Management of the Special Programs Unit at the Federal Bureau of Prisons Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York



Office of the Inspector General

U.S. Department of Justice

Management of the Special Programs

Unit at the Federal Bureau of Prisons

Metropolitan Detention Center in

Brooklyn, New York

Evaluation and Inspections Division 15-08

September 2015

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Ronell Wilson was convicted in 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of New York of capital murder for killing two undercover New York City

police detectives. In 2007, Judge Nicholas Garaufis sentenced Wilson to death. On

February 18, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed

Wilson’s conviction but vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for a

new penalty phase trial. On July 24, 2013, a federal jury again unanimously

returned a death penalty recommendation and, on September 10, 2013, Judge

Garaufis reinstated the death sentence.

While at the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Metropolitan Detention Center

in Brooklyn, New York (MDC Brooklyn) awaiting the new penalty phase trial and

resentencing, Wilson had a months-long sexual relationship with then Correctional

Officer Nancy Gonzalez that resulted in the birth of their child. Gonzalez’s conduct

was investigated by the Investigations Division of the Department of Justice Office

of the Inspector General (OIG), and she was prosecuted for and convicted of Sexual

Intercourse with a Ward.

During Wilson’s resentencing hearing in 2013, an inmate housed in the same

unit as Wilson testified that he and another inmate had submitted a handwritten

complaint to MDC Brooklyn’s head of security, reporting Gonzalez’s sexual

relationship with Wilson. Testimony alleged that, following the inmates’ complaint,

Wilson held an inquisition in the housing unit to determine who had reported him.

The OIG Investigations Division investigated the possibility that a Correctional

Officer in the unit in which Wilson was housed (the Special Programs Unit (SPU))

gave the inmates’ complaint to Gonzalez, who subsequently gave it to Wilson; but

the OIG could not substantiate the information.

Inmates also testified at the

resentencing hearing that Wilson bullied them and manipulated staff in a variety of

ways.

Judge Garaufis’s opinion regarding Wilson’s resentencing cited “the apparent

ineptitude of the Bureau of Prisons” and recommended that the OIG “examine the

management, policies, and procedures of the MDC that allowed [Wilson’s] behavior

to occur, placing at risk of harm other inmates and the many hard working

personnel at the facility.”

Objective and Scope

Our review sought to determine whether MDC Brooklyn’s management

controls, policies, procedures, and practices could have contributed to Wilson’s

The SPU was established at MDC Brooklyn in October 2000, primarily to house inmates with

mental health conditions who require greater control, supervision, or monitoring than afforded in a

typical general population unit. The SPU also houses certain inmates whose characteristics may

increase their likelihood of physical or sexual victimization while incarcerated.

alleged disruption of the safety and security of inmates and staff in the SPU from

March 2011 to August 2012, and whether any such issues reflected more general

problems that need to be addressed at the facility.

Results in Brief

Although the events the court noted in its resentencing opinion were due in

large measure to the criminal actions of Gonzalez and the alleged misconduct of

another Correctional Officer, we identified concerns related to the BOP’s placement

of Wilson in the SPU with vulnerable inmates without implementing safeguards or

providing guidance to correctional staff. We also noted areas where MDC

Brooklyn’s ability to communicate information across shifts and housing units

should be improved. However, we did not find that these communications

deficiencies directly led to the incidents that were the subject of our review. During

the course of our review, MDC Brooklyn management began to address some of the

concerns we identified.

Wilson Was Assigned to the SPU without Management Implementing Safeguards To

Prevent and Detect His Disruption of the Safety and Security of the Unit

MDC Brooklyn senior management (management) recognized the need to

closely monitor Wilson because of his violent history and gang member status.

Management told us that they would have preferred to assign Wilson to the Special

Housing Unit (SHU) for the duration of his resentencing proceedings, but they

believed this was not an option because his death sentence had been vacated and

during a previous incarceration at MDC Brooklyn the court issued an order requiring

MDC Brooklyn to remove Wilson from the SHU and reassign him to general

population, subject to his continued good behavior.

After a brief initial period in

the SHU, management assigned Wilson to the SPU knowing that he would be

housed with vulnerable inmates. Management told us they assigned Wilson to the

SPU rather than a general population unit because the SPU is significantly smaller in

size and population than typical general population units at MDC Brooklyn, which

they assumed would make it easier for Correctional Officers to monitor him.

While the SPU primarily houses inmates with mental health conditions, the

unit’s procedures also allow MDC Brooklyn’s management to house inmates without

mental health conditions there. However, SPU procedures do not provide any

instructions for staff on how to manage inmates like Wilson who have not been

classified as needing the BOP’s mental health services and who could potentially

intimidate other SPU inmates. In addition, management did not provide any special

instructions to staff on how to manage Wilson differently while he was in the SPU.

We define senior management at MDC Brooklyn as the Warden, Associate Wardens, and the

Captain.

SHUs are housing units in BOP institutions where inmates are securely separated from the

general inmate population and may be housed either alone or with other inmates. See BOP Program

Statement 5270.10, Special Housing Units (August 1, 2011).

As a result, staff told us that they generally did not manage Wilson differently than

other inmates in the SPU.

While it is clear that Wilson’s relationship with Gonzalez disrupted the safety

and security of the institution, we could not determine the extent to which the

inmates’ allegations of bullying and manipulation occurred. Staff told us they were

unaware of instances when Wilson’s behavior should have prompted them to write

an incident report, and the unit’s documentation that we reviewed does not

corroborate the inmates’ statements.

During Our Review, Management Took Steps To Improve Communication Related to

the Safety and Security of MDC Brooklyn; However, Areas of Concern Remain

We identified several instances in which MDC Brooklyn policy was unclear

and may not have been fully communicated to staff. For example, we found that

MDC Brooklyn issued a revised SPU memorandum in January 2015, making it part

of the directives (known as post orders) for staff in the SPU; however, some staff

did not recall ever seeing this version or any previous versions.

We also found

certain post orders in place at the time of our review did not ensure that

Correctional Officers routinely conducted searches of all housing unit cells. Further,

we found that the policy as to how staff should handle sealed inmate complaints

that have been placed in unit mailboxes needs to be clarified. Finally, we found

that MDC Brooklyn should consider additional steps to improve its methods to

ensure relevant security information is consistently shared across shifts and

housing units.

Recommendations

We make five recommendations in this report to improve MDC Brooklyn’s

policies and procedures when managing inmates in the SPU who do not have a

mental health condition, to ensure staff is notified of the process for handling

sealed inmate complaints, to ensure that supervisors verify that staff is conducting

searches of all housing unit cells within the time policy requires, and to ensure that

staff receive relevant security information.

The Chief Psychologist originally issued the Operational Procedures for Unit K-81, Special

Programs Unit (the SPU memorandum) to the then Warden on November 10, 2011, and again on

November 19, 2013. During the course of our review, MDC Brooklyn issued a new SPU memorandum

reflecting significant changes from the 2011 and 2013 memoranda. Chief Psychologist, MDC Brooklyn,

memorandum to Warden, Operational Procedures for Unit K-81, Special Programs Unit, January 14,

2015.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1

Wilson Was Assigned to the SPU without Management Implementing

Safeguards To Prevent and Detect His Disruption of the Safety and

During Our Review, Management Took Steps To Improve Communication

Related to the Safety and Security of MDC Brooklyn; However, Areas of

FINDINGS.................................................................................................... 9

Security of the Unit .......................................................................... 9

Concern Remain............................................................................. 16

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................ 21

Conclusion ........................................................................................ 21

Recommendations ............................................................................. 22

APPENDIX 1: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW ....................... 23

Interviews ........................................................................................ 23

Site Visits ......................................................................................... 23

Document Review.............................................................................. 24

APPENDIX 2: THE BOP’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT............................ 25

APPENDIX 3: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE BOP’S RESPONSE ................................... 28

The BOP's General Comments ............................................................. 28

The BOP's Response to Recommendations............................................. 28

INTRODUCTION

Ronell Wilson was found guilty of the March 10, 2003, capital murder of two

undercover New York City police detectives who were posing as gun buyers in

Staten Island, New York. Wilson, a member of the Bloods gang, shot them each in

the back of the head at point blank range. After a trial before Judge Nicholas

Garaufis of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, a jury found

Wilson guilty of capital murder on December 20, 2006. On March 29, 2007, Judge

Garaufis sentenced him to death — the first federal death sentence in New York

State in over 50 years.

On February 18, 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Wilson’s

conviction but vacated his death sentence based on constitutional grounds and sent

the case back to the Eastern District of New York for a new penalty phase trial.

July 24, 2013, a federal jury unanimously returned a death penalty

recommendation. On September 10, 2013, Judge Garaufis reinstated the death

sentence. During the trial and again during the resentencing proceedings, Wilson

was incarcerated at the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Metropolitan Detention

Center in Brooklyn, New York (MDC Brooklyn).

After hearing extensive testimony during the resentencing proceedings about

Wilson’s incarceration at MDC Brooklyn, Judge Garaufis found that, “not only did

Mr. Wilson’s behavior in prison illuminate his continuing lack of remorse and

disregard for authority, but it also shed light on the apparent ineptitude of the

[Federal] Bureau of Prisons.”

In his opinion, the Judge expressed concerns in three general areas. First,

Wilson was able to carry on “a months-long sexual relationship” with Correctional

Officer Nancy Gonzalez “that resulted in the birth of their child.” Second, Wilson

allegedly was given a handwritten complaint addressed to MDC Brooklyn’s head of

security, reporting Gonzalez’s sexual relationship with Wilson. He then allegedly

held “an inquisition in the housing unit, interrogating inmate after inmate to

determine who had reported him.” Finally, Wilson “was permitted to treat MDC as

his own private fiefdom” by manipulating staff members to his advantage and

intimidating more-vulnerable inmates. The Judge therefore recommended that the

Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) “examine the

management, policies, and procedures of the MDC that allowed [Wilson’s alleged

behavior] to occur, placing at risk of harm other inmates and the many hard

working personnel at the facility.”

See United States v. Wilson, 04-CR-1016 (ED NY, December 20, 2006) (guilty verdict). See

also United States v. Wilson, 04-CR-1016 (ED NY, March 30, 2007) (sentencing order).

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found in substance that the prosecution’s arguments

related to the issues of remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and future dangerousness impaired

Wilson’s constitutional rights.

Wilson is currently incarcerated at the U.S. Penitentiary Terre Haute, Indiana, awaiting

execution.

Our review focused on whether weaknesses in management controls,

policies, procedures, and practices contributed to Wilson’s alleged manipulation of

staff and intimidation of vulnerable inmates in his housing unit. The OIG’s

Investigations Division investigated the inmates’ allegation that Wilson was given a

copy of their complaint; however, the OIG was unable to substantiate the

allegation. The sexual relationship between Wilson and Gonzalez resulted in

Gonzalez’s criminal conviction for Sexual Intercourse with a Ward, and she was

sentenced to 12 months and 1 day in federal prison.

In this introduction section, we provide a general overview of MDC Brooklyn;

a description of MDC Brooklyn’s Special Programs Unit (SPU); current BOP Office of

Internal Affairs sexual abuse statistics; information about Wilson’s conviction and

death penalty sentencing; and Wilson’s first and second confinement at MDC

Brooklyn, including allegations inmates raised while Wilson was pending

resentencing.

Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York

MDC Brooklyn is the largest federal metropolitan detention center in the

country, currently housing approximately 1,853 inmates and employing over

500 staff members. The institution’s mission is to house federal detainees from the

New York metropolitan areas who are going through the federal judicial process. As

an administrative security facility, MDC Brooklyn houses all types of offenders —

sometimes including high-profile offenders — with a variety of criminal histories

including terrorism, organized crime, and drug smuggling.

Generally, offenders

are housed on a short-term basis averaging 120 to 180 days and, after conviction

and sentencing, are assigned by the BOP to facilities that house sentenced inmates

around the country.

The SPU at MDC Brooklyn

In October 2000, MDC Brooklyn established the SPU, also known as

Unit K-81, primarily to house inmates with mental health conditions who require

greater control, supervision, or monitoring than afforded in a typical general

population unit. The SPU also houses certain inmates whose characteristics may

increase their likelihood of physical or sexual victimization while incarcerated.

The

SPU is significantly smaller than other general population units, housing

approximately 30 inmates compared to over 120 in typical general population units.

See United States v. Nancy Gonzalez, 13-CR-00122 (ED NY, February 19, 2014) (sentencing

order). The BOP terminated Gonzalez’s employment on July 27, 2013.

Administrative facilities are institutions with special missions, where inmates are assigned

based on factors other than security and/or staff supervision (for example, medical/mental health,

pretrial and holdover). Administrative institutions are designed to house all security level inmates.

See BOP Program Statement 5100.08, Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification

(September 12, 2006).

These characteristics include physical handicap and physical appearance, for example, blind

inmates or preoperative transsexual inmates.

There are two types of MDC Brooklyn staff with responsibility for overseeing

inmates in the SPU: the unit team who are assigned to that floor and security staff

who may rotate quarterly.

Correctional Officers assigned to the SPU are

responsible for ensuring the security and sanitation of the unit and the safety and

accountability of the inmates. Lieutenants have a variety of responsibilities,

including conducting rounds to supervise Correctional Officers. Because they are

required to make rounds for many units and have various other supervisory duties,

Lieutenants typically spend approximately 5 minutes in any one unit, including the

SPU, during each 8-hour shift.

In addition to the unit team and security staff,

there is a Psychologist, also known as the SPU Coordinator, permanently assigned

to the SPU. The SPU Coordinator has an office located directly outside the SPU’s

door.

MDC Brooklyn Directives Governing the SPU

Two main documents lay out the procedures for SPU staff to follow. The post

orders lay out specific tasks and duties that must be performed on each shift.

For

example, the post orders state that the Morning Watch Officer for each unit is

required to collect and screen the outgoing inmate mail at 1 a.m. In 2011 and

again in 2013, MDC Brooklyn issued the Operational Procedures for Unit K-81,

Special Programs Unit (the SPU memorandum), which contains information on

managing the SPU, including the purpose of the unit, the types of inmates who can

be assigned there, and the criteria for assigning inmates to the unit.

Both versions of this memorandum describe various ways that inmates can

be assigned to the SPU. Specifically, they state that the SPU serves ”primarily as a

placement for individuals suffering from a mental disorder, severe personality

disorder, or medical condition that require greater control, supervision, or

The unit team, which includes the Unit Manager, Case Manager, Correctional Counselor,

and Unit Secretary, is tasked with determining and monitoring inmate program needs, such as

counseling groups or recreation programs. The unit team also oversees other inmates on the same

floor. Security staff includes Correctional Officers and Lieutenants.

According to MDC Brooklyn’s specific post orders, three shifts collectively span a 24-hour

day. Correctional Officers can serve on morning, day, or evening shifts.

The SPU Coordinator assists the Correctional Officer on duty as needed, conducts meetings

with the inmates to address issues they may have and to solve problems, and has some responsibility

for cell assignments. In addition to other responsibilities for the institution as a whole, the Chief

Psychologist supervises the SPU Coordinator, oversees management of the SPU, and authors updates

to the SPU memorandum (described below).

In addition to specific post orders, MDC Brooklyn unit staff are governed by special post

orders that provide a general overview of Correctional Officers’ responsibilities, for example, how the

Correctional Officer is required to handle inmate mail.

The Chief Psychologist originally issued the SPU memorandum to the then Warden on

November 10, 2011, and issued a revised version on November 19, 2013. The 2011 SPU

memorandum was in effect at the time the events we reviewed took place. During the course of our

review, MDC Brooklyn issued a new SPU memorandum reflecting significant changes from the 2011

and 2013 memoranda. Chief Psychologist, MDC Brooklyn, memorandum to Warden, Operational

Procedures for Unit K-81, Special Programs Unit, January 14, 2015.

monitoring than afforded in a general population unit.” In addition, these

memoranda note that “other special-need individuals may be appropriate

placements for the SPU due to having other characteristics which may increase the

likelihood of physical and/or sexual victimization.”

These memoranda also allow

the Warden and his executive staff the discretion to assign inmates who, because of

particular “demographic, legal, or other characteristics,” will be better managed in

the smaller and more closely monitored housing setting of the SPU. Specific

examples identified in the memoranda include inmates with sex offense charges

adjusting poorly to the larger general population units, as well as certain high-

profile cases. In these memoranda, the Warden and his executive staff are the only

officials with authority to assign these inmates to the SPU, following a “courtesy

notification” to the Chief Psychologist and/or the SPU Coordinator “for proper and

safe cell and cellmate assignment.” Pursuant to these memoranda, the Warden

infrequently may also assign inmates to the SPU for population control purposes.

These memoranda require that, for such population control placements, the Warden

consult the Chief Psychologist to assist in the selection of inmates who can

adequately adjust to the SPU and who will not negatively impact other inmates in

the unit.

Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Inmates at MDC Brooklyn

In light of Gonzalez’s sexual relationship with Wilson, as part of our review

we looked at the number of reported allegations of sexual abuse of inmates by staff

at MDC Brooklyn and all BOP facilities by reviewing the most recent BOP Office of

Internal Affairs report of allegations of sexual abuse. Because there are still BOP

cases pending completion and the relatively small number of allegations at MDC

Brooklyn, we were unable to draw meaningful historical comparisons between the

number of reported and substantiated allegations throughout BOP and at that one

facility. However, the Internal Affairs report, issued in March 2015, does contain

statistics on the number of reported and substantiated allegations of sexual abuse

of inmates by fiscal year (FY), including a description of what the investigating

entity found in each case as well as the number of allegations reported in that fiscal

year that are still pending.

The table below shows that from FY 2010 through

FY 2014 there were 2,618 allegations of sexual abuse reported at BOP institutions,

contract halfway house facilities, and privatized facilities, of which 140 were

substantiated. MDC Brooklyn specifically had 27 reported allegations with

2 substantiated during that 5-year period. Both of these allegations involved

female Correctional Officers having inappropriate relationships with male inmates.

For example, the SPU memoranda noted some characteristics like physical handicap and

physical appearance.

The OIG Investigations Division receives complaints and reports of alleged misconduct

directly from individuals and also forwarded from the BOP. The OIG has the right of first refusal to

investigate these complaints. For each case, the Investigations Division may determine that it

warrants investigation by the OIG or may refer it back to the BOP for investigation.

The statistical information in the table includes allegations of Unprofessional Conduct of a

Sexual Nature (e.g., inappropriate comments, voyeurism), and is not solely a reflection of sexual

relationships like that of inmate Wilson and former Correctional Officer Gonzalez.

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One of these involved Gonzalez and her relationship with Wilson that is the subject

of our review.

Table

Allegations of Sexual Abuse of Inmates by Staff in BOP Institutions

FY 2010 – FY 2014

Year All BOP

Inmate

Population

All BOP

Reported

Allegations

All BOP

Substantiated

Allegations

MDC

Brooklyn

Inmate

Population

MDC

Brooklyn

Reported

Allegations

MDC Brooklyn

Substantiated

Allegations

2010 210,154 415 34 2,685 3 1

2011 217,562 392 29 2,376 4 0

2012 218,665 549 37 2,264 8 1

2013 219,323 675 30 2,312 4 0

2014 214,365 587 10 1,977 8 0

Total --- 2,618 140 --- 27 2

Note: The BOP reports out the number of cases that were substantiated during each quarter, but not

all allegations are completely investigated or substantiated in the year they are reported. For

example, there were 415 allegations of sexual abuse reported in FY 2010 but there were 4 allegations

still pending as of March 2015. In addition, we used full fiscal years and thus included only the

numbers through FY 2014.

Source: BOP Office of Internal Affairs.

Ronell Wilson’s Incarceration at MDC Brooklyn

Wilson was incarcerated at MDC Brooklyn twice: the first time during his

original trial and death penalty proceedings in 2004 and the second time during his

death penalty resentencing in 2011. (See the figure below.)

The other sustained allegation was in FY 2010 and involved unprofessional conduct of a

sexual nature by a female Correctional Officer with a male inmate. The OIG investigated the

allegation, and the employee resigned. The government decl

ined to prosecute the case.

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Figure

Ronell Wilson’s BOP Incarceration Timeline

Source: BOP central file and court documents.

Wilson’s First Confinement at MDC Brooklyn

Wilson’s first confinement at MDC Brooklyn began on November 22, 2004,

when he was transferred to federal custody and assigned to the Special Housing

Unit (SHU).

During the first 15 months Wilson remained in the SHU, his attorneys

repeatedly petitioned the court to remove him, arguing that confining him in the

SHU was impeding his participation in his legal defense. In a January 6, 2006,

hearing on one of these motions, Judge Garaufis found that Wilson’s confinement in

the SHU was “based on legitimate security concerns arising from” his repeated

violations while incarcerated at MDC Brooklyn and Rikers Island and the fact that he

had been charged with intentionally murdering two law enforcement officers.

However, since Wilson had not incurred any disciplinary infractions since

mid-October 2005, the Judge said he would be open to reconsidering Wilson’s

motion if Wilson followed the rules for a sustained period of time. Judge Garaufis

noted that he expected the Warden to consider moving Wilson to the general

population if he did not incur any disciplinary infractions and directed MDC Brooklyn

to report to him every 30 days on Wilson’s status.

The following month MDC Brooklyn advised the court that, while Wilson had

“been getting agitated during cell rotations and commissary procedures,” he had

been in compliance with SHU rules and regulations. Nonetheless, MDC Brooklyn

urged the court to refrain from ordering Wilson’s transfer from the SHU, arguing,

“Based on the totality of the circumstances for his placement in the SHU, we do

maintain our position that at this time it is not appropriate to place Wilson in

general population.” Wilson’s attorneys again petitioned the court to have Wilson

SHUs are housing units in BOP institutions where inmates are securely separated from the

general inmate population and may be housed in a cell alone or with other inmates. See BOP Program

Statement 5270.10, Special Housing Units (August 1, 2011).

moved to the general population for the same reasons as before. On February 9,

2006, Judge Garaufis issued an order requiring MDC Brooklyn to reassign Wilson to

general population, subject to Wilson’s continued good behavior.

However, almost 1 year later, MDC senior management transferred Wilson

back to the SHU after he committed two serious incidents of misconduct. Wilson

was subsequently transferred from MDC Brooklyn on March 31, 2007, and arrived

at the U.S. Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana (USP Terre Haute) on April 11,

2007, pending his execution.

Wilson’s Second Confinement at MDC Brooklyn

After his appeal resulted in a remand for resentencing, the BOP transferred

Wilson from USP Terre Haute on March 8, 2011, and he arrived back at MDC

Brooklyn on March 9. MDC Brooklyn management initially housed him in the SHU

for 3 weeks, then transferred him to the SPU on March 30, 2011. He was housed in

the SPU for approximately 15 months, until he was transferred from the SPU back

into the SHU on August 3, 2012, following the allegation that he was having a

relationship with then Correctional Officer Gonzalez. He remained in general

population at MDC Brooklyn, without returning to the SPU, until February 5, 2013,

when he was transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New

York (MCC New York).

After Wilson was resentenced on September 10, 2013, the

BOP transferred him back to USP Terre Haute on September 17, 2013.

Inmate Testimony about Wilson’s Behavior in the SPU

During Wilson’s resentencing, several inmates testified regarding his

behavior while he was housed in the SPU at MDC Brooklyn. Judge Garaufis noted

testimony that Wilson “manipulated staff members to his advantage,” “intimidated

weaker and vulnerable inmates,” and was able to carry on “a months-long sexual

relationship” with Gonzalez “that resulted in the birth of their child.”

Judge Garaufis stated that, based on the testimony, there was substantial

evidence concerning Wilson’s ability to manipulate staff, including manipulating

Gonzalez into having a sexual relationship. Inmates testified that they saw Wilson

and Gonzalez kissing and hugging in the unit’s activity room, talking outside of

Wilson’s cell at night, and Gonzalez standing at Wilson’s cell door with Wilson with

his pants down. Inmates also told the court that, while Gonzalez was pretending to

do rounds of the SPU, she was really meeting Wilson inside the activity room.

Inmates also testified that Wilson manipulated a Psychologist in several

ways. This included Wilson being allowed to keep his excess legal materials in an

empty cell, a violation of MDC Brooklyn policy. Inmates also testified about Wilson

being allowed a cell by himself while other SPU inmates had to have cellmates,

MDC Brooklyn’s Warden had Wilson transferred to MCC New York because he was afraid of

gang retalitation against staff after a video of Wilson being restrained in the SHU surfaced on the

Internet. Wilson’s incarceration at MCC New York was not within the scope of our review.

other inmates being prevented from occupying the cells on either side of Wilson’s

cell, and an inmate who attempted to report Wilson’s relationship with Gonzalez

being reassigned to a different cell.

During Wilson’s resentencing, inmates testified that they were intimidated by

Wilson’s aggressive behavior, including verbal and physical threats toward them.

One inmate told the court that Wilson had talked about his affiliation with the

Bloods gang and smiled when he talked about murdering two police officers; he

said Wilson had compared himself to armor-piercing bullets, saying that they were

both “cop killers.” Another inmate testified that after a confrontation regarding the

use of the unit’s microwave, Wilson had threatened him with a “small ice pick.”

Additionally, an inmate testified that he did not feel safe in his own cell because

Wilson would search his and other inmates’ cells.

Inmates gave other examples of Wilson’s intimidating behavior, including

using threats to try to determine who in the unit had written the complaint

reporting his relationship with Gonzalez, confronting an inmate in a menacing way

about his homosexuality, forcing an inmate to give up his seat while eating dinner

in the unit, monopolizing a television in the unit by not allowing other inmates to

change the channel even when he was outside on the basketball court, and

monopolizing the computer by turning the computer monitor around so that other

inmates could not use it.

Inmates also testified that Wilson violated institutional rules by exchanging cigarettes and

marijuana with other Bloods gang members in the law library and by managing a Facebook account

with the assistance of Gonzalez. Another inmate testified that Wilson slipped notes to inmates in

other units while working as a kitchen orderly.

FINDINGS

Wilson Was Assigned to the SPU without Management Implementing

Safeguards To Prevent and Detect His Disruption of the Safety and Security

of the Unit

We found that MDC Brooklyn senior management (management) recognized

the need to closely monitor Ronell Wilson. They told us they would have preferred

to assign him to the Special Housing Unit (SHU) for the duration of his resentencing

proceedings.

However, they also told us they believed that they could not

consider SHU placement because the court had vacated Wilson’s death sentence

and there was a previous court order that required MDC Brooklyn to remove him

from the SHU so he could more easily participate in his legal proceedings. After a

brief initial assignment to the SHU, management assigned Wilson to the Special

Programs Unit (SPU) despite knowing that he would be housed with vulnerable

inmates. According to the officials we interviewed, they did this because the SPU is

significantly smaller in size and population than other general population units at

MDC Brooklyn, which they assumed would make it easier for Correctional Officers to

monitor him.

While the SPU primarily houses inmates with mental health

conditions, the SPU procedures also allow MDC management to house inmates

there who do not have mental health conditions. However, the SPU procedures do

not provide any instructions for staff on how to manage inmates like Wilson, whom

the BOP has not classified as having a mental health condition and who could

potentially intimidate other SPU inmates.

In addition, we found that management did not provide any guidance to staff

about how to manage Wilson differently than the other inmates in the SPU. As a

result, staff told us that they generally did not manage Wilson differently. While

Wilson’s relationship with Gonzalez was clearly a major concern because it

disrupted the safety and security of the institution, we could not determine to what

extent the allegations of bullying and manipulation actually occurred because we

were unable to corroborate the inmates’ statements. However, staff also told us

that Wilson could have engaged in disruptive behavior when they were not able to

observe it and that some inmates might have observed Wilson’s alleged behavior

and were too intimidated to report it at the time.

Despite Misgivings, Management Assigned Wilson to the SPU

The BOP transferred Wilson to MDC Brooklyn for his death penalty

resentencing proceedings on March 9, 2011, and he initially was assigned to the

SHU there.

The Captain, who is the head of security at MDC Brooklyn, told us

We define senior management at MDC Brooklyn as the Warden, Associate Wardens, and

the Captain.

The SPU is significantly smaller than other general population housing units, housing

approximately 30 inmates compared to approximately 120 in a typical general population unit.

Wilson was first housed in the SHU upon returning to MDC Brooklyn on March 9, 2011, and

was reassigned to the SPU 3 weeks later, on March 30, 2011.

that he assigned Wilson to the SHU for several reasons, including the publicity

surrounding his case, and “the influence he might have on other inmates —

especially Bloods gang members — because he was a high-ranking leader of the

Bloods.” However, the former Warden told us that he and his executive staff did

not consider the SHU a permanent option for Wilson because the court had vacated

his death penalty sentence. They also did not believe they could defend such a

placement to a federal judge if Wilson did not exhibit disruptive behavior.

He told

us that they believed the options they had for housing Wilson were either a typical

general population unit or the SPU, which he described as a “hybrid” between the

SHU and the other general population units.

The former Warden said he and his

executive staff did not want to assign Wilson to a typical general population unit

because they believed he would not be sufficiently monitored there and he thought

Wilson needed to be where he could receive enhanced staff scrutiny.

Moreover, the Captain said he was reluctant to assign Wilson to a typical

general population unit where Wilson would have more frequent interaction with

other inmates. The Captain told us he knew that inmates in general population

units looked up to Wilson because of the nature of his crime and because his death

penalty had been vacated. According to the former Warden, they therefore

decided that the SPU would be an appropriate place to assign Wilson because

Wilson would be easier to “keep an eye on” if he was among 20–30 inmates rather

than over 100.

While the SPU primarily houses inmates with a mental health condition, or

inmates whose characteristics may increase their likelihood of physical or sexual

victimization, we learned that the 2011 and 2013 SPU memoranda gave the

Warden or executive staff the discretion to assign inmates to the SPU who had

neither a mental health condition nor were more likely to be victimized. This

discretion included assigning inmates to the SPU for “population control purposes”

or because of “particular demographic, legal, or other characteristics” that made

them more likely to be better managed in that unit.

The Warden, who assigned Wilson to the SPU for the latter reason, told us

that he did not consult the Chief Psychologist prior to his decision to assign Wilson

to the SPU, and we found that SPU procedures did not require him to do so.

Hereinafter, “former Warden” refers to the Warden at the time Wilson returned to MDC

Brooklyn on March 9, 2011.

While there is another small general population housing unit that MDC Brooklyn uses to

house inmates who could be in danger while incarcerated, such as former law enforcement officers

and some child molesters, we are unaware whether management considered that housing option for

Wilson; however, because Wilson was convicted of murdering two police officers, it is understandable

that MDC Brooklyn’s management may not have considered a unit that houses former police officers

appropriate for him.

While the 2011 and 2013 SPU memoranda required the Warden or executive staff to first

consult with the Chief Psychologist prior to assigning an inmate to the SPU for population control

reasons, they did not require advance notification when assigning a non-mental health inmate to the

SPU for the other reasons. We learned that the 2015 SPU memorandum now requires that the

referring department first consult with the Chief Psychologist or SPU Coordinator for all non-mental

(Cont’d.)

told us that he knew the Chief Psychologist always opposed housing inmates in the

SPU who did not have a legitimate mental health condition, but he believed that the

SPU was their best option for Wilson.

The Chief Psychologist told us that she did not agree with the decision to

house Wilson in the SPU: She identified him as a manipulative inmate who might

victimize the SPU inmates who did have mental health conditions. Specifically, she

told us that she had concerns about inmates like Wilson in the SPU because “many

of the inmates housed there have mental retardation issues that make them

especially vulnerable to be victimized by higher functioning inmates and inmates

with anti-social characteristics.” The former Warden told us that he recalled the

Chief Psychologist expressing these concerns but said he never heard anything

about Wilson’s behavior in the SPU that would have warranted his reassignment to

another unit.

Neither SPU Procedures nor Management Provided the Additional Guidance To

Prevent or Detect Wilson’s Disruption of the Unit’s Safety and Security

SPU Procedures Do Not Contain Guidance for Managing Inmates Who Do Not

Have Mental Health Conditions

We found that MDC Brooklyn staff recognized the SPU as a smaller unit

where inmates could be more closely monitored but that SPU procedures did not

provide guidance for managing inmates without mental health conditions who were

potentially disruptive to the unit. We reviewed the 2011 and 2013 SPU

memoranda, which included two attachments that offered additional guidance and

special instructions to Correctional Officers on how to manage SPU inmates with

mental health conditions. For example, one attachment, entitled Special Programs

Unit Inmate Management: Guidelines for Unit Officer, instructed staff not to take

“what [inmates] say or do personally” and to “set limits on behavior, not on

people.” While this additional guidance might have assisted staff in monitoring the

inmates in the unit who did have mental health conditions, neither the SPU

memoranda nor its attachments provided guidance for managing inmates like

Wilson, who did not have a mental health condition and could potentially intimidate

and manipulate the vulnerable inmates in the SPU.

We learned that, in the absence of specific guidance in the SPU memoranda,

staff believed they could closely monitor inmates based largely on the unit’s smaller

size. For example, when we asked MDC Brooklyn staff how they interpreted

management’s belief that inmates would be “more closely monitored,” almost

uniformly they told us that this meant having fewer inmates to watch rather than

taking additional steps or following different procedures. For example, a Lieutenant

told us that he felt “the smaller number of inmates made a big difference.”

According to another Lieutenant, the fact that there is a psychology staff office

immediately outside of the SPU is another way that the unit can provide closer

health placements in the SPU. Chief Psychologist, MDC Brooklyn, memorandum to Warden,

Operational Procedures for Unit K-81, Special Programs Unit, January 14, 2015.

monitoring. However, these examples did not reveal any guidance or instructions

on how to manage inmates like Wilson whom the BOP did not classify as needing

mental health services.

MDC Brooklyn Management Did Not Instruct SPU Staff To Manage Wilson

Differently than the Other Inmates in the SPU

While management believed Wilson could be managed closely because of the

smaller size of the SPU, they did not issue any instructions to SPU staff to help

prevent or detect Wilson’s alleged disruptive behavior. Without special instructions,

staff told us that they managed all SPU inmates, including Wilson, in the same way.

When we asked the former Warden whether there were additional instructions

issued to staff about Wilson, he said that while he is generally not the person who

would have given any special instructions or safeguards, he did not recall any

discussion about issuing special instructions. Further, the Captain, as well as some

of the staff we interviewed, expressed the view that generally Correctional Officers

should monitor every inmate the same as every other inmate.

The SPU

Coordinator also told us that, even when a “high-profile” inmate is assigned to the

SPU, that inmate should be managed the same as any other inmate.

Similarly, all of the Correctional Officers we interviewed told us that they did

not receive any specific instructions from management to monitor Wilson

differently. All but one of the Correctional Officers who responded to the question

told us that they did not monitor Wilson differently than other SPU inmates. The

exception is that one Correctional Officer told us that a Lieutenant said that Wilson

was a “cop killer” and that he “should watch him around other inmates.” He also

said that he did pay more attention to Wilson because he was sensitive to the

nature of Wilson’s crime and that he was aware of Wilson being previously assigned

to the SHU.

Although MDC Brooklyn management did not issue any special instructions to

SPU staff on how to manage Wilson, we learned that management can issue special

instructions for certain inmates housed in the SPU if they feel the circumstances

warrant them. For example, we learned that the Captain had placed two inmates

assigned to the SPU on a “two-hour watch” for their own safety because they had

been threatened by other inmates. The 2-hour watch requires an inmate to check

in with a Correctional Officer every 2 hours from the time he is out of his cell in the

morning until he is locked in at night; that Correctional Officer then notifies the

control center that the inmate has checked in and is safe. According to the

Captain, these two inmates were placed on 2-hour watch because gang members

had threatened to kill them and the institution was concerned about their safety.

Although the 2-hour watch was not required for Wilson, the Captain told us that if

in the future he had an inmate like Wilson who could not be housed in the SHU, he

would place him in the SPU with a 2-hour watch so he would know what he was

doing at all times.

We also found that Wilson’s inclusion in the electronic Posted Picture File

(PPF), which BOP requires security staff to review regularly, did not require staff to

take any additional specific monitoring actions, and that no such additional

guidance was given even though the PPF is used to identify inmates who, among

other things, pose a threat to inmates or staff. We learned that inmates are

included in the PPF for various reasons which might or might not indicate that they

should be managed in different ways.

For example, if an inmate was included

because of a history of escape, a Correctional Officer should monitor that inmate as

a potential escape risk. In addition, the Warden told us that staff should be

reviewing the PPF for their own safety. For example, the Warden told us that at

one point terrorists were the largest group of inmates in the PPF and that staff

should know who the terrorists are so if they see them congregating they can keep

a closer eye on them. MDC Brooklyn management could not tell us the specific

reason that Wilson was included in the PPF because at the time of our review, MDC

Brooklyn no longer retained his PPF.

However, we believe it is likely Wilson was in

the PPF because of the nature of his crime, for murdering two police detectives.

One Correctional Officer told us that there is no requirement to watch inmates in

the PPF more closely and most of the Correctional Officers we interviewed told us

that they did not manage Wilson differently because he was in the PPF.

We recognize the constraints that MDC Brooklyn faced in housing Wilson and

understand the factors that led to management’s decision to assign him to the SPU.

Nevertheless, we found that management failed to issue any additional instructions

to SPU staff that may have helped prevent or detect Wilson’s alleged disruptive

behavior. While we are unable to determine the extent to which a 2-hour watch or

a similar enhanced surveillance procedure would have prevented Wilson’s disruptive

behavior, the fact that special instructions can be issued to Correctional Officers

about managing certain SPU inmates demonstrates that additional controls for

managing Wilson could have been put in place.

Although the Extent of the Inmates’ Allegations Could Not Be Substantiated, Wilson

May Have Engaged in Disruptive Behavior without the Staff Being Aware of It

The fact that Wilson engaged in a sexual relationship with Gonzalez was, in

and of itself, a disruption to the safety and security of the SPU and a very serious

concern. We could not determine the extent to which Wilson engaged in additional

disruptive behavior — including manipulating other staff — because we were unable

to corroborate inmate testimony.

However, we found that while most MDC

According to the BOP’s PPF policy, the PPF is used “to identify inmates or detainees who,

because of prior record, current offense, institution adjustment, or other factors, pose a significant

threat to inmate or staff safety, the institution’s security, or the surrounding community’s welfare.”

See BOP Program Statement 5510.13, Posted Picture File (August 22, 2011).

When an inmate is transferred to another BOP institution, the receiving instution may alter

the PPF based on its assessment; therefore, the PPF may not remain the same.

We also looked into the inmates’ allegations that Wilson manipulated a Psychologist into

making certain cell assignments that were advantageous to Wilson, including allowing him to keep his

excess legal material in an empty cell, having empty cells on either side of his cell, and being assigned

to a cell by himself. While we learned that this Psychologist (the SPU Coordinator) had some

responsibility for making cell assignments in the SPU, we could not substantiate that Wilson

manipulated her because our interviewees provided conflicting information about who allowed Wilson

to use an empty cell for his legal materials. With regard to having empty cells on either side of his

(Cont’d.)

Brooklyn staff did not recall any serious behavioral issues with Wilson while he was

in the SPU, they believed that he could have disrupted the unit without them being

aware of his behavior.

Most Staff Said They Did Not Recall Serious Behavioral Issues with Wilson in

the SPU

Of the Correctional Officers assigned to the SPU while Wilson was housed

there, none of those we interviewed said they could recall any serious incidents

involving Wilson that would have warranted writing an incident report or a need to

communicate to management while he was in the SPU. Some staff said they

recalled Wilson as well behaved and polite. For example, one staff member said

that Wilson kept to himself and another described him as “just another person on

the unit.” Correctional Officers also told us they did not recall seeing Wilson

manipulate or bully other inmates, and a former SPU Unit Manager said that he did

not recall any complaints from SPU inmates about Wilson, including complaints that

Wilson was bullying them.

However, the Chief Psychologist did recall that an inmate told her about

Wilson bullying a transgender inmate in the SPU. She said she counselled Wilson

about homophobic behavior being inappropriate and divisive to the unit and said

that he seemed receptive. Further, two staff members recalled complaints

involving Wilson’s responsibilities as a food orderly. For example, the SPU

Coordinator said that inmates complained that Wilson was giving them small

servings of food but she dismissed these complaints because she had heard similar

complaints about the previous orderly.

Documentation Did Not Further Corroborate Inmate Testimony Regarding

Wilson’s Alleged Behavior

We examined Wilson’s Central File and the SPU’s unit log and did not find any

incident reports or log notations that would confirm the inmates’ allegations of

Wilson’s manipulative and intimidating behavior.

Inmates’ central files contain

records of all incident reports an inmate has incurred while incarcerated by the

BOP, and Wilson’s does not include any for the time that he was in the SPU for his

death penalty resentencing. Similarly, we reviewed the unit log for this time and

did not find any notations about Wilson’s behavior that verified the inmates’

allegations and concerns. The unit log is a record of all “pertinent information

regarding inmate activity, detailing time, individuals involved, and the event” that

occurred during a given shift. SPU post orders require Correctional Officers to

complete log entries for every shift. The Captain advised us that while staff had

cell, the Psychologist told us that this was because these empty cells leaked when it rained so they

could not be used to house inmates. In addition, the Psychologist also said that she would give stable

inmates cellmates last to ensure that unstable inmates had cellmates in order to help prevent suicide.

The BOP maintains complete information on all inmates confined in BOP institutions in an

Inmate Central File. See BOP Program Statement 5800.17, Inmate Central File, Privacy Folder, and

Parole Mini-Files (April 3, 2015).

discretion about what to record regarding inmate behavior, bullying should be

recorded in the unit log. The only two notations we found about Wilson — one

involving control of the television and the other a conflict with other inmates — are

both unclear and suggest that the Correctional Officers who made the notations did

not perceive Wilson as the instigator of these incidents.

Wilson May Have Disrupted the Unit without Incurring Incident Reports or the

Staff Being Aware of His Behavior

We asked the staff if it was possible that Wilson could have engaged in the

alleged bullying and manipulative behavior without them being aware of it. They

told us that they viewed Wilson as savvy enough to engage in negative behavior in

ways that staff either did not notice or did not deem necessary to take action. For

example, one Lieutenant told us that she believed Wilson knew better than to “get

stupid in front of a Lieutenant.” Another Lieutenant told us that he believed Wilson

was careful not to act aggressively when staff could observe him because he knew

he would be sent to the SHU. In addition, a Correctional Officer told us that she

heard that Wilson was bullying other inmates by controlling the television and

handing out food seconds only to select inmates; but, because she did not actually

observe this alleged behavior, she could not do anything about it. A Psychologist

also told us that while he believed Wilson was “up to something,” and that he was

always watching Wilson for an excuse to remove him from the unit, he said that he

did not observe anything that would warrant writing an incident report.

Further, MDC Brooklyn staff told us that inmates are sometimes reluctant to

complain to them about other inmates. The Chief Psychologist told us that inmates

are often afraid to complain about another inmate until that inmate leaves the unit.

The SPU Coordinator told us that she receives complaints from inmates about other

inmates bothering them but that when she tries to obtain more information so she

can address it, the reporting inmate will say “I am no snitch” and refuse to provide

additional information. The Captain speculated that inmates in housing units other

than the SPU would have spoken up about another inmate monopolizing the unit

television, while SPU inmates might not say anything to staff. Similarly, another

Lieutenant said he thought inmates in the SPU were “not going to come out and

make allegations” against Wilson even if he was doing things like monopolizing the

television.

Two security officials told us that in retrospect they believe Wilson may have

had some degree of control in the SPU that they were unaware of at the time. For

example, the Captain told us that he believed that Wilson “ran the heck out of that

place.” A Lieutenant told us that he understands why SPU inmates said Wilson

controlled the unit television and microwave and said he believed that, as a gang

member in a unit with inmates who were easily preyed upon, Wilson could have

been “running the unit.”

During Our Review, Management Took Steps To Improve Communication

Related to the Safety and Security of MDC Brooklyn; However, Areas of

Concern Remain

During our review, we identified several areas of concern related to

communication that we believe MDC Brooklyn should address. Although we did not

find that all of these deficiencies directly led or contributed to the misconduct that

led to our review, the issues we identified relate to the safety and security of the

institution. First, we found that staff were not aware of and may not have received

specific directives that applied to the SPU. Second, we found that certain directives

in place at the time of our review did not ensure that Correctional Officers routinely

conducted searches of all unit cells. Third, policy was unclear regarding how sealed

inmate complaints placed in housing units’ mailboxes along with outgoing mail

should be handled. Finally, we found that MDC Brooklyn could improve its

procedures and methods to ensure relevant security information is consistently

shared across shifts and housing units. During the course of our review, MDC

Brooklyn management began to address some of the concerns we identified.

Not All Staff Were Aware of and Had Read the SPU Memoranda

We found that MDC Brooklyn management did not ensure that all staff

assigned to the SPU were aware of the SPU memorandum, which provides guidance

on managing inmates in the unit. As discussed previously, we learned that the SPU

memorandum was issued in 2011 and updated in 2013 and 2015. However, most

staff we interviewed who had worked in the SPU said they were unfamiliar with any

version of the memorandum. We note that until the 2015 revision, the SPU

memorandum was not required to be included in the unit’s post orders that

Correctional Officers are required to sign to indicate that they have read the orders

prior to their first shift in the unit.

The Warden informed us that the SPU

memorandum was revised in January 2015 to remove redundant information. We

also found that there were other significant changes to the 2015 SPU

memorandum, including a new requirement that the referring department, i.e.,

medical or security, consult with the Chief Psychologist or the SPU Coordinator prior

to placing inmates without mental health conditions in the unit.

We reviewed the

post orders during an observation of the SPU in January 2015 and found that the

2015 SPU memorandum was now included. We later learned that management

notified staff about the 2015 SPU memorandum by emailing it to them about

5 weeks after it was issued; but, because the notification occurred after we

completed our fieldwork, we could not verify that all staff members were

aware of it.

Post orders are general instructions designed to aid the Correctional Officer in the daily

operation of each custodial post.

We also learned that, under current practice, if there is a disagreement between the

referring department and the Chief Psychologist and/or SPU Coordinator on an inmate’s placement in

the SPU, there is a team meeting. After careful review, the Chief Psychologist makes the final

decision. However, the Warden retains discretion to place an inmate in the SPU.

Post Orders in Place at the Time of Our Review Did Not Ensure that Correctional

Officers Routinely Conducted Searches of All Cells in Housing Units

Despite the importance of housing unit cell searches to the safety and

security of the institution, post orders in place at the time of our fieldwork did not

provide Correctional Officers with clear policy to ensure that all cells in the unit

were searched regularly.

When we asked the BOP Central Office what was

required of Correctional Officers regarding searches during their shifts, the

Administrator of the Correctional Services Branch, Correctional Programs Division

told us that “typically, the requirement is that the Correctional Officer search five

areas at a minimum in the housing unit, but the number of search areas is dictated

by the Captain.”

However, the Captain at MDC Brooklyn told us that the number

of searches a Correctional Officer has to conduct per shift is "open" and that, while

Correctional Officers were previously required to search five cells, the current

requirement does not mandate a specific number of searches.

When we asked MDC Brooklyn Correctional Officers about the number of cell

searches they are required to conduct during their shifts, none of the Correctional

Officers we interviewed were aware that there was not a specific number required,

nor were they aware of where information on the search policy was located.

Several Correctional Officers told us that they are supposed to do five cell searches

during a shift. When we asked where that is documented, one Correctional Officer

told us that he remembered reading it somewhere (perhaps in the post orders) but

he could not recall for sure. Another Correctional Officer suggested that it might be

in the post orders or it might have come from a training class he took years ago.

Further, the Deputy Captain and most of the Correctional Officers we interviewed

were still under the impression that Correctional Officers were required to conduct a

minimum of five searches each shift. Although the staff generally assumed that the

requirement was to conduct five searches each shift, there was no systematic way

to ensure that the same five cells were not searched repeatedly, thereby potentially

leaving some cells without having been searched over a significant time period.

After our fieldwork was completed, we learned that on February 23, 2015,

MDC Brooklyn management revised the post orders to clarify the cell search

requirements. The new post orders do not require a specific number of searches

per shift, but they specify that all cells in the unit will be searched within a 30-day

period. In addition, it appears that the BOP’s institution management system,

called TRUSCOPE, will help Correctional Officers ensure that all cells within each

unit are searched in a timely fashion.

Specifically, we observed during our

fieldwork that TRUSCOPE has the capability to allow Correctional Officers to sort a

MDC Brooklyn staff are required to read and sign the post orders prior to assuming the post

for the first time each quarter.

The BOP’s Central Office is in Washington, D.C.

TRUSCOPE is a software application within the BOP’s TRUNET program. TRUSCOPE

provides institution staff with detailed inmate and institution security-related information and provides

unit officers an electronic event log. According to the BOP’s Central Office, the Northeast Region,

which includes MDC Brooklyn, activated TRUSCOPE on July 28, 2014.

unit’s search log by the last date that cells were searched. We believe that if

TRUSCOPE is fully implemented as intended it will allow MDC Brooklyn to ensure

that all cells are searched within a 30-day period, as required in the revised post

order.

Policy Is Unclear Regarding How To Handle Sealed Inmate Complaints

During our review, we examined the policy and procedures for handling

sealed inmate complaints addressed to staff that are placed in unit mailboxes. This

was relevant to our review because an inmate testified that he and another inmate

had placed an anonymous, sealed complaint in the SPU’s mailbox to report the

relationship between Gonzalez and Wilson, as well as Wilson’s inappropriate

behavior toward inmates, and that Wilson had received the intercepted complaint.

The alleged complaint was addressed to the Captain; but, according to the inmate’s

testimony, Wilson somehow gained possession of the handwritten complaint and

attempted to determine who submitted it by comparing SPU inmates’ handwriting

with the complaint. The OIG Investigations Division investigated but could not

substantiate the possibility that a Correctional Officer gave the inmates’ complaint

to Gonzalez, who subsequently gave it to Wilson.

We learned that staff members inconsistently understand how sealed inmate

complaints addressed to staff and placed in housing units’ mailboxes should be

handled, and that there is no policy establishing the institution’s procedures for

handling those complaints. Correctional Officers and Lieutenants we interviewed

were unclear about how to handle sealed inmate complaints in the unit’s mailbox.

One Correctional Officer stated that he would not open sealed internal mail if it was

addressed to the Captain, while another stated that all mail in the unit mailbox

should be opened by the morning shift Correctional Officer.

Another Correctional

Officer believed that only legal mail and internal mail to the BOP’s Special

Investigative Services could be left sealed and unopened. Lieutenants were also

uncertain as to whether sealed internal mail in the unit mailbox should be opened.

One Lieutenant stated that he would not open sealed internal mail but would give it

to the Captain, while another Lieutenant believed that all mail placed in the mailbox

should be unsealed.

Further, we found that neither the BOP nor MDC Brooklyn policy regarding

the handling of inmate mail specifically deals with inmate complaints addressed to

staff and placed in a unit’s mailbox. The BOP’s relevant Program Statement

acknowledges that inmates are permitted to make written requests to staff

members, but it does not provide any guidance on how those requests should be

handled.

While MDC Brooklyn management now allows inmates to report complaints

electronically through TRULINCS, including directly to the Warden, we remain

Some staff referred to internal mail or mail that is sent to staff or MDC Brooklyn

departments as “cop outs.”

See BOP Program Statement 5511.07, Request to Staff, Inmate (August 14, 1998).

concerned that MDC Brooklyn has not implemented guidance to ensure the

confidentiality of sealed inmate complaints placed in the unit mailbox are consistent

with institutional security requirements and specifically instructs staff on how to

handle complaints they receive through housing units’ mailboxes, especially in light

of the inmates’ allegations that their complaint was intercepted in this case.

Certain Methods for Ensuring that Relevant Information Is Shared Across the

Institution Could Be Improved

While MDC Brooklyn shares relevant information across the institution in a

variety of ways, we found that two communication methods could be improved.

One concern involves information from the Warden’s Monday morning briefings

getting to staff who cannot attend the briefings, and the other involves the

inconsistency with which Lieutenants conduct regular conference calls with

Correctional Officers.

The Warden told us that she instituted Monday morning briefings upon her

arrival at MDC Brooklyn to make herself available to staff and to provide staff with

relevant information each week. For the first few months, the institution posted the

Monday morning briefing minutes both on Sallyport and as an icon on staff desktop

computers so that staff who could not attend the briefings would have access to the

information that was presented.

After a few months, however, MDC Brooklyn

management stopped updating the desktop icon and began posting the minutes in

TRUSCOPE instead. While several staff we interviewed recalled viewing the minutes

on their desktop initially, they said that they assumed the Warden had stopped

having the Monday morning briefings because they no longer saw the minutes.

Additionally, other staff said they were unaware that meeting minutes are now

available in TRUSCOPE.

Further, staff told us that Lieutenants hold conference calls with Correctional

Officers at each post to pass along information and that the frequency of the calls

depended on the Lieutenant. While a Lieutenant told us that the conference calls

are usually done each shift, Correctional Officers told us that some Lieutenants hold

conference calls daily, some weekly, and some every 3 weeks. In addition, another

Lieutenant told us that he “stopped doing conference calls [during] the day shift

because someone on the call keeps hanging up causing the phone to make beeping

sounds.” Moreover, most Lieutenants we interviewed told us that they prefer to

communicate information, especially sensitive information, to Correctional Officers

According to a BOP Program Statement, the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System

(TRULINCS) provides inmates with a computer system that does not jeopardize the safety, security,

orderly operation of the correctional facility, or the protection of the public or staff. BOP Program

Statement 4500.11, Trust Fund/Deposit Fund Manual (April 9, 2015). Wardens have discretion as to

whether they allow inmates to email them directly.

Sallyport is the BOP’s internal, centrally operated electronic depository of reference

information published independently by multiple BOP sites and disciplines.

In July 2014, the Monday morning briefing minutes started being entered into TRUSCOPE

and were no longer placed on staff desktop computers.

in person while visiting each unit, though we were not told and did not assess how

often this occurs in practice.

Timely, consistent communication between management and staff is vital to

the safe, secure operation of any correctional facility. We are thus concerned that

relevant security information, including what is discussed at the Warden’s Monday

morning briefings, may not be consistently or timely shared with MDC Brooklyn

staff because staff do not know where to find the briefing minutes and because

Lieutenants are not consistently conducting conference calls or taking similar steps

to provide them necessary information.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

Overall, we believe the events the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District

of New York noted in Ronell Wilson’s resentencing opinion are due in large measure

to the criminal actions of former Correctional Officer Nancy Gonzalez and the

alleged misconduct of another Correctional Officer. We found that MDC Brooklyn

management placed Wilson in the Special Programs Unit (SPU) because they

recognized the need to closely monitor him and believed that his vacated death

sentence and a court order requiring MDC Brooklyn to house him in general

population during a previous incarceration prevented housing him in the Special

Housing Unit on a continual basis. While SPU procedures allow inmates like Wilson

to be housed in this unit, which primarily houses inmates with mental health

conditions, we found that neither policies nor management provided any safeguards

or guidance on how to manage Wilson differently while he was there. As a result,

SPU staff generally did not manage Wilson differently than other inmates. Further,

while it is clear that Wilson’s relationship with Gonzalez disrupted the safety and

security of the institution, we could not determine to what extent the alleged

bullying and manipulation actually occurred because staff statements and the unit’s

documentation that we reviewed do not further corroborate them.

During the course of our review, we also identified some areas in MDC

Brooklyn’s ability to communicate information across shifts and housing units that

could be improved. Though we did not find that all of these deficiencies directly

contributed to the misconduct that led to our review, MDC Brooklyn has begun to

address them. We found that MDC Brooklyn issued a revised SPU procedures

memorandum in January 2015, making it part of the post orders directing the staff

in the SPU; however, some staff did not recall ever seeing this version or any

previous versions. We also found that certain post orders in place at the time of

our review did not ensure that Correctional Officers routinely searched all housing

unit cells. Further, we found that policy is unclear regarding the handling of sealed

inmate complaints placed in housing units’ mailboxes. Although there is now an

electronic method that allows inmates to send complaints directly to specific

departments in MDC Brooklyn, as well as to the Warden, there has been no

clarification as to how staff should handle inmate complaints that have been placed

in the unit mailbox to ensure their confidentiality in a way that is consistent with

institutional security requirements.

Finally, we found that MDC Brooklyn could improve its methods for ensuring

relevant security information is consistently shared across shifts and housing units.

For example, the Warden at MDC Brooklyn instituted Monday morning briefings

with staff; but staff were not aware, after the first few months, that the meetings

were still being held or that the minutes summarizing the information from those

briefings were still available. Lieutenants can also use a conference call to pass

relevant information along to staff at the beginning of each shift; however, we

learned these conference calls or other efforts to convey security information do not

occur consistently.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Bureau of Prisons work with MDC Brooklyn to:

1. Include information in the Special Programs Unit memorandum on how to

manage those inmates assigned to the SPU who are potentially disruptive

and do not have a mental health condition.

2. Consider implementing additional safeguards whenever a potentially

disruptive inmate without a mental health condition is placed in the SPU.

3. Establish guidance and procedures that staff at MDC Brooklyn should follow

that ensure the confidentiality of sealed inmate complaints placed in unit

mailboxes are consistent with institutional security requirements, and ensure

staff are notified of the new guidance.

4. Ensure that clear procedures are in place and communicated to staff at MDC

Brooklyn to ensure searches of all housing unit cells are regularly conducted.

5. Consider additional steps to ensure that relevant security information is

communicated to MDC Brooklyn staff consistently and effectively.

APPENDIX 1

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW

In this review, the OIG examined the policies, practices, and procedures in

place at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York (MDC Brooklyn)

between March 2011 and August 2012, the time cited in U.S. District Judge

Nicholas Garaufis’s September 10, 2013 opinion regarding the resentencing of

Ronell Wilson. Our review focused on what could have contributed to allowing

Wilson to disrupt the safety and security of inmates and staff in the Special

Programs Unit (SPU) where Wilson was housed during this time, and whether any

such issues reflected more general problems that need to be addressed at the

facility. Our fieldwork, conducted from April 2014 through March 2015, included

interviewing current and former MDC Brooklyn officials regarding policies, practices,

and procedures at the institution and for the SPU; conducting site visits to MDC

Brooklyn; and reviewing documents. The following sections provide additional

information about our methodology.

Interviews

We interviewed current and former Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials

regarding their roles in management, policy, training, and oversight of inmates

housed in federal custody. We also interviewed BOP Central Office managers of the

Correctional Programs and Correctional Services Branches to understand the

policies regarding inmate use of amenities such as the television, telephone,

computer, exercise room, commissary, library, and law library. We spoke to

subject matter experts from the Policy Development and Planning Section; the

Industries, Education & Vocational Training Division; the Health Services Division;

and the Trust Fund Branch.

We also interviewed one of the OIG Special Agents who investigated the

relationship between then Correctional Officer Nancy Gonzalez and Wilson. We

attempted to interview Gonzalez in April 2014, but she declined our request on the

advice of counsel.

Site Visits

We visited MDC Brooklyn on two occasions: once in May 2014 and a follow-

up visit in February 2015. During our visits, we interviewed a total of 27 staff

members, including the Warden, the Captain, four Lieutenants, the institution’s

Health Services Administrator, as well as Correctional Officers, unit management

staff, and psychology department staff who worked in the SPU at the time the

incidents discussed in the resentencing statement occurred and currently. Our

interviews pertained to the procedures, practices, oversight, training, and

communication of policies, procedures, and security information throughout the

institution. We also interviewed three inmates who were assigned to SPU during

the time Wilson was housed in that unit. In addition, we conducted an onsite

inspection of the SPU during both site visits.

APPENDIX 1

Document Review

We reviewed BOP and MDC Brooklyn policy and guidance pertaining to the

management of the SPU and other housing units. We also examined the unit logs

for the SPU housing unit from March 2011 through August 2012, the time Wilson

was assigned to the unit, and received a brief tutorial of the new electronic unit

logs, referred to as TRUSCOPE, that MDC Brooklyn implemented in July 2014. To

understand the scope of sexual abuse allegations made against BOP staff members,

we also reviewed the BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs data regarding allegations of

sexual abuse of inmates.

APPENDIX 2

THE BOP’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT

u.s.

Deplr1menl

Jtlce

Federal

Bureau

of P

risons

Augu5t

21,

2015

MEMORANDUM

FOR

NINA

PELLETIER

ASSISTANT

INSPECTOR

GENERAL

FOR

EVALUATION

AND

INSPECTIONS

FROM:

Charles

Samuels,

Jr.,

Direct.or

Federal

Bureau

Prisons

SUBJECT,

Response

the

Office

Inspector

General's

IG)

Formal

Draft

Audit

Report:

Review

t.he

Management

the

Special

Programll

Unit

at.

the

Federal

Bureau

Prisona

Metropolitan

Detent.ion

Center

Brooklyn,

New

York,

Assignment

Number A

2014-006

The

Bureau

Prisons

(Bureau)

appreciates

the

opportunity

respond

the

open

recommendat.ions

from

the

formal

draft

report

entitled,

Revie

the

Management

the

Special

Programs

Unit

the

Fede~al

Bureau

Prisona

Metropolitan

Detention

Cent

e r

(MDe)

Brooklyn,

New

York.

detailed

below.

the

Bureau

agrees

ith

the

recommendations

the

Office

Inspector

General

(DIG),

and

appreciates

the

efforts

the

inve

igators

provide

recommendations

based

evidence

obtained

through

their

observations.

review

policies

and

procedures,

and

interviews

with

BOP

staff,

regarding

Special

Programs

Unit

(SPU)

operations.

The

Bureau

remains

concerned,

however,

that

public

document,

the

DIG

report

does

not

provide

mor~

detailed

r~view

and

analysis

the

impact

MDC

Brooklyn

op~rations

caused

the

orders

the

Court

Ronell

Wilson's

criminal

case.

During

both

inmate

APPENDIX 2

Wilson's

periods

confinement

HOC

Brooklyn,

t.he

court

restricted

HOC

Brooklyn

' s

exercise

its

correctional

judgment

prohibiting

inmate

wilson's

placement

the

Special

Housing

Unit

(

SHU)

other

thsn

for

disciplinary

reasons.

See,

Order,

February

2006;

and

Transcript

Criminal

Cause

for

Conf'~rence,

October

2012.

The

Bureau

believes

important

for

the

report

reflect

that,

but

for

the

restrictions

placed

HOC

Brooklyn's

correctional

judgment

where

and

....

best

house

inmate

wileon,

the

unla

....

ful

sexua

relationship

that

resulted

might

nevl!!

have

occurred

Please

find

the

Bureau's

response

the

recommendations

belo

....

a.c:oaaend.ation

Include

informaticm

the

Special

Programs

Unit

memorandum

how

manage

those

inmates

assigned

the

SPU

who

are

potentially

disruptive

and

not

have

mental

health

condition.

Initial

Re.pon

••

: The

Bureau

agrees

with

thb

recommendation.

The

staff

MOe

Brooklyn

are

exploring

n~ifications

consistent

with

national

policy.

and

the

projected

implementation

October

2015.

a.comm.ndation

Consider

lmplementing

additional

safeguards

whenever

potentially

disruptive

inn~te

without

mental

health

condition

placed

the

SPU.

Initial

Re.pon

••

;

The

Bureau

agrees

with

this

recom:nendation.

The

staff

MOe

Brooklyn

are

explorlng

modifications

consistent

with

national

policy,

and:

the

projected

implementation

October

2015.

Rec~nd&ti

Establish

guidanc.!

and

procedures

that

staff

MDC

Brooklyn

should

folIo

....

that

ensure

the

confidentiality

sealed

inmate

complaints

placed

unit

mailboxes

are

conaistent

....

ith

institutional

security

requirements,

,!lnd

ensure

staff

are

notified

the

new

guidance.

Initial

••

pon

••

;

The

Bureau

agrees

with

this

recommendation.

The

staff

MOe

Brooklyn

will

explore

o~,tions

for

local

guidance

and

procedures

light

applicable

nati(mat

policies

for

the

handling

sealed

inmate

complaints

and

given

the

unique

nature

its

various

hOUsing

units.

The

projected

date

implementing

these

changes

October

~015.

ReCOlllllL8nclation

Ensure

that

cleat

procedures

are

place

and

communicated

staff

HOC

Brooklyn

ensure

searches

all

housing

unit

cells

are

regularly

conducted

APPENDIX 2

tial

Response:

The

Bureau

agrees

with

this

recommendation.

The

staff

MOe

Brooklyn

will

explore

options

for

local

guidance

and

procedures

light

applicable

national

policies

for

cell

searches

The

pro

ected

date

for

implementing

these

changes

October

2015.

Recommendation

#5:

Consider

additional

steps

ensure

that

relevant

security

information

i s

communicated

Moe

Brooklyn

staff

consistently

and

effectively.

Initial

esponse

The

reau

agrees

with

this

recommendation.

The

staff

MDe

Brooklyn

will

explore

options

for

local

guidance

and

procedures

l i

ght

applicable

national

policies,

and

the

unique

challenge

sharing

relevant

security

information

with

staff

throughout

the

facility

The

pro

ected

t e

for

implementing

these

changes

October

2015.

you

have

any

questions

regarding

this

response,

please

contact

Sara

Revell,

Assistant

Director,

Program

Review

Division,

(202)

353-2302.

APPENDIX 3

OIG ANALYSIS OF THE BOP’S RESPONSE

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this report to

the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for its comment. The BOP’s response is in

Appendix 2 to this report. We discuss the OIG analysis of BOP’s response and

actions necessary to close the recommendations below.

The BOP’s General Comments

BOP Comment: The BOP stated that it remains concerned that the OIG’s

report does not provide a more detailed review and analysis of the impact on MDC

Brooklyn operations caused by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of

New York in Ronell Wilson’s criminal case. The BOP stated that during both of

Wilson’s periods of confinement at MDC Brookyln, the court restricted MDC

Brooklyn’s exercise of its correctional judgment by prohibiting inmate Wilson’s

placement in the Special Housing unit (SHU) other than for disciplinary reasons, on

February 9, 2006 and October 5, 2012. The Bureau believes it is important for the

report to reflect that, but for the restrictions placed on MDC Brooklyn’s correctional

judgment on where and how best to house inmate Wilson, the unlawful sexual

relationship that resulted might never have occurred.

OIG Analysis: The OIG report discusses that MDC Brooklyn management

recognized the need to closely monitor Ronell Wilson and that they would have

preferred to assign him to the SHU. It also states that the OIG learned that

management believed they could not consider SHU placement because the court

had vacated Wilson’s death sentence and because of the previous court order on

February 9, 2006, that required MDC Brooklyn to remove him from the SHU.

However, the BOP incorrectly identifies the October 5, 2012, court order as relevant

to the events we reviewed because these events took place between March 30,

2011 and August 3, 2012. Therefore, the October 5, 2012, court order was not a

factor in our review or the unlawful sexual relationship between Ronell Wilson and

Nancy Gonzalez.

The BOP’s Response to Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Include information in the Special Programs Unit

memorandum on how to manage those inmates assigned to the SPU who are

potentially disruptive and do not have a mental health condition.

Status: Resolved.

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated

that staff at MDC Brooklyn are exploring modifications consistent with national

policy. The BOP stated that the projected implementation date is October 1, 2015.

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation.

By January 4, 2016, please provide a copy of the revised SPU memorandum that

APPENDIX 3

includes information on how to manage those inmates who are potentially

disruptive and do not have a mental health condition. In addition, please provide

documentation, including dates, that shows MDC Brooklyn management notified

staff of the revised memorandum.

Recommendation 2: Consider implementing additional safeguards

whenever a potentially disruptive inmate without a mental health condition is

placed in the SPU.

Status: Resolved.

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated

that the staff at MDC Brooklyn is exploring modifications consistent with national

policy. The BOP stated that the projected implementation date is October 1, 2015.

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation.

By January 4, 2016, please provide a summary of the additional safeguards the

BOP considered and/or implemented when potentially disruptive inmates without a

mental health condition are placed in the SPU. In addition, please provide

documentation that shows that MDC Brooklyn staff were notified of any changes.

Recommendation 3: Establish guidance and procedures that staff at MDC

Brooklyn should follow that ensure the confidentiality of sealed inmate complaints

placed in unit mailboxes are consistent with institutional security requirements, and

ensure staff are notified of the new guidance.

Status: Resolved.

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated

that the staff at MDC Brooklyn will explore options for local guidance and

procedures in light of applicable national policies for the handling of sealed inmate

complaints and given the unique nature of its various housing units. BOP stated

that the projected implementation date for these changes is October 1, 2015.

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation.

By January 4, 2016, please provide documentation that includes the guidance and

procedures that MDC Brooklyn implemented to ensure the confidentiality of sealed

inmate complaints. In addition, please provide documentation that shows that MDC

Brooklyn staff were notified of the new guidance and procedures.

Recommendation 4: Ensure that clear procedures are in place and

communicated to staff at MDC Brooklyn to ensure searches of all housing unit cells

are regularly conducted.

Status: Resolved.

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated

that staff at MDC Brooklyn will explore options for local guidance and procedures in

APPENDIX 3

light of applicable national policies for cell searches. The BOP stated that the

projected implementation date for these changes is October 1, 2015.

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation.

By January 4, 2016, please provide documentation that includes the guidance and

procedures that MDC Brooklyn implemented to ensure that clear procedures are in

place and communicated to staff to ensure searches of all housing unit cells are

regularly conducted. In addition, please provide documentation that shows that

MDC Brooklyn staff was notified of the new guidance and procedures.

Recommendation 5: Consider additional steps to ensure that relevant

security information is communicated to MDC Brooklyn staff consistently and

effectively.

Status: Resolved.

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated

that staff at MDC Brooklyn will explore options for local guidance and procedures in

light of applicable national policies, and the unique challenge of sharing relevant

security information with staff throughout the facility. The BOP stated that the

projected implementation date for these changes is October 1, 2015.

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation.

By January 4, 2016, please provide documentation that includes the additional

steps that MDC Brooklyn considered and/or implemented to ensure that relevant

security information is communicated to MDC Brooklyn staff consistently and

effectively.







The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General

(DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity

whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud,

abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and

to promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s

operations. Information may be reported to the DOJ

OIG’s hotline at www.justice.gov/oig/hotline or

(800) 869-4499.

Office of the Inspector General

U.S. Department of Justice