH
4
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES |
LIBYA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The Arab Spring and Libya
1
On 17 December 2010 a young fruit and vegetable seller
named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on re in a desperate
protest against bureaucratic indifference and police
corruption in Tunisia. His gruesome death provoked a month
of erce anti-government protests, and on 14 January 2011
President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali ed into exile. Inspired
by the Tunisian experience, mass demonstrations against
the politically bankrupt regime of President Hosni Mubarak
began soon aer in Egypt. e civil revolt, focused around
Cairo’s Tahrir Square, succeeded in toppling his thirty-year
dictatorship within three weeks. Sensing that a seismic shi in
regional politics was now underway, similar protests erupted
in Bahrain, Yemen and elsewhere. As popular movements
for change radiated across the Middle East and North Africa
in the opening weeks of 2011, the question was not whether
this “Arab Spring” would continue, but which repressive
government would fall next.
Muammar al-Qadda, who had ruled Libya since seizing
power in a military coup in 1969, eyed these developments
suspiciously.
2
On 15 February, just four days aer Mubarak’s
resignation, protests began in Libya. An estimated two
hundred people gathered in front of police headquarters in
Benghazi demanding the release of a well-known human
rights lawyer. A number of people were injured as the
demonstration was broken up by the Libyan security forces.
When general protests against the government spread to other
towns the following day, the security forces employed lethal
force. Fourteen people were killed and Libyan supporters
of the Arab Spring, especially those overseas with better
access to social media, called for a “Day of Rage.” Despite
government warnings that live ammunition would be used to
disperse mobs, large demonstrations took place in at least four
major cities, including Benghazi and Tripoli, on 17 February.
Human Rights Watch estimated that twenty-four protesters
were killed by the security forces.
3
e demonstrations then
rapidly increased in scale and ferocity until they evolved into
a country-wide popular uprising against Qadda.
Protesters in Benghazi, Baida, Ajdabiya, Misrata and Zawiya
took to the streets. Some attacked symbols of the regime,
set re to police stations and damaged other government
buildings. Eyewitness accounts reported “dozens” killed
by security forces in Benghazi aer 17 February, including
een people shot at the funeral of a protestor who had been
killed earlier. While it was impossible to verify all of the
terrifying and sensational reports from inside Libya, it was
credibly claimed by Human Rights Watch and others that
by 20 February at least 173 people had been killed during
four days of protests.
4
About this time the rst shaky videos purportedly showing
armed men going door-to-door in Benghazi attacking
suspected opponents of the Qadda regime were broadcast
on the international news networks. ere were also stories of
military aircra ying low over demonstrations in a menacing
display of potential lethal violence. It was reported that three
people had been killed in Tajura, on the outskirts of Tripoli,
when a ghter plane opened re. Meanwhile, armed Qadda
loyalists reportedly patrolled Tripoli in pick-up trucks,
arresting or shooting at anyone suspected of public dissent.
5
As the uprising spread, the Libyan police were forced out of
Benghazi and then from Misrata by 24 February. A number of
towns in the east of the country began to slip from Qadda’s
control. Some protesters started arming themselves and
defending their neighborhoods from the security forces.
e situation shied inexorably from demonstration to
insurrection as volunteer militias were formed across the
east of the country.
e regime committed more desperate acts of violence and
issued blood-curdling threats. On the night of 20 February
Qadda’s heir apparent, his son Saif al-Islam, appeared on
Libyan television threatening that “thousands” would die and
“rivers of blood” would ow if the rebellion did not stop. e
next day, two Libyan ghter jets landed in Malta and their
pilots alleged that they had been ordered to bomb Benghazi.
6
Soon aer, Qadda, speaking in Tripoli, called upon loyalists
to “get out of your houses” and “attack” all opponents of the
regime. Invoking language that was reminiscent of the 1994
genocide in Rwanda, he described protesters as drug-crazed
“rats,” “cockroaches” and “cowards and traitors.” He le no
doubt about his intentions as he promised to “cleanse Libya
house by house.”
7
Estimates of the number of civilians killed between 15 and
22 February vary. Residents of Tajura described numerous
bodies littering the streets.
8
e UN Human Rights Council’s
International Commission of Inquiry received medical
records regarding protesters shot dead in Tripoli, with doctors
5
| GLOBAL CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
testifying that more than 200 bodies were brought into their
morgues over 20-21 February.
9
e International Criminal
Court (ICC) later estimated that 500 to 700 civilians were
killed in February prior to the outbreak of civil war.
10
Although some of the emerging stories were exaggerated,
by 22 February it was clear that the Qadda regime, in its
desperation to hold on to power, was willing to use extreme
violence to crush the popular uprising. Despite censorship,
confusion, rumors and misinformation, the threat of mass
atrocities was imminent and real.
11
The UN Security Council Responds
From New York, the UN Secretariat viewed developments
inLibya with grave concern. On 20 February the UN
Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, had spoken with Muammar
Qadda on the phone, telling him that the violence against
civilians “must stop immediately.”
12
Qadda did not heed
thecounsel, but a number of senior Libyan diplomats,
including the leadership of the Permanent Mission of Libya
to the UN, defected. One diplomat observed that, “the more
Qadda kills people, the more people go into the streets.”
Libya’s ambassadors to Indonesia, India and several other
countries resigned.
13
On 22 February the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Navi Pillay, called for an immediate cessation
of the “grave human rights violations committed by the
Libyan authorities.” Pillay described the violence as possibly
constituting “crimes against humanity.”
14
ese sentiments
were echoed in a joint statement by the UN Secretary-
General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide
and the Responsibility to Protect. e Special Advisers also
reminded Libya of its pledge at the 2005 UN World Summit
to protect populations “by preventing genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as
their incitement.”
15
On the same day, the League of Arab States (Arab League)
banned Libya from attending its meetings. Ekmeleddin
Īhsanoğlu, Secretary-General of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, condemned the Libyan government’s
use of excessive force against civilians. e UN Security
Council similarly “condemned the violence and use of force
against civilians, deplored the repression against peaceful
demonstrators, and expressed deep regret at the deaths of
hundreds of civilians.”
16
e African Union (AU) followed
with Jean Ping, Chair of the AU Commission, calling for an
immediate end to “repression and violence” in Libya.
17
On 25 February Ban Ki-moon voiced his growing concerns to
the UN Security Council. Meanwhile, in Geneva, Navi Pillay
reminded members of the Human Rights Council about their
individual responsibility to protect their populations and
their collective responsibility to act in a timely and decisive
manner when a state is manifestly failing to protect its
population.
18
Soon aer, coordinated action by the Human
Rights Council and the General Assembly paved the way for
Libya’s suspension from the council.
19
e Responsibility to Protect focused the international
response. Resolution 1970, unanimously adopted by the
Security Council on 26 February, explicitly invoked the
“Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population.”
e resolution included a comprehensive package of coercive
measures – an arms embargo, asset freezes, travel bans and
referral of the situation to the ICC – aimed at persuading the
Qadda regime to stop killing its people.
During the weeks between Resolution 1970 and the adoption
of Resolution 1973 on 17 March, escalating violence prompted
regional and international organizations to again urge the
Qadda regime to stop the killing and resolve the crisis
through “peaceful means and serious dialogue.” On 10 March
the AU’s Peace and Security Council established an ad-hoc
High Level Committee on Libya, and on 12 March the Arab
League called for a “no-y zone” over Libya.
20
By 16 March pro-Qaddafi forces were approaching the
opposition stronghold of Benghazi and Saif al-Islam
al-Qadda was quoted on Western television as saying
the rebellion would “be over in forty-eight hours.” Libyan
television broadcast a message that the army was coming
to Benghazi “to cleanse your city from armed gangs.” Most
importantly, Qadda himself threatened the opposition in
Benghazi on national radio and television, saying that the
army was on its way “tonight” and that “we will show no
mercy and no pity.”
21
e unrelenting violence and political intransigence of
the Qadda regime, combined with the limited impact of
Resolution 1970 on its behavior, ruled out further mediation
and accommodation.
22
With Qadda’s forces on the outskirts
of Benghazi, the risk of civilian massacres seemed highly
probable if the city was allowed to fall. Urged on by the
6
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES |
LIBYA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Arab League, ten UN Security Council members supported
Resolution 1973 (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, France,
Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, United
Kingdom and United States) and ve abstained (Brazil, China,
Germany, India and Russia). Although the AU did not call for
a no-y zone, all three African members of the UN Security
Council voted for Resolution 1973. Such a vote was entirely
in keeping with Article 4(h) of the AU’s Constitutive Act,
which advocates a policy of “non-indierence,” rather than
non-interference, in the sovereign aairs of other states when
“grave circumstances,” including crimes against humanity,
are concerned.
In addition to reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan
authorities to protect its population, and deploring their
failure to comply with Resolution 1970, Resolution 1973
called for an immediate “cease-re and a complete end to
violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians.” It
stressed the need “to intensify eorts to nd a solution to
the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the
Libyan people.” e text referred to “all necessary measures,”
including coercive military action but short of a “foreign
occupation force.” Two scenarios were specically identied:
the protection of “civilians and civilian populated areas under
threat of attack,” and the imposition of a “ban on all ights
in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to
help protect civilians.”
23
ose Security Council members who voted for Resolution
1973 understood that they were voting for air strikes to protect
civilians. For at least one of those who voted for Resolution
1973, Ambassador Ivan Barbalić of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
inability of the UN to stop past atrocities weighed heavily.
He later commented that Benghazi could have potentially
developed into “a situation not unlike Srebrenica” if it were
allowed to be retaken by Qadda’s forces.
24
Moreover, the
decision to embark upon military intervention was only
takenaer other attempts at dissuasion had failed. e
nature and structure of the Qadda regime closed o other
diplomatic possibilities.
Qaddafi’s Libya
e ancient history of Libya is intimately connected with
the ebb and flow of empires across the Mediterranean,
Middle East and North Africa. Modern Libya, by contrast,
was a creation of the UN.
25
e defeat of fascist Italy in
World War II, during which Libya had been a signicant
battleground, enabled decolonization. In 1951 the United
Kingdom of Libya was created as a poor, weak, but nominally
independent,constitutional monarchy. Under King Idris
Libyawas the single largest per-capita recipient of United
States aid in the world by 1959.
26
e discovery of oil in 1959 changed everything. Within two
years Libya was an oil exporter, the revenues from which
generated considerable state wealth. Oil production increased
from 20,000 barrels per day in 1960, to nearly 3 million
barrels by the end of the decade. e economy, lubricated
by oil, grew by about 20 percent annually.
27
Libya was struggling to deal with the ramications of all
of this when an army coup in September 1969 brought to
power a small clique of young pan-Arabist ocers who
called themselves the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC). Within the RCC was Muammar al-Qadda, then
a 27-year-old heavily inuenced by the politics of Colonel
Gamal Abdel Nasser in neighboring Egypt. As charismatic
as he was ruthless, Qadda emerged as the central military
gure of what he was now calling “the Libyan revolution.”
e political form of the new Libyan republic was increasingly
shaped by Qaddafi alone. In 1973 he suspended all
previous laws. Four years later he dramatically abolished
the government and declared Libya to be a “Jamahiriya”
(state of the masses). Qadda continued only as honorary
“guide of the revolution.” His motivations were not solely
ideological.Qadda was so suspicious of the possibility of a
military coup that he had abolished the Ministry of Defense
in 1969.
28
Over the following four decades he remained
Libya’skey military decision maker.
Despite Qadda’s pretensions with regard to creating a unique
system of self-governing socialist people’s committees, Libya
remained rmly under his eccentric direction. e ruling
circle was tight and repressive. Censorship was pervasive.
e formation of opposition political parties was outlawed
under Law 71 of 1972 and punishable by death.
29
e idea that opposition to Qadda was tantamount to
treason was one that Qadda himself returned to constantly.
For example, in a speech from 1993 he declared that “now
we should seek traitors” and “kill them.”
30
Dissidents were
detained, routinely tortured and sometimes publicly executed.
ose who made it into exile could be hunted down and
assassinated by Libyan intelligence agents. Libya was also
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a major sponsor of international terrorism, including a
notorious connection to the blowing up of Pan Am Flight
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988.
31
Qadda was able to use billions of petro-dollars to fund his
political ambitions and foreign entanglements, and also buy
o inchoate domestic opposition to his rule. Between 1969
and 1979 Libya received an estimated $95 billion in revenue
from oil.
32
Hard currency and hubris enabled a disastrous
military intervention in Chad, a call for jihad in the Congo,
an alliance with Uganda’s Idi Amin and support for armed
rebels in Mali. Qadda’s pan-Arab vision failed during the
1970s when it became clear that other rulers would not bow
to his leadership. Attempts from the late 1980s onwards to
re-fashion himself as a pan-African “king of kings” similarly
floundered, despite his willingness to bankroll various
African political allies.
33
Money from oil also enabled Qaddafi to construct an
impressive welfare apparatus during the 1970s.
34
Genuine
progress was made in advancing literacy and health care,
the residual eects of which are still apparent. e UN’s
2011 Human Development Index ranked Libya 64th out of
187 countries.
35
But receipt of economic handouts depended
upon political acquiescence, and by the late 1980s the
systemof distributive welfare was crumbling both literally
and guratively.
Completely dependent upon oil revenue and subject to
Qaddafi’s whims, Libyan economic development was
distorted. By 1970 oil was already providing 99 percent of
state revenue, but employing only 1 percent of the workforce.
36
Billions of dollars were wasted through mismanagement.
Endemic corruption meant that money that was not wasted
was oen siphoned into oshore bank accounts.
37
Confrontations with a range of foreign powers had made
Libya a pariah by the mid-1980s. Western sanctions,
especially on oil exports, started to have an impact on Libya’s
revenue, which fell from $21 billion annually to $5.4 billion
between 1982 and 1986.
38
e United States’ decision to
conduct airstrikes in Tripoli and Benghazi during April
1986, including on Qadda’s personal residences, represented
an obvious attempt to aect “regime change.”
39
Because of
Libya’s complicity in international terrorism, the UN applied
damaging sanctions from 1992 until 1999.
40
In an extraordinary reversal of political fortunes, aer giving
up hisweapons of mass destruction and the restoration of
relations with several Western powers from December 2003
onwards, Qadda was actually courted as a North African
buttress against al-Qaeda.
41
During 2004 British Prime
Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac
both visited Libya. Between October 2004 and the end of
2009 the European Union granted €834.5 million worth
of arms export licenses to Libya, with Italy being Qadda’s
single largest supplier.
42
The overall effect of 40 years of Qaddafi’s misrule was
debilitating. Libya had a weak state and army, but possessed
a vigorously repressive internal security apparatus. ere was
no governmental accountability as Qadda had no formal
authority but possessed all real power.
Qadda also remained ercely resistant to the idea of reform.
For example, during a military mutiny in Misrata in 1993 and
an isolated Islamist uprising in Benghazi in 1995, extreme
violence was deployed with the air force being used to bomb
the mutinous soldiers into submission. In June 1996 the
security forces killed approximately 1,272 prisoners at Abu
Salim prison following protests there. During the following
month, when the crowd at a soccer game began to chant
anti-Qadda slogans a riot broke out and as many as y
people were shot dead by the security forces.
43
When protests began in Benghazi during February 2011,
Qadda relied upon the things he knew best – inammatory
rhetoric mixed with erce repression. When Libyans protested
or attacked symbols of his regime, he dismissed calls for
compromise or conciliation. Outside Libya, Qadda had no
signicant international allies who could pressure him to
moderate his behavior. Inside Libya, there were no restraints
upon his decision-making. Although Libya was a country of
more than six million people, one man made a negotiated
outcome to the rapidly escalating conictnext to impossible.
“No Fly Zone,” the AU “Road Map” and NATO
Implementation of Resolution 1973 began on 19 March with
a massive bombardment of Libyan air defenses and military
hardware, with a focus on Qadda’s forces outside Benghazi.
Although the United States, United Kingdom and France
initiated the operation, the NATO-led coalition assembled to
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enforce Resolution 1973 would eventually encompass eighteen
states. Notably, three Arab countries – Qatar, Jordan, and
the United Arab Emirates – made military contributions.
44
In terms of the “no-y zone,” Qadda did not have much of
an air force to disable. He did, however, have tanks, heavy
artillery and ground troops. Although estimates vary, the
regular Libyan armed forces constituted approximately
100,000 personnel. Qaddafi, who had some personal
experience of coup plotting, deliberately kept his army weak.
e exception was four well-resourced brigades directly
linked to his tribe or to one of his sons, along with the
internalsecurity forces.
45
Although Qadda’s forces outside Benghazi were destroyed by
NATO bombers, his remaining troops displayed considerable
resilience. Aer falling back from Benghazi they were able
to maintain control of most of the west of the country, with
the notable exception of Misrata, and retake several towns
that had previously ousted the security forces. Despite being
targeted by NATO, Qadda’s forces continued to pose a threat
to civilians. For example, NATO claimed that on 20 April
alone it destroyed 25 tanks that were shelling civilian areas
in Ajdabiya and Misrata.
46
NATO’s military operations in Libya proceeded on the
assumption that air strikes would cause the Qadda regime
to abandon its “cleansing” campaign. e decision to resort to
air power emerged as the preferred option due to its perceived
low risk as compared to deploying foreign ground forces.
Although improvements in accuracy and discrimination
have signicantly lowered the risk of civilian casualties,
death and damage remain intrinsic to air warfare. is is
particularly the case in densely populated urban areas, with
the corresponding possibility of accidentally killing the very
population the mission is intended to protect.
Alternatives to coercive force were also still being explored. In
particular, the AU continued to argue in favor of a negotiated
settlement between Qadda and the rebels. On 10 April, aer
the airstrikes had begun, an AU delegation including the
presidents of South Africa, Uganda, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali
and Mauritania claimed to have secured Qadda’s support
for a “road map” to end the conict. e road map included
an immediate ceasere and negotiations on political reform.
e emerging political representatives of the rebellion in
Benghazi, who were now calling themselves the National
Transitional Council (NTC), rejected the initiative.
e NTC saw the AU, whose secretariat received substantial
funding from Libya, as protecting Qaddafi’s interests.
ey were especially skeptical given that two members of
the delegation, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa and
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, had already publicly
criticized the NATO-led intervention. Indeed, Museveni had
written in March that while Qadda had made mistakes,
he was a “true nationalist” and that “I prefer nationalists
to puppets of foreign interests” – an inelegant stab at the
opposition. Another delegate, President Mohamed Ould
Abdel Aziz of Mauritania, who came to power in a military
coup in 2008, had close ties to Qadda, who had cancelled
Mauritania’s $100 million debt. It was therefore regrettable,
but not surprising, that the NTC rejected the AU road map
and repeated its demand that Qadda and his family leave
Libya as a precursor to peace talks.
47
Countries supporting the NATO-led intervention applied
little diplomatic pressure on the NTC to take the AU
initiativeseriously. Although Qadda’s gesture may have
been empty, it still should have been vigorously pursued.
However, the concerns of the NTC were also valid. e
fact that the AUdelegation publicly referred to Qadda
as “Brother Leader” rankled, as did the fact that the most
prominent member of the delegation, President Zuma, did
not visit Benghazi, returning to South Africa aer his time
with Qadda in Tripoli.
Most importantly, in Benghazi, the heart of the rebellion, the
AU’s criticism of “regime change” did not sit comfortably with
people whose lives were at grave risk if the regime survived.
Allegations that Qadda was recruiting mercenaries from
several AU member states, especially Chad and Niger, also
heightened suspicions. e AU delegation had been welcomed
at Qadda’s private compound in Tripoli, but in Benghazi
about a thousand protestors gathered outside their hotel. One
woman was photographed carrying a placard that read, in
English, “the people want to change the regime.”
48
A diplomatic opportunity was possibly missed, but this
was as much a mistake of the AU delegation as of those
enforcing the UN’s civilian protection mandate. While the
AU delegation had announced Qadda’s agreement to their
road map, Qadda made no such public statement. His
private commitment may have been genuine, but to the NTC
it appeared to be a cynical delaying tactic. Crucially, despite
the immediate ceasere promised in the road map, even as the
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AU delegation checked into their hotel in Benghazi, Qadda’s
forces continued to shell the besieged city of Misrata.
49
As the opportunities for negotiation dissipated and the
NATO bombing campaign started to focus upon “command
and control” centers in Tripoli and other urban areas, the
possibility of civilian casualties grew. NATO Secretary-
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen later insisted that, “no
comparable air campaign in history has been so accurate
and so careful in avoiding harm to civilians.”
50
But, on 21
June, NATO held a press conference where it admitted to
a small number of civilian casualties caused by technical
malfunctions or targeting errors. A later investigation by
the UN Human Rights Council’s International Commission
of Inquiry found that sixty civilians were accidentally killed
in at least ve NATO strikes that went wrong. While the
commission declared that “we are quite sure that NATO
did not deliberately attack civilians,” this was little solace
for those who lost loved ones.
51
e Qadda regime purposefully misrepresented the issue
of NATO casualties. For example, a journalist writing for
e Economist from Tripoli reported at the start of July that:
e point, repeated relentlessly, is that civilians have been killed
by Western bombs and that the people remain loyal to the Brother
Leader. Crowds chanting his name greet reporters everywhere they
are taken on ocial tours. But nowhere else. e picture presented by
the regime oen falls apart, fast. Cons at funerals have sometimes
turned out to be empty. Bombing sites are recycled. An injured seven-
year-old in a hospital was the victim of a car crash, according to a
note passed on surreptitiously by a nurse. Journalists who point out
such blatant massaging of facts are harangued in the hotel corridors.
52
Over eight thousand sorties were eventually own over Libya
by the NATO-led alliance. Although the immediate objective
of stopping Qadda’s assault on Benghazi was successful,
theoperational directive confining the use of military
force solely to protecting civilians proved challenging. On
the one hand, such a mandate created expectations about
neutrality and impartiality.
53
On the other, limiting the
military operation to civilian protection was undermined
by developments on the ground.
While the east of the country was under the control of rebels
by the end of April, most of the west, including Tripoli, was
still controlled by Qadda’s forces. e Benghazi-based NTC
was busy transforming itself into an alternative government.
e various civilian militias had slowly consolidated into
a rebel army under the NTC’s loose overall command.
Increasingly, any attempt by Qadda’s forces to retake key
towns and villages in the east was met by fearsome NATO
airstrikes in coordination with the defending rebels. By any
measure, Libya was now in the midst of a full-blown civil war.
Mass Atrocity Crimes
Protecting civilians from mass atrocity crimes was the reason
the Security Council authorized a military intervention in
Libya. But crimes also continued throughout the civil war.
Aer being repulsed from Benghazi, the Qadda regime
continued to rely upon its weakened security forces and
also deployed suspected mercenaries, a number of whom
were allegedly recruited from neighboring African
countries or Eastern Europe.
54
A later investigation by the
UN Human Rights Council’s International Commission of
Inquiry concluded that “international crimes, specically
crimes against humanity and war crimes, were committed
by Qadda forces,” including “acts of murder, enforced
disappearance, and torture” that were “perpetrated within
the context of a widespread and systematic attack against a
civilian population.”
55
Among other war crimes, the rebel-
held western city of Misrata, home to half a million people,
was subjected to a vicious siege by loyalist forces from mid-
March until May.
Qaddafi’s troops indiscriminately shelled Misrata with
Grad rockets, mortars and artillery. A hospital in Misrata
was attacked and cluster munitions were fired into the
el-Shawahda residential district. Loyalist snipers preyed
upon civilians. In at least one case Qadda’s forces also
used civilians as a “human shield” to deter NATO attacks
on their positions. ere was a deliberate attempt to starve
the civilian population and block humanitarian aid from
reachingMisrata. ere were also widespread allegations that
loyalist forces were guilty of the “murder, rape and sexual
torture” of Misrata’s residents. Doctors testied to “military-
sanctioned rape” of women and girls as young as fourteen.
In all, more than 1,100 Misrata residents died as Qadda’s
forces besieged the city.
56
Given the extensive nature of war crimes perpetrated
in Misrata, it was clearly within the UN’s “all necessary
measures” mandate for NATO to attack Qadda’s forces
encircling the city. But as the duration of the Libya operation
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lengthened beyond initial expectations, it became a battle
of nerves between Qadda and NATO as much as between
Qadda and the NTC rebels. Military stalemate and de facto
partition of Libya seemed a distinct possibility. Meanwhile
international public support for the intervention fell. In the
United States, for example, the percentage of “likely voters”
who supported the intervention in late March was 46 percent,
but by August it was down to 24 percent.
57
Far away from the frontlines of Misrata, the battle to hold
perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes legally responsible
for their actions also continued. On 27 June an ICC arrest
warrant was issued for Qadda, his son Saif al-Islam and
the head of intelligence services, Abdullah al-Senussi, for
responsibility for alleged crimes against humanity committed
since mid-February.
It was not until late May that the military momentum started
to shi decisively in favor of the rebels, with NATO air-
support proving crucial to their oensive. ey broke the
siege of Misrata and started to move towards Tripoli. Intense
ghting continued, but aer six months the nal collapse of
Qadda’s forces was rapid. On the night of 21 August rebel
forces were inside Tripoli.
Even as it became clear that all was lost, Qadda’s forces
continued to commit war crimes. On 23 August, as Tripoli
was falling to the rebels, soldiers from the 32nd Brigade,
following orders from a senior member of the military, carried
out a massacre of prisoners at a warehouse that had been
used earlier as a place of detention and torture. More than
y “civilians and combatants” were murdered by their
guards in addition to an unknown number who had been
tortured to death in earlier incidents. In the words of one
investigative report compiled aerwards, high-ranking
military commanders were at the warehouse, ordered the
massacre and conspired to “conceal and destroy evidence of
their crimes.”
58
Human Rights Watch documented similar
atrocities in al-Qawalish, al-Khoms and Bani Walid.
59
Such
massacres were part of an established pattern of conduct
rather than isolated incidents.
Humanitarian Intervention versus R2P
roughout the conict a number of media commentators
misleadingly labeled the international action in Libya as a
“humanitarian intervention.”
60
Some protagonists rushed to
defend the inviolability of Libya’s national sovereignty and
denounced Western malfeasance, while others proclaimed a
new dawn for the notion of just war. Almost all misrepresented
the Responsibility to Protect.
Even though the Responsibility to Protect features in just
three paragraphs of the 40-page outcome document of the
2005 UN World Summit, historian Martin Gilbert has
suggested that it constituted “the most signicant adjustment
to national sovereignty in 360 years.”
61
R2P’s core idea is
that all governments have an obligation to protect their
populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
It is primarily a preventive doctrine. However, R2P also
acknowledges that we live in an imperfect world and if a
state is “manifestly failing” to meet its responsibilities, the
international community is obliged to act. It is not a right to
intervene, but a responsibility to protect. e distinction is
not diplomatic artice. Aer the 1994 genocide in Rwanda
and the 1995 genocide in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica,
the international community resolved to never again be a
passive spectator to mass murder.
By contrast, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention may be
summed up as, “military intervention in a state, without the
approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing
widespread suering or death among the inhabitants.”
62
is diers from the Responsibility to Protect on at least
three grounds.
First, the remit of humanitarian intervention, which aims at
preventing large scale suering, is far broader than that of R2P,
which focuses upon the prevention of the four mass atrocity
crimes. Second, humanitarian intervention automatically
focuses upon the use of military force, by a state or a group
of states, against another state without its consent. As such
it overlooks the broad range of preventive, negotiated and
other non-coercive measures that are central to R2P. ird,
to the extent that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is
predicated on the basis of the “right to intervene,” it assumes
that it can proceed without the need to secure appropriate
authorization under international law.
e Security Council’s framing of the crisis in terms of
R2P and its authorization of Resolution 1973 made Libya
stand apart from cases of humanitarian intervention to
halt mass atrocities, such as NATO’s 1999 intervention in
Kosovo, which was conducted without UN authorization.
Although previous interventions to halt atrocities may have
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been morally justiable, they lacked international legality.
63
Rather than compromising sovereignty, R2P harnesses the
notion of sovereignty as responsibility and seeks to respond
to extreme crises in a way that is both legitimate and legal.
64
Military action in Libya was preceded by a range of non-
military measures that sought to persuade the Qadda regime
to stop the killing. All the steps considered in Resolution 1970
—referral of the matter to the ICC, imposition of an arms
embargo, enforcement of a travel ban for certain individuals,
freezing the assets of senior regime gures — while coercive,
were peaceful. It was only when these measures failed that
the use of military force was nally considered.
It must also be remembered that since the 1990s there has
been a tendency to conate any military action in support
of humanitarian ends with military invasion for material
gain. Long considered the prime-motive for any foreign
intervention in the Middle East or North Africa, oil is only
one of many factors inuencing international interest in
this strategically important region. Libya was already fully
integrated into the world energy market and several Western
governments had extensive oil contracts with the Qadda
regime.
65
On 22 February, prior to Resolution 1970, it was
reported that the crisis in Libya had increased global oil
prices by 2.6 percent - reaching the highest point since before
the 2008 global nancial crisis. e price of oil increased
again following the rst airstrikes.
66
is volatility in the
oil market occurred at a time of growing uncertainty in
the global economy. If anything, oil was a disincentive for
intervention in Libya.
Unlike a “humanitarian intervention,” the decision to resort
to “all necessary measures” in Libya was not only legal under
international law, it also met a number of key political tests.
e Qadda regime was committing mass atrocities and its
public rhetoric was an open incitement to further crimes.
Qadda’s determination to hold onto power at all costs clearly
implied the risk of escalating violence, and senior Libyan
diplomats had defected in open disapproval of the regime’s
behavior. e fact that Resolution 1973 was adopted without
a single negative vote on the Security Council reected that
even those with serious reservations about a NATO-led
military intervention recognized that the world needed to
act. But in Libya there was also the vexed political question
of “regime change” to consider.
R2P and Regime Change
Airstrikes to halt the attacks of Qadda’s forces on civilians
in Benghazi, Misrata and elsewhere were clearly justiable
under “all necessary measures” in Resolution 1973. However,
as the civil war became a war of attrition between Qadda’s
forces and the rebel army, other forms of military intervention
became less clearly in keeping with the spirit, if not the letter,
of the UN mandate. For example, despite an arms embargo
under Resolution 1970, some countries provided sizeable
quantities of weapons to the rebels. In June France admitted
to supplying assault ries, rocket launchers and anti-tank
missiles, claiming that such actions were both morally
justiable and within the legal parameters of Resolution
1973. Dwarng the French contribution was that of Qatar,
which allegedly supplied militias connected to the NTC with
eighteen shipments amounting to 20,000 tons of weaponry.
67
Other forms of support from key members of the NATO-led
alliance included providing battleground leadership advice
during the nal rebel oensive on Tripoli and Sirte. During
August 2011 the New York Times reported that “Britain,
France and other nations deployed special forces on the
ground inside Libya to help train and arm the rebels.” Qatar
went much further, later admitting that it had “hundreds” of
troops “in every region” ghting against Qadda’s forces. is
was conrmed by a senior gure from the NTC.
68
Although
not a direct violation of Resolution 1973, which only expressly
forbid “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of
Libyan territory,” this was not in keeping with the spirit of the
civilian protection mandate represented in Resolution 1973.
Although much of this support was only publicly admitted
in late October aer the Qadda regime had collapsed,
rumors and reports were circulating as early as June.
India’s Ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, started
disparagingly referring to NATO as the “armed wing” of the
UN Security Council precisely because he believed NATO’s
role in Libya had casually shied from protecting civilians in
Benghazi to overthrowing the government in Tripoli.
69
ere
was a growing view at the UN in New York that NATO was
no longer acting as a defensive shield for populations at risk,
but as the NTC’s air force.
Those who had most strenuously advocated in favor of
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 faced criticisms that R2P had been
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LIBYA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
co-opted by the “regime change” agenda of a few Western
powers. e contrary argument was that while Qadda’s
forces had been engaged, but not broken, they still constituted
a grave threat to civilians. Was there a strategic middle ground
between these positions?
e operational alternatives were far from desirable, but were
certainly more clearly in keeping with the original protective
mandate. Or, as “NATO Watch” argued:
e threat to Benghazi was the principal basis on which UN and
Arab League support was obtained for a no-y zone. at threat
was averted within days and no further resolution was gained for
NATO to support a rebel advance on Tripoli. Once [Qadda’s] heavy
weapons had been stopped the Libyan people could have been le to
struggle it out themselves (which might have prolonged the conict
and led to even more casualties). If no party had prevailed the option
of a negotiated political settlement brokered by the African Union
may have become more attractive.
70
Critiques of the ongoing intervention were especially strident
in the corridors of the UN, particularly regarding arms
being supplied to the NTC rebels despite the UN-authorized
embargo. Such activities le several countries enforcing
Resolution 1973 open to criticism regarding double standards
and clandestine agendas.
At the start of the intervention in Libya, President Barack
Obama of the United States had been careful to stay on
message, announcing on 21 March that, “when it comes to
our military action, we are doing so in support of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 that specically
talks about humanitarian eorts, and we are going to make
sure that we stick to that mandate.”
71
But in a joint op-ed by
President Obama, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and
Prime Minister David Cameron of the United Kingdom,
published around the world on 15 April, these leaders tried
to have it both ways. Aer referring to the “bloodbath” that
had been prevented in Benghazi, the three leaders argued that:
Our duty and mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1973
is to protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to remove
Qadda by force. But it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya
with Qadda in power. It is unthinkable that someone who has
tried to massacre his own people can play a part in their future
government. e brave citizens of those towns that have held out
against forces that have been mercilessly targeting them would face
a fearful vengeance if the world accepted such an arrangement. It
would be an unconscionable betrayal.
72
As early as 10 March, before Resolution 1973 was passed,
France recognized the NTC as the legitimate representative
of the Libyan people. is conveyed the impression that,
beyond civilian protection, France had partisan interests in
Libya. Similarly, on 20 March, just a few days aer the NATO
bombing commenced, United Kingdom Defense Minister
Liam Fox said:
Mission accomplished would mean the Libyan people free to control
their own destiny. is is very clear – the international community
wants [Qadda’s] regime to end and wants the Libyan people to
control for themselves their own country.
73
ere is no doubt countries that were actively supporting
the Libyan intervention stretched their interpretation of
Resolution 1973 regarding “all necessary measures” to its
limit. But, on the other hand, questions regarding protection
of civilians cannot neglect political and military realities.
Given the well-founded fear that if Qadda were to regain
control of rebel-held territory he would perpetrate further
mass atrocities, assisting the rebels in preventing him from
doing so was, arguably, a legitimate part of the protection
mandate. Moreover, as has been argued by James Traub with
regard to Darfur:
Once the international community threatens to use coercive action
against a state committing atrocities, indigenous forces opposing the
state will see outside actors as their allies and act accordingly. e
discovery that the international community is on their side enhances
their sense of righteousness… ey will have little, if any, incentive
for diplomacy and compromise… Diplomats must make it clear
that they are intervening on behalf of a people, not an insurgency.
74
NATO’s prolonged campaign raised hopes among those
whose lives remained under threat and emboldened
the Benghazi-based NTC, while simultaneously raising
suspicion that the Libyan intervention was about more
thancivilian protection.
As the conict dragged on, these problems highlighted
the need to revisit the issue of establishing possible
guidelines for the use of military force in R2P situations.
In various high-level reports, books and speeches, Gareth
Evans, formerAustralian foreign minister and co-chair
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| GLOBAL CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
of the international commission that developed R2P, has
consistently argued for ve criteria that could be used.
Without elaborating upon all of his supporting arguments,
the criteria are worth briey reviewing:
1.
Seriousness of harm. Is the threat clear and extreme
enough to justify military force?
2.
Proper purpose. Is the central purpose to halt or avert
the threat, despite “whatever other purposes or motives
may be involved?”
3.
Last resort. Has every reasonable non-military option
been explored?
4.
Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity
of military action the minimum necessary?
5.
Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance
of success in averting the threat without worsening the
situation? Is action preferable to inaction?
75
The Libya intervention initially met all five criteria.
However, it is arguable that as the civil war dragged on
the “proportional means” became less credible. But, it is
alsoimportant to remind ourselves of two essential facts.
e rst is that if Benghazi or Misrata had fallen to Qadda
there is every indication that widespread, indiscriminate
and deadly violence against civilians would have resulted.
Former British statesman Paddy Ashdown’s comment that
we should measure our success by “the horrors we prevent,
rather than the elegance of the outcome,” is perhaps relevant
in this regard.
76
Second, in some cases curtailing a government’s ability to
commit further mass atrocity crimes may not prove sucient
if such activities are integral to its survival. Few would quarrel
with the view that halting mass atrocities in Cambodia during
the genocidal rule of the Khmer Rouge, Uganda under Idi
Amin or Rwanda during the genocide became inseparable
from the goal of ending those regimes. Where a government
is the primary perpetrator of ongoing atrocities, changing
the leadership may sometimes be the only eective way to
end the crimes. In this context, permanently disabling the
capacity of the Qadda regime to harm its own people was
seen by some as essential to discharging the mandate of
civilian protection.
Backlash
Following the fall of Tripoli at the end of August, Libya’s
new leaders, having won a bitter civil war, faced enormous
challenges. Aer 42 years of dictatorship under Qadda,
the rule of law was almost non-existent. Infrastructure had
been damaged or destroyed throughout the country and
whatever limited governmental bureaucracy that existed
before February had collapsed. In addition, tribal divisions
and regional interests conicted with the NTC’s desire to
promote reconciliation and rebuilding.
According to the NTC an estimated 25,000 Libyans, including
soldiers from both the rebel and loyalist forces, died during
the civil war. One death, however, was especially notable. As
Tripoli fell to the rebels, Qadda and his entourage ed to
Sirte. Qadda continued to denounce the rebels in messages
broadcast via foreign media.
77
When rebels reached the center
of Sirte on 20 October, Qadda made the fateful decision to
ee the city in a convoy of vehicles.
Aer being detected from the air, the convoy was bombed,
apparently without NATO realizing Qadda was in one of
the cars. Qadda survived, but was wounded and disoriented.
He then walked with two aides towards the main road, before
hiding in a drainage pipe to avoid rebel soldiers. Upon
discovery he was infamously hauled from the pipe, beaten
and most likely tortured, before being executed by gunshots
to the belly and head. His corpse was then publicly displayed
in Misrata as a trophy of war.
Although the UN, the ICC and numerous international
human rights organizations would all call for an investigation
into the extra-judicial execution of Qadda, within Libya
there initially seemed to be little appetite for anything except
rejoicing over his demise. Nevertheless, his treatment at the
hands of his captors (recorded on smartphone and broadcast
around the world) was deeply disturbing and possibly
constituted a war crime.
78
While rebel forces had largely escaped critical scrutiny in the
international media during the struggle against Qadda’s
regime, organizations such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International raised serious concerns about the
conduct of some rebel units. Human Rights Watch reported,
for example, on the situation in Tawergha, near Misrata,
where rebels had taken reprisals against a town mainly
comprised of black Africans who were collectively accused
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of siding with Qadda during the civil war. e town of
30,000 people was forcibly depopulated and much of it put
to ame. Human Rights Watch also documented another
incident where 53 pro-Qadda loyalists appeared to have
been summarily executed by rebel soldiers in Sirte.
79
e UN Human Rights Council’s International Commission
of Inquiry later concluded that anti-Qaddafi forces,
“committed serious violations, including war crimes and
breaches of international human rights law.” ese crimes
included “unlawful killing, arbitrary arrest, torture, enforced
disappearance, indiscriminate attacks and pillage.” e March
2012 report detailed ongoing attacks by anti-Qadda militias
against former residents of Tawergha, but also noted that
“the signicant dierence between the pastand the present
is that those responsible for abuses now are committing them
on an individual or unit level, and notas part of a system of
brutality sanctioned by the centralgovernment.”
80
Even before Qadda’s death the UN had recognized the NTC
as the legitimate representatives of the Libyan people. But the
end of the civil war led to broader reection regarding the
legitimacy of the intervention. Announcing the completion
of NATO’s operation at the end of October, the alliance’s
Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, claimed that
NATO-led forces had “prevented a massacre and saved
countless lives.”
81
But rather than focusing on the lives saved
in Benghazi and elsewhere, some critics continued to focus
upon the deaths resulting from six months of civil war.
82
For example, former President abo Mbeki echoed the South
African government’s criticisms of the Libyan intervention,
arguing that NATO members on the UN Security Council
had actively “blocked” the AU’s attempts to peacefully resolve
the Libyan conict.
83
A soer, but more widely reported,
critique came from former UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan. Speaking at the University of Ottawa on 4 November,
at a meeting to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the
creation of the R2P concept, Annan expressed concern over
the fact that “regime change came up very quickly” in Libya.
84
Inuential voices in the mass media also chimed in, but the
real test would be inside the Security Council.
85
As Resolution 1973 passed in the Security Council, Syria
erupted in protest. Similarly inspired by the Arab Spring, an
opposition movement that had been developing since January
had become a popular uprising by mid-March. e reaction
of the Syrian security forces was bloody and unrelenting.
Over the following year more than 10,000 civilians would be
killed as the Syrian state used soldiers, tanks, artillery, attack
helicopters and even warships to crush popular opposition
to its rule. With the Security Council initially distracted by
Libya, and with permanent council member Russia a long-
standing ally, the government of President Bashar al-Assad
was able to prevaricate, break numerous promises to reform
and avoid UN action.
ere was a glaring disparity in the Security Council’s
response – timely and effective in Libya, tardy and
underwhelming in Syria. ere are ve factors that explain
the Security Council’s actions.
First, key actors in the region played a dierent role in both
crises. e Arab League’s rapid condemnation of Qadda’s
actions and calls for a no-y zone in Libya contrasted with its
initially cautious response to the situation in Syria. Lebanon,
the only Arab League member on the Security Council,
pushed the council to take action on Libya but initially
defended the Syrian government. e Arab League did not
start to play a leading role regarding the Syrian crisis until
the second half of 2011.
Second, whereas a sizable number of key Libyan ocials
defected from the regime (including the leadership of Libya’s
Permanent Mission to the UN, who made compelling
statements during Security Council discussions), in Syria
the regime maintained the formal allegiance of most senior
government ocials during the rst months of the crisis. e
Ambassador of Syria to the UN, Bashar Ja’afari, remained a
steadfast supporter of Assad.
ird, Libya’s status as a pariah state without powerful allies
contrasts with Syria, which maintains close relationships with
Russia and Iran. Fourth, public statements by Qadda that
he would “cleanse” the nation of “cockroaches” were viewed
as incitement to commit crimes against humanity, whereas
Assad made statements that were viewed as conciliatory
despite all evidence to the contrary. Finally, several council
members were nervous about the Security Council possibly
being drawn into another armed intervention.
Despite ongoing mass atrocity crimes, on 4 October 2011
Russia and China vetoed a Security Council resolution that
sought to impose sanctions, an arms embargo and travel bans
on the Syrian government. e ostensible justication was
that Russia and China were nervous that such UN-authorized
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| GLOBAL CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
measures might eventually lead to Syria becoming “the
next Libya.” e double veto was, therefore, also an explicit
challenge to the Responsibility to Protect.
The reality is that Russia would have vetoed the Syria
resolution even if the Libyan intervention had never happened
and R2P did not exist. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union
was Syria’s major military supplier and the government
allowed the Kremlin to establish a naval base at Tartus, the
Soviets’ only military outpost in the Mediterranean and
Middle East. Tartus remains a key component of Russia’s
plan to rebuild a global military presence befitting a
recovering superpower. Furthermore, in August 2011 the
Moscow Times had commented that Russia’s tepid support
for Security Council action in Libya had adversely aected
Russia’s arms industry and strategic interests. At the start
of the Syrian crisis, Assad’s government had $6 billion in
activearms contracts, making it one of the top ve importers
of Russianweaponry.
86
Traditionally nervous about any UN action that impinges
upon state sovereignty, China had only used its veto six times
since 1972. Lacking any direct interest in Libya and facing a
world outraged by Qadda’s crimes against his own people,
China abstained from the crucial Security Council resolution
that led to the Libyan intervention. However, Russia’s intense
lobbying convinced the Chinese to veto with regard to Syria.
Not surprisingly, therefore, Syria brought the issue of R2P and
selectivity into the center of the political debate. Although
some critics argued that selectivity posed a potentially fatal
risk to the norm, academic Michael Barnett argued that it
was necessary to not exaggerate the issue:
All international norms are selectively applied, especially norms that
include the use of force. If selectivity and inconsistent use doomed
international norms, then there would probably be no international
norms to speak of. e real measure of R2P’s success is whether it
helps those marked for death.
87
Libya and Syria also posed important questions regarding the
role of the IBSA countries – India, Brazil, South Africa – on
the Security Council. South Africa voted for Resolution 1973
while Brazil and India abstained. All three emerging powers
abstained on the Syria resolution in October. e position
of Ambassador Baso Sangqu of South Africa was that with
regard to Syria the “trajectory, the templates for the solution
were very clear, it was along similar lines to Libya.”
88
Such
a view became less sustainable the longer the crisis endured
and the more the coercive elements in the proposed resolution
were amended and diluted.
e media became increasingly critical. On 9 November, for
example, BBC correspondent Barbara Plett wrote that despite
“a declared commitment to championing human rights,”
the IBSA countries had “mostly lined up with Russia and
China in key debates over Libya and Syria, strengthening
dismay about the Security Council’s inability to respond in
a unied way to the deepening crisis.” Her conclusion was
that, “IBSA’s approach has in practice meant supporting a
repressive regime rather than those calling for democratic
change. It has meant not a new voice on the Security Council
speaking on their behalf, but the absence of one.”
89
In a situation where ongoing crimes against humanity were
being perpetrated in Syria, and where the Security Council
was divided between a majority who wanted a vigorous
response in keeping with R2P and a veto-wielding minority
who did not, the IBSA countries appeared to be abstaining,
both literally and guratively, from the process of nding a
solution. Brazil, however, tried to bridge the political divide
by publishing a short paper on the “Responsibility while
Protecting” and convened a private meeting of countries
from the global North and South to discuss a way forward.
90
While the failure of the Security Council to adequately
respond to the crisis in Syria exposed it to intense criticism,
it did invoke R2P in resolutions concerning Yemen and South
Sudan. e UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council
also passed strong R2P-inuenced resolutions condemning
crimes against humanity in Syria. When a second, weaker,
Syria resolution was put to the Security Council on 4 February
2012, Russia and China vetoed it again.
Although the veto was to have tragic consequences for
ordinary Syrians, there was a glimmer of hope. ere were
no abstentions, and India and South Africa were among
the thirteen Security Council members who voted for the
resolution.
91
During the high level discussion that preceded
the vote, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, Harold Caballeros,
had insisted that:
Non-intervention in the internal aairs of sovereign States and
the respect for their territorial integrity are cardinal principles
of our foreign policy. But we also acknowledge the obligation of
all States to observe certain norms of conduct in relation to their
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LIBYA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
own populations… at is why, in an era when the principle of
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is being questioned, we are not
ashamed to arm that, with some nuances that we have explained
in other forums, we support that principle.
92
Aer the 13-2 vote, the “Libya hangover” was declared over
by several journalists. Moreover, despite Russia’s protests to
the contrary, its second veto on Syria was widely perceived
as not being about Libya and R2P, but as being motivated by
arms, allies and strategic power. By February 2012, therefore,
despite lingering concerns regarding Libya, the emerging
consensus (enabled largely by the Brazilian initiative) was that
R2P’s advocates needed to develop better preventive, mediated
and coercive tools as they operationalize R2P in the future.
Conclusion
Despite the failures of the past, Libya revealed that the
international community can act in a timely fashion to
halt mass atrocity crimes when sucient political will and
operational capacity exists. e swi and unanimous adoption
of Resolution 1970 contrasts sharply with the paralysis that
overtook the UN during the Rwandan genocide and the
painful dithering during the Balkans wars of the 1990s.
On a military level, it took two days between the adoption
of Resolution 1973 and the imposition of the no-y zone.
By comparison, it had taken NATO twelve days to initiate
operations over Bosnia two decades earlier. In this sense,
Libya represents an important demonstration of what can
happen when political will and operational capacity align.
When a regime is already committing atrocities against its
own people the options for policymakers are narrow, but
that does not mean that they do not exist. We need timely
and proportional reactions to all R2P situations. We need to
learn not only from Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, but also from
Guinea, Kenya and other places where R2P has been invoked,
but military force was unnecessary. While we must strive
for consistency with regard to the future application of R2P,
we also have to judge each crisis on its own merits. Exactly
what measures should be utilized depends upon the need to
develop varying responses to diverse situations.
Crucially, we need to be mindful of the fact that the most
catastrophic and ignoble decision of the UN in its entire
history was not the result of misplaced action, but of inaction.
Almost one million people died during the Rwandan genocide
in just one hundred days – making it the fastest and most
deadly genocide of the twentieth century. The UN was
forewarned of the impending catastrophe, but was unwilling
to act. e same was true of Srebrenica the following year.
e Genocide Convention had been in place for almost y
years, but when faced with the reality of genocide in the
heart of Europe, the UN could only respond with empty
threats and broken promises. ese failures created the moral
and political basis for the emergence of the Responsibility
toProtect.
In an end of year press conference held on 14 December 2011,
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addressed the question
of Libya and R2P. e Secretary-General told reporters in
New York that:
Security Council resolution 1973, I believe, was strictly enforced
within the limit, within the mandate. is military operation done
by the NATO forces was strictly within 1973. I believe this is what
we have seen, and there should be no misunderstanding on that.
93
The Secretary-General argued that the international
community had “advanced the Responsibility to Protect”
in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, both of which were “important
victories for justice and international law.”
94
But given the
lingering disagreement over the Libya intervention, perhaps
we should also recall the words of Rwanda’s President Paul
Kagame in May 2011:
No country knows better than my own the costs of the international
community failing to intervene to prevent a state killing its own
people. rough UN Resolution 1973, we are seeing a committed
intervention to halt the crisis that was unfolding in Libya. From
what the world saw on the sidelines of this conict, had this action
not been taken, the bombardment of that country’s towns and cities
would have continued, Benghazi most likely would have borne the
brunt of a furious administration, and hundreds of thousands of
lives could well have been lost… Our responsibility to protect is
unquestionable – this is the right thing to do; and this view is backed
with the authority of having witnessed and suered the terrible
consequences of international inaction.
95
At the opening of the sixty-sixth UN General Assembly
during September 2011, Syria’s Foreign Minister declared that
in confronting mass protests and the “blatant conspiracies”
of foreigners, the government of Syria had “exercised its
responsibility to protect its citizens.”
96
Ironically, by invoking
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R2P language the Syrian Foreign Minister paid a backhanded
compliment to the strength of the emerging norm, despite
the political backlash from Libya.
Within the UN the debate now is about how R2P should be
practically implemented in specic cases and crises rather
than whether such an abstract responsibility exists. But the
struggle to give deeper meaning, operational substance and
institutional structure to R2P continues to develop. Misuse of
R2P debases the concept. Clarity of purpose, proportionality
and precision remain essential.
Finally, we can not be distracted by the obfuscation of those
who argue that Libya is the sole benchmark by which to
measure the Responsibility to Protect. Despite division and
debate about the meaning and implications of the Libyan
intervention, R2P is still the best instrument we have to
bridge the gap between the noble aims of the UN and the
imperfect world of global diplomacy. R2P remains our best
hope to make “never again” a living principle, rather than a
cliché to whisper as we shue past the memorials and mass
graves of those who died while the world sat in silence.
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Endnotes
1
This paper draws upon the earlier work of Global Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect staff whose policy brief, “R2P After Libya and
Côte d’Ivoire: Perceptions and Misconceptions,” is further developed here.
2
Matthew Weaver, “Muammar Gaddafi condemns Tunisia uprising,” The
Guardian, 16 January 2011, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2011/jan/16/muammar-gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprising.
3
Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Security forces fire on ‘Day of Anger’
demonstrations,” 17 February 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/02/17/libya-security-forces-fire-day-anger-demonstrations.
Also, “’Day of rage’ kicks off in Libya,” Al Jazeera, 17 February 2011,
available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011217550
57219793.html.
4
Nick Meo, “Libya protests: 140 ‘massacred’ as Gaddafi sends in snipers
to crush dissent,” The Telegraph, 20 February 2011, available at: http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/
libya/8335934/Libya-protests-140-massacred-as-Gaddafi-sends-in-
snipers-to-crush-dissent.html; Angelique Chrisafis, “Libya protests: ‘Now
we’ve seen the blood our fears have gone,’” The Guardian, 21 February
2011, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/libya-
protests-blood-fears-gone; Human Rights Watch, “Security Forces Kill 84
Over Three Days,” 18 February 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/02/18/libya-security-forces-kill-84-over-three-days; Human
Rights Watch, “Governments should demand end to unlawful killings,”
20 February 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/20/
libya-governments-should-demand-end-unlawful-killings.
5
Meo, “Libya protests: 140 ‘massacred’ as Gaddafi sends in snipers to crush
dissent;“ Chrisafis, “Libya protests: ‘Now we’ve seen the blood our fears
have gone;’” “Libya protests spread and intensify,” Al Jazeera, 21 February
2011, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122
1133557377576.html.
6
Both pilots claimed political asylum, see “Libya protests spread and
intensify,” Al Jazeera.
7
Vivienne Walt, “Gaddafi’s Son: Last Gasp of Libya’s Dying Regime?,”
Time, 21 February 2011, available at: http://www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,2052842,00.html; “Moammar Gaddafi clings to power in
Libya, protests continue,” Washington Post, 22 February 2011, available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/22/
AR2011022205119.html; “Libya protests: Defiant Gaddafi refuses to quit,”
BBC News, 22 February 2011, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-12544624.
8
“Fresh violence rages in Libya,” Al Jazeera, 22 February 2011, available
at:Libya Paper Footnote changes 24 September.docx http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122261251456133.html; “Libya
protests: Defiant Gaddafi refuses to quit,” BBC News; “Libya Civil War
(2011),” Global Security, available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/war/libya-civil-war.htm; James Downie, “When Numbers
Lie: why isn’t there an accurate death toll in Libya?,” The New Republic,
1 April 2011, available at: http://www.tnr.com/article/world/86090/
libya-death-toll-war-qadaffi.
9
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (Advance
Unedited Version), United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/19/68, 2
March 2012, 9, 52-53, available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.44_AUV.pdf.
10
Marlise Simons and Neil MacFarquhar, “Hague court seeks warrants for
Libyan officials,” New York Times, 4 May 2011, available at: http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/05/05/world/africa/05nations.html?_r=2&ref=world.
For a more general overview of the protests in Libya see, International
Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V):
Making Sense of Libya,” Middle East/North Africa Report no.107, 6 June
2011, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-
north-africa/north-africa/libya/107-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-
the-middle-east-v-making-sense-of-libya.aspx.
11
In a piece published after the Libyan civil war ended, Hugh Roberts
doubted the veracity of some accounts of atrocities. See, Hugh Roberts,
“Who said Gaddafi had to go?,” London Review of Books, Volume 33, no.22,
17 November 2011, 8-18, available at: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n22/hugh-
roberts/who-said-gaddafi-had-to-go. Note also the contrary responses
given by Gareth Evans and others in the Letters following Roberts’ article.
12
“Libya protests spread and intensify,” Al Jazeera.
13
“Libya protests spread and intensify,” Al Jazeera; “Fresh violence rages in
Libya,” Al Jazeera.
14
Pillay quoted in “Fresh violence rages in Libya,” Al Jazeera.
15
UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide,
Francis Deng, and Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect,
Edward Luck, on the Situation in Libya, UN Press Release, 22 February
2011, available at: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/
OSAPG,%20Special%20Advisers%20Statement%20on%20Libya,%20
22%20February%202011.pdf.
16
UN Security Council Press Statement on Libya, SC/10180, 22 February
2011, available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sc10180.
doc.htm.
17
“Libya: African Union Condemns Libya Crackdown,” Radio France
International, 24 February 2011, available at: http://allafrica.com/
stories/201102241041.html.
18
“Secretary-General’s Remarks to United Nations Security Council
Meeting on Peace and Security in Africa,” New York, 25 February
2011, available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/
search_full.asp?statID=1095; Statement by Navi Pillay, United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Council, 15th Special
Session, Geneva, 25 February 2011, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10760&LnglI.
19
On 1 March 2011, following an unprecedented request by the UN Human
Rights Council, the UN General Assembly suspended Libya’s membership
of the Geneva-based Council. See, United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 65/265, A/RES/65/265, 1 March 2011, available at: http://
daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/528/44/PDF/N1052844.
pdf?OpenElement.
20
On 5 March the Libyan opposition formally organized itself as the National
Transitional Council (NTC) with major ex-regime figures like former
Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel Jalil in the leadership.
21
David Usborne, “’This will be all over in 48 hours:’ Gaddafi’s son vows
to crush revolution,” The Independent, 17 March 2011, available at: http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/this-will-all-be-over-in-48-
hours-gaddafis-son-vows-to-crush-revolution-2244163.html; “Gaddafi
tells Benghazi his army is coming tonight,” Al Arabiya News, 17 March 2011,
available at: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/17/141999.html.
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22
On the issue of the regime’s previous experience with sanctions, see, Dirk
Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, (Cambridge University Press, New
York, 2011), 152-161.
23
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, S/RES/1970, 26 February
2011, available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/245/
58/PDF/N1124558.pdf?OpenElement. United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1973, S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement.
24
Comments by Ambassador Ivan Barbalic´ at a meeting on “The Media and
Srebrenica,” hosted by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
on 28 November 2011, New York.
25
For more on the UN process, see Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya: From
Colony to Independence, (Oneworld Short Histories, Oxford, 2008), 98-102.
26
Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 45; St. John, Libya: From Colony to
Independence, 116.
27
Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 63.
28
Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 149; St. John, Libya: From Colony to
Independence, 166-171.
29
On mounting opposition to Qaddafi during the 1980s and 90s, see, St.
John, Libya: From Colony to Independence, 221-224.
30
Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 125.
31
Ibid., 132.
32
Ibid., 97.
33
St. John, Libya: From Colony to Independence, 186, 212-215, 229.
34
Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 107.
35
See, UNDP’s Human Development Report, 2011, available at: http://hdr.
undp.org/en/.
36
Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 89, 91-92, 113.
37
In this context, perhaps one of the most damning assessments of the
nature of the Qaddafi regime has surfaced via Wikileaks. Written in 2009
at a time of rapprochement between Tripoli and Washington, the United
States’ secret diplomatic cable described Libya as “a kleptocracy in
which the government – either the al-Qadhafi family itself or its political
allies – has a direct stake in anything worth buying, selling or owning.”
See, Eric Lichtblau, David Rohde and James Risen, “Shady dealings
helped Qaddafi build fortune and regime,” New York Times, 24 March 2011,
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world/africa/24qaddafi.
html?pagewanted=all.
38
Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 114-116.
39
Ibid., 134.
40
Ibid., 152-161, 186, 192.
41
After the fall of Qaddafi it was alleged that two rebels, Abdel Hakin Belhaj
and Sami al-Saadi, had been taken to Libya in joint CIA and M16 “rendition”
operations and handed over to Qaddafi’s intelligence service. Both claimed
they had been tortured. Belhaj became the the head of the rebels’ Tripoli
Military Council. See, Dominic Casciani, “Libya rendition claims to be
investigated by UK police,” BBC News, 12 January 2012, available at: http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16523249.
42
“EU arms exports to Libya: who armed Gaddafi?,” The Guardian DataBlog,
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/mar/01/
eu-arms-exports-libya; St. John, Libya: From Colony to Independence, 241.
43
St. John, Libya: From Colony to Independence, 223, 256-257.
44
See, Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, “NATO’s Success in Libya,”
New York Times, 30 October 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/10/31/opinion/31iht-eddaalder31.html.
45
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (Advance
Unedited Version), United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/19/68, 2
March 2012, 46-49.
46
See, Kareem Fahim, “With Confidence and Skittishness, Libyan Rebels
Renew Charge,” New York Times, 20 March 2011, available at: http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/africa/21benghazi.html; Harriet Sherwood
and Chris McGreal, “Libya: Gaddafi has accepted roadmap to peace says
Zuma,” The Guardian, 10 April 2011, available at: http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2011/apr/10/libya-african-union-gaddafi0-rebels-peace-talks.
47
Sherwood and McGreal, “Libya: Gaddafi has accepted roadmap to peace
says Zuma;” S. Denyer and L. Fadel, “Gaddafi accepts African Union’s
road map for peace,” Washington Post, 10 April 2011, available at: http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/african-leaders-arrive-in-libya-in-
attempt-to-broker-cease-fire-gaddafi-hopes-for-sympathy/2011/04/10/
AF0VH6ED_story.html; Jason Straziuso, “Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi can
live in Uganda,” Boston Herald, 30 March 2011, available at: http://www.
boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2011/03/30/apnewsbreak_
libyas_gadhafi_can_live_in_uganda/; Simon Tisdall, “Gaddafi figures
prominently on the roadmap for peace,” The Guardian, 11 April 2011,
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/11/
gaddafi-libya-roadmap-peace.
48
For a photograph of the protest, see, Dan Murphy, “Why the African Union
road map for Libya is unlikely to go anywhere,” Christian Science Monitor, 11
April 2011, available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/
2011/0411/Why-the-African-Union-road-map-for-Libya-is-unlikely-to-
go-anywhere.
49
Murphy, “Why the African Union road map for Libya is unlikely to go
anywhere.”
50
Ian Davis, “How good is NATO after Libya,” NATO Watch Briefing Paper,
no.20, 8 September 2011, available at: http://www.natowatch.org/sites/
default/files/Briefing_Paper_No.20_NATO_After_Libya.pdf. See also,
Daalder and Stavridis, “NATO’s Success in Libya.”
51
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (Advance
Unedited Version), United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/19/68,
2 March 2012, 2, 20-21; John Heilprin, “UN panel urges nations to help
stop Libyan human rights abuses,” Washington Post, 9 March 2012; Saif
Tawfiq, “Fresh civilian deaths pile pressure on NATO,” Reuters, 20 June
2011, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/20/us-libya-
idUSTRE7270JP20110620; “Press Briefing on Libya,” NATO, 21 June 2011,
available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_75652.htm;
“Counting the Cost of NATO’s Mission in Libya,” BBC News, 31 October 2011,
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15528984; C.J.
Chivers and Eric Schmitt, “In strikes on Libya by NATO, an unspoken civilian
toll,” New York Times, 17 December 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/12/18/world/africa/scores-of-unintended-casualties-in-nato-
war-in-libya.html?_r=1&ref=world. On 14 May 2012 Human Rights Watch
released a report detailing 72 civilian deaths caused by NATO airstrikes.
See, Human Rights Watch, “Unacknowledged Deaths: Civilian Casualties
from NATO’s Air Campaign in Libya,” 14 May 2012, available at: http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0512webwcover_0.pdf.
20
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES |
LIBYA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
52
O.A, “Reporting from Libya: Close your window,” The Economist, 1 July
2011, available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/07/
reporting-libya.
53
With regard to impartiality, the NATO-led alliance was keen to point out
that on 19 April it forced a MiG fighter jet commanded by the rebels to
land, in keeping with the terms of the no fly zone. Sherwood and McGreal,
“Libya: Gaddafi has accepted roadmap to peace says Zuma.”
54
See, for example, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on
Libya (Advance Unedited Version), United Nations Human Rights Council,
A/HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, 21, 187-190; Andrew Osborn, “Libya: Belarus
mercenary ‘paid £1900 a month to help Gaddafi forces’,” The Telegraph, 6
April 2011, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
africaandindianocean/libya/8432996/Libya-Belarus-mercenary-paid-
1900-a-month-to-help-Gaddafi-forces.html.
55
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (Advance
Unedited Version), United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/19/68, 2
March 2012, 2.
56
For more on war crimes in Misrata see, Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Libya (Advance Unedited Version), United Nations
Human Rights Council, A/HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, 18-19, 160-163, 185, 186;
Physicians for Human Rights, “Witness to War Crimes: Evidence from
Misrata, Libya,” August 2011, available at: http://physiciansforhumanrights.
org/library/reports/witness-to-war-crimes.html. See also, Human Rights
Watch, “Indiscriminate Attacks Kill Civilians,” 17 April 2011, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/17/libya-indiscriminate-attacks-kill-
civilians; Tarik Kafala, “’Cleansed’ Libyan town spills its terrible secrets,”
BBC News, 12 December 2011, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
magazine-16051349; Amnesty International, “Attacks against Misratah
residents point to war crimes,” 5 May 2011, available at: http://www.
amnestyusa.org/research/reports/libya-attacks-against-misratah-
residents-point-to-war-crimes?page=show; Human Rights Watch, “Cluster
Munitions Strike Misrata,” 15 April 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/
en/news/2011/04/15/libya-cluster-munitions-strike-misrata; Human Rights
Watch, “Government Attacks in Misrata Kill Civilians,” 10 April 2011, available
at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/10/libya-government-attacks-
misrata-kill-civilians; International Crisis Group, “CrisisWatch,” no. 93, 1 May
2011, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/
media-releases/2011/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-93.aspx.
57
Andrew C. Miller and Paul B. Stares, “How New Atrocity-Prevention Steps
Can Work,” Expert Brief, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 August 2011,
available at: www.cfr.org/conflict-prevention/.
58
Qaddafi’s son, Khamis, was overall commander of the 32nd Brigade.
For a full report on the massacre, see Physicians for Human Rights,
“32nd Brigade Massacre: Evidence of war crimes and the need to ensure
justice and accountability in Libya,” December 2011, available at: http://
physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/32nd-brigade-massacre.
html. See also, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya
(Advance Unedited Version), United Nations Human Rights Council, A/
HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, 9-11.
59
See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Halt Exhumations of
Mass Graves,” 22 September 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/09/22/libya-halt-exhumations-mass-graves.
60
See, for example, Mahmood Mamdani, “Libya: Politics of Humanitarian
intervention,” Al Jazeera, 31 March 2011, available at: http://www.aljazeera.
com/indepth/opinion/2011/03/201133111277476962.html.
61
Sir Martin Gilbert, “’The Terrible 20th Century’; Canada’s offer of a big
way forward can help prevent past horrors, says Holocaust historian and
Churchill Biographer,” The Globe and Mail, 31 January 2007.
62
Adam Roberts, “Humanitarian war: military intervention and human
rights,” International Affairs, Vol. 69, no. 3, 1993, 429.
63
Previous unilateral action to stop mass atrocities have included India’s
intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam’s in Cambodia in 1978,
France’s involvement in the overthrow of Jean-Bédel Bokassa of the
Central African Empire in 1979 and Tanzania’s decision to topple the
murderous Idi Amin regime in Uganda the same year. Multilateral
interventions have also taken place in Northern Iraq in 1991, and Sierra
Leone in 1999 as well as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999.
64
Francis Mading Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild
and I. William Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management
in Africa, (Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC, 1996).
65
In January 2005 Qaddafi made sure that eleven out of fifteen new oil
agreements went to United States’ oil companies. Libyan oil exports
constitute about 2 percent of the world oil market and 10 percent of
Europe’s. Although this made Libya the twelfth largest oil exporter, it was
still ranked below Norway, Nigeria, Angola and Algeria. St. John, Libya:
From Colony to Independence, 245.
66
“Libya unrest leads to rise in oil price,” BBC News, 22 February 2011,
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12522291; “Oil jumps
above $103 as Libya crisis escalates,” CNN Money, available at: http://
money.cnn.com/2011/03/21/markets/oil_prices_Libya/index.htm. See
also, U.S. Energy Information Administration, available at: http://www.eia.
gov/countries/index.cfm?topL=exp.
67
Louis Charbonneau and Hamuda Hassan, “France defends arms airlift to
Libyan rebels,” Reuters, 30 June 2011, available at: http://in.reuters.com/
article/2011/06/30/idINIndia-58000920110630; “Update 1-NATO: not
involved in French arms aid to Libya rebels,” Reuters, 30 June, available
at: http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFLDE75T0TD20110630;
Sam Dagher, Charles Levinson and Margaret Coker, “Tiny Kingdom’s Huge
Role in Libya Draws Concern,” The Wall Street Journal, 21 October 2011,
available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204002304
576627000922764650.html.
68
Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers, “Surveillance and Coordination With
NATO Aided Rebels,” New York Times, 21 August 2011, available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/world/africa/22nato.html; “Qatar admits
it had boots on the ground in Libya: NTC seeks further NATO help,” Al
Arabiya News, 26 October 2011, available at: http://www.alarabiya.net/
articles/2011/10/26/173833.html.
69
Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri quoted in Barbara Plett, “UN Security
Council middle powers’ Arab Spring dilemma,” BBC News, 7 November
2011, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15628006.
70
Davis, “How good is NATO after Libya.”
71
Jesse Lee, “President Obama Answers Questions on Libya: ‘A Testament
to the Men and Women in Uniform,’” The While House Blog, 21 March 2011,
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/03/21/president-
obama-answers-questions-libya-testament-men-and-women-uniform.
72
“Joint op-ed by President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron and President
Sarkozy: ‘Libya’s Pathway to Peace’,” White House Press Release, 14 April 2011,
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/14/joint-
op-ed-president-obama-prime-minister-cameron-and-president-sarkozy.
73
Patrick Wintour and Ewen MacAskill, “Gaddafi may become target
of air strikes, Liam Fox admits,” The Guardian, 20 March 2011,
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/20/
coalition-criticism-arab-league-libya.
21
| GLOBAL CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
74
James Traub, Unwilling and Unable: The Failed Response to the Atrocities in
Darfur, GCR2P Occasional Paper, 2010, 26.
75
For a more detailed explanation of the criteria, see, Gareth Evans, The
Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All,
(Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2008), 139-147.
76
Paddy Ashdown, “Ray-Bans and pick-ups: this is the future; Iraq-style
intervention is over. The messy Libyan version will be our model from
now on,” The Times, 26 August 2011, www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/
columnists/article3145750.ece.
77
Clara M. O’Donnell and Justin Vaisse, “Is Libya NATO’s Final Blow?”
Brookings Institute, 2 December 2011, available at: http://www.brookings.
edu/research/opinions/2011/12/02-libya-odonnell-vaisse. See, Kareem
Fahim, “In his last days, Qaddafi wearied of fugitive’s life,” New YorkTimes,
22 October 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/world/
africa/in-his-last-days-qaddafi-wearied-of-fugitives-life.html?pagewanted=all.
78
Clara M. O’Donnell and Justin Vaisse, “Is Libya NATO’s Final Blow?”
Brookings Institute, 2 December 2011, available at: http://www.brookings.
edu/research/opinions/2011/12/02-libya-odonnell-vaisseSee, Kareem
Fahim, “In his last days, Qaddafi wearied of fugitive’s life,” New YorkTimes,
22 October 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/world/
africa/in-his-last-days-qaddafi-wearied-of-fugitives-life.html?pagewanted=all.
79
Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Apparent execution of 53 Gaddafi supporters,”
23 October 2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/24/
libya-apparent-execution-53-gaddafi-supporters; Human Rights Watch,
“Libya: Militia’s terrorizing residents of ‘Loyalist’ town,” 30 October
2011, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/30/libya-militias-
terrorizing-residents-loyalist-town; Kafala, “’Cleansed’ Libyan town spills
its terrible secrets;” Amnesty International, “The Battle for Libya: Killings,
Disappearances and Torture,” 13 September 2011, available at: http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/025/2011/en/8f2e1c49-8f43-46d3-
917d-383c17d36377/mde190252011en.pdf. See also, Kareem Fahim and
Adam Nossiter, “In Libya, Massacre Site Is Cleaned Up, Not Investigated,”
New York Times, 24 October 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/10/25/world/middleeast/libyas-interim-leaders-to-investigate-
qaddafi-killing.html?pagewanted=all; Seumus Milne, “If the Libyan war was
about saving lives, it was a catastrophic failure,” The Guardian, 26 October
2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/
libya-war-saving-lives-catastrophic-failure.
80
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (Advance
Unedited Version), United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/19/68, 2
March 2012, 2, 15-16, 44, 87, 128-136, 141, 148-149, 156.
81
“Nato chief Rasmussen ‘proud’ as Libya mission ends,” BBC News,
31 October 2011, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/
world-africa-15516795.
82
See, for example, Grant Dawson, “Libya intervention has left us with
blood on our hands,” Wales Online, 15 May 2012, available at: http://
www.walesonline.co.uk/news/local-news/aberystwyth/2012/05/15/
libya-intervention-has-left-us-with-blood-on-our-hands-91466-30968413/.
83
“Mbeki: We should learn from Libya’s experiences,” Mail &
Guardian Online, 5 November 2011, available at: http://mg.co.za/
article/2011-11-05-mbeki-we-should-learn-from-libyas-experiences/.
84
Mike Blanchfield, “Don’t fear Islamic resurgence from Arab Spring,
former UN chief tells students,” The Globe and Mail, 4 November 2011,
available at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/dont-fear-
islamic-resurgence-from-arab-spring-former-un-chief-tells-students/
article2226277/.
85
The most notable of these was David Reiff of the New York Times whose 7
November op-ed was dramatically entitled, “R2P, R.I.P.” Reiff claimed that
the “interventionist paradigm” in Libya may have “done grave, possibly
even irreparable, damage to R2P’s prospects of becoming a global norm.”
In Libya, “regime change became the West’s policy, and the civilian
protection mandate of R2P was its cover.” D. Reiff, “R2P, R.I.P.,” New York
Times, 7 November 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/
opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all. For Gareth Evans’ response, see
Evans, “The Lesson of Libya,” New York Times, 15 November 2011, available
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/opinion/the-lesson-of-libya.html.
86
Howard Amos, “Billions of Dollars of Russian Business Suffers Along
With Syria,” Moscow Times, 2 September 2011, available at: http://www.
themoscowtimes.com/business/article/billions-of-dollars-of-russian-
business-suffers-along-with-syria/443078.html; M.K. Bhadrakumar,
“Russia remains a Black Sea power,” Asia Times Online, 30 August 2008,
available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JH30Ag02.
html; “Russian Navy to base warships at Syrian port after 2012,” Global
Security, 2 August 2010, available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/
library/news/russia/2010/russia-100802-rianovosti02.htm; Howard
Amos, “Russia Damages Image in Arab Spring,” Moscow Times, 26 August
2011, available at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/
news-analysis-russia-damages-image-in-arab-spring/442712.html;
“Moscow counting on Syria to keep arms exports high,” The Jerusalem
Post, 31 January 2012, available at: http://www.jpost.com/International/
Article.aspx?id=255923.
87
Michael Barnett, “The Responsibility to Protect: An International Norm
Comes of Age,” Carnegie Reporter, Vol. 6, no. 3, Fall 2011, available at:
http://carnegie.org/publications/carnegie-reporter/single/view/article/
item/287/.
88
Ambassador Baso Sangqu quoted in Plett, “UN Security Council middle
powers’ Arab Spring dilemma.”
89
Plett, “UN Security Council middle powers’ Arab Spring dilemma.”
90
Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of
Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, available
at: http://www.globalr2p.org/media/pdf/Concept-Paper-_RwP.pdf.
91
Brazil’s period as an elected member on the UN Security Council finished
at the end of 2011.
92
Statement by Harold Caballeros, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala,
to United Nations Security Council Debate on the Situation in the Middle
East, 31 January 2012.
93
Louis Charbonneau, “U.N. chief defends NATO from critics of Libya
war,” Reuters, 14 December 2011, available at: http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2011/12/14/uk-libya-nato-un-idUKTRE7BD1XF20111214.
94
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “Opening remarks at end-of-year press
conference,” UN News Centre, 14 December 2011, available at: http://www.
un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=1419.
95
Paul Kagame, “Intervening in Libya was the right thing to do,” New African,
1 May 2011.
96
“At UN, Syria warns of ‘blatant conspiracies’ from outsiders against its
people,” UN News Service, 26 September 2011, available at: http://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39802&Cr=syria&Cr1.
22
Glossary of Abbreviations
Arab League League of Arab States
AU African Union
IBSA India, Brazil and South Africa
ICC International Criminal Court
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTC National Transitional Council
R2P Responsibility to Protect
RCC Revolutionary Command Council
UN United Nations
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
e Graduate Center, CUNY
365 Fih Avenue, Suite 5203
New York, NY 10016-4309, USA
Phone: +1-212-817-2104
www.GlobalR2P.org
Email: info@GlobalR2P.org
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Dr. Simon Adams
SUPPORTERS
Governments of Australia, Denmark, e Netherlands,
Norway, Rwanda, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
Arsenault Family Foundation
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Humanity United
e Stanley Foundation
e Open Society Institute
INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS
Gareth Evans, Co-Chair
Mohamed Sahnoun, Co-Chair
Francis Deng
Jan Egeland
elma Ekiyor
Edward Luck
Frank Majoor
Juan Méndez
Edward Mortimer
Gert Rosenthal
Darian Swig
omas G. Weiss
PATRONS
Ko Annan
Lloyd Axworthy
Roméo Dallaire
Jan Eliasson
David Hamburg
Lee Hamilton
Prince El Hassan bin Talal
Sadako Ogata
Fidel V. Ramos
Mary Robinson
Desmond Tutu
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
The Graduate Center, CUNY
www.GlobalR2P.org
