Widening the Training Pipeline: Are Warrant Officer Instructor Pilots the Best Solution to Increase Pilot Production?

WIDENING THE TRAINING

PIPELINE:

Are Warrant Ofﬁcer Instructor Pilots

the Best Solution to Increase Pilot

Production?

Aaron R. Ewing, Major, USAF

Air Command and Sta College

Evan L. Pettus, Brigadier General, Commandant

James Forsyth, PhD, Dean of Resident Programs

Bart R. Kessler, PhD, Dean of Distance Learning

Paul Springer, PhD, Director of Research

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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Widening the Training Pipeline:

Are Warrant Ocer Instructor Pilots the

Best Solution to Increase Pilot Production?

A R. E, , 

Wright Flyer Paper No. 77

Air University Press

Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Commandant, Air Command and Sta

College

Brig Gen Evan L. Pettus

Director, Air University Press

Maj Richard T. Harrison

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Air University Press

Accepted by Air University Press August 2019 and published September 2020.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied

within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily repre-

sent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of

the Air Force, the Air Education and Training Command, the Air

University, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public

release: distribution unlimited.

is Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are available elec-

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iii

Contents

List of Illustrations iv

Foreword v

Abstract vi

Introduction 1

Overview of the Study 1

Nature of the Problem 1

Purpose of the Study and Research Question 2

Research Structure and Methodology 2

Literature Review 3

Factors Driving the Pilot Shortage 3

Pilot Shortages by Fixed Wing Mission Set 5

History of the Warrant Ocer in the USAF 6

Warrant Ocer Utilization in Sister Services 7

Warrant Ocer Accession Timelines 11

Alternative Options to Increase Pilot Production 13

Comparison of Warrant Ocers and Alternatives 16

Analysis 24

Conclusion 25

Recommendation 26

Abbreviations 30

Bibliography 31

List of Illustrations

Figures

1. Airline hiring versus Air Force pilot attrition 4

2. Distribution of warrant ocer accessions by

years of service 12

3. Distribution of Army Aviator promotions by

years of service 19

Tables

1. 2018 Military Pay Chart- monthly basic pay 19

2. Summary of the comparison between

methods and criteria 24

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another issue of e Wright Flyer Papers.

rough this series, Air Command and Sta College presents a sampling of

exemplary research produced by our resident and distance- learning stu-

dents. is series has long showcased the kind of visionary thinking that

drove the aspirations and activities of the earliest aviation pioneers. is

year’s selection of essays admirably extends that tradition. As the series title

indicates, these papers aim to present cutting- edge, actionable knowledge—

research that addresses some of the most complex security and defense chal-

lenges facing us today.

Recently, e Wright Flyer Papers transitioned to an exclusively electronic

publication format. It is our hope that our migration from print editions to an

electronic- only format will foster even greater intellectual debate among Air-

men and fellow members of the profession of arms as the series reaches a

growing global audience. By publishing these papers via the Air University

Press website, ACSC hopes not only to reach more readers, but also to sup-

port Air Force–wide eorts to conserve resources. In this spirit, we invite you

to peruse past and current issues of e Wright Flyer Papers at https://www

.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Wright- Flyers/.

ank you for supporting e Wright Flyer Papers and our eorts to dis-

seminate outstanding ACSC student research for the benet of our Air Force

and war ghters everywhere. We trust that what follows will stimulate think-

ing, invite debate, and further encourage today’s air, space, and cyber war

ghters in their continuing search for innovative and improved ways to de-

fend our nation and way of life.

EVAN L. PETTUS

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

Abstract

e United States Air Force is struggling to cope with a worldwide pilot

shortage that has le the service over 2,000 pilots short of what is needed to

fully man its squadrons. With pilot retention declining in a time of unprece-

dented airline hiring, the service is desperately trying to nd ways to increase

pilot production. To recover from the current shortage, the Air Force has de-

termined it needs to increase annual production from 1,200 to 1,600 pilots

per year. Despite identifying a need for increased production, the service has

yet to identify a clear method to accomplish this task. A 33 percent increase

of students will necessitate an increase of undergraduate pilot training (UPT)

instructors; where the Air Force intends to nd additional instructors given

the current pilot shortage is unclear.

is research paper seeks to ll this gap in knowledge by answering the

question, are warrant ocers the best solution to increase UPT instructor

manning to achieve the overarching goal of producing 1,600 pilots per year?

To answer the question, this study used a problem/solution framework to

compare four methods of increasing pilot production: warrant ocer UPT

instructors, contracted civilian UPT instructors, increasing the number of

rst assignment instructor pilots, and timeline reductions via the Pilot Train-

ing Next program. e four methods were assessed against ve criteria: time-

liness of implementation, personnel cost savings, training squadron manning

stability, impact on operational squadron manning, and quality of training.

Ultimately, this study concluded that warrant ocers are not the best option,

however, neither are any of the other methods. e problem of increasing

pilot production is too complex to be solved with a single, silver-bullet solu-

tion. While no single method could suciently satisfy all ve criteria, apply-

ing all four methods in parallel does have the potential to meet the Air Force’s

goal of producing 1,600 pilots per year.

Introduction

Overview of the Study

e United States Air Force (USAF) is contending with the most severe pi-

lot manning crisis in its 71-year history. e former Secretary of the Air Force,

Heather Wilson, has stated that active duty, guard, and reserve total force is

currently over 2,000 pilots short of what it needs to ll its billets.

While many

factors are at play, years of declining retention in a time of unprecedented air-

line hiring and a signicant decrease in authorized end strength despite sub-

stantial mission growth for the Air Force, have contributed signicantly to the

current pilot shortage. To address the shortage, Air Force is focusing eorts on

improving pilot retention and increasing pilot production. is research proj-

ect will focus on the latter eort by investigating how the Air Force can best

achieve its goal of increasing pilot production at a time when the current in-

ventory of available instructor pilots is at a premium.

One of the potential solutions the paper will investigate is utilizing warrant

ocers to serve as undergraduate pilot training (UPT) instructors. While the

Air Force eliminated warrant ocers from its rank structure long ago, all

three sister services currently and successfully employ warrant ocer pilots

in daily operations. Over the next several years the Air Force intends to in-

crease its overall end strength, presenting an opportunity for the service to

reconsider if it now has a need for warrant ocers in the force. is paper

hypothesizes that warrant ocers are the best long- term solution to the UPT

instructor manning problem and will compare this course of action to several

alternatives to determine the best way forward.

Nature of the Problem

In February 2017, the chief of sta of the Air Force (CSAF) established an

aircrew crisis task force with the purpose of identifying factors that drive de-

clining retention and recommend initiatives to reverse the trend. e task

force identied that problems in work/life balance, quality of service, and pay

discrepancies between military and airline pilots were the primary factors

causing pilots to leave military service. To address these problems the task

force presented 44 initiatives to the CSAF for approval and at the time of this

writing 37 of the task force’s recommendations had been implemented.

Hopefully these initiatives serve their intended purpose and retention rises;

however, retaining current pilots will only help short- term manning stability

in ying squadrons. In order to achieve long- term pilot manning stasis, the

Air Force must increase pilot production.

To alleviate the shortage, Air Force has determined that it is necessary to

increase the pilot production rate from 1,200 to 1,600 pilots per year.

If the

Air Force intends to increase the number of yearly students by 33 percent a

corresponding increase in required instructor pilots should be expected.

erein lies the problem, as the Air Force has yet to reveal where it is going to

nd additional instructors in times of a pilot shortage. Furthermore, given the

ceaseless pace of combat operations, the Air Force must nd a way to increase

instructor manning without negatively impacting combat capability.

Purpose of the Study and Research Question

Reassigning pilots from combat squadrons to serve as UPT instructors is

the only method the service currently implements to increase instructor man-

ning at ying training squadrons. Continuing to do so will have negative im-

plications to combat capability as operational squadrons already suer from

manning shortages. Any additional reduction in personnel will only further

degrade the unit’s ability to project combat airpower. us, it is imperative that

the Air Force nd alternative solutions to increase its pool of UPT instructor

pilots. is paper will investigate and compare various potential sources of

instructor pilots in order to answer the following research question: are war-

rant ocers the best solution to increase UPT instructor manning in order to

achieve the overarching goal of producing 1,600 pilots per year?

Research Structure and Methodology

is research paper will utilize the problem and/or solution framework to

identify the best method to increase instructor pilot manning at UPT squad-

rons and will compare the warrant ocer option against three alternative

methods that could feasibly increase pilot production: bolstering the number

of rst assignment instructor pilots, implementing contracted civilian in-

structors, and reducing the timeline to produce a pilot via the Pilot Training

Next program. Each option will be weighed against ve criteria: timeliness of

implementation, personnel cost savings, stability in training squadron man-

ning, impact on operational squadron manning, and quality of training. is

analysis will be essential in determining if warrant ocers are the best solu-

tion to increase instructor pilot manning at UPT squadrons to meet the Air

Force’s target of producing 1,600 pilots per year.

Examining the factors that lead to the current pilot shortage and under-

standing how the Air Force arrived at this unfortunate state of aairs will be

essential to provide a context in determining if warrant ocer instructor pi-

lots have advantages over the current practice of using traditional ocers as

UPT instructors. Additionally, statistical data on pilot manning shortages by

mission area will be analyzed to demonstrate that the Air Force will be unable

to increase instructor manning utilizing the current pool of pilots without

causing unacceptable harm to combat squadron manning.

Next, the paper will outline the history of the warrant ocer in the USAF,

as well as the reasoning behind the decision to eliminate the rank. Under-

standing this history is necessary to comprehend why Air Force senior lead-

ers are so resistant to the notion of reinstating the rank structure. While serv-

ing as the 17th chief master sergeant (CMSgt) of the Air Force, James Cody

conducted a video all call in which he provided insight into the Air Force’s

position on warrant ocers, “When we really have a conversation about war-

rant ocers, we’re talking about money, you don’t get dierent people; they

don’t get any better at their job. You just pay people dierent.”

If this paper is

to succeed in its goal of demonstrating how warrant ocers could provide

exceptional value in the realm of pilot training, it will be necessary to address

counter opinions held by senior Air Force leaders such as CMSgt Cody. Un-

derstanding the logic behind why the Air Force determined warrant ocers

were unnecessary is a necessary step in producing a counterargument.

Unlike the USAF, the US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have employed

warrant ocers during the entirety of their existence. Research on sister ser-

vice viewpoints on the roles, responsibilities, and employment of warrant of-

cers will be presented to show that the Air Force may have missed the mark

in its original decision to eliminate the rank structure. In order to set the

foundation for the primary analysis of this paper, it must rst be established

that warrant ocers have a place in the modern Air Force.

Literature Review

Factors Driving the Pilot Shortage

e Air Force’s capacity to train new pilots is wholly dependent on having

a cadre of experienced pilots available to instruct new students. Years of de-

clining pilot retention combined with congressionally mandated force reduc-

tions have produced a climate where increasing pilot production will be dif-

cult. While many intangible factors contribute to a pilot’s decision to leave

military service, such as quality of life and increased stress from persistent

combat operations, the Air Force pilot attrition rate has a denitive direct cor-

relation to airline hiring. Figure 1 includes data from a study on Air Force

pilot attrition that not only conrms this correlation but also predicts that the

airline hiring rate will continue to increase until 2027.

Figure 1. Airline hiring versus Air Force pilot attrition

With airline hires expected to increase over the next decade, it is logical to

assume Air Force attrition will continue to rise and the service is scrambling

to nd ways to inuence pilots to stay. In addition to nonmonetary initiatives

designed to reduce additional duties and improve quality of life, the Air Force

recently increased the maximum aviation bonus to $455,000 in return for an

additional thirteen- year service commitment by pilots eligible to leave in s-

cal year (FY) 2018. At the time of this writing, only 34.6 percent of eligible

pilots had accepted the bonus, falling well short of the 64 percent target the

Air Force is hoping for.

It is clear that the pilot shortage is going to get worse

before it gets better; however, declining retention is only partially responsible

for the current shortage.

In addition to declining retention, the USAF pilot shortage is impacted by

signicant reductions in end strength compounded by an increase in mission

responsibilities. e end of the Cold War precipitated a massive military force

reduction that resulted in decreasing USAF authorized end strength from

over 500,000 in 1991 to only 311,000 in 2016.

Despite the 38 percent decrease

in manpower, the USAF has experienced signicant growth in responsibili-

ties over the past 27 years as mission sets that did not previously exist began

to materialize. During the Cold War, remotely piloted aircra (RPA) existed

only in the minds of innovators. Today, the war on violent extremism em-

ploys over 60 RPA combat orbits with 24-hour coverage, necessitating over

1,100 pilots to meet the demand.

Although space and cyber operations ex-

isted at the end of the cold war, the scope of responsibility in each domain has

magnied as the increasing threat from state and nonstate actors challenge

the United States’ ability to maintain information dominance. In 2016 alone,

over 4,000 oensive cyber operations were conducted against more than

100,000 adversarial targets.

While space and cyber do not require pilots to

conduct operations, signicant growth in cyber and space personnel limit the

Air Force’s ability to increase pilot authorizations due to congressional restric-

tions on authorized end strength. To put it simply, the USAF is too small to

meet its worldwide commitments.

Senior Department of Defense (DOD) leadership has recognized this fact

and is asking for congressional approval to grow. e Air Force’s current au-

thorized end strength sits at 325,100 for FY 2018. FY 2019 budget request

seeks an increase to 338,800 by 2023.

If approved, the USAF should be judi-

cious with the application of additional manpower. Clearly, some of the ad-

ditional personnel will be used to bolster the pilot corps. However, Air Force

must consider if the current practice of solely using commissioned ocers as

pilots remains the best course of action.

Given that sister services successfully employ warrant ocers as pilots, the

opportunity for end strength growth opens the door for the Air Force to recon-

sider its pilot rank structure. CMSgt Cody’s argument that changing a pilot’s

rank from commissioned to warrant ocer does not add capability is valid if

pilot authorizations remain constant. However, if an increase in end strength

is approved, the Air Force could gain signicant capability by reinstating war-

rant ocers to serve as UPT instructors. Doing so would allow hundreds of

ocers currently assigned to pilot training squadrons to return to their pri-

mary airframe, thereby restoring signicant combat capability to the force.

Pilot Shortages by Fixed Wing Mission Set

In April 2018, the Government Accountability Oce (GAO) was directed

by the US Senate to research the DOD’s management of the pilot workforce.

e goal was to identify the extent of the dierence between actual manning

and pilot authorizations for each branch of the military. During FY 2017, the

GAO found that the USAF had the following xed wing pilot shortages or

overages by mission area: -27 percent ghter, -8 percent bomber, 3 percent

mobility, 24 percent surveillance, and -13 percent special operations.

Ignor-

ing the dierences in mission set, the Air Force was 8 percent short of the

pilots needed to ll its authorizations across the force in FY 2017.

With shortages in three of the ve primary mission areas, the Air Force is

struggling to nd pilots to serve as undergraduate pilot training instructors.

In order to sustain combat operations, the Air Force has already begun to shi

the excess mobility and surveillance pilots to man positions in basic pilot

training that would traditionally be staed by ghter, bomber, and special

operations pilots; however, this course of action is unsustainable.

With air-

line hiring rates expected to increase until 2027, the trend of declining reten-

tion is going to linger. If the Air Force continues to cash in overages of mobil-

ity and surveillance pilots, then shortages will inevitably occur in those

communities as well. If the Air Force is going to achieve manning stability for

all operational units, then it is essential that it rapidly develops a cadre of pi-

lots dedicated to training. e Air Force needs a pilot that focuses on basic

pilot training for their entire career, and as this paper will investigate, warrant

ocers may ll that niche requirement.

History of the Warrant Ocer in the USAF

Birth of the USAF Warrant Ocer. e origins of the USAF warrant of-

cer can be traced to the rank structure created by the Army Air Forces (AAF)

during World War II. e explosive growth of personnel during the war re-

sulted in the AAF end strength increasing from 21,000 to over two million

soldiers.

To keep the service from becoming too top heavy in commissioned

ocers, the Army appointed warrant ocers in over 40 dierent specialties

and created entirely new categories of rank, including the new position of

ight warrant ocer. As a result, thousands of aviation cadets who tradition-

ally would hold commissioned ocer ranks instead entered service as ight

ocers.

Prior to the war, it was not abnormal for enlisted men to serve as pilots.

However, as aircra became more complex, the aircrew positions required for

safe operation increased. is created a discontinuity in the chain of com-

mand as enlisted pilots would technically be the aircra commander of ocer

crewmembers serving in other crew positions. To resolve this dilemma, the

Pentagon held the position that ight ocers were to be treated as “third lieu-

tenants” and were due all the same customs and courtesies as commissioned

ocers.

e chaos of war tended to drown out any objections by commis-

sioned ocers about the rank authority of this so- called third lieutenant.

However, as the hostilities ended, confusion on how the rank truly t into the

chain of command grew since ight ocers were technically not enlisted

men, nor were they commissioned ocers.

Post- WWII confusion on warrant ocers. e signicant drawdown af-

ter the war and the establishment of Air Force as a separate military branch

resulted in the service inheriting over 1,200 warrant ocers from the former

AAF rank structure.

ough the appointment of ight ocers ceased, the

Air Force continued to appoint warrant ocers without any clear career path

for them. roughout the 1950s the Air Force struggled to nd an identity for

its small warrant ocer corps. In 1953, Air Force Regulation 36–72 dened a

warrant ocer as “a technical specialist with supervisory ability, who is ap-

pointed for duty in one superintendent Air Force specialty.”

However, this

denition did not suciently encapsulate how the role of a warrant ocer

was distinct from an enlisted noncommissioned ocer. Similarly, at a time

when numerous warrant ocers lled commissioned ocer positions, this

denition did not identify how the responsibilities of a superintendent were

signicantly dierent from those of junior commissioned ocers.

Addition-

ally, the Air Force and Congress were at odds on warrant ocer appoint-

ments. e Air Force clearly believed warrant ocers were distinct from

commissioned ocers; however, the Ocer Grade Limitation Act of 1954

mandated that warrant ocers be counted against the cap on ocer authori-

zations.

As confusion on the appropriate roles and responsibilities of war-

rant ocers continued, the debate began on whether or not the USAF should

divest itself of the rank.

Death of the USAF warrant ocer. To resolve the confusion, the Air Force

directed the ocers of Air Command and Sta School to investigate whether

or not the service truly required warrant ocers to accomplish the mission. In

1954 they published the results of their study in a report entitled Should We

Eliminate the Grade of Warrant Ocer in the Air Force. e investigating o-

cers found that the majority of warrant ocer appointments were being used

as a reward for outstanding master sergeants who had reached a ceiling in

promotability aer achieving the maximum grade of E-7. ey also identied

that the Air Force needed to enhance the prestige of the senior noncommis-

sioned ocer corps in order to restore their authority to hold supervisory po-

sitions; however, they concluded that maintaining the warrant ocer ranks at

the top of the enlisted career ladder was not the best method to do so.

e Air Force needed to provide upward career mobility for its senior en-

listed members in order to satisfy a need for enlisted supervision at the group,

wing and major command level. To provide this upward mobility they recom-

mended that warrant ocers be eliminated and realigned to a “Warrant Air-

men” or “Superintendent” construct which focused more on supervisory and

management responsibilities, rather than on technical expertise.

is con-

cept eventually morphed into the E–8 and E–9 ranks in use today and the

subsequent death of the warrant ocer grades.

Warrant Ocer Utilization in Sister Services

During the 1950s, the edgling Air Force underwent a period of self-

reection as it attempted to carve out a unique service identity. In this pro-

cess, a need for senior enlisted supervision was identied and concluded that

a warrant ocer’s focus on technical expertise was incompatible for this role.

However, during this time, the Air Force failed also to consider whether it had

a need for some members to remain technical experts in their cra. e force

reductions following WWII also challenged sister services to codify the roles

and responsibilities of warrant ocers. However, the Army, Navy, and Marine

Corps reached dierent conclusions than the air service as evidenced by their

successful utilization of warrant ocers across numerous occupations today.

United States Navy. e US Navy (USN) has employed warrant ocers

longer than any other branch of the armed forces. In 1775 with the outbreak

of the Revolutionary War, Continental Congress established warrant ocer

grades to serve in eight unique positions upon newly commissioned frigates

to combat the British.

ese men were initially selected based upon their

expertise in civilian trades such as surgery, carpentry and gunnery. As the

naval technology matured, the Navy continued to add warrant ocers to its

force to meet its demand for specic technical knowledge. By WWII, the ini-

tial eight career elds had expanded to twelve and vast numbers of warrant

ocers had been added to meet wartime demands.

ough the warrant ocer has been a near constant position throughout

the history of the Navy, the necessity of the rank has not always been without

question. Similar to the experiences of the USAF, the personnel drawdown

following WWII challenged the Navy to consider whether or not warrant of-

cers were still necessary. From 1951 to 1959 three investigative boards were

convened to determine how warrant ocers t into the rank structure of the

Navy. ese boards ultimately decided to follow the same path as the Air

Force and eliminated warrant ocers in favor of adding the senior enlisted

E-8 and E-9 ranks.

As a result, this decision would not last for long. Drastic

cuts in the warrant ocer corps between 1959 and 1962 le the Navy strug-

gling to nd a replacement for the loss in technical expertise aboard its ships.

In 1963 the warrant ocer issue was reopened by another investigative board

which determined that warrant ocers should not only be reinstated but

their use should be expanded because of the rapidly growing technological

capabilities of modern warships.

While the Air Force held true to its initial decision, the Navy reversed

course and today there are twenty- six occupational designations where war-

rant ocers dutifully serve, including for a period of time, as pilots.

In 2006,

the Navy faced challenges with producing enough commissioned ocers to

meet its demand for pilots during a period of high accession. In response, the

Navy began an experimental program that generated warrant ocer pilots to

replace a portion of commissioned ocers in squadrons with extensive junior

ocer aviator populations. e goal was to create ying specialists that would

not be required to follow the traditional career path of a commissioned ocer

but would be able to remain ying without negative career repercussions.

Although the program was terminated in 2013 when the Navy reevaluated its

personnel requirements and no longer had a need to supplement its pilot bil-

lets with warrant ocers, it eectively proved that warrant ocers could reli-

ably serve as aviators.

e demise of the warrant ocer in the Air Force was largely due to its in-

ability to nd a dierence in responsibilities between senior noncommis-

sioned ocers and warrant ocers. However, the Navy was able to resolve

this confusion. e Navy denes an E–9 as a “senior enlisted leader respon-

sible for matters pertaining to leadership, administrative, and managerial

functions involving enlisted ratings.” In contrast, a warrant ocer is “a techni-

cal leader and specialist who directs technical operations in a given occupa-

tional specialty and serves successive tours in that specialty, yet remains the

technical expert.”

As will be discussed later in the analysis section of this

paper, it is this focus on technical leadership over successive tours that make

warrant ocers an appropriate t for the Air Force as UPT instructors.

United States Marine Corps. e origin of warrant ocers in the Marine

Corps can be traced back to WWI when Congress passed the National De-

fense Act of 1916, authorizing the military to expand quickly in response to

the great European war. Driven by technological advancements and in de-

mands resulting from rapid personnel growth, the Marine Corps instituted

warrant ocers for a specic purpose, “to maintain a selected body of person-

nel with special knowledge, training, and experience along particular lines...

beyond those required of noncommissioned ocers.”

Initially, 84 warrant

ocers were appointed as quartermaster clerks and marine gunners. Once

the United States ocially entered WWI, the demand for commissioned of-

cers in the Marine Corps increased and all but three of the initial 84 warrant

ocers were granted temporary commissions as second lieutenants.

At the

war’s conclusion, the need for ocers decreased and the temporary lieuten-

ants reverted back to the grade of warrant ocer. Similarly, growth of the

Marine Corps occurred during WWII. On a greater scale, Congress autho-

rized the appointment of 576 warrant ocers as well as granting the Secretary

of the Navy the responsibility for career management of warrant ocers, in-

cluding temporary commissions up to the rank of captain.

Following WWII, the lines of responsibility between warrant and commis-

sioned ocers became blurry. e Marine Corps trod a similar path as the

Air Force and Navy as it fought to alleviate the confusion. In 1959, the Marine

Corps headquarters directed a study on the warrant ocer force structure

which claried the role of the rank. First, warrant ocers jobs would be tech-

nical in nature and require long on- the- job or specialist training. Second,

their level of supervision would not require formal education such as a bach-

elor’s degree. ird, the rapid turnover of warrant ocers was undesirable.

Finally, warrant ocers should only be employed in technical positions that

were not suitable to prepare a commissioned ocer for broad, general, or

command duties.

is concept of employment for warrant ocers has sus-

tained eectiveness in the Marine Corps to the present day.

Current Marine Corps regulations dene a warrant ocer as “a technical

ocer specialist who performs duties that require extensive knowledge, train-

ing, and experience with the employment of particular capabilities which are

beyond the duties and responsibilities of senior noncommissioned ocers.”

Under this guidance, Marine Corps warrant ocers are divided into two func-

tional based categories: marine gunner and technical warrant ocer. Marine

gunners are experts in all aspects of infantry weapons and experts as unit lead

instructors for tactical training programs. In contrast, technical warrant o-

cers specialize in technical noncombat arms specialties such as intelligence

and electronics maintenance.

Although, the Marine Corps does not utilize

warrant ocers as pilots, the demonstrated experience and stability that they

provide to technically oriented career elds helps one to conceptualize how

warrant ocers could be benecial to USAF pilot training squadrons.

United States Army. e US Army (USA) warrant ocer corps recently

passed a 100-year milestone in dutiful service to the nation. In July 1918, the

US Congress rst introduced Army warrant ocers to serve in the Coast

Artillery Corps as mine planters charged with the defense of major ports

during WWI.

Aer the war, the Army warrant ocer corps followed a sim-

ilar path as its Navy and Marine counterparts. e force was initially reduced

and subsequently expanded in preparation for WWII. By the end of WWII,

the Army warrant ocer corps had grown to over 57,000 soldiers serving in

40 occupations.

During the 1950s the Army began to diverge from its sister services regard-

ing warrant ocers. While other branches questioned if warrant ocers were

needed, the Army greatly expanded its use of the grade. e establishment of

the Air Force as a separate branch of service in 1947 resulted in the Army los-

ing a substantial portion of its aviators and warrant ocers. ese ocers

were chosen as the answer to the pilot shortage problem. e Army graduated

its rst class of warrant ocer helicopter pilots in 1951. Among its regular

ocers, warrant ocers provided valuable continuity within the Army’s avia-

tion program which oen suered from rapid assignment rotation.

ough the Army did not question the need for warrant ocers aer

WWII, it did adjust the lens through which the rank was viewed. Prior to the

war, warrant ocer grades were utilized as a tool to reward long- serving en-

listed men, as well as former commissioned ocers of WWI who lacked the

educational requirements necessary for continued commissioned service.

Because the service lacked a clear policy on warrant ocers entering WWII,

appointment, assignment, promotion, and training were decentralized to ma-

jor commanders, which resulted in a disorganized force upon the war’s con-

clusion.

To establish centralized personnel management, the Army con-

ducted several studies during the 1950s in order to formalize the purpose and

form of the warrant ocer program. ese studies culminated in 1957 with

the Army publishing a denition of a warrant ocer as “a highly skilled tech-

nician who is provided to ll positions above the enlisted level which are too

specialized in scope to permit the eective development and continued utili-

zation of broadly- trained, branch- qualied commissioned ocers.”

Over the following six decades the Army warrant ocer corps continued

to evolve. ough the specic occupations have changed to match the de-

mands of emerging technology, the focus on technical and tactical employ-

ment of weapon systems has remained constant. Current Army regulations

highlight this unique aspect of warrant ocer grades: “warrant ocers re-

main single- specialty ocers whose career track is oriented towards pro-

gressing within their career eld rather than focusing on increased levels of

command and sta duty positions.”

is perspective, discussed later in this

paper, suggests that proper utilization of warrant ocers could signicantly

enhance unit manning stability. Furthermore, given the successful track re-

cord of warrant ocer pilots in the Army, and the specic technical nature of

instructing basic ight training, warrant ocers could provide exceptional

value to USAF pilot training squadrons.

Warrant Ocer Accession Timelines

e Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all recognize that the value of a warrant

ocer lies in their technical expertise at the tactical level of warfare. However,

the three services dier on determining when a person has the experience level

necessary to validate appointment into the warrant ocer corps. e three

personnel management models in use by the DOD for warrant ocer acces-

sions are early select, mid- career select, and late- career select.

e early select model is the least applied method as it is utilized only by the

Army and specically to acquire warrant ocer pilots. Under this model, the

Army selects approximately seventy- ve percent of its pilots from soldiers in

their rst or second term of enlistment with two to eight years of military expe-

rience in any occupation. e remaining quarter of Army aviators are recruited

directly from civilian life.

e ability to select pilots from outside its ranks

provides signicant advantages to the Army by expanding the applicant pool.

Many civilian applicants have prior ight experience which increases the likeli-

hood that the trainee will successfully graduate from military ight school.

e mid- career select model is used to select warrant ocers in technical

career elds for both the Army and the Marine Corps. For both services, an

applicant must have achieved a minimum grade of sergeant (E-5) and the

member must have typically completed 10 to 15 years of military service upon

selection.

e jobs of technical warrant ocers in the Army and Marine

Corps are closely related to the same occupational area that they worked as an

enlisted members.

Many of these technical warrant ocer billets have com-

parable responsibilities to jobs found in the civilian sector, such as equipment

maintenance. However, because the services do not recruit civilians for direct

accession into technical warrant ocer positions, the applicant pool in the

mid- career select model is considerably smaller than the early select model.

e Navy stands alone in using the late- career select model to appoint war-

rant ocers. Prior to applying for warrant ocer, Navy candidates must have

reached the rank of chief petty ocer (E-7). Almost all newly appointed naval

warrant ocers have at least 14 years of service. Occasionally, the applicants

have over 20 years of military experience and were eligible to retire.

Similar

to the Army and Marine Corps, the Navy values the technical expertise of its

warrant ocer corps and assigns them to supervisory and training positions

that align with their previous enlisted specialties. However, unlike the other

services, the Navy does not consider warrants to be “junior ocers” in these

positions due to their extensive experience in military service.

<0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

Percentages of Accessions

Army Aviator

Army Technician

Marine Corps Technician

Navy

Years of Service

Figure 2. Distribution of warrant ofﬁcer accessions by years of service

Figure 2 provides a graphical presentation of the diering patterns of war-

rant ocer accessions among the three services. From this gure, it becomes

clear that each military branch has a dierent viewpoint on the requisite ex-

perience level to serve as a warrant ocer. Note that Army aviators are the

warrant ocer corps with the least time in military service at accession. In

order to qualify for Air Force pilot training, a candidate must begin ight

training before age 30.

For this reason, if the Air Force was inclined to rein-

state its warrant ocer corps to serve as pilots, it would need to adopt an ac-

cession strategy that is similar to the one in use by the Army. For the purposes

of analysis later in this paper, an assumption is made that Air Force warrant

ocer pilots would be obtained via the early select method described above.

Alternative Options to Increase Pilot Production

Additional rst assignment instructor pilots. One option that may allow

the Air Force to bolster instructor manning at UPT squadrons is to increase

the allocation of rst assignment instructor pilots (FAIPs) per graduating

class. e current assignment process for graduating pilots is described in Air

Education and Training Command Instruction (AETCI) 36–2504. Prior to

receiving a follow- on assignment in a major weapon system (MWS), a stu-

dent’s training performance is evaluated to determine their potential to com-

plete the training successfully.

A student’s academic test scores, daily ight

performance, check ride grades, and ight commander rankings are com-

piled to produce a merit- based score.

ese standardized scores are used to

generate a class rank for each student which partially determines the follow-

on aircra they will y.

Before receiving an assignment, each student indicates their follow- on air-

cra preference from rst to last. ese preferences are combined with the

class ranking to determine the student’s next assignment. In general, the top

student in the class should get the rst assignment choice, assuming a training

slot is available

. If one is not available, the second, third, or fourth preference

would be assigned and so on. is process continues by class ranking until all

assignments have been fullled.

e only exception to the process is a student receiving a ight command-

er’s recommendation to become a FAIP. Typically, students receiving a FAIP

recommendation are in the top third of the class. Pilots with instructor duties

are required to have high maturity, ying, and interpersonal skills. When a

quota for a FAIP is le unlled aer the process described above, a high per-

forming student that otherwise may have received a preferred assignment is

instead selected to remain on station to become a UPT instructor. e new

pilot serves as a FAIP for three to four years, aer which an assignment in

another MWS is given. e leadership and supervisory responsibilities ac-

companying FAIP duties are limited; therefore, captains are prohibited from

FAIP selection because of the negative career progression that would occur.

Current regulations clearly indicate that FAIP assignments need to be

lled, even if it means not giving a high performing student a preferred fol-

low- on assignment. If the Air Force adjusted regulations to permit captains to

serve as FAIPs, the pool of potential instructor pilots could be immediately

increased. Furthermore, there are typically only one or two FAIP assignments

per graduating class. e Air Force could quickly improve its UPT instructor

manning by increasing the number of FAIP assignments given to each class.

However, such an action would temporarily decrease manning in operational

squadrons until an increase in yearly student production is obtained from the

additional instructor capacity. Given the current manning shortages in opera-

tional squadrons combined with ongoing combat operations, it is unclear if

this is an acceptable premise.

Contracted civilian instructors. e second option the Air Force may use

to increase instructor manning at UPT squadrons is to expand the resource

pool by looking outside its own ranks to the civilian market. e Air Force has

a recent history of utilizing contracted civilian pilots to ll manning shortages

in noncombat specialties across the force. Congressionally mandated force re-

ductions in 2014 forced the Air Force to close the 65th Aggressor Squadron,

resulting in a y percent reduction in organic red air support capacity at Nel-

lis Air Force Base.

To resolve this problem, the Air Force awarded Draken

International a contract to provide adversary training support sorties for

weapons school, operational test, and Red Flag exercises. e company owns a

eet of A-4 and L-139 decommissioned military aircra that are own by con-

tracted civilian pilots. e demonstrated success of this contract has led the

Air Force to expand its use of contracted red air. In August 2018, the Air Force

released a request for proposals, annually soliciting bids to support 30,000 ad-

versary air sorties in the continental US, Alaska, and Hawaii.

At rst glance, contract pilots seem like a logical solution to supplement

Air Force pilot shortages; however, the civilian option is not without potential

pitfalls of its own. First, the pilot shortage is not limited to the Air Force but is

a worldwide problem. e rapid growth of air travel in Asia is increasing

worldwide demand for pilots. Current estimates project a need for over 23,000

new pilots per year until 2029.

e Air Force is only one of many players in

competition for experienced pilots, and will undoubtedly face signicant

challenges recruiting them. Second, while the civilian market could expand

the pool of potential instructor pilots, the expansion would be limited by the

fact that not every civilian pilot is a suitable candidate to become a military

ight instructor. e performance characteristics of Air Force training air-

cra far exceed anything an average civilian pilot would have experienced. As

such, former military pilots are the most likely candidates to easily make the

transition to UPT instructor without requiring extensive training.

Timeline reductions via the pilot training next program. e nal

method this paper will analyze to determine the best way to increase pilot

production involves reducing the timeline to produce a pilot via syllabus re-

ductions and simulation. If the Air Force intends to increase the number of

students yearly, reducing the syllabus requirements for live ights is probably

a necessity, since the availability of daily sorties is limited by the fact that the

training aircra eet is a xed asset. Increasing the number of students

would only increase the demand for ight time, so training opportunities

must be found elsewhere.

e Air Force is already experimenting with this process in a program

known as pilot training next (PTN). e PTN program is designed to reduce

the overall cost and time it takes to produce a pilot by replacing ight hours

with modern virtual reality simulators.

Currently, each UPT base uses ve

or six high delity simulators to train 300–400 students per year.

Because

the simulators are such a low- density, high- demand asset, the students’ simu-

lator time is closely regulated, leaving little capacity for additional practice

outside of designated syllabus events. As a result, the vast majority of instruc-

tion under the current pilot training syllabus occurs in the aircra with stu-

dents receiving approximately 200 ight hours before graduation.

e PTN program is revamping ight simulation by investing in modern

virtual reality technology. Instead of purchasing traditional simulators at the

cost of two to three million dollars each, the Air Force has looked toward

commercial o- the- shelf technology to lower costs. For a cost of approxi-

mately $10,000, a virtual reality headset and personal computer are pro-

grammed with an ‘articially intelligent’ ight simulator program that oers

feedback on the student’s performance without a human instructor in the

loop.

e signicantly reduced cost allows the Air Force to provide each

student a simulator for personal use at their residence, and the Air Force is

hoping additional simulator time, and computer- based instruction will re-

place actual ight time.

In August 2018, the rst graduates of the PTN program received their

wings aer only six months of training, far faster than the year it takes tradi-

tional UPT students to graduate.

Under the new syllabus, these newly

minted pilots received only 60 hours of ight time before graduation, a sev-

enty percent reduction compared to traditional UPT students.

Additionally,

the PTN students did not y the T-38, or T-1 follow- on trainers that tradi-

tional UPT students y. Aer graduation, the students will proceed to train

for their assigned MWS having own only the T-6 trainer. With the inaugural

class being a test case and if the students fail to complete training for their

primary MWS, they will return to UPT to complete the second half of the

current syllabus in the T-38 or T-1.

While some portion of ight time needs to be replaced by simulators, the

Air Force must be careful in achieving the appropriate balance between the

two. Simulation cannot accurately replicate the physical forces of ight that

can create life- threatening cases of spatial disorientation and G induced loss of

consciousness. Additionally, no amount of preprogrammed simulations can

cover the nonstandard situations pilots experience in an actual air trac con-

trol environment. Simulators are useful to practice the basics of standard de-

partures, ight maneuvers, recoveries, instrument approaches, and pattern

operations. However, in real- world situations, air trac control will eventually

issue an instruction that causes a safety issue with conicting trac or terrain

that requires a pilot to rely on prior experience and judgement to diuse the

danger. e Federal Aviation Administration denes airmanship as “a sound

knowledge of and experience with the principles of ight, the knowledge, ex-

perience, and ability to operate an airplane with competence and precision

both on the ground and in the air, and the application of sound judgment that

results in optimal operational safety and eciency.”

e key word in this def-

inition is experience. While simulators help to build procedural knowledge,

true airmanship is best obtained through actual experience in the air.

Comparison of Warrant Ocers and Alternatives

To determine the best method for increasing instructor manning at UPT

squadrons and annual pilot production, warrant ocers, FAIPs, contractors,

and the PTN program will be compared against the following ve criteria:

timeliness of implementation, personnel cost savings, training squadron

manning stability, impact on operational squadron manning levels, and qual-

ity of training.

Timeliness of implementation. Of the four options outlined in this paper,

increasing FAIP assignments is by far the quickest method to increase in-

structor manning at UPT squadrons. Within a span of only a few months, the

Air Force could bolster instructor manning by giving additional FAIP assign-

ments to the next graduating class of pilots. e training apparatus for FAIPs

already exists, and the only delay in acquiring additional instructor pilots

would be a short break aer UPT graduation, while the newly winged aviator

waits for a training slot to open in the two- month pilot instructor training

(PIT) course.

Utilizing civilian contractors as UPT instructors is the second fastest

method that could be implemented. However, two assumptions need to be

made to validate this ranking. First, the time it takes for the Air Force to de-

velop contract requirements, release a request for proposals, nd contractors

to submit proposals, and select a contract winner varies widely depending

upon the scale of the contracted work. As such, an assumption is made that it

would take one to two years to award the contract. If the Air Force was willing

to issue contracts to individual pilots, rather than contracting a parent com-

pany to manage the workforce, this timeline could be reduced; however, re-

search for this project revealed no instances in which this method of contract

employment was utilized. e second assumption is that potential applicants

would be limited to civilians with former military ight experience. As de-

scribed earlier, a civilian that did not previously attend UPT would need ex-

tensive training to y high- performance aircra. is would only increase the

total training bill for the Air Force, negatively impacting its ability to produce

additional pilots. To become qualied instructors, former military pilots

would only need to attend the same two- month PIT course that FAIPs com-

plete. With these assumptions in mind, it would take approximately two to

three years to acquire a sizable Corps of contracted instructor pilots.

e PTN program ranks third in the speed of implementation. e rst

iteration of the program is already completed and has produced its rst round

of pilots. However, because the program is experimental, there is still a large

amount of uncertainty in the quality of pilots it produces. As described ear-

lier, if the pilots fail to graduate training for their assigned MWS, they will be

recycled to complete the second half of the traditional UPT syllabus. Depend-

ing upon the assigned MWS, it could take between four and twelve months

for these students to complete follow- on training, providing the rst chance

to assess the eectiveness of the PTN program. e second iteration of PTN

is already scheduled to begin in January 2019, and these students will follow

the same syllabus as the rst class.

In order to determine if the PTN syllabus

has achieved an appropriate balance of simulator and ight time, it will take

several years until enough students graduate to provide sucient data points

for statistical analysis. In the author’s estimate, the PTN program is a mini-

mum of ve years from being ready for full implementation. However, if the

rst several rounds of PTN pilots perform competitively with pilots from the

traditional UPT syllabus, this timeline could be reduced.

Warrant ocer instructor pilots would be the lengthiest method to in-

crease manning at UPT squadrons and for this reason, the Air Force would

rst need to develop a structure for training and career development of the

rank. e Army currently has a comprehensive education system for warrant

ocers that consists of preappointment, entry, advanced, senior, and master

level courses.

Air Force has none of this training apparatus and would need

to start from scratch. e Air Force could build these training programs in-

crementally by rst developing the preappointment and entry- level training

to get warrant ocer appointments going. As the initial appointees promote

up the warrant ocer rank ladder, advanced courses could be developed to

meet the need for further education. Incrementally developing training

courses could move the timeline for appointing warrant ocers earlier; how-

ever, it would still take several years to generate the initial courses. A second

problem that would delay the appointment of Air Force warrant ocers is the

need to nd applicability of the rank in multiple career elds. It would be

impractical to generate an entirely new rank structure solely for the UPT in-

structor career eld. However, the technical expertise that warrant ocers

provide could be a benecial addition across numerous disciplines in the Air

Force. Although, proving this case to senior Air Force leaders, as well as Con-

gress, would undoubtedly take a signicant amount of time. Due to these

issues, the rst Air Force warrant ocer appointment would most likely be

ve to ten years away.

Personnel cost savings. Warrant ocer instructor pilots have the highest

potential to reduce personnel costs at UPT squadrons if they were used to ll

billets currently occupied by company grade ocers (CGO). In addition to

instructor responsibilities, CGOs have additional duties within UPT squad-

rons that they perform when not in the cockpit. e duties assigned to lieu-

tenants consist primarily of administrative tasks, with very little supervisory

responsibilities. ese tasks are well within the capabilities of any warrant

ocer to perform. Captains at UPT squadrons are typically assigned as ight

commanders who supervise the lieutenants. While sister services primarily

utilize warrant ocers for their technical expertise, they are not restricted

from serving in supervisory positions as their experience grows. For the pur-

poses of analyzing potential cost savings, it will be assumed that warrant of-

cers in the grades of W-1 and W-2 are used to replace rst lieutenants (O-2),

and similarly W-3s are tting substitutions for captains (O-3).

Figure 3 shows the distribution of Army aviator warrant ocer promo-

tions by years of service. From this gure, it is important to note that in the

Army aviator population, W-2 promotions typically begin at four years of

service, and W-3 promotions begin aer nine years of service. In this analysis,

a similar promotion rate for the notional Air Force warrant ocer instructor

pilot will be used.

W-2 W-3

W-4 W-5

Percentages of Promotions

Years of Service

ARMY AVIATORS

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34

Figure 3. Distribution of Army Aviator promotions by years of service

In the Air Force, ocer promotions to rst lieutenant occur automatically

aer two years of service, and promotions to captain happen aer four years.

Due to the time it currently takes to graduate UPT and subsequently com-

plete training to become an instructor, virtually all FAIPs at UPT squadrons

are rst lieutenants with two to four years in service. It will be similarly as-

sumed that warrant ocers would have a minimum of two years of time in

service before they are qualied instructor pilots. Furthermore, captains serv-

ing as ight commanders typically have anywhere between four and 10 years

of time in service.

Pay

Grade

2 or less Over 2 Over 3 Over 4 Over 6 Over 8 Over 10

O–3 4,143.90 4,697.10 5,069.70 5,527.80 5,793.00 6,083.40 6,271.20

O–2 3,580.50 4,077.90 4,696.20 4,854.10 4,955.10 4,955.10 4,955.10

O–1 3,107.70 3,234.90 3,910.20 3,910.20 3,910.20 3,910.20 3,910.20

W–3 3,910.80 4,073.70 4,240.80 4,296.00 4,470.60 4,815.30 5,174.10

W–2 3,460.50 3,787.80 3,888.60 3,957.60 4,182.30 4,530.90 4,703.70

W–1 3,037.50 3,364.50 3,452.40 3,638.10 3,857.70 4,181.70 4,332.60

Table 1. 2018 Military Pay Chart- monthly basic pay

Adapted From: Defense Finance and Accounting Service, “Basic Pay,” 2018 Military Pay Chart, (Washington, D.C:

Department of Defense Comptroller, 1 January 2018).

e outlined cells in Table 1 indicate the qualitative data that was used for

comparison in order to determine the potential cost savings by using the war-

rant ocer for CGO substitutions described above. For Example, a newly

promoted O-3 was compared to a newly promoted W-3. From this data, if an

O-2 is replaced by a W-1 or W-2, the annual personnel bill would be reduced

by an average of $7,362 per person. e W-3 for O-3 substitution results in

even greater annual savings at an average of $10,854 per person.

In addition to monetary savings from annual salaries, substituting warrant

ocers for CGOs could result in a signicantly reduced obligation to pay re-

tirement benets because many warrant ocers would likely separate before

completing the 20 years of service needed to retire. As discussed earlier, the

pay discrepancy between airline and military salaries is a signicant factor in

declining pilot retention. is discrepancy would only be higher for warrant

ocers and many would leave for higher paying civilian employment. In fact,

less than half of Army warrant ocer aviators complete 20 years of service.

Finally, while the Air Force would lose its training investment as warrant

ocers separated aer their 10-year service commitment, the loss would be

far less for a warrant ocer pilot than a commissioned ocer because war-

rant ocers would not have incurred additional expenses from training in

another MWS. e GAO estimates that it costs approximately $11,000,000 to

produce a ghter pilot. In contrast, the cost to produce a UPT instructor is

approximately $1,000,000.

e PTN program and increasing FAIP assignments tie for second in terms

of reducing personnel costs, since there would mainly be no change to the

current obligation. While the PTN program would save money in dierent

ways, such as replacing expensive ight hours for simulators, the impact on

personnel costs is negligible. It does not matter if a student is receiving in-

struction in an airplane or a simulator, the fact remains that an instructor

needs to be there to teach the student. If that instructor is a commissioned

ocer, the cost of employing them remains unchanged. Similarly, increasing

the use of FAIPs only adds more commissioned ocers to the payroll, and by

doing so, there are no unrealized savings in personnel costs.

Contract pilots rank fourth in personnel savings primarily because it is

impossible to say whether they would be cheaper than using commissioned

ocer instructor pilots. Conversely, contractors may actually increase costs to

the US taxpayer because their salaries need to be competitive with other op-

portunities in the civilian market. When military pilots are already leaving

service for higher salaries in the civilian sector, any contract the Air Force

proposes must provide an incentive that is more attractive than what the air-

lines provide. ere is serious international competition to acquire pilots. For

example, Air China is oering salaries beginning at $16,500 per month to

American pilots willing to y for a foreign airline.

If the Air Force does bring

competitive contract salaries to the table, it may inadvertently exacerbate its

retention problem and end up paying recently separated UPT instructors

more money to do the same job.

Some may argue that contractors would save money on healthcare costs

over military personnel; however, the relatively young age and good health of

the Air Force’s pilot community does not typically result in numerous expen-

sive hospital visits. Furthermore, a pilot with the necessary experience to be

hired by the airlines is unlikely to take a job as an Air Force contractor that

does not pay enough to cover health insurance. While healthcare costs may

not be directly absorbed by the Air Force, it would inevitably be incurred

through a higher contract salary.

Training squadron manning stability. Warrant ocers are the best op-

tion to bring instructor manning stability to UPT squadrons because they can

work in a single vocation for an entire career. In contrast, commissioned of-

cers require a wide breadth of knowledge because eventually they will lead

large and diverse groups of people. Wing commanders need to have a general

understanding of operations, maintenance, logistics, base support, and nu-

merous other functions. e scope of their command requires commanders

lead the people executing these tasks and functions. To acquire this wide body

of knowledge, commissioned ocers are expected to move to a dierent base

every three to four years.

is poses a problem, as every time a UPT instructor leaves for career

broadening opportunities, the Air Force incurs two additional training bills.

e departing instructor must attend training for a combat airframe, and the

replacement pilot must relearn how to y training aircra. ese additional

training bills could be signicantly reduced if warrants replaced commis-

sioned ocers as UPT instructors. e high degree of specialization, inherent

to the warrant ocer ranks would allow them to stay at the same location,

producing new pilots, for the entirety of their 10-year service commitment. A

warrant ocer instructor serving a 10-year assignment would eliminate six to

eight training requirements for commissioned ocers subject to a three- year

assignment cycle. While the initial two- year training investment to create a

UPT instructor is the same for commissioned and warrant ocers, the return

on that investment is signicantly higher for warrants.

Contracted instructor pilots rank slightly behind warrant ocers in the

competition to improve training squadron manning stability. eoretically,

so long as the Air Force maintained continuous funding, contract pilots could

remain employed as UPT instructors. However, the civilian status of contract

pilots carries a potential to produce hazardous problems in the UPT arena.

Because contractors are civilians, they have the option to quit if the condi-

tions of the contract become unfavorable. is exact situation occurred in

2009 at Vance Air Force Base when over 350 contracted aircra maintainers

went on strike over a dispute with the parent company that owned the con-

tract. With the aircra grounded, pilot training screeched to a halt. e re-

sulting pile up of students waiting to begin training caused a blockage in the

pipeline that took months to resolve.

To achieve a production rate of 1,600 pilots per year, the Air Force must

avoid situations that prevent a steady ow in the training pipeline. If the Air

Force issued contracts to individual pilots rather than selecting a parent com-

pany to provide the contracted workforce, the likelihood of a major work

stoppage could be reduced but not eliminated. An individual pilot that fails to

fulll the conditions of a contract would undoubtedly be subject to monetary

penalties. However, these penalties cannot guarantee that the pilot will not

quit. If the civilian marketplace presents an opportunity to achieve a higher

paying salary, the pilot may be enticed to accept the penalty and leave. e

threat of monetary penalties pales in comparison to punishment under the

Uniform Code of Military Justice for a warrant ocer that is absent without

leave. As such, contract pilots fall second to warrant ocers in enhancing

manning stability in UPT squadrons.

Finally, the PTN program and increasing FAIP assignments are the meth-

ods with the least impact toward improving instructor manning stability at

UPT squadrons. ough the PTN program should theoretically produce pi-

lots faster, and additional FAIPs would provide a self- sustained source of

manning by directly training their replacements, both programs would still

produce commissioned ocer pilots that are subject to a three- year assign-

ment cycle. If either of these programs were fully implemented, there would

be no appreciable change in manning stability from current operations.

Impact on operational squadron manning levels. Ignoring the amount of

time it takes to develop and award the contract itself, contract instructor pi-

lots could produce a near immediate positive impact on operational squadron

manning levels. Assuming the contractors are former military pilots, they

would not need to undertake the year- long UPT syllabus. In all likelihood,

these contractors would only need to complete the same PIT course that any

new instructor to UPT attends. Aer graduating, they could immediately be-

gin replacing military pilots, thereby freeing the military personnel to return

to operational squadrons. Additionally, because contractors do not count

against the Air Force’s total end strength authorization, they do not require a

one- for- one pilot swap between operational and training squadrons. Under

the current structure, the net personnel gain from a change of assignment for

either operational or training squadrons is zero. For each contracted UPT

instructor, operational squadrons could gain an additional body.

e PTN program is the second- best method to restore operational squad-

rons to full manning status. e experimental program should produce pilots

faster, thereby allowing them to attend follow- on training and get to opera-

tional squadrons well before a pilot is produced by the current syllabus. is

is evident in the case of the test class, as they reduced the UPT graduation

timeline by y percent in comparison with peers who followed the standard

syllabus. It remains to be seen if such a drastic reduction in the PTN students’

ight time will yield acceptable performance in follow- on training. If the stu-

dents have no problems progressing through the next phase of training, the

Air Force may decide to fully implement the program and operational squad-

rons may see improved manning relatively quickly. However, it is more likely

that the Air Force still needs a few years to adjust the balance of ight and

simulator time to guarantee consistency in the quality of pilots it produces.

Regardless of how long it takes to fully implement the PTN program, there

should eventually be a signicant reduction in the time it takes to make a pilot

and improve operational manning levels.

Warrant ocers rank third regarding their ability to improve operational

manning levels. Warrant ocer instructor pilots would have similar benets

as contract pilots by freeing commissioned ocers to return to operational

squadrons. However, because a warrant ocer would need to attend the full

pilot training course before PIT, the process of replacing commissioned o-

cer instructors would be delayed by an additional year in comparison with

contractors. Additionally, until a sizable warrant ocer instructor corps is

developed, warrant ocer UPT students would take training slots away from

commissioned ocers who otherwise would have reinforced operational

squadron manning.

Lastly, additional FAIPs is the worst option to provide immediate relief to

operational squadron manning shortages. First, assuming they follow the

standard UPT syllabus, the production timeline is unchanged, and it would

take approximately 16 months to make them useful UPT instructors. Second,

similar to the problem with warrant ocers as described above, the UPT

training slots used to create a FAIP prevent a newly minted pilot from going

to operational squadrons aer graduation. Finally, following graduation,

FAIPs serve a three to four- year assignment at their initial training squadron.

Hence, a FAIP will not directly improve operational squadron manning until

four to ve years aer beginning pilot training. Although, they do indirectly

contribute toward solving the manning shortage in operational squadrons by

training new pilots.

Quality of training. To determine which method presents the highest

quality of training, an assumption is made that warrant ocers, FAIPs, and

contract pilots would all be instructing under the current UPT syllabus. With

this in mind, since the current UPT syllabus is a time proven method of in-

structing aviators, all three methods have equally high potential to produce

quality pilots. ere is nothing to suggest that changing the instructor’s rank,

or adding civilians to the instructor corps, would negatively impact the qual-

ity of graduating pilots.

e worst option regarding quality of training is the PTN program. For

reasons already described, simulator time is not a perfect replicator of actual

ight conditions. Students graduating with reduced ight hours will be more

susceptible to airborne physiological incidents because they have less experi-

ence in the airplane. e ability to recognize, conrm, and recover from phys-

iological degradation is only gained through previous experience with the

phenomena that induced it. Before fully implementing the program, the Air

Force must acknowledge that PTN graduates will join operational squadrons

with less experience to counter the disorienting eects of ight. e service

must be willing to accept an increased risk of aviation accidents.

Analysis

e Air Force has established a goal of increasing production from 1,200 to

1,600 pilots per year, and additional students will necessitate a corresponding

increase of instructors to train them. e ceaseless pace of combat operations,

in concert with a widespread pilot shortage in operational squadrons, has

presented a situation where the Air Force may not be able to organically sup-

port increasing instructor manning at UPT squadrons. e objective of this

paper was to determine a solution to this problem and answer the question,

are warrant ocers the best solution to increase UPT instructor manning, in

order to achieve the overarching goal of producing 1,600 pilots per year?

Criteria

Method to Increase Pilot Production

Rank

Warrant

Ofﬁcers

Contract

Pilots

Additional

FAIPs

Pilot Training

Timeliness of Implementation 4th 2nd 1st 3rd

Personnel Cost Savings 1st 4th 2nd (Tie) 2nd (Tie)

Training Squadron Manning

Stability

1st 2nd 3rd (Tie) 3rd (Tie)

Impact on Operational

Squadron Manning Levels

3rd 1st 4th 2nd

Quality of Training 1st (Tie) 1st (Tie) 1st (Tie) 4th

Table 2. Summary of the comparison between methods and criteria

Table 2 summarizes the results of the comparison between warrant ocers

and alternative methods to increase pilot production. Each method is given a

rank by how well it satises the previously identied criteria. A simple scan of

this table reveals that no single solution to the problem exists. While warrant

ocers are the best option regarding personnel cost savings and training

squadron manning stability, they cannot be implemented quickly and would

delay operational squadrons from returning to full manning status. To put it

simply, the answer to the question proposed in this paper is no. Warrant o-

cers are not the best option to increase instructor manning at UPT squadrons;

however, neither are any of the alternatives. e pilot shortage in the Air

Force is a complex problem that requires a multifaceted solution.

Conclusion

In order to provide a recommendation to solve the complex problem at

hand, several conclusions regarding the pilot shortage must be understood

and addressed. First, with airline hiring rates projected to increase for the

next decade, pilot retention will continue to decline, and the Air Force cannot

delay increasing its annual pilot production. e longer the Air Force waits to

implement any of the methods described in this paper, the more dicult it

will become to nd available instructors. us, lling all empty instructor

positions at UPT squadrons via the quickest method possible should be rst

priority. e Air Force cannot aord any delays in production that result from

a lack of instructors to teach students.

Second, while fully manning UPT squadrons is rst priority, the Air Force

must simultaneously avoid reducing operational squadron manning, since it

is evident the pace of combat operations shows no signs of slowing. Maintain-

ing constant readiness to project combat airpower is the most important ob-

ligation the Air Force owes to the American people. Reducing operational

squadron manning to ll training slots puts this obligation in danger and

should be avoided at all costs.

ird, contractors can provide a means to temporarily increase manpower

because they are not counted against congressional limits on end strength,

but this benet may come at a high cost. Since any proposed contract must be

able to compete with other employment opportunities, contract pilots are

likely to be expensive. If the Air Force is inevitably going to lose pilots to the

civilian sector, it might as well be willing to pay the necessary price to recruit

them back as civilians to help solve the pilot production problem. However,

with high expense and the potential for a contracted workforce to go on strike,

any use of contract pilots should be implemented aer a plan to replace them

with military personnel is in place.

Fourth, the Air Force should eventually move away from the traditional

practice of solely using commissioned ocers as UPT instructors. Being sub-

ject to a three- year assignment cycle generates an excessive training burden

for the Air Force that could easily be avoided by utilizing warrant ocer in-

structor pilots. Warrant ocers in the Army and Navy, have a proven track

record of providing technical expertise and manning stability to aviation ca-

reer elds, and there is no reason to suspect the Air Force would experience

anything dierent.

Finally, with the expectation that the training aircra eet is not going to

grow in the near future, additional students will make ight time a low-

density high- demand resource. e use of advanced simulators to replace the

training lost from reduced ight time, while not desirable, is a necessary real-

ity. e Air Force should continue its research and experimentation to deter-

mine the appropriate balance between ight and simulator time.

Recommendation

With the conclusions described above, the Air Force should proceed with

the following course of action to begin producing additional pilots and start

chipping away at the pilot shortage. First, immediately assess how many ad-

ditional UPT instructors are required, and starting with the next graduating

class, give out as many FAIP assignments as necessary to ll the gaps. In a

period of two to three months UPT squadrons could be fully manned. For a

short period of time this would reduce the number of new pilots owing into

operational squadrons; however, it avoids the need to reassign a fully- trained

operational pilot to serve as a UPT instructor.

Simultaneously, the Air Force should begin to develop and solicit con-

tracts for civilian instructor pilots. To mitigate the potential for a major work

stoppage, the contracts should be given out to individual pilots with prior

military ight experience, rather than contracting a parent company to pro-

vide the work. Once accomplished, the contract pilots could begin a one- for-

one replacement of military pilots, thereby freeing them to return to their

primary MWS and initiate the process of restoring operational squadrons to

full manning status.

As this occurs, the Air Force should continue to research the utility of war-

rant ocers throughout every career eld. ough it is impractical to gener-

ate an entirely new rank structure solely for UPT instruction, it is likely that

numerous occupations across the force would benet from the specialization

provided by warrant ocers. If warrant ocers can provide widespread value

to the force, senior Air Force leaders should work toward gaining congres-

sional approval to reinstate the rank. Once approved, warrant ocers could

begin phasing out contract pilots, thus providing extensive personnel savings

and manning stability to UPT squadrons.

Finally, the PTN program has taken ambitious strides to reduce the time-

line to produce a pilot and these eorts should continue. However, the PTN

program needs a slight shi in focus to ensure it consistently produces high

quality pilots. Going forward, the emphasis of the PTN program should not

be on determining the absolute minimum amount of ight time needed to

graduate, rather the focus of the program should be on maximizing ight

time for each student within the constraints of limited aircra availability, and

the requirement to produce 1,600 pilots per year. Once the appropriate bal-

ance of ight and simulator time is achieved, the PTN program should be

fully implemented in concert with the recommendations described above.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the

bibliography.)

1. Mitchell, “Air Force Face Serious 2,000-pilot Shortage.”

2. United States GAO, “Report: Military Personnel,” 57.

3. Losey, “Air Force 2019 Budget: Pilot Training.”

4. Cody, “CMSAF All Call” (video recording, Washington DC).

5. Sweeney, “Increase in Major Airline Pilot Hiring,” 3.

6. United States GAO, “Fighter Pilot Workforce Requirements,” 66.

7. Wilson, “Current Readiness of the United States Air Force,” 7.

8. Wilson, “Current Readiness of the USAF,” 3.

9. Wilson, “Current Readiness of the USAF,” 4.

10. DOD, Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request, 7.

11. United States GAO, Fighter Pilot Workforce Requirements, 67.

12. United States GAO, Fighter Pilot Workforce Requirements, 16.

13. Callander, “e In- Betweeners,” 70.

14. Callander, “e In- Betweeners.”

15. Callander, “e In- Betweeners,” 71.

16. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 36–72, Ocer Personnel.

17. Air Command and Sta School (ACSC), Warrant Ocer in the Air Force, 7.

18. Brantley, memorandum, 2–3.

19. Air Command and Sta School, “Should We Eliminate,” 6.

20. Air Command and Sta School, “Should We Eliminate,” 13.

21. Department of the Navy, Navy Personnel (NAVPERS) 15627A, 1–1.

22. Reilly, “History of Warrant Ocers in the US Navy.”

23. Briem, “e Navy Needs More Warrant Ocers.” 88–89.

24. Briem, “e Navy Needs More Warrant Ocers.”

25. Reilly, “History of Warrant Ocers in the US Navy.”

26. Warrant Ocer Historical Foundation, “Warrant Ocer Histories.”

27. Message. R-010032Z AUG 13, To NAVADMIN 192/13, 1.

28. Navy Occupational Development and Analysis Center, “Classication Struc-

tures,” 10.

29. Johnson, “Marine Corps Warrant Ocers,” 7.

30. Johnson, “Marine Corps Warrant Ocers.”

31. Johnson, “Marine Corps Warrant Ocers,” 8–9.

32. Johnson, “Marine Corps Warrant Ocers,” 11–12.

33. Department of the Navy, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 1412.9b, 2.

34. Johnson, “Marine Corps Warrant Ocers,” 17.

35. United States Army Combined Arms Center, “Warrant Ocer Program.”

36. Department of the Army, Leader Development Panel Phase III, 1.

37. Davis, “Warrant Ocers Have Been the Experts,” 73.

38. Department of the Army, Army Training Leader Development, 1.

39. Coroneos, “Warrant Ocer in the Volunteer Force,” 7.

40. Coroneos, “e Warrant Ocer,” 9.

41. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 7–0—Training, 4–22.

42. United States Congress, e Warrant Ocer Ranks, 18.

43. United States Congress, e Warrant Ocer Ranks.

44. United States Congress, e Warrant Ocer Ranks, 7.

45. Department of the Army, Army Training and Leader Development, 9.

46. United States Congress, e Warrant Ocer Ranks, 19–20.

47. Department of the Navy, Warrant Ocer Professional Guidebook, 2–3.

48. United States Congress, e Warrant Ocer Ranks, 20.

49. Department of the Air Force, “Pilot Qualications Summary.”

50. Air Education and Training Command Instruction (AETCI) 36–2605v4, 42.

51. Air Education and Training Command Instruction (AETCI) 36–2605v4, 58.

52. Air Education and Training Command Instruction (AETCI) 36–2605v4, 43.

53. Air Education and Training Command Instruction (AETCI) 36–2605v4, 44.

54. Tirpak, “Aggressor Unit Inactivating.”

55. Brian Everstine, “USAF Releases RFP for Contracted Adversary Air.”

56. Sweeney, “Predicting Air Force Pilot Attrition,” 5.

57. United States Air Force Public Aairs, “Report: Pilot Training Next.”

58. Frame, “Experimental Pilot Training Program.”

59. Frame, “Experimental Pilot Training Program.”

60. Frame, “Experimental Pilot Training Program.”

61. Bolinger, “Airmen Earn eir Wings.”

62. Frame, “Experimental Pilot Training Program.”

63. Strang, “Pilot Training Program.”

64. Federal Aviation Administration, FAA- H-8083-3B—Airplane Flying Hand-

book, 1–1.

65. Maucione, “Air Force’s Experimental Way of Training Pilots.”

66. Department of the Army, “Army Training Leader Development,” 2.

67. US Congress, “e Warrant Ocer Ranks,” 28.

68. US Congress, “e Warrant Ocer Ranks,” 29.

69. United States Government Accountability Oce, Pilot Requirements, 3.

70. Sweeney, “Predicting Air Force Pilot Attrition,” 6.

71. Blossom, “Strike Grounds Operations.”

Abbreviations

Abbreviation Denition

AAF Army Air Forces

ACSC Air Command and Sta College

AETCI Air Education and Training Command Instruction

CGO company grade ocers

CMSgt chief master sergeant

CSAF chief of sta of the Air Force

DOD Department of Defense

FAIP rst assignment instructor pilot

GAO Government Accountability Oce

MWS major weapon system

PIT pilot instructor training

PTN pilot training next

RPA remotely piloted aircra

UPT undergraduate pilot training

USA United States Army

USN United States Navy

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